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Abstract
Analysis o f southern naval stores production, an industry in many respects more 
representative of southern economic development than cotton textiles, reveals a pattern of 
continuity between the antebellum and post-war South. Naval stores manufacturing began in the 
colonial era but languished as a marginally-profitable business until the 1830s when new uses for 
spirits of turpentine resulted in increased demand and higher prices. Large turpentine operations 
developed almost exclusively in eastern North Carolina and the slaves, who performed most of 
the work, experienced distinct work patterns. By the 1850s, destructive gum-harvesting methods 
led to the depletion o f  North Carolina’s iongleaf pine forests; producers determined to continue 
in the business moved their operations and slaves into fresh pine tracts in South Carolina,
Georgia, Florida, and Alabama.
The antebellum industry’s trends—large-scale production, primitive harvesting methods 
that wounded the trees, and reliance on forced labor—continued after the Civil War. Producers 
continued moving into the deep South and solved the problem o f labor shortages with convict 
leasing and peonage. Intensive work routines and difficult conditions in isolated forest camps 
also persisted, despite attacks on the industry’s labor practices in the early twentieth century. 
Moreover, producers continued to migrate through the South as gum collection devastated pine 
stands. Progressive-era initiatives did bring moderately successful efforts to introduce less 
destructive harvesting methods than those in use since the 1700s. However, two new problems 
plagued the industry in the first half of the century: the rapid rise of production costs and 
competition from both foreign gum naval stores producers and the rapidly growing wood naval
xi
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stores industry. These rivals, combined with the economic and social changes that affected the 
South in the 1930s and 1940s, brought the gum naval stores industry to virtual collapse, despite 
federal assistance through New Deal farm programs. The wood naval stores industry, which 
relied on heavy mechanization and a small number of well-trained technicians, made gains at the 
expense of the gum industry. That naval stores production did not modernize until World War II, 
demonstrates that a significant portion of post-Civil War southern development represented a 
continuation of antebellum patterns.
xii
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Introduction
The southern naval stores industry relied on forced labor and primitive production and 
marketing techniques from the eariy-nineteenth century into the first half of the twentieth 
century. It presents an alternative view of southern economic development than that usually 
provided by historians who have focused on antebellum cotton cultivation and post-war textile 
manufacturing. Such scholars find a dramatic difference between the Old South and the New. 
They describe a region emerging from the ravages of the Civil War ready to cast off its 
dedication to forced labor, agriculture, and the underdevelopment these two factors spawned and 
shift its resources toward the construction of factories, located in towns, and employing free, if 
inadequately-paid, wage laborers. Although largely ignored, naval stores production, the South’s 
oldest industry with deep roots in the antebellum and even colonial eras, perhaps reflects the 
nature of development in the region better than any other form of manufacturing. It thus serves 
as a vehicle through which to explore several broad issues regarding the South’s development 
both before and after the Civil War-economic growth, industrial expansion, the transition from 
slave labor to free labor, environmental alterations, twentieth-century reform efforts, and changes 
in the rural countryside—and the degree of continuity in these elements from the antebellum to 
postbellum years.
Despite the importance of naval stores to the history of the South, few people today even 
know what naval stores are. Since ancient times, naval stores have been vital commodities for 
shipbuilding: Originally defined to include all materials used in ship construction and 
maintenance-hemp, flax, masts, spars, planking, tar, and pitch—the term “naval stores” by 1800
1
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2referred only to tar, raw turpentine, and their derivatives—spirits o f turpentine, rosin, and pitch. 
Tar, produced by firing pine branches and logs in slow-burning kilns, and pitch, made by boiling 
tar, were used primarily for nautical purposes. To reduce decay, seamen slathered heavy 
applications of tar on the standing rigging that held masts in place and painted lighter coats on 
the running rigging used for raising and adjusting sails. Tar was also used as an axle grease for 
wheeled vehicles, a rust protective for cannons, and a preservative for fence posts. Livestock 
wounds that received an application of tar stood a lower chance o f infection and seeds coated 
with the sticky, resinous substance proved less appetizing to hungry birds and rodents. Pitch, 
applied to the sides and bottoms o f wooden ships, prevented leakage. The other principal naval 
stores product, raw turpentine, a substance secreted by living conifer trees to protect wounds to 
their trunks and also known as resin or gum, had minimum uses before the nineteenth century. It 
was an ingredient in the paint that coated the sides o f ships above the water line and was also 
employed for a variety of medicinal purposes—as an external rub, a laxative, and a flea repellent. 
Turpentine also served to waterproof leather and cloth. The residue that remained in the still 
after the raw turpentine finished distilling, called rosin, possessed few applications before 1800. 
Over the course of the nineteenth century, however, turpentine and rosin came to be used for a 
multitude of purposes. Spirits of turpentine became an important solvent in the growing rubber 
industry and an essential ingredient in a widely popular lamp oil. It was also employed in the 
manufacture of such diverse products as adhesives, pharmaceuticals, disinfectants, and shoe 
polish. Rosin was used as paper sizing and in the production of soap, floor covering, and paving 
material. These new applications expanded the demand for turpentine and rosin and spurred the 
naval stores industry’s rapid expansion across the South during the nineteenth and early part of 
the twentieth centuries.1
1 Michael Williams, Americans and Their Forests: A Historical Geography (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989), 83; Carroll B. Butler, Treasures of the Longleaf Pines: Naval 
Stores (Shalimar, Florida: Tarkel Publishing, 1998), 3; Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores
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Because o f its primitive production characteristics, disagreement has persisted as to 
whether naval stores operations constituted industry or an unusual form o f agriculture. 
Throughout the nineteenth century, the United States government classified naval stores products 
as a manufactured commodities, but in the 1930s it reversed itself and designated them as 
agricultural products. The a m b ig u i ty  persisted. For example, in the Encyclopedia of Southern 
Culture, published in 1989, Percival Perry’s article, “Naval Stores,” appears in the section on 
agriculture but the topic is also discussed in Roland L. Lewis’s article on “Antebellum Industry” 
and Thomas F. Armstrong’s piece on the “Timber Industry.”2 The confusion arose because the 
techniques for refining turpentine closely mirrored manufacturing, but the schedule and methods 
of harvesting raw turpentine resembled those in agriculture. Naval stores production first 
demanded multiple and systematic sweeps through pine forests to prepare trees for the collection 
of raw turpentine and to keep the resin flowing during the harvest season, just as agricultural 
fields required periodic trips through them for plowing, planting, and hoeing. Moreover, the 
harvest of raw turpentine involved several operations on the same tree each season, just as 
tobacco harvests involved picking leaves from the same stalk at different times. The complicated 
distilling process to refine the raw turpentine did not transform the gum’s chemical properties, 
but simply separated the spirits from the rosin. A turpentine enterprise is perhaps best compared 
to a better-known southern industry, sugar production. In her analysis of slave use in the mid- 
nineteenth-century Cuban sugar industry, Rebecca Scott explains that mills “were integrated
Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861” (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 200-201; 
Melvin G. Herndon, “Naval Stores in Colonial Georgia,” The Georgia Historical Quarterly 52 
(December 1968): 426; Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Old South, 1790-1860,” 
The Journal of Southern History 34 (November 1968): 511.
2 Charles Reagan Wilson and William Ferris, eds., Encyclopedia o f Southern Culture 
(Chapel Hill: The University o f North Carolina Press, 1989), s.v. “naval stores,” “antebellum 
industry,” and “timber industry;” Robert S. Starobin, Industrial Slavery in the Old South (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1970), 10; Peter Kolchin. American Slavery. 1619-1877 (New 
York: Hill and Wang, 1993), 176.
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4units, combining the growing o f cane and the manufacture o f sugar from its juice. Work on a 
sugar plantation involved elements of both field and factory but differed from other forms of 
agriculture and industrial work.”3 Most laborers worked in the “agricultural” sector of the 
operation. Like raw turpentine or resin, which had to be collected and distilled, sugar cane had 
to be cut, gathered, and hauled to the sugar house where it was processed. As with sugar 
production, naval stores manufacturing had an “industrial” phase, which employed a minority of 
the total number of laborers involved in the enterprise.4 As a hybrid of agriculture and 
manufacturing, it typified rural-based industries common in the antebellum and postbellum 
South.
Ignoring such ambiguous forms of industry, many historians argue that antebellum 
Southerners were either incapable of, uninterested in, or antagonistic toward establishing 
manufacturing.5 That the South failed to fund industrialization to the extent that the North did is
3 Rebecca J. Scott, Slave Emancipation in Cuba: The Transition to Free Labor. 1860- 
1899 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 24.
4 Roderick A. McDonald, The Economy and Material Culture of Slaves: Goods and 
Chattels on the Sugar Plantations of Jamaica and Louisiana (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1993), 11-14; J. Carlyle Sitterson, Sugar Country: The Cane Sugar Industry in 
the South. 1753-1950 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1953), 134-44; Scott, Slave 
Emancipation in Cuba. 28; List o f Negroes belonging to Mr John W. Grist Worked by Grist + 
Striknev during the year o f 1860. James Redding Grist Papers, Special Collections Library, Duke 
University, Durham, North Carolina.
5 Stephen J. Goldfarb, who studies southern textile production, maintains that industry 
was handicapped by the absence of efficient transportation in areas with water sources powerful 
enough to run a mill. He points out that the four southern counties with the largest textile 
production in the antebellum years were those that possessed both rail and water transportation 
routes. Only after the Civil War, when railroad expansion linked areas with falling water to 
markets, did the South’s mills begin their rise. “The South had to overcome geographical 
obstacles,” Goldfarb concludes, “before it could begin on that long road to an industrial 
economy.” Harold Woodman contends that southerners invested their money in agricultural 
instead of industrial pursuits because they believed that the most reliable and best returns lay in 
planting. Southern farmers, he adds, also lacked the capital necessary to develop manufacturing. 
Eugene D. Genovese argues that the South failed to industrialize because the slaveholding class, 
which exercised economic and political power in the region, “feared a strong urban bourgeoisie, 
which might make common cause with its Northern counterpart. They feared a white urban 
working class of unpredictable social tendencies.” Stephen J. Golfarb, “A Note on Limits to the
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clear. On the eve of the Civil War the South produced only fifteen percent of the value o f 
manufactured goods in the United States. Yet southerners did not ignore industrialization and 
during the late antebellum period they began significant initiatives into economic development 
outside of agriculture. Spurred by the Panic o f 1837, which depressed cotton prices until the 
mid-1840s, investment in manufacturing rose from $53 million in 1840 to $93.6 million in 1850 
and jumped to $163.7 million by 1860. Between 1850 and 1860 the value of manufactured 
output rose seventy-nine percent. Southern industrialists built railroads, operated ironworks, and 
wove textiles, but most o f  them extracted and processed raw materials or agricultural products. 
They established and operated rice, sugar, wheat, and com mills, saw mills, cotton gins, tobacco 
factories, hemp factories, salt works, coal mines, and turpentine operations.
A few scholars have recognized these activities. In her study of Confederate 
entrepreneurs in Georgia, Mary DeCredico finds that southerners, even planters, supported 
economic diversification, internal improvements, and industrial expansion. Driven by the 
depression of the late 1830s, Georgia’s boosters and political leaders encouraged manufacturing 
and the exploitation of natural resources. Although Georgia’s manufacturing, like the rest of the 
South’s, primarily involved the processing and refining of raw materials—cotton, lumber, flour, 
meal—the increase was significant. Between 1850 and 1860 manufacturing output per capita 
increased 104 percent and capital investment rose 71 percent. The trend toward economic 
diversification, DeCredico believes, also occurred in other regions of the South in the late 
antebellum period. Fred Bateman, James Foust, and Thomas Weiss present evidence that 
supports her suspicions and find that planters were responsible for much of the investment in
Growth of the Cotton-Textile Industry in the Old South,” The Journal o f Southern History 48 
(November 1982): 545-549, 557-558; Harold Woodman, King Cotton and His Retainers: 
Financing and Marketing the Cotton Crop o f the South. 1800-1925 (Lexington: University Press 
of Kentucky, 1968; reprint, Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1990), 147, 150; 
Eugene D. Genovese, The Political Economy o f Slavery: Studies in the Economy and Society of 
the Slave South (Middletown. CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1989), 24.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
6industry. Although “manufacturing development was retarded by an inability to transfer 
resources, primarily capital, out of agriculture,” they argue, planters still supported industry. 
Indeed, large planters controlled a significant percentage o f the South’s new industry; twenty 
percent of manufacturers owned more slaves than the average slaveholder. Although such large 
slavehoiding investors were a small minority o f planters, only six percent, they controlled 
twenty-three percent o f manufacturing capital. In North Carolina, where the naval stores 
industry first developed on a large scale, planters enthusiastically invested in manufacturing and, 
in fact, represented the majority of backers. In the Tar Heel State, thirty-three percent of 
manufacturers owned more slaves than average slaveholders, and many owned two to three times 
as many bondsmen. Much of North Carolina’s high rate o f planter investment in industry was a 
result of the state’s prominence in naval stores production. In 1860, North Carolina’s total 
capital investment in industry amounted to $9,693,703 o f which $2,059,780, or a little more than 
twenty-one percent, was in naval stores production. That same year the state produced 
$16,678,698 in manufactured goods of which $5,355,780, or thirty-two percent, was naval stores. 
Moreover, forty-two percent of the state’s manufacturing establishments made these products.6
Not only was naval stores production a prominent antebellum southern industry, it also 
possessed the general characteristics typical of southern manufacturing after the Civil War, much 
more so than textile production. James C. Cobb explains that most industries in the postbellum 
South, like those before the war, comprised industries that were largely undercapitalized and
6 William J. Cooper, Jr. and Thomas E. Terrill, The American South: A History (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1990), 323; Fred Bateman, James Foust, and Thomas Weiss, “The 
Participation of Planters in Manufacturing in the Antebellum South.” Agricultural History 68 
(April 1974): 279-280.284,286-290,292, 294,296-297; James C. Cobb, Industrialization and 
Southern Society. 1877-1984 (Chicago: The Dorsey Press, 1984), 5; Mary A. DeCredico, 
Patriotism for Profit: Georgia’s Urban Entrepreneurs and the Confederate War Effort (Chapel 
Hill: The University o f North Carolina Press, 1990), 1-2, 10-12, 16, 18-20; United States 
Department o f the Interior, Manufactures o f the United States in 1860 (Washington, DC: 1865), 
437-438.
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7involved extracting and processing agricultural products and raw materials—such as gum 
turpentine. Cobb also notes that southern industry shared these characteristics with southern 
agriculture. They “remained locked in a mutually dependent relationship in which the weakness 
of one reinforced the weaknesses of the other.”7 David Carlton finds that the New South did not 
conform to the prevailing image of an industrial society, but rather remained predominantly rural 
and relied on Iow-wage and ununionized labor—again, both common in the naval stores industry. 
F. Ray Marshall argues that the lives of agricultural and industrial workers in the South, 
especially those involved in forest industries, usually diverged very little. Both lived and worked 
in rural areas, inhabited similar houses, labored for paternalistic bosses, and received company 
scripts which they spent in company stores. Although the textile industry used the South’s most 
important raw commodity and employed low-skilled workers, it did not extract or process the 
fiber but rather produced a finished product in a highly-mechanized facility typically located in at 
least a moderate-size town. These characteristics offered by Cobb, Carlton, and Marshall do not 
fully apply to cotton textile production. These traits, however, describe naval stores 
manufacturing. It typically took place in rural areas where few other opportunities for economic 
development existed, where capital commanded a high price, and where pines grew in abundance 
and sold for little. The industry used crude techniques that maximized the short-term returns of 
both capital and labor and employed methods and work rhythms that in many ways resembled 
agriculture more than industry. Furthermore, naval stores production relied on a variety of 
systems of forced labor, which supports recent scholarship that argues that slavery, peonage, and 
convict leasing, rather than serving as drags on the southern economy, helped to modernize it. 
Turpentining can therefore be studied as a prototypical southern industry.8
7 Cobb, Industrialization and Southern Society. 11, 16.
8 David L. Carlton, “The Revolution from Above: The National Market and the 
Beginnings of Industrialization in North Carolina,” The Journal o f American History 77 
(September 1990): 446; F. Ray Marshall, Labor in the South. (Cambridge: Harvard University
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8It certainly provides a better means of examining the region’s growth than does cotton 
textile production, which was not only unrepresentative of most southern industry but was not 
even the New South’s most important industry until after the First World War. Edward Ayers 
maintains that “while the cigarette, furniture, and textile industries made impressive strides in the 
New South, most Southern industrial workers labored in forests and mines rather than in 
factories. Those extractive industries became increasingly dominate throughout the New South 
era, outstripping the growth of more heavily mechanized enterprises.”9 Economist Gavin Wright 
finds that, until 1920, the South’s timber products industry—raw timber, lumber, and naval stores- 
-was the region’s largest in terms o f both employment and value added. Indeed, a map of 
southern industry in 1900 included in Ayers’ The Promise of the New South reveals that the 
percentage of families with a member engaged in manufacturing was the highest and most 
widespread across the rural pine region of south Georgia, Florida, and the Gulf coast of Alabama 
and Mississippi—where the timber products industry was most concentrated—not in the more 
town-oriented Carolina piedmont, which possessed most of the South’s textile mills. Naval 
stores and other timber products production has received little attention in studies of the South, 
even though, as Ayers argues, “lumber, more than any other industry, captures the full scope of 
economic change in the New South, its limitations as well as its impact.”10 Wright believes that 
scholars have largely ignored the rural-based timber industry because it was of an extractive and 
therefore transient nature and, in most areas of the South, consequently made no lasting
Press, 1967), 87; Edward L. Ayers, Vengeance and Justice: Crime and Punishment in the 19th- 
Century American South (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984); Alex Lichtenstein, Twice 
the Work of Free Labor The Political Economy of Convict Labor in the New South (New York: 
Verso, 1996); Michael David Tegeder, “Prisoners of the Pines: Debt Peonage in the Southern 
Turpentine Industry, 1900-1930,” (Ph.D. diss., The University of Florida, 1996).
9 Edward L. Ayers, The Promise of the New South: Life After Reconstruction (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 105.
10 Ibid., 123.
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9contributions to local development11 But in a significant portion o f die South, timber and naval 
stores operations were—despite their mobility—the largest and most influential businesses for half 
a century. Furthermore, their failure to bring lasting development to rural areas constitutes an 
important legacy and helps explain why the southern pine belt remains relatively devoid of 
industry and towns today. Naval stores alone, it must be admitted, did not represent the most 
important industry in even the piney woods South. But as a part o f  the larger timber products 
trade, with which it shared common characteristics, the naval stores industry serves as a superior 
example o f southern economic development.12
In examining three interrelated dimensions of the southern naval stores industry— 
business, labor, and environment—this study addresses some of the issues Gerald Nash asked 
historians of the South to consider over three decades ago. Nash believed that ‘‘the growth of 
business and industry, readjustments in agriculture, the changing nature o f the South’s 
transportation system, its financial institutions, and its labor force all require further detailed 
investigation before we obtain a clearer conception of the tortuous course of industrialization in 
the twentieth-century South.” Nash also argued that the region’s timber industry, the role of 
government in the process o f industrialization, and the use of applied science also deserved 
attention.13 By also exploring the human dimension of the naval stores industry’s development, 
especially the experiences o f laborers, this work adopts an approach advocated by Edward Ayers 
and Thomas F. Armstrong. Ayers argues that despite industry’s failure to meet the claims of 
southern boosters, it did indeed shape the lives of a significant number o f people whose existence
11 Gavin Wright, Old South. New South: Revolutions in the Southern Economy Since the 
Civil War (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1986), 159, 161.
12 Ibid., 159; Ayers, Promise of the New South. 23; For comparative figures of cotton, 
timber product, and naval stores production see Appendix A.
13 Gerald D. Nash, “Research Opportunities in the Economic History of the South After 
1880,” The Journal o f  Southern History 32 (August 1966): 314, 320-321.
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deserves attention.14 Armstrong employs such an examination in his study of the work 
experience and residential and family patterns of Georgia lumber workers. Armstrong admits 
that, for the historian, such issues might seem mundane topics, but “for the workers these were 
often the questions which had daily meaning in their lives.”1* Finally, as advocated by Alan 
Taylor, this study explores the part the environment played in shaping the naval stores industry 
and the lives o f those involved in it, and, in turn, the role the industry and its workers played in 
altering the environment. Taylor finds that social historians typically concentrate on human 
interrelationships and treat “the natural context” as an “unexplored backdrop.” On the other 
hand, environmental historians, he charges, commonly “describe societies and cultures as 
homogeneous wholes.” But in fact, Taylor argues, “social and environmental history are 
fundamentally compatible and mutually reinforcing” and together can show the “systematically 
unequal distribution of the rewards and burdens extracted from the environment.”16 Such a 
pattern was deeply rooted in the southern naval stores industry’s colonial past and persisted well 
into the twentieth century.
14 Ayers, Promise o f the New South. 105.
15 Thomas F Armstrong, “Georgia Lumber Laborers, 1880-1917: The Social Implications 
of Work,” The Georgia Historical Quarterly 67 (Winter 1983): 436.
16 Alan Taylor, “Unnatural Inequalities: Social and Environmental Histories,” 
Environmental History 1 (October 1996): 7-8, 16.
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Chapter One
The Rise o f the Tar Heel State:
Early American Naval Stores Production
Over the course o f the eighteenth century, North Carolina developed into the largest 
colonial producer and Britain’s principal supplier of naval stores. England had manufactured its 
own naval stores supplies since the Middle Ages, but, no longer able to do so in the seventeenth 
century, turned to other Western European sources for tar, pitch, and turpentine. For much of the 
1600s, England found the quality and price of imported naval stores to be satisfactory. But by 
the beginning o f the eighteenth century, wars and mercantilistic trade policies scuttled this 
arrangement. Therefore, in 1704 England created an incentive program to encourage its North 
American colonies to increase their then small output of naval stores. After a slow start, the 
program succeeded and, for most of the remainder of the colonial era, England enjoyed a steady, 
abundant supply o f naval stores, most of it produced in North Carolina. For a variety of 
economic, environmental, and geographical reasons, North Carolina was particularly well-suited 
for making naval stores. Although other colonies with similar capabilities produced tar, pitch, 
and turpentine, in them other commodities proved more profitable and crowded out naval stores 
products. North Carolina, with few alternative staple crops, therefore, never lost its hold on the 
naval stores trade once it achieved dominance after the 1720s. In fact, North Carolina produced 
so many of these products that it became known as the “Tar Heel State.”1
In the Middle Ages England had provided its own ship materials. As the country’s 
merchant fleet and navy grew larger, its population increased, and its iron industry expanded,
1 Hugh Talmage Lefler and Albert Ray Newsome, North Carolina: The History o f a 
Southern State (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1954), 90.
1 1
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however, England’s forest resources rapidly dwindled, causing wood product prices to climb. 
Ships required wood for lumber, planking, and masts; homes needed wood for heating; and iron 
forges burned charcoal, carbonized wood. Coal proved to be an adequate substitute for heating, 
and iron manufactures found alternative wood sources in Ireland. Ship-building supplies were 
more difficult to obtain. At the beginning of the seventeenth century, English shipyard managers 
sought materials from Prussia, the most important producer and exporter of naval stores at the 
time. Soon, Sweden established itself as the primary European supplier and retained that status 
throughout the remainder o f the seventeenth and all o f the eighteenth centuries. Sweden—whose 
territory by the late seventeenth century included not only what is today Sweden, but also 
Finland, Estonia, Livonia, and parts of northern Germany—made the highest quality tar. Using 
Scotch pine, Swedish tar-makers employed a labor-intensive process that involved removing the 
bark of the tree from the base to a height of eight feet and leaving only four inches on the north 
side to sustain the tree’s life. After standing this way for a year, the pines were cut and their 
pitchy bottom sections burned in a ground kiln. Because tar-manufacturing paid little, farmers 
made it primarily as an income supplement. Few producers were willing to sacrifice their own 
forest lands to such a wasteful method, so they used community-owned land instead. For forest 
owners with tracks close to markets or transportation centers, significantly greater profits could 
be had from sawing timber into lumber. In the more remote areas where shipping charges proved 
prohibitably expensive, tar was the only profitable choice. Although it was relatively 
inaccessible to markets, the tar region had sandy soil, which not only grew the most resinous 
trees, but also eased the task o f digging a kiln.2
2 Kustaa Hautala, “European and American Tar in the English Market During the 
Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries.” Annales Academia; Scientiarum Fennicae 130 
(1964): 7-9; Sinclair Snow, “Naval Stores in Colonial Virginia,” The Virginia Magazine of 
History and Biography 72 (1964): 78; Mikko Airaksinen, “Tar Production in Colonial North 
America,” Environment and History 2 (1996): 116; Stephen Innes, Creatine the Commonwealth: 
The Economic Culture of Puritan New England (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1995), 
243.
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Although inefficient, the Swedish tar makers offered England a reliable supply of a high- 
quality product at reasonable prices. The exclusion of forest products from the enumerative 
clause of the 1660 Navigation Act suggests that England did not consider its dependence on 
Swedish naval stores a problem. In the mid-seventeenth century, however, a single firm, the 
Stockholm Tar Company, tightened its grip on the entire Swedish tar trade; by the 1690s it 
possessed enough power to fix tar prices at home and abroad. Between 1689 and 1699 tar prices 
more than doubled (from 5 pounds, 15 shillings to eleven pounds for twelve barrels). England 
scrambled to find a cheaper source. Improved trade relations with Russia following Peter the 
Great's visit to England in the 1690s, combined with Russia's rising naval stores production, 
offered hope for an alternative tar supplier. However, the Tsar raised Russia’s price to capitalize 
fully on this highly-demanded product.3
In the early 1700s, England’s problems in securing reasonably priced naval stores 
increased. During the Great Northern War, the Russian Army overran Finland, which resulted in 
a drop in the latter’s naval stores production. England had imported 30,117 barrels of Swedish 
tar and pitch in 1701, but only 6,654 barrels arrived the following year. The War of the Spanish 
Succession, in which the English, Dutch, Austrians, and Prussians fought France from 1700 to 
1713, led to a massive naval buildup that increased demand and pushed naval stores prices to 
record levels. By 1703, the cost of twelve barrels o f tar had risen to twenty-two pounds, double 
its price before the war. At the same time the Stockholm monopoly further tightened its control 
of the market. It no longer sold naval stores directly from Stockholm, but only through its factors 
abroad and only at the price and quantities set by the company. All supplies sold to England
3 Thomas R. Cox, Robert S. Maxwell, Phillip Drennon Thomas, and Joseph J. Malone, 
This Well-Wooded Land: Americans and Their Forests from Colonial Times to the Present 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1985), 28; Justin Williams, “English Mercantilism and 
Carolina Naval Stores, 1705-1776.” The Journal of Southern History 1 (May 1935): 172;
Hautala, “European and American Tar,” 9-11,22-23.
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were delivered only aboard company ships. Not only did Stockholm force Britain to pay 
exorbitant prices for naval stores, but British shipping interests lost a valuable cargo. England’s 
cheap and stable naval stores supply had ended.4
England’s dependent position in the early eighteenth century had developed through 
years of failed endeavors to develop naval stores production in its colonies. From the beginning 
of their efforts in North America, English financiers hoped the new colonies would produce, 
among other commodities that England had to import, naval stores—products essential to the 
construction and maintenance of Britain’s growing fleet of naval and commercial ships. In 
1585, Ralph Lane, the governor of the fledgling colony on Roanoke Island, reported “that what 
commodities soever Spaine, France, Italy, or the East parts do yeeld unto us in wines of all 
sortes, in oils, in flaxe, in rosens, pitch, frankenscence, currans, sugars & such like, these parts do
abound with ye growth of them all ”5 Prospects for naval stores also appeared promising
with Thomas Harriot’s exploration of the Carolina coast. He claimed that “Pitch, Tarre, Rosen 
and Turpentine. There are those kinds of trees which yeeld them abundantly and great store.”6 
But any attempts by the Roanoke colonists to produce naval stores ended with the colonists’ 
mysterious disappearance. However, the Jamestown colony, founded in 1607, met with early 
success in tar manufacturing. In 1608 the colony was resupplied with a second group of 
colonists, among them Poles who knew the methods of tar and pitch making. With the English
4 Hautala, “European and American Tar,” 19-20; J. Williams, “English Mercantilism,” 
173; Walter Allen Knittle. The Early Eighteenth Century Palatine Emigration: A British 
Government Redemptioner Project to Manufacture Naval Stores (Philadelphia: Dorrance & 
Company, 1936), 114; Peter H. Wood, Black Majority: Negroes in Colonial South Carolina from 
1670 Through the Stono Rebellion (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1974), 111.
s David B. Quinn and Alison M. Quinn, The First Colonists: Documents on the Planting 
of The First English Settlements in North America. 1584-1590 (Raleigh: North Carolina 
Department o f Cultural Resources, Division of Archives and History, 1982), 22.
6 Ibid., 51.
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apprenticed to the Poles, Jamestown managed to include several barrels o f naval stores among its 
first exports. Despite hopes that Virginia would become an important source for these products, 
however, the new colony soon lost interest in tar and pitch and cast its lot with another staple, 
tobacco, a crop that could deliver more substantial returns. When British officials pushed 
Virginians to produce naval stores—particularly tar—the colonists complained that there were no 
horses or other means to transport the wood necessary for production. Moreover, they argued, 
the threat of Indian attack made work in the forest too dangerous. Parliament tried to encourage 
tar production by allowing naval stores from Virginia and Maryland to be imported free of the 
four shilling, two pence duty for five years. The effort apparently failed because, in 1682, the 
colonial government made its own attempt to increase production. The Virginia General 
Assembly made tar legal tender in the colony with each thirty-two-gallon barrel carrying a value 
of fifteen shillings. Like Parliament’s, Virginia’s attempt to encourage production met with little 
success. By 1698, the only place in Virginia where naval stores were produced in any significant 
quantity was Elizabeth City County, and its products never exceeded 1200 barrels annually.7
More than the Indian threat or a lack of horses, three significant disadvantages in 
profitably selling naval stores to overseas markets discouraged colonial production. First, 
shipping distances between North America and Britain vastly exceeded those between the Baltic 
and Britain and therefore resulted in significantly higher shipping costs for colonial suppliers, 
despite colonial measures to lower them. In an effort to lower transport costs, the Virginia 
General Assembly in 1640 set a standard shipping rate charge of six pounds per ton on products 
traveling from Virginia to England. Although the act was primarily designed to reduce the 
excessively high rates for shipping tobacco, it applied to naval stores as well. Despite the act,
7 Snow, “Naval Stores in Colonial Virginia,” 78-81, 91; Thomas Gamble, “Early History 
of the Naval Stores Industry in North America,” in Naval Stores: History. Production.
Distribution and Consumption, ed. Thomas Gamble (Savannah: Review Publishing & Printing 
Company, 1921), correction of page 17.
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however, by 1704, the cost o f  shipping naval stores from Virginia had climbed to eight pounds 
per ton. Exporters from the Baltic states paid only two pounds. Second, colonial labor costs also 
exceeded those in the Baltic states because of a shortage of workers in the colonies. Third, the 
colonies lacked experience in tar-making, which resulted in lower productivity and a lower- 
quality product than that made in Europe. For all three reasons, naval stores never became the 
predominate export o f any colony during the seventeenth century. Virginians produced some 
naval stores, but concentrated on tobacco. The Carolinas exported a combination of beef, pork, 
rice, and naval stores, but not significant quantities o f the latter before 1700. In the seventeenth 
century, New England became the first center of American naval stores production, but its 
exports failed to supply more than a small fraction o f England’s needs. New Englanders tended 
to favor lumbering and shipbuilding as more profitable enterprises for wood products and limited 
tar and pitch production to quantities required for their own needs.8
The Whig government, which controlled Britain in the early eighteenth century, felt new 
pressure to force colonial naval stores manufacturing. Coming to power in the Glorious 
Revolution of 1688, the Whigs strongly supported mercantilist policies that emphasized 
exporting the largest possible amount of products while importing as little as possible. Under 
their control in 1696 Parliament created the Board of Trade, which determined that the empire’s 
mercantilist structure was not operating up to its potential. Not only were the colonies failing to 
supply adequately the raw materials for British manufacturing, but the northern colonies actually 
posed a threat to the English wool industry. A shift to a more mercantilist-oriented trade policy,
8 Hautala, “European and American Tar,” 42; Snow, “Naval Stores in Colonial Virginia,” 
91; Donald Fraser Martin, “An Historical and Analytical Approach to the American Gum Naval 
Stores Industry” (Ph.D. diss., University of North Carolina, 1942), 43-45; A. Stuart Campbell, 
Robert C. Unkrich, and Albert C. Blanchard, The Naval Stores Industry (Gainseville, FL: Bureau 
of Economic and Business Research, College of Business Administration, The University of 
Florida, 1934), 8; Airaksinen, “Tar Production,” 120; Innes, Creating the Commonwealth. 272; 
Wood, Black Majority. 110.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
17
the Whigs believed, would help strengthen English manufacturing, increase the volume o f 
English shipping, and develop the outer regions of the empire. Colonial naval stores production 
could help achieve these ends.9
A combination of these three factors—the Scandinavian tar monopoly, Whiggish 
mercantilist support, and the threat of developing colonial manufacturing—influenced Parliament 
when in 1704 it passed “An Act for Encouraging the Importation of Naval Stores from America,” 
a piece of legislation that one historian has described as “one of the most interesting and 
significant mercantilist experiments made by England during the whole colonial period.”10 
Encouragement took the form of bounties, or subsidized prices, which compensated for the high 
shipping charges associated with transatlantic export. Effective January I, 170S, and lasting nine 
years, the Navy Department would pay a bounty of four pounds per ton on tar and pitch, three 
pounds per ton of rosin and turpentine, six pounds per ton o f hemp, and one pound for each ton 
of masts, yard-arms, and bowsprits. The Admiralty, however, had the right of refusal for up to 
twenty days of any colonial naval stores sent as part of the program. The act also made naval 
stores enumerated commodities; colonists could export tar, pitch, and turpentine only to British 
ports and aboard British or British colonial ships. Few colonists complained about the 
restriction; in essence the bounty act created a receptive market for colonial naval stores by 
forcing the British Navy to purchase them at inflated prices. The British, not the colonists, 
complained most about the new policy."
9 Williams, “English Mercantilism,” 170-171; Hautala, “European and American Tar,” 
20; Knittle. Palatine Immigration. 122.
10 Williams, “English Mercantilism,” 169.
"Charles Christopher Crittenden, The Commerce o f North Carolina. 1763-1789 (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1936), 37-39.
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The War o f the Spanish Secession delayed the bounty act’s effectiveness because the 
high wartime freight rates, as much as four times those from Sweden, rendered the compensation 
inadequate. While Swedish exporters paid only £.25 to ship a barrel of tar to England, Carolina 
colonists paid £.1, New England £.9, and New York £.8. Although colonial exports rose slightly 
immediately following the bounty act’s passage, between 1708 and 1710 tar exports actually 
dropped. However, with the end of hostilities in 1713 and a subsequent drop in shipping costs, 
American tar achieved prominence in the British naval stores market and soon came to dominate 
it. Britain had imported only 177 barrels, or one half o f a percent, of its naval stores, from the 
colonies in 1701. By 1714 the colonies supplied 11,639 barrels, or twenty-five percent. A year 
later it imported nearly one half of its naval stores from America, two years later a majority and 
six years later ninety percent of its supply. Between 1716 and 1724 England received an annual 
average of 61,488 barrels of tar and pitch from the colonies and an annual average of only 12,849 
from the Baltic. By 1725 the colonies provided England with more than it required for annual 
use. England then began to export naval stores to Holland, Flanders, Germany, Spain, Portugal, 
and Ireland. Britain’s import volume released it from its dependence on Sweden and, in fact, 
drove down the costs o f the Swedish products.12
Although highly successful in stimulating naval stores production, the 1704 act did not 
foster the industry where Whig administrators had wanted. They intended the act to boost naval 
stores manufacturing in the northern colonies whose export products actually competed with 
England’s. New England and New York, with a climate similar to England’s, produced 
agricultural commodities that could just as easily be grown by farmers in the mother country.
Much of the northern colonies’ produce, consequently, had to be exported to other colonies. The
12 Hautala, “European and American Tar,” 45-47; Martin, “American Gum Naval Stores 
Industry,” 49; G. Melvin Herndon, “Naval Stores in Colonial Georgia,” The Georgia Historical 
Quarterly 52 (December 1968): 427; Williams, “English Mercantilism,” 175, 177-178.
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mercantilists hoped that if  New England could shift from wool to naval stores production, not 
only would competition with English woolen works diminish and an alternate source of tar and 
pitch open, but the colonists could use the profits from naval stores to purchase England’s 
woolens. The act called for bounties to be paid only on naval stores produced in the New 
England and middle colonies. But by the end of seventeenth century, New Englanders had 
relentlessly cut timber, especially pine, until its depletion curtailed even limited naval stores 
activities. The southeastern colonies, however, possessed an abundance o f longleaf pines, a 
species that yielded much more oleoresin than New England pines. Therefore, most o f the tar, 
pitch, and limited amounts o f turpentine that left northern ports originated from the southern 
colonies, especially Carolina. Southern producers exported naval stores through such northern 
ports as Philadelphia, New York, and Boston so they could receive the bounty. The British 
overlooked the origin o f most of the naval stores because they were pleased with the volume they 
received. England remained determined, however, to build a northern naval stores industry, so 
determined that in 1709 it sent, three thousand Palatine immigrants to New York and instructed 
them to produce naval stores. The effort failed when it lost its financing and the Germans, who 
were not accustomed to burning tar kilns, found they could prosper as farmers instead. Britain 
also persisted in its efforts to obtain masts—for which it continued to rely on the Baltic states— 
from the northern colonies. To preserve the mast supply in the northern colonies, the bounty act 
prohibited the cutting o f pines smaller than twelve inches thick, three feet from the ground. 
However, when the colonies failed to produce an adequate number of masts, Parliament, in 1711, 
imposed a one-hundred-pound penalty for cutting such pines. Continued depletion of forests in 
the Northeast led to additional measures. A 1715 Massachusetts law forbade the boxing of pine 
trees for turpentine on Cape Cod. In 1720, Parliament outlawed the cutting of any pine in Nova 
Scotia, New England, New York, or New Jersey.13
13 Williams, “English Mercantilism,” 168; Cox et al., Well-Wooded Land. 28; Hautala,
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While few pines grew in the northern colonies by the early eighteenth century, an 
expansive pine forest covered the coastal plain of the southern colonies. In much of this area, 
longleaf pine, the best pine species for making naval stores, made up eighty percent of the tree 
species. Only river bottom lands, where hardwoods and other pines grew, broke up this almost 
pure longleaf growth. A nineteenth-century traveler through the southern forest observed that 
“its features are monotonous in the extreme, varied only by alternate swamp and piney woods; 
the former bordering the water-courses, the latter covering the sandy ridges between.”14 
Stretching for nearly twelve hundred miles from near Norfolk, Virginia, through the Carolinas, 
eastern Georgia, the Florida panhandle and northern peninsula, southern Alabama and 
Mississippi, and portions o f Louisiana and Texas, the longleaf pine forest o f the southeastern 
coastal plain and Gulf South regions covered an estimated sixty million to ninety million acres. 
Andre Michaux, the French botanist who explored the United States’ forests in the late 
eighteenth century, found only three significant areas in the southern pine belt where longleaf did 
not dominate, one in the Neuse River vicinity in North Carolina, another north of Columbia, 
South Carolina, and the third just north of Augusta, Georgia.ls
“European and American Tar,” 15, 21, 42-43, 70-71; Snow, “Naval Stores in Colonial Virginia,” 
82; Knittle, Palatine Immigration. 120, 122, 128, 226, 133; Airaksinen, “Tar Production,” 119; 
Martin, “American Gum Naval Stores Industry,” 59-60; Carl E. Ostrom, “History of Gum Naval 
Stores Industry,” The Chemurgic Digest 4 (July 15, 1945): 219.
14 Porte Crayon, “North Carolina Illustrated: The Piney Woods.” Harper’s New Monthly 
Magazine 84 (May 1857): 745.
15 R. D. Forbes, Timber Growing and Logging and Turpentining Practices in the 
Southern Pine Region (Washington, DC: United States Department o f  Agriculture, 1930), 7; 
Edward Buckner, “Prehistory of the Southern Forest,” Forest Farmer 54 (July/August 1995): 21; 
Thomas C Croker, Jr. “The Longleaf Pine Story,” Southern Lumberman (December 1979): 69; S. 
W. Greene, “The Forest that Fire Made,” reprint from American Forests. Austin Cary Memorial 
Forestry Collection, Department of Special Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries,
University o f Florida, 2; F. Andre Michaux, The North American Svlva (Philadelphia: D. Rice & 
A. N. Hart, 1857), 107.
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The longleaf pine is particularly well adapted to the southern environment. As a pioneer 
tree species, pines are first to appear on land where vegetation has been disturbed by wind, water, 
fire, or human or animal activity. In the absence of further disturbance, they give way to a mixed 
forest of gum, oak, and other hardwood species. The mixture of hardwoods represents the 
natural climax forest for the southeastern United States’ coastal plain. But in areas of frequent 
fires, caused either by lightning or humans, the longleaf remains dominant. For while hardwoods 
and other pine species are easily damaged and killed by fire, the longleaf s reproductive and 
growth characteristics render it well-suited to not only survive but to thrive in frequently burned 
over areas. Although it produces seed only at long intervals, usually no more than once every 
seven years, it does so in abundance. These seeds take two years to mature in large cones. When 
the seeds reach maturity, the cone dries out and its scales spread apart, freeing the winged seeds 
which then float to the ground. Although the relatively large size of the seeds permits foraging 
animals and birds to find them with ease, their weight enables them to penetrate undergrowth and 
reach the forest floor where they can germinate. The tops o f new longleaf pines emerge in early 
winter but achieve little height growth. They remain at a low grass stage for three to ten years, 
depending on growing conditions, which puts the longleaf at a disadvantage to other tree species, 
especially other pines. Slash and loblolly pines, for example, grow considerably faster at an 
early stage and can crowd out the squat longleaf seedlings. But the longleaf s slow growth gives 
it superb fire resistance. Until the first autumn alter germination, very young longleafs are as 
susceptible to fire as other species. However, after that, when the stem reaches six inches tall, 
the longleaf is well protected from fire by a covering o f heavy eight- to fifteen-inch needles that 
grow in bundles of three. At this stage, the seedling grows a deep root system in which it stores a 
reserve food supply. In the event it looses its crown of needles in a fire, the seedling can draw on 
the energy stored in the root to grow a new set Once the grass stage ends, the longleaf begins 
rapid height growth for two or three years, and is once again susceptible to fire. If it survives,
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though, it develops a layer of heavy bark, from one-quarter- to one-half-inch thick, that can 
protect it from most fires for the rest of its life. The longleaf requires fire to eliminate the 
competing tree species. In fact, it is seldom successful in wet areas where fires occur 
infrequently. In such places other tree species shade the longleaf out during its short, grass stage 
years.16
The southeastern forests endured frequent fires. Some had natural causes. The heat and 
humidity the region experienced during the warmer months encouraged thunderstorms and 
lightning that sparked fires. But because most lightning strikes were accompanied by 
precipitation which moistened the forest floor, the fires it started often bum slowly, low to the 
ground, and, consequently, rarely spread. On occasion they could smolder until extinguished by 
the next rain. Lightning, however, was only a secondary cause of the fires that created the 
longleaf pine forest.17 Native Americans were responsible for most of the fires in the 
southeastern forest. “It was in large measure owing to the Indian and his Grandfather Fire,” 
explains Stephen J. Pyne, historian of fire in America, “that the forest primeval had already been 
widely cleared, converted, and otherwise managed.”18 Environmental historian Albert E. 
Cowdrey maintains that in the hands of native Americans, “fire became central to the 
maintenance of a human-centered ecology.”19 Burning served as a means of sustaining a balance
16 Timothy Silver, A New Face on the Countryside: Indians. Colonists, and Slaves in 
South Atlantic Forests. 1500-1800 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 18; Buckner, 
“Prehistory of Southern Forests,” 21, Albert E. Cowdrey, This Land. This South: An 
Environmental History, revised edition (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1996), 15; 
Forbes, Timber Growing. 7-11,25; Howard E. Weaver and David A. Anderson, Manual of 
Southern Forestry (Danville. Illinois: The Interstate Printers and Publishers, Inc., 1954): 38-39; 
Lenthall Wvman. Florida Naval Stores (Tallahassee: State o f Florida, Department of Agriculture, 
1929), 5; Greene, “Forests that Fire Made,” 2-3; Michaux, North American Svlva. 107.
17 Silver. New Face on the Countryside. 18.
18 Stephen J. Pyne, Fire in America: A Cultural History of Wildland and Rural Fire 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), 83.
19 Cowdrey, This Land. This South. 14.
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in the forest that supported the Indian economy. It was the only way for Indians to maintain their 
population in the temperate forest that developed in eastern North America at the end o f the last 
ice age. As glaciers retreated northward, the boreal forest, which consisted mostly o f conifers 
adopted to cold weather and once extended as far as central Georgia, followed. But when 
undisturbed, the temporal or mild climate forests that replaced it sustain relatively low plant and 
animal populations, making human habitation difficult for all but the smallest communities. By 
the time vegetation in such a forest reaches its most mature stage, it has developed a two- or 
three-layer canopy that shades the ground enough to prevent grass and undergrowth 
development. Since the beginning of the Holocene period, which began ten thousand years ago 
and marks the disappearance of the megafauna, Indians relied on bison, deer, elk, and other 
grazing animals as their source o f protein. To encourage the growth o f grasses and shrubs on 
which this game could feed, native Americans periodically burned the undergrowth to keep the 
forest open, a common approach among both pastoral and farming cultures. Indians also used 
fire to herd their prey together for easier hunting and to improve their own quality of life in the 
forest. Fire drove off mosquitoes, flies, snakes, and other pests. It improved the production of 
edible berries, eased nut gathering by clearing away debris, opened the forest for better travel, 
boosted security by giving better visibility, unlocked nutrients for trees and grasses, and 
discouraged larger forest fires by clearing away their fuel, forest debris.20
The accumulation rate of ground litter—leaves, needles, branches, and twigs—varies with 
forest type. In pine forests it tends to collect more rapidly than in hardwood or mixed forests.
20 Thomas Hansbrough, “Human Behavior and Forest Fires,” in Southern Forests and 
Southern People, ed. Thomas Hansbrough (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
1963), 22-23; Buckner, “Prehistory of Southern Forests,” 20; Pyne, Fire in America. 74; Michael 
Williams, Americans and Their Forests: A Historical Geography (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989), 43; Silver, New Face on the Countryside. 60-63; Cowdrey, This Land. 
This South. 14; Greene, “Forests that Fire Made,” 3; Forbes, Timber Growing. 25.
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But the volume at any given time depends on the burning frequency. Pyne explains that “under 
natural conditions the intensity and frequency o f fire varies according to the work required of it: 
The greater the litter, the more intense the fire; the more frequently litter is built up, the more 
frequent the fire.”21 By keeping accumulation to a minimum, Indians, who may have fired the 
southern coastal plain woods as often as twice a year, ensured that fire had only enough fuel to 
bum slowly and at ground level. Besides fuel accumulation, other factors that contributed to fire 
intensity include precipitation patterns, relative humidity, wind speed and direction, ground 
slope, and temperature. During periods o f average precipitation, only the upper layer of debris 
burned because the lower layer remained damp and fire resistant. Indians allowed such fires, 
which offered no threat to their life or property, to bum until they reached water courses or were 
put out by rain. These fires rarely harmed hardwoods and other pine species which occupied the 
swampy terrain that seldom played host to fires. But when areas that had escaped fire for a 
number of years finally did bum, considerable damage occurred, especially if the flames began 
spreading through the tree tops. Because Indian burning was primarily localized and not all areas 
o f the forest received even burning, such occasions were not uncommon. Lush undergrowth and 
a thick layer of debris could fuel a conflagration, which, if started during a dry summer period 
when the entire forest floor was dry, could consume everything in its path. Such hot fires were 
especially damaging during the growing spring and summer seasons and in dense stands of young 
trees. The vast differences in forest fire frequency and characteristics created different 
vegetation environments. Intense fires during dry periods could eliminate trees altogether, 
creating open fields with dense shrub growth on their periphery, while areas that experienced
21 Pyne, Fire in America. 35.
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frequent low-burning became savannas with widely spaced trees, little undergrowth and lush
grasses.22
Indians, therefore, “made an indelible impact on the forest” through burning as ecology, 
historical geographer Michael Williams has explained.23 “Far from being incapable of modifying 
his environment, the Indian created it, gradually replacing dense forest with thinner forest, 
thinner forest with grassland, and changing the composition of the standing forest.”24 The initial 
arrival of the Europeans may have caused some forest areas to grow uninterrupted and close. As 
native population declined, primarily from disease epidemics, cultural pressure on the 
environment relaxed and reduced the need for frequent burning. But European settlers quickly 
adopted and continued the Indian patterns, a practice that lasted for centuries and for a time 
enabled the longleaf to retain its dominance over the coastal plain.23
In addition to its ability to endure fire, other features of longleaf favored its growth in the 
southeastern coastal plain. The tree thrives in poor, dry soil. With the exception of river flood 
plains, where longleafs rarely prospered, the soil of the southeastern coastal plain is relatively 
poor. Southern topsoils are old, having experienced the leaching effects of rain much longer than 
northern topsoils. They have also experienced more the process that reduces soil to a mixture of 
clay and aluminum hydroxides and iron hydroxides. In such soils the soluble nutrients from 
organic decomposition are carried deep into the ground, beyond the reach of many plants’ root 
structures. But the longleafs taproot, which penetrates well into the ground, enables it to
22 Buckner, “Prehistory of Southern Forests,” 21; Silver, New Face on the Countryside.
18, 60; Greene, “Forests that Fire Made,” 3; Forbes, Timber Growing. 25; Williams, Americans 
and Their Forests. 43; Cowdrey, This Land. This South. 14.
23 M. Williams, Americans and Their Forests. 44.
24 Ibid., 43.
23 Ibid., 49; Buckner, “Prehistory of Southern Forests,” 22, Hansbrough, “Human 
Behavior,” 23; Cowdrey, This Land. This South. 15.
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survive in such soils where the growth o f other trees would be slow. Its long taproot also helps it 
withstand severe weather conditions. During dry periods it can access water deep within the 
ground and in high winds the tap root acts as an anchor to prevent it from blowing over.26
Despite its ability to withstand harsh conditions—fire, poor soil, low precipitation, and 
high winds—the longleaf is not invincible. When the seedling first emerges, ants may attack it, 
biting out the tenderest parts. Only after the formation of needles does their threat end. More 
than any other pine species the longleaf is susceptible to brown-spot needle blight, a disease that 
strikes seedlings that have been covered by dead grass and rough. Since young longleafs can 
spend up to ten years as seedlings, they are easy targets for needle blight. As its name suggests, 
the disease causes brown spots to form on the needles. During the spring of the second year of 
infection, new needles are attacked by spores produced on the old needles. In severe cases, the 
young pine is defoliated and dies. Once the young trees are two feet high, however, they are less 
susceptible to such a damaging attack. Another enemy of the longleaf pine, feral hogs, were 
especially destructive. These hogs, which savored the energy-packed longleaf taproots, could dig 
up scores of seedlings a day. Introduced by the Spanish, hogs had little effect on existing forests 
because hogs posed no threat to mature trees, but in later years, wild hogs became a significant 
cause of the longleafs inability to reproduce itself.27
On the margins of the longleaf belt and in the coastal plain’s wetter areas, loblolly, 
shortleaf, and slash pine grew along side hardwoods. Loblolly grows individually or in small 
groups and is adapted to a variety of soil conditions, from wet bottom lands to dryer, rolling
26 Cowdrey, This Land. This South. 2; Silver, New Face on the Countryside. 18; Forbes, 
Timber Growing. 8-9.
27 F. C. Craighead, “Insects that Attack Southern Pines,” Austin Cary Memorial Forestry 
Collection, Department o f Special Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries, University of 
Florida, 9; Greene, “Forests that Fire Made,” 3; Weaver and Anderson, Manual of Southern 
Forestry. 286.
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uplands. It produces a smaller seed than the longleaf and can prosper in a variety o f soil 
conditions. Although it grows rapidly as soon as it germinates, it is somewhat resistant to fire, 
although not as much as the longleaf. Shortleaf pines can be found scattered among longleafs, 
but grow in purer stands near rivers and in swamps throughout the southeastern coastal plain.
Like the loblolly pine, the shortleaf produces a smaller seed and is capable o f growing in a 
variety of soils. They grow rapidly but remain susceptible to fire until they are ten to twelve 
years old. The slash pine’s characteristics resemble the shortieafs. It is abatable to different, 
soils but is found more in bottom lands and their rapid growth makes them susceptible to fire, 
especially in their first years. But throughout the southeastern coastal plain the number of slash 
pines, along with loblollies and shortieafs, were vastly outnumbered by the longleaf.28
Because of the abundance of longleaf pine, southern colonists, especially those in the 
Carolinas, were well situated to manufacture naval stores. From the 1700s to the 1720s, most 
Carolina naval stores came from the region between the Cape Fear River and Charleston, South 
Carolina. In fact, production of these commodities dated back to before 1700 when settlers first 
arrived in the region.29 In his 1709 account o f travels through Carolina, John Lawson observed 
that “as for Pitch and Tar, none of the Plantations are comparable for offering the vast Quantities 
of Naval Stores, as this Place does.”30 Between 1705 and 1718, the Carolinas exported 134,212 
barrels of tar and pitch while New England exported only 86,411 barrels, many of them 
originating from the Carolinas. Planters in the colony took advantage o f their ability to make tar 
and pitch on a large scale. They not only possessed significant holdings o f longleaf pine forest,
28 Silver, New Face on the Countryside. 21; Forbes, Timber Growing. 7, 10-11.
29 Norman Hawley, “Naval Stores: America’s First Widespread Forest Industry,”
Southern Lumberman (December 15, 1966): 163.
30 John Lawson. A New Voyage to Carolina (1709: reprint, Chapel Hill: The University 
of North Carolina Press, 1967), 11.
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but numerous slaves whom they set to building and burning tar kilns. After the bounty made 
naval stores an attractive export product, some planters bought even more slaves on credit to cash 
in on the trade’s increased profitability. They operated on a grand scale, employing their large 
slave labor forces in thousands o f acres o f pine forest. Until the 1720s, South Carolina’s naval 
stores export tonnage exceeded that o f  any other product, including rice.31
The sparsely settled area of southeastern North Carolina produced only small quantities 
of tar, pitch, and turpentine until the 1720s, when settlers began spreading up the Cape Fear 
River. In the Cape Fear Valley, the river and its tributaries provided North Carolina makers of 
tar and other naval stores products with an extensive water transportation system. The first part 
of the journey was usually overland. Laborers drove a stick through each barrel of naval stores 
and left both ends protruding so it could serve as an axle. A draft animal drew the barrel, which 
rolled on its own hoops, to a landing where workers sawed both ends of the stick off leaving it in 
the barrel. Rafts took barrels of naval stores to points where they could be collected for export 
aboard larger vessels. The port at Brunswick, laid out in 1727 on the west bank of the Cape Fear 
River, handled most o f the region’s early naval stores exports. A rival port community, Newton, 
planned in 1733 and incorporated as Wilmington in 1739, gradually drew commerce from 
Brunswick until, by the Revolution, Wilmington enjoyed the most active trade. Like their South 
Carolina counterparts, naval stores producers along the Cape Fear Valley owned abundant land 
in the longleaf belt and controlled slave labor forces o f considerable size. But it appears that not 
all Cape Fear area settlers brought their slaves with them; those who did not found it difficult to 
acquire needed workers. Cumberland County, set in the heart o f the longleaf pine forest and
31 Williams, “English Mercantilism,” 176; Lawrence Lee, The Lower Cape Fear in 
Colonial Davs (Chapel Hill; The University of North Carolina Press, 1965), 59-60, 97, 151; 
Hautala, “European and American Tar,” 76; Wood, Black Majority. 55, 110.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
29
beside the Cape Fear River, would seem to assure it as a base for substantial naval stores 
production, actually made very little because it had few slaves.32
Slaves labored at tar-making during the winter and at crop cultivation and limited 
turpentine production during the warmer months. In 1699 Edmund Randolph witnessed slaves 
preparing tar kilns. Alexander Spotswood, Virginia’s governor from 1710 to 1723, reported that 
in the 1720s he purchased from the Royal Africa Company four hundred slaves to make naval 
stores in his colony.33 John Brickell’s The Natural History o f  North-Carolina. published in 1737. 
describes slaves laboring to produce both tar and turpentine. “The Planters,” he writes, “make 
their Servants or Negroes cut large Cavities on each side of the Pitch-Pine Tree (which they term 
Boxing of the Tree) wherein the Turpentine runs, and the Negroes with Ladles take it out and put 
it into Barrels.” Producers distilled little of the raw turpentine their slaves collected, “few giving 
themselves to the trouble.” Not only did the refining process require considerable skill, but the 
large iron stills necessitated considerable capital outlay.34 In 1765 a Frenchman traveling 
through North Carolina also noted that slaves worked in tar and pitch production and “that one 
Negroe will tend 3000 [boxes], which will rendr about 100 Baris, terpentin”35
During the winter slaves built tar kilns, first gathering pine Iightwood, then splitting it to 
the thickness of a man’s leg, and finally building and firing kilns to extract the tar. Tar producers
32 Lee, Lower Cape Fear. 97, 151-152; Harry Roy Merrens, Colonial North Carolina in 
the Eighteenth Century (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina, 1964), 89-90, 106; 
William S. Powell, North Carolina Through Four Centuries (Chapel Hill: The University of 
North Carolina Press, 1989), 83; Crittenden, Commerce of North Carolina. 42, 57; Thomas J. 
Schoenbaum, Islands. Capes, and Sounds: The North Carolina Coast (Winston-Salem, NC: John 
F. Blair, Publisher, 1982), 225, 227.
33 J. Williams, “English Mercantilism,” 180.
34 John Brickell, The Natural History of North Carolina (New York: Johnson Reprint 
Corporation, 1969), 265, 267.
35 “Journal of a French Traveler in the Colonies,” The American Historical Review 26
(July 1921): 733.
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made earthen kilns by digging shallow pits as large as twenty-four feet in diameter. The floors o f 
these pits sloped toward the center from which a gutter led to the perimeter and extended 
outward anywhere from two to ten feet. Some kiln builders used a wooden pipe to channel tar 
from the kiln. Laborers placed two-to three-foot long pieces of split pine wood into these pits.
The wood pile extended up and out over the sides o f the pit until it formed what J. F. D. Smyth 
described as a “circular pyramid,” that often reached from twenty-five to thirty feet in diameter 
and was ten to twelve feet high. Slaves covered the structure with earth and clay, sometimes 
mixed with pine straw, so that only an opening at the top was left. The kiln was fired through 
this top vent, often around sundown. Once the top wood was ignited and the combustion had 
begun to penetrate downward, usually after twenty-four hours, workers covered the top hole and 
made vents in the walls. Laborers manning the burning kiln, it was reported in American 
Husbandry, “temper the heat as they think proper, by thrusting a stick through the earth, and 
letting the air in at as many places as they find necessary.” If the kiln burned too fast, black 
smoke arose, indicating that the tar was burning before it reached the bottom. A hard wind from 
one direction could build up the fire on one side, requiring a worker to climb to the top of the 
kiln and stomp hard to seal the vents and smother the blaze. After a day of burning, the tar began 
to flow, falling first to the bottom of the kiln, then sliding to the center, and running out through 
the gutter, and finally collecting in a trough from which workers dipped it into barrels. Unlike 
turpentining, building a tar kiln was not strenuous work but did require limited technical skill. 
Monitoring a kiln only meant keeping a constant eye on the flow of tar and the amount o f smoke. 
But the job did require patience. Tar burners probably lived in brush lean-tos and did their own 
cooking as did those laborers who continued this occupation in the nineteenth century. A typical 
kiln that produced from 100 to 130 barrels of tar could take eight to nine days to bum 
completely. The work could also be hazardous. Workers who fell into the kilns while sealing
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vents could be burned to death. Those who were injured were often miles from help. Brickell 
observed that in accidents with the kilns, “Negroes have been very much burnt or scalded.”36
Although delighted by the increased export volume o f colonial naval stores produced 
largely by these slave laborers, Britain was greatly disappointed with the product’s quality.
British buyers complained about the condition of many colonial goods; they claimed that colonial 
flour was too old and course, tobacco dark and sour, timber poorly dried, linseed light in weight, 
and beeswax dirty in color. But naval stores, particularly tar, appear to have been of especially 
poor quality. Consumers grumbled that manufacturers added foreign matter—dirt, sticks, water, 
grass-to barreled tar to increase its weight. Trash also accidentally mixed with tar as it drained 
from earthen, woodland kilns.37 Ship builders and captains complained that the poor-quality or 
“hot” tar “burned” the rigging, but modem scholars disagree on the nature of the harm. Some 
maintain that the inferior tar’s acidity damaged the ropes. Timothy Silver explains that “the high 
temperatures of the kilns led to the accumulation of wood acids in the tar. When applied to the 
ship’s rigging, those acids sometimes weakened or ‘burned’ the very ropes the tar was supposed 
to protect.”38 Others believe the complaints referred to how the hot temperature of the tar 
actually caught the ropes on fire. Before workers applied tar, it had to be heated until its 
consistency was thin enough for it to penetrate into the rope fiber. Colonial tar, the argument
36 Brickell, Natural History of North Carolina. 265-266; Snow, “Naval Stores in Colonial 
Virginia,” 78; John Macleod, “The Tar and Turpentine Business in North Carolina,” Monthly 
Journal o f Agriculture 2 (July 1846): 17-18; Michaux, North American Svlva. 114; “Journal o f a 
French Traveler in the Colonies,” 734; John Ferdinand Dalziel Smyth, A Tour in the United 
States of America (1784; reprint, New York: Amo Press, Inc., 1968), 95-97; Harry J. Carman, 
ed., American Husbandry (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, Inc., 1939), 244-245; John K. 
Cross, “Tar Burning, A Forgotten Art?,” Forests and People 23, no. 2 (1973): 22-23; Robert M. 
Weir, Colonial South Carolina: A History (Millwood, NY: KTO Press, 1983), 144; John K.
Cross, “C-HAR-C-O-A-L Charcoal” NSCP Safetv-Valve 3 (June 1965): 2.
37 Hautala, “European and American Tar,” 58; Snow, “Naval Stores in Colonial 
Virginia,” 88; Crittenden, Commerce of North Carolina. 58.
38 Silver, New Face on the Countryside. 127.
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goes, was so thick and the temperature at which it reached viscosity so high, that it literally 
burned the rope. “So by calling tar hot,” Mikko Airoksinen writes, “the dockyard workers 
actually meant it was too thick.”39 Finally, tar often sat for long periods on wharves where, 
unprotected from the hot sun, its temperature could rise to degrees that permitted it to melt and 
ooze from cracks in poorly-constructed barrels. Many barrels shipped from the colonies were 
reportedly made of green timber. Although the cooper may have fashioned a tight barrel at his 
shop, as the staves dried they contracted, opening cracks between them.40
As with tar, British consumers also complained about the quality of colonial pitch and 
turpentine. Buyers claimed that colonists processed their pitch only half way, thus increasing its 
volume but rendering it useless. Colonial pitch was also reputed to contain dirt, rocks, and 
debris, a result o f  having been processed in ground pits.41 Naturalist William Bartram, who 
toured the southeast in the 1770s, described this primitive method used in the Carolinas. He 
explained that “when they design to make pitch, they dig large holes in the ground, near the tar 
kiln, which they line with a thick coat of good clay, into which they conduct a sufficient quantity 
of tar, and set it on fire, suffering it to flame and evaporate a length of time sufficient to convert 
it into pitch, and when cool, lade it into barrels, and so on until they have consumed all the tar, or 
made a sufficient quantity of pitch for their purpose.”42 Producers were also accused o f packing 
pitch, like tar, into weak barrels that leaked. Turpentine quality received similar complaints. 
British buyers claimed that colonial turpentine, most shipped as raw gum, contained wood chips,
39 Airaksinen, “Tar Production,” 121.
40 Crittenden, Commerce of North Carolina. 58.
41 Ibid., 58.
42 William Bartram, Travels Through North and South Carolina. Georgia. East and West 
Florida, the Cherokee Country, the Extensive Territories o f the Muscogulees or Creek 
Confederacy, and the Country of the Choctaws in William Bartram: Travels and Other Writings. 
The Library of America (New York: Literary Classics of the United States, Inc., 1996), 339.
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water, and other foreign matter. The barrels in which the colonists shipped it were so inferior 
and prone to leakage, the British said, that some packed with three hundred pounds of turpentine 
when shipped could arrive in Britain weighing only a few pounds.43
Three factors contributed to the low quality of American naval stores. First the 
producers’ economic situation demanded that they extract the quickest return from their land 
with the least possible labor and capital expenditures. Producers, therefore, avoided the labor- 
intensive Baltic practice of barking and felling the trees from which to secure wood to build kilns 
and instead instructed their slaves to gather dead pine wood in the forest. A second and related 
reason for poor quality tar, especially among less wealthy producers, was the practice of 
collecting dead wood from ungranted lands. No law forbade the scavenging of fallen limbs from 
unowned property, but to bark a tree and then later cut it down, as the east country method 
required, constituted trespassing. Third, American tar makers did not choose shortcuts but 
simply did not know proper techniques. Since Britain had produced almost no naval stores for 
many decades before North American colonization, English settlers possessed little practical 
knowledge of tar making. Neither did their slaves. Whereas Africans arrived in America with 
knowledge of rice production, knowledge South Carolina planters quickly put to use, Africans 
had no prior experience with naval stores. Producers did not know the best wood to use and, as 
North Carolina Governor Gabriel Johnston suspected, fired their kilns to such high temperatures 
that all of the wood’s juices came out with the tar.44
The colonial assemblies addressed the problem of colonial tar quality through legislation.
The first attempts actually predated the bounty. A 1698 Virginia General Assembly measure
%
43 Crittenden, Commerce o f North Carolina. 58.
44 Martin, “American Gum Naval Stores Industry,” 62; Cox et al., This Well-Wooded 
Land. 17; Snow, “Naval Stores in Colonial Virginia,” 83; Lee, Lower Cape Fear. 53; Hautala, 
“European and American Tar,” 58.
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created a penalty for marketing unclean or inferior-quality tar and pitch. Producers were subject 
to a twenty-shilling fine for each barrel of unacceptable pitch and ten shillings for each barrel of 
low-quality tar. The same act also established a standard-size naval stores barrel and created an 
inspection system. In 1705 the Assembly passed a similar measure. Continued complaints, 
however, suggest the legislation had little effect. A North Carolina act, much like Virginia's, 
stipulated that naval stores barrels were to be made of seasoned staves, bound by at least twelve 
strong hoops, and contain thirty-two gallons. As in Virginia, North Carolina’s law produced very 
little regulatory activity. Virginia again tried in 1720, this time offering its own bounty on top of 
that already paid by Britain for tar made according to the east country method. Two shillings per 
thirty-two gallon barrel were to be paid provided the tar was made on land belonging to the 
producer. Yet, nothing changed.45
Enterprising colonists attempted to evade criticism of their tar by making pitch from it 
and marketing that product instead. Good pitch could be produced from even the poorest-quality 
tar, but pitch did not bring the profits that tar returned. One barrel o f pitch required two barrels 
of tar, thus reducing the quantity of marketable goods by half. Since the bounty for tar and pitch 
were the same, four pounds per ton, half of the potential profits were lost by making pitch. From 
the colonists’ perspective, however, receiving one half payment for their pitch was better than 
receiving nothing for the tar that the Navy rejected as substandard. The threat of rejection was 
real. In 1707, alone, the Navy refused to pay the bounty on six thousand barrels of Iow-quaiity 
tar. Another advantage o f pitch was that its shipping costs were half that o f tar. Shipping firms 
favored hauling pitch over tar because tar had a tendency to leak from its barrels and ruin other 
merchandise during the voyage. Some colonies, including North Carolina, did not export pitch. 
Yet Virginia and South Carolina did and in such quantities that for some years England received
45 Crittenden, Commerce of North Carolina. 51, 57; Snow, “Naval Stores in Colonial 
Virginia,” 88.
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more pitch than tar from the North American colonies. (Shipments to the West Indies contained 
more tar than pitch.) This export pattern did not serve the purpose England had intended for the 
bounty because Britain’s shipyards needed more tar than they did pitch. Furthermore, colonial 
pitch production contradicted the mercantilist economic policy. England, not the colonies was 
supposed to refine goods.46
The British Navy expressed disgust at the excessive expense of the bounty program, the 
poor-quality tar they received at this high cost, and the colonists’ shift to pitch production. 
Between 1705 and 1724, the Navy paid a yearly average of £18,703 for colonial naval stores. In 
years of active production the cost ran considerably higher—£27,410 in 1716 and £52,011 in 
1718. Many British administrators advocated an end to the bounty system, favoring acquisition 
of naval stores supplies from the troublesome Baltic suppliers. Despite opposition, Parliament 
finally succeeded in renewing the bounty act in 1713 for eleven more years. By the early 1720s, 
tar quality had still not improved and prospects for the act’s renewal at the end of 1724 appeared 
bleak. With the approaching bounty renewal threatened by mounting criticism, Parliament 
passed an act in 1722, to take effect on September 29, 1724, that would exclude from the bounty 
program any tar not made by the Swedish method. Some colonial producers fought 
unsuccessfully for the act’s repeal. Others attempted the required method, but, unfamiliar with 
the technique, barked all the way around the trunk, essentially girdling it, causing the tree’s 
death. Parliament’s attempt to change procedure succeeded no better than earlier colonial 
efforts, little more green tar found its way to England, and the Navy continued to complain. The 
act’s greatest effect was to reduce naval stores production in areas with high labor costs—the 
northern colonies, South Carolina, and the Cape Fear region-and to push it into areas settled by
46 Airaksinen, “Tar Production,” 123; Hautala, “European and American Tar,” 64-68; 
Snow, “Naval Stores in Colonial Virginia,” 92.
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poorer colonists where labor was cheaper, including the region surrounding North Carolina’s 
Albemarle Sound.47
Throughout 1724, representatives of the tar issue’s two sides refused to compromise and 
on January 1, 1725, the bounty expired. Over the next few years colonial naval stores exports to 
England dropped nearly sixty percent, from 81,003 barrels in 1725 to 66,667 barrels in 1726 to 
34.277 barrels in 1727. The colonies simply could not compete with the Baltic states’ lower 
production and shipping costs. The colonists carried a seven-shillings-per-barrel labor expense, 
but in Finland the cost was only four shillings. Colonists paid eight shillings per barrel in freight 
charges; shipping from Finland was but half as much. Other costs were roughly the same. But 
the higher labor and shipping costs made a barrel o f colonial tar seven and one half shillings 
more expensive to produce and transport than a barrel of Finnish tar. The bounty had provided a 
payment of ten shillings per barrel, a payment that more than compensated for the colonists’ 
disadvantage. With its disappearance, Russia and Sweden, who offered a better product at a 
cheaper price, resumed their exports to Britain. In the absence of competition from the English 
colonies, Sweden raised its prices. In addition, the English shipping business suffered with the 
colonial naval stores industry’s decline since British vessels lost the extra business that the naval 
stores bounty had generated. In part to end the shipping depression, Parliament restored the 
bounty in 1729.48
The new bounty act paid a subsidy payment for colonial naval stores, but on terms more 
acceptable to the Navy. Tar made using the Swedish method received four pounds per ton, but
47 Williams, “English Mercantilism,” 181, 183; Hautala, “European and American Tar,” 
48, 61; Snow, “Naval Stores in Colonial Virginia,” 83; Martin, “American Gum Naval Stores 
Industry,” 53.
48 Williams, “English Mercantilism,” 175, 179, 184; Herndon, “Naval Stores in Colonial 
Georgia,” 427; Snow, “Naval Stores in Colonial Virginia,” 86; Hautala, “European and 
American Tar,” 46,48.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
the act reduced payment for common tar to two pounds, four shillings per ton, and the payment 
for pitch to one pound per ton. Furthermore, only the lowest-quality tar, the last half to emerge 
from the kiln, could be made into pitch. One pound, ten shillings was paid for every ton of 
turpentine. In sum, the new act attempted to tailor production to England’s needs. It encouraged 
higher-quality tar, reduced the reward for making common tar, and made pitch production a 
practice of last resort with only the worst tar. The act made specific requirements about how tar 
was collected from the kiln. It insisted that producers catch the tar in a cask as it ran from the 
kiln, not collect it in a hole in the ground as was the common practice. These casks were to be 
covered to prevent rain from mixing with the tar. The act also called for products to be shipped 
in lots of eight barrels, each barrel holding thirty-two gallons and constructed of seasoned staves, 
well-hooped, bunged at the sight of production, and to be kept in the shade or a cool place until 
shipped. Finally, the act used stiff penalties to discourage violation o f its provisions. A tar 
maker could lose half his product for breaching the act’s requirements. For the remainder of the 
colonial period Parliament unfailingly renewed the bounty act, once in 1742, again in 1750, and 
for the last time in 1758.49
Within a decade of the 1729 act’s passage, a large percentage of American naval stores 
were accepted on par with those from the Baltic states, not because the new bounty act’s 
combination of punishments and incentives achieved the desired result, but rather, because the 
quality of Swedish tar went down. Turmoil generated by the Great Northern War so greatly 
disrupted the Swedish tar industry that by the conflict’s end few former producers successfully 
reestablished their trade and within a short time the traditional tar-making practices were largely 
forgotten. Also, the Tar Company went out o f business in 1714 and with it went its strict
49 Williams, “English Mercantilism,” 184; Snow, “Naval Stores in Colonial Virginia,” 
86-87; A. K. Thurmond, Jr., “The Early American Naval Stores Industry,” Olustee Experiment 
Station Files, Georgia Agrirama, Tifton Georgia, 6; Hautala, “European and American Tar,” 44.
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standards and efficient quality inspections. Finally in 1734, in an effort to save the country’s 
remaining forest resources, the Swedish government declared that tar was to be manufactured 
only from stumps, roots, and trees that had blown down. In other words, Swedish tar was now to 
be made by the same method used in the American colonies. Kustaa Hautala, a Finnish scholar 
of international commerce, explains that “since the quality of Finnish tar was not much better 
than that of American tar at the beginning of the 18th century, it is no wonder that the latter 
captured the English market.”50
With the bounty’s return and the Swedish industry’s decline, the colonial naval stores 
industry quickly rebounded. England received 33,062 barrels from the colonies in 1730,47,541 
in 1731, and 70,428 in 1732. But these exports did not come from South Carolina and the Cape 
Fear area as they had before the bounty act’s lapse at the end of 1724. In the southern portion of 
South Carolina, the Yamasee War of 1715 had already disrupted naval stores production. Many 
producers in other regions o f the Carolinas had purchased slaves on credit to take advantage of 
the high naval stores prices resulting from the bounty. When the subsidies stopped, these 
indebted slave masters faced ruin unless they could find another way to put their slaves to 
profitable employment. At least one South Carolinian attempted to provoke the British 
mercantilists by warning that if the bounties were not continued, the slaves who had labored to 
make tar could be diverted to industries that competed with England. Although this threat was 
never carried out, South Carolina did reduce naval stores manufacturing and turned its slaves’ 
energy toward increased rice production. The cultivation of rice continued after 1729 because at 
the same time Parliament revived the naval stores subsidy, it also repealed restrictions on the rice 
trade. Where before South Carolina had to export rice to other countries through England, it 
could now ship it directly to other markets, especially Southern Europe, where demand for rice
50 Hautala, “European and American Tar,” 63-64.
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was high. In the 1740s indigo offered another alternative to naval stores, especially after 1748 
when Parliament placed a subsidy of six pence per pound on indigo shipped directly to England. 
The naval stores bounty act’s premium o f four pounds per ton for green tar could not compete 
with these more profitable uses for slave labor. In 1748 Charleston exported only 5,521 barrels 
of pitch, 3,075 barrels o f tar, and 2,387 barrels of turpentine, a decline o f forty-one percent from 
1741 and a drop of almost seventy-five percent from 1738. While tar and pitch production in 
South Carolina never ended entirely, that colony’s tar exports dropped in both relative and 
absolute figures and remained low for the remainder o f the colonial period.51 "South 
Carolinians,” one historian explains, “believed that they had better things to do.”52 For the same 
reasons that it declined in South Carolina, naval stores production also declined in the Cape Fear 
region, which also switched to rice and indigo as well as tobacco.53
Yet North Carolina’s naval stores exports, as a whole, increased during the late colonial 
era. The industry’s center shifted northward into the counties surrounding the Albemarle Sound. 
The Albemarle area, settled for roughly sixty years by 1725, had a relatively sparse population. 
The area’s small farmers and backwoodsmen owned few slaves and contributed little to the 
colony’s staple export trade except limited amounts of tobacco. Living among the longleaf 
pines, however, they could use their own labor to make and bum tar kilns and tap trees for raw 
turpentine. Reduced competition from the wealthy slave owners to the south and the renewed 
bounty on tar made production o f these commodities profitable for Albemarle settlers, who
51 Williams, “English Mercantilism,” 176, 181; Weir. Colonial South Carolina. 108, 149- 
150; Lee, Lower Cape Fear. 97; Hautala, “European and American Tar,” 79-81, 163; “The 
Manufacture of Turpentine in the South,” The Commercial Review of the South and West 8 
(May 1850): 451.
52 Weir, Colonial South Carolina. 145.
53Powell. North Carolina. 131-134.
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heretofore had made only limited quantities.54 Because northeastern North Carolinians lacked 
the capital resources to invest in large slave labor forces and huge timber tracts, they 
manufactured naval stores on a small, almost casual level, performing most of the work 
themselves, and often using timber they did not own.
Not only did naval stores producers in the Albemarle region lack the financial means to 
develop large operations, they faced the challenge of transporting their goods to the open sea. 
The Albemarle region possessed no significant water courses, such as the Cape Fear River, 
which could connect it to a port facility accessible to ocean-going ships. Exasperated ship 
captains had to ply its smallish rivers, picking up barrels of naval stores from the many small 
landings that dotted the banks. Even the largest Albemarle port, Edenton, could be reached from 
the Atlantic only with considerable time and difficulty.55 In the 1780s Johann David Schoepf, a 
German traveling through the confederation, described this challenge:
The road which ships must take coming in from the sea by the navigable and best 
channels is as much as 180 miles long, although the town itself is not more than 35-40 
miles from the sea in a direct line. There would be a shorter passage if the 
Roanoke and other inlets were navigable for vessels even of a moderate tonnage.
Coming in, vessels must first pass the Occacock Bar, where at high tide there is no 
more than 13 ft. water, and then there lies in the way another bank, 2-3 miles wide, 
called the Swash, consisting of firm sand, and a t  the highest tide giving a depth o f only 9 
ft. Ships, therefore, often take 8-12 days entering and clearing the Sound, at times must 
wait months for a favorable opportunity, and then are subject to the very inconvenience 
of lading and unlading at a distance from the town by means of lighters. And when at 
last a ship is freighted and past all obstacles, shortly after getting into the ocean the Gulf 
Stream must be contended with, which in this latitude approaches very near the main­
land.”56
54 Hautala, “European and American Tar,” 82; W . W. Ashe, The Forests. Forest Lands, 
and Forest Products o f Eastern North Carolina (Raleigh: North Carolina Geological Survey, 
1894), 18; Lefler and Newsome, North Carolina. 90,113; W. Neil Franklin, “Agriculture in 
Colonial North Carolina.” The North Carolina HistoricaJ Review 3 (October 1926): 553-554.
55 Merrens, Colonial North Carolina. 91, 106.
56 Johann David Schoepf, Travels in the Confederation (New York: Burt Franklin, 1968),
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Shipping challenges encouraged a concentration on naval store production by preventing 
commercial lumber operations from developing in the Albemarle region as they had along the 
Cape Fear River.57 “It is found much more profitable,” the author of American Husbandry 
explained, “to apply the timber they cut down to this use [turpentine] than to saw it or export it in 
any kind of lumber; and the tar &c. being far more valuable in proportion to bulk, is a 
circumstance of great importance in a country that does not abound with good ports.”58 
Moreover, the expensive mill equipment was well beyond the means of the relatively poor 
Albemarle settlers.
Some producers near the Virginia boarder preferred to transport their naval stores to 
Norfolk for shipping. The volume of this traffic reached such a high level that Virginia, which 
remained a relatively unimportant tar-producing colony itself, generated revenue from North 
Carolina naval stores by charging a duty of eighteen pence on each barrel of pitch and twelve 
pence on each barrel o f  tar that left the colony.59
From the mid eighteenth century to the Revolution, the naval stores industry spread 
southward from the Albemarle region, into the Washington and New Bern areas, and slowly 
migrated up the Tar and Neuse Rivers. In 1811, Jeremy Battle explained that settlers from 
around the Albemarle region introduced naval stores production in Edgecombe County, through 
which the Tar River flowed. “The natives of this county . . .  would have starved,” he argued,
“had they been possessed of no other means of subsistence. Emigrants from Virginia and the 
northeastern Counties o f this State, settled on these barren lands, and converted the pines into
57 Merrens, Colonial North Carolina. 99.
58 Carman, American Husbandry. 245.
59 Ashe, Forests. Forest Lands, and Forest Products. 18; Snow, “Naval Stores in Colonial 
Virginia,” 91-92.
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meat, bread and money.”60 This area east o f the Pamlico Sound remained the heart of North 
American naval stores production until the mid-nineteenth century. In the Albennarle region 
production declined so that by the end of the eighteenth century it produced little naval stores. 
Virginia naval stores production, only a small part o f that colony’s economy, also declined. In 
1743, England received approximately eight thousand barrels of tar and pitch out of the ten 
thousand made in Virginia. But from October 1764 to October 1765 only four hundred, seventy 
left the upper James River area.61
Like the upper Albermarle area and Virginia, other regions of North America produced 
limited quantities of naval stores but failed to sustain an important and lasting industry. Georgia, 
not settled until the 1730s, included these commodities among its exports, but never approached 
North Carolina’s volume. During Georgia’s trustee period, which lasted until 1753, its officials 
considered sending representatives to North Carolina to learn the trade of tar and pitch 
production. Nothing came of the plan, however, and it was not until later in the decade that the 
colony began shipping naval stores. By then the colony’s ban on slavery was lifted, and 
Georgians, like South Carolinians, found rice and indigo cultivation to be the most profitable 
employment for their slaves.62 Georgia consequently exported only small quantities of naval 
stores, their manufacture confined to coastal areas and lands adjacent to the major rivers. The 
second half of the 1760s saw the beginning o f a trend toward proportionately greater tar 
production. In fact, by the last two years before the Revolution, tar exports exceeded pitch by
60 Quoted in Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789- 
1861” ( Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 232.
61 Ashe, Forests. Forest Lands, and Forest Products. 18; Snow, “Naval Stores in Colonial 
Virginia,” 92-93.
62 Many of the largest slaveholders in colonial Georgia were South Carolinians who had 
moved southward with their slaves seeking new lands. Herndon, “Naval Stores in Colonial 
Georgia,” 428, 430; Betty Wood, Slavery in Colonial Georgia (Athens, GA: University of 
Georgia Press, 1984), 65; Cox et al., This Well-Wooded Land. 18.
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nearly a third. In 1766 the Georgia legislature, concerned that the colony’s tar, pitch, and 
turpentine could not compete in the English market, passed an act requiring that the colony’s 
naval stores meet the standards set by the 1729 bounty act. To ensure compliance, the law called 
for inspection of all naval stores before they were loaded aboard ships and levied a five-shilling 
fine for each barrel that was not up to standard. Despite these efforts, Georgia’s naval stores 
business remained small. From 1755 to 1775, Georgia only exported a yearly average o f only 
220 barrels of tar, 149 barrels of pitch, and 44 barrels o f  turpentine.6'’
Florida and Louisiana, both colonial possessions of various European countries until the 
nineteenth century, experienced considerable difficulty with their respective naval stores trades. 
At the turn of the eighteenth century, the time when Britain experienced its most urgent need for 
a colonial naval stores supplier, Spain was also seeking a source. In a memorial to the King of 
Spain, probably written in 1700, the curate rector o f St. Augustine reported that not only did 
Florida possess “a diversity of woods” suitable for masts, posts, and yards, but already “a very 
good pitch and tar necessary for the careening of the frigates and vessels o f your majesty and the 
rest of the vessels o f the presidio is made in the land.. . . ” He admitted that the products were 
not as good as those available in Europe, “because the master is not very expert in the science 
and thus it is a little thick.. . . ” Transporting the Florida naval stores to Cuba for the readying of 
ships, the rector believed, could save the crown the cost o f shipping them from Europe.64 Spain 
did not take swift action in this matter, by the 1730s administers were still attempting to 
implement the policy. In 1757, however, another governor developed an independent naval 
stores operation and with the King’s endorsement shipped his goods to Havana. The Spanish
63 Herndon, “Naval Stores in Colonial Georgia,” 428-431; I. Jams Pikl, A History of 
Georgia Forestry (Athens, GA: Bureau of Business and Economic Research, University of 
Georgia, 1966), 4.
64 John H. Hann, “Translation of Alonso De Leturiondo’s Memorial to the King of 
Spain.” Florida Archaeology. n.s. 2 (1996): 195-196.
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crown sought to encourage their export by allowing naval stores into Vera-Cruz duty free.65 
Further evidence of Spanish Florida tar and pitch production comes from William Bartram’s 
report on his travels through America in the 1770s. While walking near Mobile Bay, then part of 
West Florida, he observed “three vast iron pots or kettles, each of many hundred gallons 
contents.. . . ” He was informed that “they were for the purpose of boiling tar to pitch, there 
being vast forests of Pine trees in the vicinity of this place.”66 Although the Spanish were most 
interested in tar and pitch, chipped faces discovered deep in the hearts of Florida pines indicate 
that before 1750 turpentine production had also begun.67
French administrators in colonial Louisiana also struggled to stimulate naval stores 
production. In the early eighteenth century, Governor Bienville recommended that France would 
offer subsidies, transportation, and a guarantee to purchase tar, pitch, and turpentine as well as 
import slaves to make them. Some production started. Bienville reported in 1734 that three or 
four tar works operated across Lake Pontchartrain from New Orleans. When the French crown 
cut the price it paid for naval stores by half, however, production slowed. As in the English 
colonies, higher returns from alternative staples drew efforts away from naval stores. Tobacco 
and indigo cultivation increasingly consumed the energy of slave laborers, as these products 
replaced naval stores in the crowded hulls o f  merchant ships. In fact, the merchants’ preference 
for products other than naval stores was so great that, despite offering advances and preferences 
to shippers for carrying naval stores, the colonial government found cargo space inadequate.
Naval stores stock began overcrowding warehouses. Through the 1740s the importance o f  naval
65 Robert S. Blount, Spirits of Turpentine: A History of Florida Naval Stores. 1528 to 
1950 (Tallahassee: Florida Agricultural Museum, 1993), 8.
66 Bartram, Travels. 339.
67 Florida Writers’ Project, “The Story of Naval Stores . . . , ” Florida Highways 11 (May 
1943): 12.
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stores declined as shipments of indigo, rice, cotton, timber, and pelts rose.68 Under Spanish rule, 
which lasted in Louisiana from the 1760s to the beginning of the nineteenth century, demand for 
the colony’s tar and pitch rose. Local consumers purchased some of these products. One 
enterprising New Orleans builder fashioned roofs using resin, oyster shell, and two types o f 
tile.69 However, it appears that no turpentine production developed.70 With only moderately 
successful efforts to develop naval stores production in Georgia, Florida, and Louisiana, North 
Carolina remained the manufacturing center o f tar, pitch, and turpentine in America.
By the 1760s the center of colonial naval stores production in North America was 
located between North Carolina’s Pamlico Sound and the Cape Fear River. The area’s poor soil 
could not support extensive agriculture, but its expansive pine forests offered its residents a 
means of support. A traveler in the 1780s described the region as “a wide extended dead flat, 
covered in a thousand places with stagnated water.” But, he continued, “this land that appears,
68 Jack D. L. Holmes, “Naval Stores in Colonial Louisiana and the Floridas,” Louisiana 
Studies 7 (Winter 1968): 295-300.
69 Ibid., 301.
70 In February 1773, Bernard Romans sailed into New Orleans “there being a necessity 
for some turpentine on board of the vessel.. .  the Captain was obliged to pay sixteen dollars for a 
half cask of it, and i have been informed, that even then it was sold in that town for medical uses 
at a great price by the pint and quart.” Bernard Romans, A Concise Natural History of East and 
West Florida (Gainesville: University of Florida Press. 1962), 150. In 1797, Governor 
Carondelet granted permission for a resourceful producer to use his slaves to make tar and pitch 
from pines that had fallen down on an island considered royal land. Carondelet to Don Pedro 
Olivier, Feb. 2, 1797, Archivo Central de Indias, Cuba 24, fol. 183. Louisiana continued to make 
tar and pitch into its American territorial period, but still no turpentine. During his travels 
through Louisiana from 1803 to 1805, C.C. Robin observed that in the areas around Lake 
Pontchartrain “the most lucrative industry of the region.. .  is the manufacture of pitch which 
requires fewer men than would agriculture.” Robin does not indicate which method of tar 
production was used, but he does describe a unique method o f making pitch. According to him, 
“iron balls are heated red hot and thrown into the collected pitch, which bursts into flames with a 
loud explosion and throws off a thick smoke. When the pitch is judged to be concentrated 
enough, the pits are covered with a screen which is then covered with turf. The fire is smothered, 
the tar then cools and hardens. It is cut out with an ax.” C. C. Robin, Voyage to Louisiana (New 
Orleans: Pelican Publishing Company, 1966), 29.
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and actually is, totally barren and altogether useless and unfit for any kind of culture, yields more
profit to the occupiers, from the smallest capital imaginable, than can well be conceived-----
This prodigious profit is derived from making tar, which is one of the most estimable staples of 
North Carolina.”71 Another observer, surprised to find so few “plantations scattered about in 
these woods at various distances, 3-6 miles, and often as much as 10-15-20 miles apart,” reported 
that rather than staple agriculture “it is the forest which supplies the present inhabitants o f North 
Carolina not merely an occupation and a support, but the means as well o f an easier life and often 
considerable estates.”72 The author of American Husbandry was not so well impressed with the 
promises of naval stores. For him, that “pitch, tar, and turpentine are made throughout this 
province in vast quantities[, was].. .  a proof, among others, that the country is very far from 
being well settled even yet.”73
Not only did counties between the Pamlico Sound and the Cape Fear River have a higher 
concentration of longleaf pines than the Albemarle area, its forests were closer to more 
accessible port facilities. The ports o f Beaufort and Brunswick, both offered easier access to the 
open sea than Edenton, together handled approximately seventy-five percent of the total naval 
stores exports from North Carolina, and the greatest portion o f these exports from North 
America.74 Yet despite the importance of these two ports in the naval stores trade, their overall 
size and total export volume paled in comparison to others such as Charleston and the northern 
ports. A Frenchman traveling through Beaufort in 1765 could not have been less enthusiastic 
about the town. He reported it was “a Small village not above 12 houses, the inhabitants seem
71 Smyth, Tour in the United States. 94-95.
72 Schoepf, Travels in the Confederation. 103.
73 Carman, American Husbandry. 244.
74 Merrens, Colonial North Carolina. 88-89.
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miserable, they are very lasy and Indolent, they live mostly on fish and oisters, which they have 
here in great plenty.” As for the harbor, “Non but small vessels Can come here there being but 
13 feet water on the bar at low water, the tide does not rise above 4 feet, the little trade that is 
Caryed on here Consists in terpentine, tar and pich.”75
North Carolina made naval stores, especially tar, its specialty. In 1768 England imported 
one hundred, thirty-five thousand barrels of tar, pitch, and turpentine from her colonies, around 
sixty percent from North Carolina. In 1769 North Carolina exported 63,301 barrels of tar and 
pitch. The same year Virginia exported only 23,365 barrels, much of which was actually made in 
North Carolina and shipped through Norfolk. South Carolina exported 10,531 barrels, Georgia 
653 barrels, and Maryland only 24 barrels. By 1775, North Carolina alone exported 130,000 
barrels of naval stores. This volume made the bounty program increasingly expensive for the 
navy. Between 1730 and 1750 the annual subsidy averaged £17,000 and by the 1750s rose to 
£24,000. Between 1763 and 1776 the annual average rose again to just under £34,000. Colonists 
no longer tried to compensate for poor quality tar by making it into pitch. By the late colonial 
period the percentage of pitch as part of naval stores export had dropped dramatically, down to 
only seven percent by 1771. Although tar dominated naval stores shipments, turpentine, 
nevertheless, represented a significant commodity o f North Carolina. Most often it was shipped 
in its raw form. In 1785 Port Brunswick exported nineteen thousand barrels of crude turpentine 
and only twelve barrels of distilled spirits.76
Despite the 1729 bounty act’s measures aimed at improving naval stores quality, the 
export of substandard and adulterated products continued to worry colonial officials. In a 1735 
letter to North Carolina’s Governor Johnston, a group of concerned gentlemen requested that he
75 “Journal of a French Traveler in the Colonies,” 773.
76 Williams, “English Mercantilism,” 176, 185; Merrens, Colonial North Carolina. 86; 
Hautala, “European and American Tar,” 69,79,85; Crittenden, Commerce of North Carolina. 54.
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suggest to “the Assembly that some proper regulations might be enacted as rules for making Tar 
throughout the Province and a proper person or persons appointed to inspect the several kilns that
penalties might be inflicted on such o f them who transgress the said rules ” They feared that
“if the Tar of your Province should be brought into disrepute by the burning quality of it none of 
it will be exported from thence and that Manufacture will be quite lost to those of your Province 
who now maintain themselves thereby.”77 In 1751 the colonial assembly passed a law regulating 
exports from the Cape Fear River, later applied to all ports, that provided for inspection o f goods 
before shipment to ensure that they conformed to quality, weight, and packaging standards. Only 
marketable casks, each bearing the producer’s initials, were to be exported. Each county court 
was responsible for appointing inspectors for its own jurisdiction, but because county judges 
were sometimes naval stores producers themselves, the inspectors integrity rarely rose above 
suspicion.78 In a March 1770 memorial to the Earl of Hillsborough, British tar, pitch, and 
turpentine importers expressed their concern over the poor monitoring o f North Carolina naval 
stores quality. The colonies’ refusal to enforce standards, they argued, resulted from “the 
Officers and Inspectors being appointed by the Magistrates of the different Counties.. .  such
Magistrates being Planters and Tar Burners ”79 The British recommended the usual
remedies: only the second half of tar should be made into pitch, official inspection of kilns, 
better-made tar barrels, cleaner turpentine, and finally, pitch fully-made in kettles. Despite these 
continued efforts, green tar represented only a minor portion of the colony’s naval stores exports
77 Fitz. Walker, et. al. to Governor Johnson, 12 September 1735, The Colonial Records 
o f North Carolina, vol. 4, ed. William L. Saunders (Raleigh: P. M. Hale, Printer to the State,
1886), 16.
78 Lee, Lower Cane Fear. 153; Crittenden, Commerce of North Carolina. 57.
79 The Memorial o f Messrs. Bridgen & Waller and Hindley & Needham Merchants 
Trading to North Carolina and Importers o f Naval Stores to the Earl of Hillsborough, 31 March 
1770, The Colonial Records o f North Carolina, vol. 8, ed. William Saunders (Raleigh: Josephus 
Daniels, Printer to the State, 1890), 189.
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on the eve of the Revolution. O f the 82,075 barrels of tar exported from the colonies in 1770. 
only 653 barrels, less that one percent, contained green tar.80
Colonial administrators also attempted to deal with the problem o f unscrupulous 
producers who made naval stores from trees on land they did not own. As early as 1717,
Virginia passed a law that anyone manufacturing naval stores from material taken from crown 
lands for which they had no intention to patent and pay quitrents would be guilty of trespass.
The problem arose in North Carolina as well, especially after 1730 when small producers, who 
owned little land, began production in the Albemarle area.81 In 1738 Henry McCulloh 
complained to the Board o f Trade in London that “it has been a practice o f long standing in the 
Colony [North Carolina] for people to Box pine trees for Turpentine and bum light wood for 
Pitch and Tarr without taking out Patterns for the Lands the Govemour has been much censured 
for the preventing this—  .” McCulloh requested that the board support the governor in his effort 
to collect quitrent on this property.82 As late as 1772 North Carolina Governor Josiah Martin 
issued a proclamation addressing a similar problem. According to the governor, unprincipled 
colonists “have made frequent practice of entering Tracts of Land in the Secretarys Office and 
immediately set down on the same—carried off the timber and burnt the Iightwood without 
further prosecuting their claim to a patent for the said Land ”83
By the end o f the colonial period naval stores had become North Carolina’s most 
important export. In 1769 North Carolina’s total export tonnage amounted to 23,113, of which
80 Ibid., 187-190; Crittenden, Commerce of North Carolina. 57; Martin, “American Gum 
Naval Stores Industry,” 56-57; Hautala, “European and American Tar,” 62-63.
81 Snow, “Naval Stores in Colonial Virginia,” 82; Merrens, Colonial North Carolina. 89.
82 Proclamation from Governor Martin, “American Gum Naval Stores Industry,” to King 
George III, 26 May, 1772, The Colonial Records of North Carolina, vol. 9, ed. William L. 
Saunders (Raleigh: Josephus Daniels, Printer to the State, 1890), 294-295.
83 Ibid.
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more than half went to Great Britain and Ireland. Naval stores, the colony’s number one export, 
was valued at £42,000. Although the export of all goods from six other colonies—Massachusetts, 
Virginia, Pennsylvania, New York, Maryland, and South Carolina—exceeded North Carolina’s, 
North Carolina exported seventy percent of tar from the North American colonies, more than 
Fifty percent of the turpentine, and twenty percent of the pitch. Ports servicing the Cape Fear 
Basin—Brunswick and Wilmington—saw the most overall trade activity o f any of North 
Carolina’s ports, handling a total tonnage of 8,500, and shipping the largest volume of naval 
stores. Port Roanoke, which handled the entire Albemarle region’s trade—6,000 total tons in 
1769—was the colony’s next busiest port and ranked behind Brunswick and Wilmington in naval 
stores exports. The other three important ports—Beaufort, Bath, and Currituck—shipped a 
combined total o f 8541 tons in 1769 but considerably smaller quantities of naval stores.84 
Although tar, pitch, and turpentine represented significantly important commodities for a colony 
that possessed so few export staples, North Carolinians relied too heavily on them. As historian 
Lawrence Lee observes, “by unduly concentrating their energy on naval stores, they built their 
economy on a flimsy foundation o f bounties that might be discontinued, and on a narrow and 
distant market over which they had no control.”85
84 Crittenden, Commerce of North Carolina. 41-41, 70-73.
85 Despite North Carolina’s specialization in naval stores, the colony did export a few 
other goods. Timber products, although not enumerated like naval stores, retained their 
importance. North Carolina ranked only behind Massachusetts in lumber exports, and held first 
place among the southern colonies. The Cape Fear Valley, which by the end of the colonial 
period possessed around fifty sawmills, produced most of the colony’s exported lumber. The 
amount was considerable. Average annual exports before the revolution ranged between 2.5 
million and 3 million feet. Seventy to seventy-five percent o f  the colony’s lumber passed 
through Port Brunswick. Staves, commonly cut from oak, came from areas with considerable 
bottom lands in whose wet soil conditions these trees grew best. Similarly, shingles, most often 
crafted from white cedar and cypress because these woods are light, soft, and resistant to 
dampness, originated from swampy areas where the trees could be found in greatest abundance. 
The Albemarle region’s slight dominance of this market may be attributed to the area’s many 
swampy environments. Cox et al., This Well-Wooded Land. 19; Lee, Lower Cape Fear. 149-150, 
169; Merrens, Colonial North Carolina. 93-94,99, 101-105; Crittenden, Commerce of North 
Carolina. 39; Lefler and Newsome, North Carolina. 71.
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The American Revolution created volatility in colonial naval stores trade and production, 
but Britain possibly suffered more than the United States. As early as August 1774 the first 
North Carolina Provincial Congress, which was called to elect delegates to the Continental 
Congress, drew up a set o f resolutions criticizing British colonial policies. One resolve 
threatened “That unless American Grievances are redressed before the first day of October 1775, 
We will not after that day directly or indirectly export Tobacco, Pitch, Tar, Turpentine, or any 
other articles whatsoever, to Great Britain, nor will we sell any such articles as we think can be
exported to Great Britain ”*6 When bounty payment to the colonies ended in 1776, North
Carolinians, free from the navigation acts that had restricted colonial trade, found markets for 
their products in other countries and colonies. It appears that tar remained profitable, each 
laborer, according to one report, generating “from one hundred pounds, to two hundred pounds 
sterling, and upwards, annually.”87 Britain, however, suffered a naval stores shortage. American 
tar and pitch exports to Britain dropped from 87,152 barrels in 1774 to 78,358 in 1775, and then 
to 4,823 in 1776, and to 216 in 1777. So desperate were the British for naval stores, the Second 
Continental Congress feared that the Redcoats might attempt to capture the sizable stash of these 
supplies at the Wilmington port. On May 21, 1777, it advised that that these products be either 
transported to a more secure area or destroyed before they could fall into British hands. Nothing 
apparently came of the perceived threat and the British navy was forced to obtain its badly 
needed supplies from the sources it had tried to free itself from decades earlier, Scandinavia and 
Russia. The rise in naval stores imports from Sweden, Russia, and Denmark corresponded with 
the falling of colonial trade. In 1774, British tar and pitch imports from these three countries
86 “Resolutions o f the First Provincial Congress, August 27,1774,” quoted in Hugh 
Talmage Lefler, ed., North Carolina History Told bv Contemporaries (Chapel Hill: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 1948), 97.
87 Smyth, Tour in the United States. 95.
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were only 6,900, 5,340, and 945 respectively. But by 1776 they had risen to 27,929, 17,397, and 
1,704 and reached their high in 1781 with imports of 73,079, 43.123. and 8,606.“
Britain attempted to secure at least a portion of its badly needed naval stores from 
Florida, which it had take possession of in 1763 as part o f the agreement ending the Seven Years 
War. Despite Britain’s early efforts to encourage naval stores production and population growth 
in its new colony, by 1776 only approximately three thousand settlers lived in Florida, they made 
tar and pitch in only small quantities. During the American Revolution, however, loyalists from 
Georgia and South Carolina seeking political asylum and economic opportunity flooded into 
Florida. Between the war’s outbreak and 1784, Florida’s population grew to 17,000, as it rose, 
so did naval stores production. Florida made only 190 barrels of tar in 1776 but in one year 
output jumped to 2,241 barrels of tar and 417 barrels of pitch, and in 1778 it increased to 8100 
and 1980 barrels respectively. By 1783, the last year of British rule in Florida, the colony made
20,000 barrels of tar and turpentine, the production centered in the vicinity o f the St. Marys, 
Nassau, and especially the St. Johns Rivers.89 Florida colonists made tar in the same fashion as 
their counterparts in Carolina and Georgia did. In his natural history o f Florida, published in 
1775, Bernard Romans observed that “green tar has not yet been made in Florida.. .  [because] it 
was entirely unknown in the country.” Instead, tar was manufactured the common way, “by 
splitting the heart of the pitch pine, fallen dow n.. .  -”90 An active turpentine trade also developed 
over these years. In a pine forest four miles north o f St. Augustine, one producer used slaves to 
harvest turpentine from 25,000 trees. Another producer, John Imrie, made turpentine on 450
88 Gamble, “Early History,” 22; Thurmond, “Early American Naval Stores,” 6; Hautala, 
“European and American Tar,” 105-107.
89 Holmes, “Naval Stores,” 304; Historic Properties Survey of St. Johns County (St. 
Augustine, Florida: Historic St. Augustine Preservation Board, 1985), 23.
90 Romans, Concise Natural History. 149-150.
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acres along Moultre Creek in northeastern Florida.91 Because Britain no longer received naval 
stores from the rebellious colonies, Florida became its only source in North America. With the 
American patriots’ success sealed upon Cornwallis’ surrender at Yorktown in 1781, Francis 
Philip Fatio reported to Britain in 1782 that “East Florida is now the only Province ofN . 
America belonging to the crown where Naval Stores can be made.”92 But, in 1783 Florida 
returned to Spain as part of the Treaty o f Paris and Britain lost this last colonial supplier.93
Following the Revolution, North Carolina continued its dominant role in American naval 
stores production and export, despite the absence of a bounty.94 Manufacturing recovered 
gradually. In 1785 North Carolina exported 56,000 barrels of naval stores, less than half the
128,000 barrels exported in 1768. By 1788 naval stores exports rose to 95,000 barrels. Tar
91 Imrie owned five hundred acres, four hundred, fifty o f which he used in his operation. 
Fourteen slaves labored to make his tar and turpentine, each slave tending an estimated 2,500 
trees and producing sixty barrels of turpentine. Along with turpentine, Imrie’s operation made 
three hundred to four hundred barrels o f tar a year. With the help of his slaves Imrie built for 
himself a wood-framed house, thirty feet by twenty feet and two stories high with two rooms on 
each floor. He also constructed a log house for his overseer, six or seven slave cabins, and a 
bam. Blount, Spirits o f Turpentine. 12; Stanley C. Bond, Jr., “The Development of the Naval 
Stores Industry in St. Johns County, Florida.” The Florida Anthropologist 40 (September 1987): 
195.
92 That forest depletion was already a concern is evident in Fatio’s claim that “experience 
has teached us how to remedy, to that vast destruction o f Timber by such Crops [turpentine].. . . ” 
To solve this problem Fatio recommended outlawing the setting of fires in pine forests, 
regulating boxing trees for turpentine, requiring a few trees be left on every acre for reseeding, 
and preventing hunters and cattlemen from burning over pine forests until the tree bases had been 
raked clear of weeds and debris. Francis Philip Fatio, “Considerations on the Importance o f the 
Province of East Florida to the British Empire,” December 14, 1782, transcript at St. Augustine 
Historical Society Research Library, St. Augustine, FL, 2.
93 As it did in the first Spanish period, Florida naval stores production suffered after
1783. Many of the British settlers who had entered Florida during the American Revolution left 
for other parts o f the Empire or returned to the United States. East Florida’s population fell to 
under 2000. Spanish administrators did little to encourage the new naval stores industry’s 
continuation and by 1787 only three tar and pitch producers remained. Blount, Spirits o f  
Turpentine. 14; Historic Properties Survey of St. Johns Countv. 25; Holmes, “Naval Stores,” 
304-305.
94 Crittenden, Commerce o f North Carolina. 160.
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remained the principal naval stores export product, followed by turpentine, pitch, and rosin (fig. 
1.1 ).9S As the quantity of production resumed, so did poor quality. In his history o f  North
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Figure 1.1. Exports ofTar, Pitch, Turpentine, and Rosin, 1789-1799 
^Numbers for 1794 not available.
Franklin B. Hough, Report Upon Forestry, vol. 2, (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1878), 333.
Carolina, published in 1812, Hugh Williamson, like the British during the colonial era, blamed 
inferior tar on the producer, who “performed every operation in the most hasty and slovenly 
manner” and on “unprincipled inspectors, who, instead of being broke by giving their sanction to 
imperfect produce, are apt to court popularity by passing the worst that comes.”96 The industry 
center appears to have moved back towards the Albermarle area. An increase in naval stores 
shipments through Port Roanoke and a decline through the state’s more southerly ports indicated
95 Ibid; Franklin B. Hough, Report Upon Forestry, vol. 2, (Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, 1880), 333.
96 Hugh Williamson, The History of North Carolina (Philadelphia: Thomas Dobson, 
1812), 213-214.
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a northward shift in production. Although the port at Brunswick saw its total export tonnage 
increase, its naval stores exports actually declined while Port Roanoke’s naval stores shipments 
almost doubled.97 At the same time, tobacco shipments from Brunswick and Beaufort increased 
over sixteen times from the late 1760s while Port Roanoke, which had lead in tobacco export, 
dropped to third place, Brunswick took its lead and Bath came in second. This pattern suggests 
that, as during the late 1720s when the bounty lapsed for four years, naval stores production 
declined in South Carolina and the Cape Fear region where slaveholders required profits 
adequate enough to cover their large investments in labor and moved into the northern half o f the 
state where slaves were fewer and labor was cheaper. The iate-eighteenth-century shift 
represented the industry’s center’s third movement since the 1700s, the first being from 
southeastern North Carolina to the Albermarle region, then from there to the area of the Neuse 
and Tar Rivers. In another change, the northern states replaced Great Britain as the principal 
buyer of North Carolina naval stores. The revival of American shipping, especially in New 
England, lead to this increased domestic consumption 98 By 1800 North Carolina was firmly 
established as the principal American naval stores producer and would continue to live up to its 
designation as the “Tar Heel State” for most of the nineteenth century.
North Carolina achieved this distinction, not solely because it possessed abundant 
longleaf pine trees, for expansive stands o f the species grew in other southern colonies, but 
because North Carolinians lacked any other staple they could produce profitably. England’s 
bounty, which compensated for the prohibitably high shipping costs from America, was required
97 Overall trade in the southeastern portion of the state was hurt by a sand bar, which 
blocked the Wilmington port during the 1780s and allowed no more than nine to ten feet o f  
clearance and limited shipping volume through the town. Schoepf reported that “larger ships 
must consequently first lighten cargo at Brunswick a litle place 16 miles from here.” Schoepf, 
Travels in the Confederation. 145.
98 Hautala, “European and American Tar,” 121,123.
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to stimulate colonial naval stores manufacturing. South Carolina and portions o f southeastern 
North Carolina manufactured tar, pitch, and turpentine until the bounty ended and changes in 
trade policies made rice and later indigo viable substitutes with even better returns. As Georgia’s 
economy developed in the mid eighteenth century, settlers there also preferred rice and indigo to 
naval stores. The same proved true in Florida and Louisiana, in North Carolina, however, tar, 
pitch, turpentine, and other forest products did not face competition from other staples. Except 
for tobacco, which grew well in the fertile eastern river bottom lands, and rice, which could be 
cultivated in the coastal region near Wilmington, North Carolina lacked any other profitable 
export commodity. Even though naval stores did not bring the returns that rice and indigo 
provided other colonies, the bounty, which continued uninterrupted from 1729 until the 
Revolution, made profits from them adequate enough to attract attention of producers who lacked 
the large slave labor forces to operate on the same grand scale as South Carolinas and settlers 
along the Cape Fear River. Although North Carolinians were able to produce some lumber from 
their pine forests, scarcity of water power for sawmills and the difficulty and high cost of 
transporting lumber made tar and pitch relatively more profitable. Also, naval stores 
manufacturing, especially tar making, which could be performed at any time o f the year, 
provided small farmers with a means to supplement their income, just as it did for Finnish 
farmers.99 With no competing export commodity, limited transportation opportunities, and 
seasonal flexibility in the production, “tar-making conditions,” as one scholar has explained, 
“were at their best in the Carolinas, especially in North Carolina.”100
99 Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Old South, 1790-1860,” The Journal 
of Southern History 34 (November 1968): 511; Martin, “American Gum Naval Stores Industry,” 
58-59; Airaksinen, “Tar Production,” 121; Schoenbaum, Islands. Capes, and Sounds. 225.
100 Airaksinen, “Tar Production,” 121.
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Chapter Two
North Carolina Trades Tar for Turpentine:
The Emergence of the Southern Turpentine Industry
During the antebellum period, turpentine developed into the most heavily demanded 
naval stores product and its rapid production increase drove the industry, which remained 
centered in North Carolina, to impressive heights. New uses and a growing need for turpentine 
following the American Revolution brought prices high enough to make gum and spirit 
production an appealing alternative to cotton cultivation for the southeastern North Carolina 
counties, whose poor soils prevented extensive plantation agriculture. Such high returns 
attracted the attention of the state’s planter class by the 1830s. With access to capital resources 
and the control of large, slave labor forces, these market-sensitive entrepreneurs invested in 
thousands of acres of previously undesirable pine land, constructed their own distilleries, and 
began production on a grand scale. At the same time a transportation revolution in North 
Carolina facilitated turpentine’s expansion into areas previously too remote to permit profitable 
manufacture. As high demand continued through the 1830s, 40s, and 50s the number o f 
turpentine operations that spread across southeastern North Carolina taxed the state’s 
undeveloped economic resources and structures. Not only did the many new businesses drive 
land and labor costs higher, but the greatly increased production volume strained the poorly 
organized marketing system. By the antebellum period’s end, efforts were under way to organize 
better the system o f inspecting and selling these commodities.
During the first decades of the 1800s the variety of applications for rosin, tar, and 
turpentine grew. Rosin became widely used in making soap. It did nothing to enhance the 
properties of soap, only increased its bulk. Tar had a multitude of uses. It was painted on coarse
57
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surfaces to make them smooth and applied to posts to prevent rotting. Cuts on domestic animals 
that received a coat of tar stood less chance of infection and the feet o f cattle painted with tar 
were less likely to be injured by dampness or abrasion. Some farmers coated their grain seeds 
with tar to discourage hungry birds. At the beginning o f the nineteenth century the greatest 
demand for naval stores continued to come from shipyards. Tar remained the most important 
naval stores commodity, but turpentine production increased faster than other naval stores 
manufacturing and replaced pitch as the second most produced of these products.1 Spirits also 
served as flea repellent and as a waterproofing agent for cloth. It could even be used to wash 
clothes, especially to remove grease spots. Economist Kustaa Hautala speculates that this rise in 
demand for turpentine occurred because of oil paints, in which turpentine served as a thinner. 
Turpentine’s use in oil based paints increased until, by 1855, it was estimated that the industry
1 Thomas Jefferson’s trade policies did little to stifle the industry’s progress. Attempting 
to bring Great Britain and France to terms over abuses o f American shipping rights, in 1807 
Jefferson drafted and Congress passed an embargo which forbade American ships to leave the 
United States for any foreign port. Repealed in early 1809, the Embargo Act’s short lived impact 
on naval stores exports was reflected in the sudden rise o f  prices in foreign ports. Tar, which 
sold in 1807 in Liverpool for $4.67 a barrel rose to $5.56 the next year. The rise in turpentine 
prices was even greater, from $3.00 for one hundred pounds in 1807 to $8.00 or $9.00 in 1808, a 
jump of around three hundred percent. Foreign turpentine prices probably reacted more to the 
embargo than did tar because no alternative source for the former existed. The Baltic states 
continued to produce tar in limited quantities. Yet, during the embargo turpentine exports from 
North Carolina rose by more than three hundred percent. In 1804, 28,500 gallons or 650 barrels 
of gum left North Carolina. By 1810 the amount was 94,900 gallons or 2160 barrels. However 
the War of 1812 appears to have more seriously affected naval stores trade. The inability of 
North Carolina producers to ship their products to northern ports caused crude gum prices in 
New York to rise from $2.50 per barrel in 1812 to $12.00 per barrel the next year. A Dr.
William Lay Smith, who made turpentine by the Chowan River north o f Edenton and one o f the 
few producers in the upper Albermarle region at the time, saw his business ruined by the war­
time interruption in trade. W. W. Ashe, The Forests. Forest Lands, and Forest Products of 
Eastern North Carolina (Raleigh: North Carolina Geological Survey, 1984), 74; Jack Temple 
Kirby, Poquosin: A Study of Rural Landscape and Society (Chapel Hill: The University o f North 
Carolina Press, 1995), 30-31; F. Andre Michaux. The North American Svlva (Philadelphia: D. 
Rice & A. N. Hart, 1857), 112, 114; Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante- 
Bellum South, 1789-1861” (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 49; Thomas Gamble, “Early 
History of the Naval Stores Industry in North America,” in Naval Stores: History. Production. 
Distribution and Consumption, ed. Thomas Gamble (Savannah: Review Publishing & Printing 
Company, 1921), 23; G. Terry Sharrer, “Naval Stores, 1781-1881,” in Material Culture o f the 
Wooden Age, ed. Brooke Hindle (Tarrytown, NY: Sleepy Hollow Press, 1981), 252.
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consumed 112,000 gallons of it a  day. Popular belief held that turpentine possessed a multitude 
of curative properties, especially as a treatment for respiratory disease and as a powerful 
purgative. So powerful was the effect of turpentine perceived to be against cholera, diphtheria, 
whooping cough, hay fever, and phthisis that merely living in a pine forest was thought to 
provide some protection. As a preventative measure, turpentine could also be burned to purify 
the air. Patients with worms, hemorrhages, and severe gas might receive turpentine rectally. 
Turpentine was even applied to both male and female genitalia to treat gonorrhea and sores. But 
taken in too large a dose, turpentine could have dangerous consequences.2 Alex MacRae of 
Washington, North Carolina warned his brother Donald to “watch carefully the effects o f the 
vermifuge [medicine to expel parasites] + Spts. Turpt you give Lizzy.. .  When given too often or 
for too long a time results badly.” MacRae recounted that he “was once rendered blind + stupid 
as a goose for 24 hours for taking too much” turpentine.34
In the 1830s the discovery of two new uses for turpentine further boosted its production. 
The rubber industry, which was expanding during that decade, began using turpentine as a 
solvent. More important, turpentine became a main ingredient in a popular lamp fuel. During 
the 1830s Americans experimented with alternatives to tallow-dipped candles and sperm whale
2 “The Southern Pine Forest—Turpentine,” De Bow’s Review. 18 (February 1855): 190- 
191; Ashe, Forests. Forest Lands, and Forest Products. 75; Kustaa Hautala, “European and 
American Tar in the English Market During the Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries,” 
Annales Academiae Scientiarum Fennicae 130 (1964): 114-115; Francis Peyre Porcher, “Uses of 
Rosin and Turpentine in Old Plantation Days,” in Naval Stores: History. Production. Distribution 
and Consumption, ed. Thomas Gamble (Savannah: Review Publishing & Printing Company, 
1921), 29-30; John S. Haller, Jr., “Sampson of the Terebinthinates: Medical History of 
Turpentine,” Southern Medical Journal 77 (June 1984): 752-753; Franklin B. Hough, Report 
Upon Forestry, vol. 1, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1878), 138;
3 Alex MacRae, Jr. to D. MacRae, August 27, 1863, Hugh MacRae Papers, Special 
Collections Library, Duke University.
4 Charles Christopher Crittenden, The Commerce of North Carolina. 1763-1789 (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1936), 160.
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oil. Early efforts to bum turpentine as a substitute failed because it gave off a strong odor and 
had a tendency to smoke. Attempts at burning turpentine-based mixtures met with similar 
failure. The first wideiy-used lighting alternative consequently was not turpentine but lard oil. 
Introduced in 1841, this fast-burning fuel gave off satisfactory light, however in cold weather it 
hardened and became useless. Soon afterwards, a mixture o f alcohol and turpentine, popularly 
known as Camphene, Camphine, Teveline, and Palmetto oil, appeared for general use and 
gradually replaced lard oil. Not only did Camphene give off more light without ever flaring up, 
but it was cheaper and burned longer.5 In February 1847, B. Murphy & Co., manufacturer of 
Camphene lamps in Philadelphia, claimed of the lamps that for “half the money they will give 
double the light of any Oil or Lard Lamp yet invented.”6 It sold for about 40 cents per gallon. 
Camphene soon became the most popular illuminant in America and burned in homes, 
businesses, hotels, public buildings, and aboard some trains. In at least one instance it was even 
burned as a heat source for hatching eggs in an incubator. It could be purchased at distilleries, 
from merchants or druggists, or, in large cities, delivered to the home or business.7 So popular 
was the oil that when the New York market experienced unusually low turpentine shipments 
from the South, it was reported that “the quantity of Camphene used for burning has become so
5 By the mid 1850s, the rubber industry annually consumed 4,650 casks containing a 
total of 187,000 gallons of spirits. Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum 
South, 1789-186l” (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 203-208, 213.
6 “Latest Improvement in the Camphene Lamp,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 26 
February 1847.
7 “Camphine! Camphene!!,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 2 March 1849;
Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861” (Ph.D. diss., 
Duke University, 1947), 212, 214; Michael Williams, Americans and Their Forests: A Historical 
Geography (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 158; “Camphine Lamps,” 
Wilmington. North Carolina Chronicle 21 December 1842; “The Southern Pine Forest— 
Turpentine,” 191.
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great, that for this purpose alone, a large supply is needed, and any considerable disruption in the 
receipts is immediately felt.”*
However, Camphene had to be handled with great care. When used correctly this oil 
provided safe effective lighting, but serious accidents sometime occurred from carelessness with 
this volatile and flammable fluid. When in 1847 a Philadelphia man attempted to fill a lighted 
lamp, the Camphene exploded, “blowing the lamp to pieces and the bottom of the can out, and 
setting fire to the room and to his clothes, from which he was so dreadfully burned.” After a day 
he died.9 In 1851 a Mrs. Ewing of Chesterfield County, Virginia, near Petersburg, met 
unfortunate circumstances when the lit camphene lamp she held in her hand burst into flames 
which immediately engulfed her. She too lingered for several days before succumbing to her 
burns. Each of these cases represents the two different circumstances under which camphene 
lamps could explode. As in the Philadelphia case, refilling the lamp while the wick still burned, 
could ignite vapors rising from the pouring liquid and transfer the flame from the wick to the oil 
can. In many such instances, the panicked lamp lighter would drop the can spreading the flames. 
As in the Chesterfield County case, the sloshing of the oil in the glass lamp, even from the 
motion of walking with it, could cause the oil to overflow its reservoir, catch fire from the wick, 
and run down the outside of the lamp. The heat from the burning oil on the lamp’s exterior 
would crack the glass causing the rest of the oil to escape, spreading the fire. By the 1850s the 
annual deaths from accidents involving Camphene lamps exceeded those from steamboat 
explosions and railroad accidents combined. In response to consumer concerns, a safer lamp 
soon appeared. Newell’s Patent Safety Lamps kept the burning wick away from the vapor, thus
*Quoted in Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789- 
1861” (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 207.
9 “Death from Camphine Gas,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 12 October 1849.
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reducing the risk of explosion. Also introduced was the safety can and filler which allowed for 
refilling of the lamp while it continued to bum.10
With Camphene rendered safe, producers who rushed to meet the increased demand for 
turpentine faced a perplexing problem. Because distilled gum yielded four gallons o f rosin for 
every one gallon of spirits of turpentine, increased turpentine production resulted in over­
production of rosin. Experiments to discover marketable uses for rosin yielded two new oil 
products. Pinoline, the lightest of these oils, could be burned as an illuminant, while the heavier 
oil, known as rosin oil, was used as a lubricant and in the manufacturing o f  printing inks. Rosin 
oil production increased in the 1850s, with most of its manufacturing facilities located in the 
northern states. However, similar plants opened in Wilmington and New Bern before the end of 
the 1850s. Yet rosin consumption never approached that o f turpentine and throughout the 
nineteenth century was treated largely as a byproduct of spirits production."
As increased demand for turpentine raised its price, more North Carolinians began 
harvesting gum. The first burst of production began in the area between the Tar and Cape Fear 
Rivers, especially the Washington and New Bern areas, where the inhabitants were already 
familiar with the methods of turpentining (fig. 2.1). By the late 1830s, the quest for more 
suitable pine land lead to the opening of turpentine operations on the west and south sides of the 
Cape Fear River, where, until then, general opinion held that local pines would not yield
10 Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861” 
(Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 206, 209-212.
" Ibid., 216-221; “The Southern Pine Forest—Turpentine,” 191.
Figure 2.1: Tench Coxe, A Statement of the Arts and Manufactures o f the United States 
of America for the Year 1810 (Philadelphia: A. Comman. Jr. 1814), 133-134.
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sufficient gum (fig. 2.2). By 1840, when Edmund Ruffin traveled through the Cape Fear Basin, 
turpentining was “the almost sole business of the thinly settled population of the pine lands.” 
Throughout the 1840s the industry moved up the Cape Fear toward the northwest into 
Cumberland and Harnett Counties and to the south, spreading into South Carolina. In 1844 one 
Henry Harrison cut the first boxes near the town of Manchester in Harnett County and shipped 
the gum to Fayetteville for distilling. Harrison’s turpentine was probably handled by Thomas 
Lutterlaw, who that same year opened the first distillery in Fayetteville.12
Repeal of British duties on turpentine over-heated the market and eventually led to a 
temporary downturn. Becoming effective in May 184S, the repeal made exports to England 
increase and American prices climb. Speculation followed. A New York firm attempted to 
comer the market, causing prices to rise from $2.30 per barrel to $3.00 to more than $5.00.13 
Attracted by these outrageously high prices, the Wilmington Journal reported, “many of our 
citizens have withdrawn their labor and capital from their wonted channels, and have embarked 
them in making Turpentine.. . . ” However, the bubble soon burst. In the mean time, “Lands and 
negroes have been both purchased and hired at high prices, in the anticipation that the product of 
the pine would continue to command such a price as would amply repay any outlay.” Producers
12 Edmund Ruffin, “Notes of a Steam Journey,” The Farmer’s Register 8 (30 April
1840): 250; Ashe, Forests. Forest Lands, and Forest Products. 75; Percival Perry, “The Naval 
Stores Industry in the Old South, 1790-1860,” North Carolina Forestry History Series 1 (April 
1967): 8; Percival Perry, “The Naval-Stores Industry in the Old South, 1790-1860,” The Journal 
of Southern History 34 (November 1968): 516; Hough, Report Upon Forestry. 138.
13 Percival Perry, “The Naval-Stores Industry in the Old South, 1790-1860,” The Journal 
of Southern History 34 (November 1968): 517.
Figure 2.2: United States Department of State, Compendium o f the Enumeration of the 
Inhabitants and Statistics o f the United States as Obtained at the Department o f State. From the 
Returns of the Sixth Census. 1840 (Washington. DC: 1841), 158, 170, 182, 194, 206, 218, 230, 
242, 254, 266, 338.
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were urged to hold their current crop off the market until the large supplies at New York, 
Liverpool, and London had diminished and the price recovered.14 The strategy worked. By the 
fall of 1845 prices rose to $3.50 per barrel of raw turpentine and 600 for spirits and production 
resumed its expansion.15 By 1847 North Carolinians made an estimated 800,000 barrels o f were 
urged to hold their current crop off the market until the large supplies at New York, Liverpool, 
and London had diminished and the price recovered.16 The strategy worked. By the turpentine, 
valued at between $1,700,000 and $2,000,000. And around ‘Tour or five thousand laborers are 
engaged in making it, and perhaps three times as many more human beings are supported mainly 
from the proceeds o f its first sale.”17 De Bow’s Review guessed that “there is no one article 
produced in this country by the same number o f laborers, which contributes so much to the 
commerce and prosperity o f the country as the article o f turpentine.”18 By 1850, turpentine 
production had reached the upper reaches of the Cape Fear and Deep Rivers and Fayetteville and 
Cumberland County especially its seat, Fayetteville, became the inland center of the trade.19
A shift to planter control of production accompanied the turpentine industry’s migration 
into the Cape Fear region. Since the late 1720s, small farmers had manufactured most naval 
stores; as the industry expanded along the Cape Fear in the 1840s and continued its dramatic
14 “Naval Stores,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 15 May 1846.
15 “New York Market,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 20 November 1846.
16 “Naval Stores,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 15 May 1846.
17 “North Carolina, Its Resources, Manufactures, Ect.,” The Commercial Review of the 
South and West 4 (October 1847): 257.
18 “North Carolina, Its Resources, Manufactures, Ect.,” 258.
19 Ashe, Forests. Forest Lands, and Forest Products. 75-77; Percival Perry, “The Naval 
Stores Industry in the Old South, 1790-1860,” North Carolina Forestry History Series 1 (April 
1967): 8; Percival Perry, “The Naval-Stores Industry in the Old South, 1790-1860.” The Journal 
of Southern History 34 (November 1968): 519.
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growth into the 1850s, men with capital and large numbers o f slaves entered the production on a 
grand scale. Although these businessmen may not have participated in a classic market 
relationship with their bound labor, they certainly engaged in a market exchange of their product 
and shifted to turpentine in order to benefit from its increasingly profitable trade. The large 
producers included James R. Grist, who worked timber in Brunswick and Columbus Counties 
with over 100 slaves; James Metts, whose 65 slaves harvested turpentine in both North and South 
Carolina; John A. Averitt, whose 125 slaves were primarily employed in turpentine on his huge 
estate in Onslow County; and Daniel L. Russell, who with 25,000 acres in Brunswick County 
and 150 slaves, was one of the largest producers in the state. In many cases these large operators 
were the sons o f Washington, North Carolina, area planters who moved to the previously 
untapped region where they could work their slave labor forces more profitably in the virgin 
timber than in the region’s poor soils, which were unable to sustain intensive agriculture.20 As 
large turpentiners took control o f more and more production in the 1840s and 1850s, evidence 
suggests, the size of the operation tripled. A sample of newspapers advertisements for the sale of 
operations reveals that while the average business in the 1840s consisted of around 25,000 boxes, 
by the 1850s the typical operation made use of 85,000 boxes.21
20 James Oakes, Slavery and Freedom: An Interpretation of the Old South (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1990), 54; Percival Perry, “The Naval-Stores Industry in the Old South, 1790- 
1860,” The Journal of Southern History 34 (November 1968): 516; Percival Perry, “The Naval 
Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861” (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), ISO- 
151.
21 “Land for Sale on Cape Fear River,” Wilmington. North Carolina Chronicle. 10 
November 1841; “Lands for Sale,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 27 June 1845; “Real 
Estate for sale,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 4 July 1845; “Plantation for Sale,” 
Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 24 April 1846; “Valuable Turpentine Land For Sale,” 
Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 20 November 1846; “Valuable Real Estate.” Wilmington. 
North Carolina Journal. 26 February 1847; “Valuable Lands For Sale.” Wilmington. North 
Carolina Journal. 22 December 1848; “Lands For Sale,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 29 
December 1848; “Valuable Farming and Turpentine lands For Sale.” Wilmington. North 
Carolina Journal, 2 March 1849; “Valuable Land For Sale,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal.
11 May 1849; “For Sale,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal.” 10 August 1849; “Notice.—A
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For those few North Carolinians capable of profitably cultivating cotton, naval stores 
actually offered a better alternative in many years. At the same time turpentine prices rose 
during the 1830s and 1840s, cotton prices fell. The Panic of 1837 badly hurt the cotton market; 
the 1836 price o f 13.30 by 1839 had dropped to 7.90 and reached a low o f  5.50 in 1844.22 With 
cotton prices generally depressed during the 1840s, one observer commented that “compared to 
other labor,” turpentine “has, for the last ten years, been deemed the most profitable of all.”23 In 
1846 the Fayetteville Observer reported that the turpentine region of North Carolina “has never, 
to our knowledge, been in so prosperous a condition as at present. Lands have risen, one, two, or 
three hundred per cent, and labor is so profitable that the country is full o f  money to make 
investments.”24 In 1846 the Tar boro Press described “a gentlemen [sic] who had gone to 
Wilmington to sell his turpentine, in pocketing $1900, remarked that sum was the produce of the 
labor of four hands.” In 1850 a Barnwell County, South Carolina man concluded that turpentine
Valuable Plantation For Sale.” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 23 November, 1849; 
“Valuable Plantation For Sale,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 23 November 18491;
“Land For Sale,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal.” 19 July 1850; “A Great Bargain,” 
Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 4 October 1850; “Land and Negroes For Sale,”
Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 4 July 1851; “10,000 Acres of Land For Sale,” Wilmington. 
North Carolina Journal. 21 November 1851; “For Sale,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 29 
October 18521; “Valuable Cape Fear Plantation For Sale,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal.
24 June 1853; “Valuable Real Estate For Sale,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 4 
November 1853; “Valuable Real Estate For Sale,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 10 
March 1854; “Land For Sale.” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal 13 October 1854; “A 
Valuable Tract o f Land For Sale,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 4 January 1856; 
“Turpentine Land For Sale,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 21 March 1856; “For Sale, 
Valuable Turpentine and Farming Lands in Bladen County,” Wilmington. North Carolina 
Journal. 21 March 1856; “Turpentine Lands in Florida For Sale,” Wilmington. North Carolina 
Journal. 21 March 1856; “A Turpentine Farm For Sale or Rent,” Wilmington. North Carolina 
Journal. 29 August 1856.
22 William J. Cooper, Jr. and Thomas E. Terrill, The American South: A History (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1990), 192.
23 “Product of Turpentine at the South,” De Bow’s Southern and Western Review 11 
(September 1851): 305.
24 “The Turpentine Region,” Tar boro. North Carolina Press. 11 February 1846.
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production offered a profitable alternative for timber owners who “are tired of making cotton at 
the low prices, to which planters have been hitherto compelled to submit.”25
Cotton prices recovered by the early 1850 and remained stable, even during the Panic o f 
1857.26 But turpentine prices also remained relatively stable and continued to rival cotton 
profits. Dugall McMillan of Wilmington maintained that one slave could collect 200 barrels of 
turpentine in a season and that the profit margin was very good. It was “better by far than cotton 
raising,” he reported, and “many cotton planters are going into it.” Prices remained steady, he 
believed, because the demand expanded with the growing number of producers.27 The average 
hand, it was estimated in 1850, could make one hundred, fifty barrels o f dip and fifty of scrape. 
With the former selling at $2.50 per barrel and the latter at $1.25 a barrel, a producer could 
realize a gross profit of $437.50. Subtracting $137.50 in expenses ($60 for two hundred barrels 
costing 30 cents each, $50 for shipping to market at twenty-five cents per barrel, and $27.50 in 
commission to the factorage house), the turpentiner could make $300 per hand. With cotton 
selling at nine cents per pound, a cotton planter could make only $200 per hand. With prices 
running around $2.31 for dip and $1.50 for scrape in 1852, the naval stores industry continued to 
attract producers.28 That year William Underhill of Wake County reported that “turpentine is all 
that is talk a bout nearby, it has been very high this year.”29 In the fall, a Wake County area
25 “The Manufacture o f Turpentine in the South,” The Commercial Review of the South 
and West 8 (May 1850): 455.
26 Cooper and Terrill, American South. 192.
27 Dugall McMillan to Southern Cultivator. 14 April 1846, Southern Cultivator 4 
(November 1846): 172-173.
28 “The Manufacture o f Turpentine in the South,” 455; “Review of the Newbem 
Market,” The New Bern. North Carolina Newbemian. 6 January 1852.
29 W. M. Underhill to Brother and Sister, 20 December 1852, Ransom Lee Papers, 
Special Collections Library, Duke University.
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shoemaker quit his shop and began cutting boxes in his father-in-law’s pines.30 Naval stores 
prices soared in 1853. On the Wilmington market, dip sold for $3.90 to $4.00 per barrel, scrape 
for $2.10 to $2.30 and spirits at 63 cents to 65 cents per gallon. At these prices, the Fayetteville 
Observer reported, “the Naval Stores men o f the state, (and their name is legion,) are coining 
money out o f the pine trees.”31
The increased prosperity and rise in land values that the turpentine boom brought seemed 
a blessing for North Carolinians living in southeastern portion of the state where soil was 
incapable of sustaining commercial cotton agriculture. Edmund Ruffin, the South’s leading 
agricultural reformer, like other observers, was struck by the poor, sandy soil of the southeastern 
pine region. He found the level land broken only by slight depressions of swampy areas where 
loblolly pine grew. “But whether dry or wet,” he proclaimed, “ all these pine lands, and the 
shallow ‘bays’ intersecting them are very poor. . .  and will continue worthless for tillage.”32 J. 
MacLeod of Wilmington agreed that the “long leaf was found on soil that will produce little 
else.”33 Dugall McMillan, who traveled through the area in the mid 1840s, remarked that “the 
stranger who enters North Carolina will be struck with the wilderness appearance.” The area’s 
“sandy, stark soil offers little to tempt the adventurer or emigrant to settle down.”34 Olmsted 
understood that North Carolina dominated the South’s naval stores production “because, in it, 
cotton is rather less productive than in the others, in an average of years.” He observed that “in 
the region in which the true turpentine-trees grow, indeed, there is no soil suitable for growing
30 Ibid.; W. M. Underhill to Brother and Sister, 1 September 1852, Lee Papers.
31 “High Prices,” Fayetteville Observer. 1 February 1853.
32 Ruffin, “Notes on a Steam Journey,” 246.
33 John MacLeod, “The Tar and Turpentine Business o f  North Carolina,” Monthly 
Journal of Agriculture 2 (July 1846): 13.
34 McMillan to Southern Cultivator. 172.
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cotton; and it is only in the swampy parts, or on the borders of streams flowing through it, that 
there is any attempt at agriculture.35 A Bladen County resident commented that “in the pine 
region tracts owned by individuals unfit for cultivation, high prices o f turpentine has added much 
to their value.”36
In the mid 1850s turpentine continued to distract producers away from cotton. 
Turpentiner Benjamin Williams, his wife explained in 1854, did “not like to remove any of his 
hands from his turpentine land, the income from that being much larger than from the 
plantation.”37 In 1855 De Bow’s Review reported that “no business makes better returns for 
common labor, take one year with another, not even the culture of cotton and tobacco, especially 
when the amount o f capital employed is taken into consideration.” The same article claimed that 
a prime turpentine laborer could gather $600 or $700 worth of turpentine in a year. After 
deducting the costs o f barrels, hauling, provisions, the overseer’s wage, and other expenses, $200 
per hand was a moderate return.38
With the increase in turpentine harvesting, the number o f distilleries in port towns grew. 
In 1818 the first turpentine still in Wilmington began operating. In 1845 the Tarboro Press
35 Frederick Law Olmsted, Joumev in the Seaboard Slave States (New York: Dix & 
Edwards, 1856), 338.
36 J. Wright to Thomas D. McDowell, 9 December 1858, Thomas David Smith 
McDowell Papers, Southern Historical Collection, The University of North Carolina at Chapel 
Hill.
37 Sarah F. Williams to Parents, 17 March 1854, Sarah Hicks Williams Papers, Southern 
Historical Collection, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
38 “Turpentine: Hints for Those About to Engage in Its Manufacture,” De Bow’s Review 
2 (October 1855): 488. D.W. Kyle, an enterprising man searching for business opportunities with 
the greatest return, informed his friend John Buford in 1856 that he was interested in the Pacific 
Railroad because “it is the place to make money.” He also anticipated going into “the turpentine, 
tar, and pitch trade.” D. W. Kyle to John Buford, 29 March 1856, John Buford Papers, Special 
Collections Library, Duke University. In 1859 one producer proclaimed, “good turpentine land is 
a fortune.” G. W. Perry, A Treatise on Turpentine Farming (New Bern, North Carolina: Muse & 
Davis, 1859), 87.
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reported that Wilmington had nine turpentine distilling operations with a total o f thirty stills.
The paper estimated the daily capacity o f  these facilities combined at five hundred barrels of 
resin and four thousand casks o f spirits a  day. The largest distillery operated seven stills, while 
the smallest ran but two. Between September 1845 and March 1846 Wilmington added three 
new distilleries, bringing the city’s number of stills to thirty-seven with three more under 
construction. When all were completed, the city’s thirty-seven stills were thought to consume 
1,500 barrels of crude turpentine a day and produce two hundred barrels of spirits.39 A traveler 
visiting Wilmington in 1846 reported that “there are to be seen here twenty turpentine 
distilleries, most of them lately set up and all doing a very profitable business.” So impressed 
was he with such activity in the port town that he proclaimed it North Carolina’s commercial 
capital.40 Washington experienced a similar increase in distilleries. In 1842, three distilleries 
that consumed up to two hundred barrels a day were operating in Washington. By January 1846, 
Washington, where naval stores represented nearly seventy-five percent o f the value of all 
products leaving its port, had seven turpentine distilleries in operation and another was under 
construction. Between these seven operations there were fifteen stills which, when all running at 
their peak capacity, required six hundred barrels of crude gum a day 41 The increase in local 
distilling brought an end to the earlier practice of shipping crude turpentine to the North and
39 Steam Mills and Turpentine Distilleries, Tarboro. North Carolina Press. January 25, 
1845; Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861” (Ph.D. 
diss., Duke University, 1947), 243, 249; Sharrer, “Naval Stores,” 254.
40 McMillan to Southern Cultivator. 172.
41 “Trade of Washington.” Tarboro. North Carolina Press. 21 January 1846.
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England for distillation.42 By 1844 fifty percent o f  the crude gum distilled in the United States 
was distilled in North Carolina, the result o f the growing number o f stills operating in that state.43
With the rapid increase in distilleries, raw turpentine processing grew into an important 
segment of the North Carolina economy. In 1847, the industry supported 150 stills with an 
average cost of SUSOO.44 One observer explained that “the cost o f distilling is very great, and 
when we reckon the cost o f transportation, the profits of distillers, o f ship owners, commission 
merchants, and the venders o f the article abroad, it will be seen that the capital and labor 
employed is not only immense, but the numbers who are supported by the manufacture and sale 
of the article is astonishing.”45 Distilleries consisted of more than one or more stills and their 
shelters. In 1849 one typical operation, located one-half mile north o f Wilmington, had four 
stills, capable of running one hundred barrels of gum a day; a large spirit house, where distilled 
turpentine was stored to protect the casks from the heat of the sun; a large glue house, where 
empty spirit casks were prepared by coating their interior with hot glue; “a large Negro house” 
where the slave workers slept; and a wharf.46
Communities did not always welcome these combustible facilities. Between 1842 and 
1852, twenty Wilmington area stills were destroyed by fire. In 1844 the Wilmington Chronicle 
objected to the construction of a distillery in a densely populated section of the town. At around 
the same time, a still at the Brown and DeRossets Distillery caught fire, destroying all the
42 Percival Perry, “The Naval-Stores Industry in the Old South, 1790-1860,” The Journal 
of Southern History 34 (November 1968): 516.
43 Donald Fraser Martin, “An Historical and Analytical Approach to the Current 
Problems of the American Gum Naval Stores Industry” (Ph.D. diss., The University of North 
Carolina, 1942). 77.
44 “North Carolina, Its Resources, Manufactures, Ect.,” 258.
45 Ibid.
46 “Distillery for Sale,” Wilmington. North Carolina Chronicle. 24 January 1849, 3.
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buildings, most o f them sheds, and between six hundred and seven hundred barrels o f rosin. The 
total loss amounted to between $1200 and S1500.47 In 1837 John Meyers became alarmed when 
he learned that Joseph Redding planned to set up a turpentine still on a lot adjacent to his 
property by the Tar River in Washington, North Carolina. Meyers feared for the safety o f the 
wooden structures on his lots, which not only included shelters for protecting naval stores and 
produce from the weather, but his family’s residence. Distilleries, Meyer complained, belted 
ashes and soot throughout the community. Moreover these facilities commonly caught fire, 
erupting into flames as many as six to eight hours after the still had stopped operating. When 
such operations caught fire, they were difficult to extinguish. Flammable barrels of turpentine 
and rosin surrounded stills and often guaranteed that accidental fires would grow large and last 
long. Meyer worried that with the right winds, the flames from such a conflagration could travel 
the distance to his property. “It is because of the great annoyance for smoke + ashes that 
distilleries are commonly placed out o f the reach o f other buildings,” Meyer stated.48
With naval stores promising such high returns, not only did businessmen erect annoying 
stills in North Carolina’s port communities but sections of the state experienced a population 
increase as hopeful producers rushed into the area. Fayetteville and Cumberland County 
experienced solid economic and population growth, each related to the turpentine industry’s 
prosperity. The county’s population, especially its slave population, was on the rise. Between 
1840 and 1850 Cumberland’s white population increased from 15,284 to 20,160, a rise o f 34 
percent. However the slave population rose 75 percent, from 4285 to 7217 49 The Fayetteville
47 Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861,” 
(Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 62-63.
48 Edward Pauly to the Honorable the Judge o f  the Court of Equity for the County of 
Beaufort, 16 January 1837, Thomas Sparrow Papers, Southern Historical Collection, The 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
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Observer explained in 18S3 that “the population o f this county has increased about 1000 since 
the first of the present month—about 300 whites and 700 slaves having come here from other 
parts of the State to engage in the turpentine business.” Area boosters looked forward to the 
increased business this production would bring since “grain, provisions, and other necessities of 
life, would be in demand.”50
One result of this newfound prosperity was an increased cost o f labor. The Fayetteville 
North Carolinian reported that “Negroes hired on New Year’s day for prices higher by 25 to 33 
per cent than last year—first rate men bringing from 100 to 135 dollars. This is attributed to the 
high price of timber in the Wilmington market, the great demand for labor on the various plank 
roads now in process of construction from this place, and also on the Cape Fear and Deep River 
improvements, and the increasing production of turpentine in the surrounding country.”51 
Olmsted found that in the early 1850s “wages of ordinary practiced turpentine hands (slaves) are 
about $120 a year, with board, clothing, ect., as usual.”52 In 1852 one producer reported that 
hiring prices were high for turpentine hands, between $125 and $150. However for $100 he had 
been able to hire a white man. Although the slave population rose it was not enough to keep up 
with demand. With one slave estimated to earn for his employer $500 to $800 a year laboring in 
the naval stores industry, owners could hire them out for between $150 and $175 annually. The 
rising cost of hiring turpentine slaves in the 1840s and 1850s is illustrated by the prices charged 
by the Francis Harper heirs o f New Bern who hired out slaves to turpentine producers. In 1849 
they received $56.50 for “Amas” and $49.50 for “Haywood.” In 1852 Amas and Haywood were
49 Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861” 
(Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 258-259.
50 “The Tide Turned,” Fayetteville Observer. 25 January 1853.
51 Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861” 
(Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 258.
52 Olmsted, Joumev in the Seaboard Slave States. 346.
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each rented for $125, and by 1853 Aamas’s hiring price had risen to $175 and in 1854 to $215. 
This increase corresponds with a 1853 Fayetteville Observer report indicating that the annual 
cost of hiring a good naval stores laborer was $ 150 to $ 175. By 1860 turpentine workers were 
hired for as much as $250. However especially skilled slaves could cost even more to rent. In 
1853 a blacksmith for the Grist operation cost $300 to hire.53 Producers found difficulty in 
securing such talented slaves. They occasionally became available for hire when the operation 
they worked for closed.54
Producers could not only rent slaves, but turpentine boxes as well. The rental price 
depended on the boxes’ age and their distance from transportation. In 1854 C. W. Smith 
received $ 181.32 for the rent of 17,435 boxes for 4 years. The price amounted to $26.00 per year 
for 10,000 boxes. However, some rental agreements were made for only one year. For the 
turpentine season of 1846/1847 William D. Rodman rented his turpentine boxes to Mabum 
Minifield and Allison Whitly but found new renters for the next season. In cases of a turnover in 
renters, it was common for the gun in the boxes to be reserved for the previous year’s renter until 
time for the new renter to commence chipping. Rental agreements usually contained other 
stipulations. When a producer rented turpentine boxes belonging to the estate of A. B. Mattick 
for 1860, he was required to post notes of security before working the boxes and had to agree to
53 W. M. Underhill to Brother and Sister, 20 December 1852, Lee Papers; “High Prices;” 
Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861” (Ph.D. diss., 
Duke University, 1947), 42-42; Slave Hiring Agreements, 1849, 1852, 1854, 1854, Francis 
Harper Papers, Special Collections Library, Duke University; Alfred Smith to James R. Grist, 11 
January 1853, “List o f Negroes belonging to Mr. John W. Grist and Worked bv Grist + Striknev 
during the year of 1861,” 1860, James Redding Grist Papers, Special Collections Library, Duke 
University.
54 In 1854 a sawmill and distillery business in Lumberton was auctioned at the Robeson 
County courthouse. At the sale there was “hired out until the I st day of January next, about 
twenty-five slaves who have been engaged in the Turpentine and Saw-Mill business.” “Steam 
Saw-Mill, Turpentine Still, &c. Trust Sale" Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 17 March 
1854.
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maintain a split rail fence on the premises. For this lease, the renter had use o f a house on the 
land, its out buildings, and the orchard.55
As naval stores prices rose and created greater demand for both rented and purchased 
pine land, more marginal areas went into production. Convenient access to a still or market 
could determine whether or not a timber stand was worked for turpentine. Olmsted noted that “it 
is yet thought a harder venture to start the business where more than thirty miles wagoning is 
required to bring the spirits o f turpentine to a railroad or navigable water.”56 Turpentine 
producers were advised to locate their operations as nearby a still as possible. “You may do a 
very profitable business,” De Bow’s Review explained, “six or seven miles off if the country is 
favorable for hauling. If the distillery is on a river, turpentine may be hauled two or three miles, 
and rafted down forty or fifty miles, cheaper than to haul to the still over six or seven miles.”57 
Pine forests on the periphery of transportation systems were often so isolated they could not be 
profitably worked at all or, at most, worked for only the most valuable gum.58 Some producers 
could only profitably harvest gum, not scrape, or work the tree for only a few years. While 
traveling through North Carolina Olmsted observed trees at a prohibitively far distance from the 
market that had never been scraped. In such cases scrape, which contained about half the spirits 
of gum and was therefore less valuable, was not worth the expense of the labor to collect it and
55 Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861” 
(Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 44; John F. Minifield to William R. Rodman, 30 October 
1847, William Blount Rodman Papers, North Carolina State Archives; “The Condition of 
renting farm land + Turpentine Boxes belonging to the estate A. B. Matttick dec.,” 28 December 
1859, William Basden Papers, Special Collections Library, Duke University.
56 Olmsted, Journey in the Seaboard Slave States. 339.
57 “Turpentine: Hints for Those About to Engage in Its Manufacture,” 486.
58 One producer found that “the tract o f land belonging to Mary Eliza laying on Turnbull 
is so inconvenient that I have concluded not to cut Turp. boxes this spring.” Thomas D. S. 
McDowell to Sir, 16 January 1843, Thomas David Smith McDowell Papers, Southern Historical 
Collection, The University o f North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
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the transportation to get it to market. But at the time of his journey, he added, “the price o f 
turpentine being now much higher than usual, many of the small proprietors are this year 
scraping their trees, that have not scraped before.”59 Edmund Ruffin observed that in the case of
scrape, which “is sold at half the price o f the fluid turpentine[,] the expense o f Iand-carriage
is a sufficient bar to the production of so heavy and low-priced products, where the distance is 
considerable.”60 Other times when prices were not as high, turpentine operations located some 
distance from transportation were worked only three or four years and then abandoned for new 
areas. The greatest profits came during the first year’s harvest which yielded virgin turpentine 
and number one rosin, the finest quality of these respective products and which could be 
obtained from trees only during their first year harvested for turpentine. Second and third year 
harvests were also profitable. But as the distance that the gum had to flow down the face to the 
box increased with each season, the more the gum deteriorated from greater exposure to the sun 
and the less valuable it became.61
Olmsted also explained that with the rising demand for spirits “the business has been 
extended into the depths of the forest.”62 The copper still, introduced in 1834, helped these 
producers push farther inland and affected the turpentine industry much like the gin had cotton 
production. Distilling in the forest permitted turpentining to be done further from transportation 
routes near to which the industry had previously been confined. Copper stills, much like those 
used in the scotch whisky industry, were much lighter than the large iron ones used in port cities 
and could be transported, making it possible to refine gum in the forest, near to where it was
59 Olmsted, Journey in the Seaboard Slave States. 343
60 Ruffin, “Notes on a Steam Journey,” 250.
61 Percival Peny, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861” 
(Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 45; Peny, Treatise on Turpentine Farming, 78.
62 Olmsted, Journey in the Seaboard Slave States. 339.
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harvested. Naval stores products were bulky relative to their value. With on-site stills, producers 
were no longer burdened by the trouble and expense of hauling the heavy barrels o f raw 
turpentine to port. They could save by shipping just the lighter and more valuable spirits and 
transport rosin only when its price was high enough to bring a profit Rosin prices reached these 
high levels only occasionally. At distilleries located near rivers, producers saved just the first 
and second quality rosin while the poorer qualities were run off and wasted. One distillery, by 
the mid 1850s, had accumulated an estimated $15,000 worth of rosin which was simply drained 
out of the still and left at the site because the freight prices were too high to justify shipping it to 
market.63
Because stills cost between $1,500 and $2,000, only the largest producers could afford 
their own. Wealthy businessmen also constructed inland distilleries to take advantage of the 
spreading production. In 1854 Jonathan Worth, who would become the state’s governor during 
Presidential Reconstruction, and his son operated a still in the extreme western part o f Harnett 
County. Some Wilmington distillers brought their services closer to their clients. In 1848 W. O. 
Jeffreys of Wilmington advertised that he was constructing two new stills at Sarecta in Duplin 
County. When constructing a still, they looked for three qualities in its location—close proximity 
to adequate timber supply, access to transportation facilities, and a nearby water supply from 
which to fill the condenser’s cooling tank.64
63 “Turpentine Business in North Carolina and Georgia,” The Commercial Review of the 
South and West 5 (April 1848): 364; Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Old 
South, 1790-1860.” The Journal of Southern History 34 (November 1968): 514; Kenneth B. 
Pomeroy and James G. Yoho, North Carolina Lands: Ownership. Use, and Management o f Forest 
and Related Lands (Washington, DC: The American Forestry' Association, 1964), 14; Ashe, 
Forests. Forest Lands, and Forest Products. 76; “The Southern Pine Forest—Turpentine,” 190; 
Olmsted, Journey in the Seaboard Slave States. 345.
64 Ashe, Forests. Forest Lands, and Forest Products. 77; “To Turpentine Makers in 
Duplin,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 12 May 1848; Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores 
Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861” (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 59; Martha 
Green Hayes, “General History of the Turpentine Industry,” Georgia Agrirama, Tifton, Georgia,
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A temporary price collapse in late 1846 and 1847 necessitated a reduction in shipping 
costs to maximize profits and thus spurred a movement away from central distillation in the port 
cities and toward more inland locations, nearer the source o f production. Where in 1844 
Cumberland County had only one distillery, by 1852 thirty-two distilleries operated. They 
represented a combined capital investment o f $75,000, required $300,000 of operating capital, 
and yielded an annual income of $348,000. And new distilleries were always being 
constructed.65 In May 1847 prices dropped to two dollars per barrel for crude gum and to thirty- 
five cents for a gallon o f spirits, down from sixty-five cents during the 1846 speculative bubble. 
Wilmington exported 145 times as many barrels o f crude turpentine as casks o f spirits in 1837; 
by 1848 only seven times as many gum barrels as spirit casks came through the port, and by the 
mid 1850s their numbers were about even. Washington experienced a similar trend. By 1855 
about half o f  the spirits shipped from Washington had been distilled inland. The amount of 
spirits shipped was also up over crude gum. That year 147,211 casks of turpentine left the port 
and 68,897 barrels of gum. By 1860 the difference had grown even wider, with 147,962 casks of 
spirits shipped, but only 49,176 barrels of crude turpentine. Consequently, less raw turpentine 
reached the market, reducing the loading volume and need for distilleries.66 In 1848, Scientific 
American reported that “twenty years ago, there was more spirits of turpentine distilled in 
Europe than in the United States, but the tide has now turned and Europe gets turpentine from
53; Nollie Hickman, Mississippi Harvest: Lumbering in the Loneleaf Pine Belt. 1840-1915 
(University: The University o f Mississippi, 1962), 126.
65 Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861” 
(Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 258-259.
66 Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Old South, 1790-1860,” The Journal 
of Southern History 34 (November 1968): 518; Ashe, Forests. Forest Lands, and Forest Products. 
76-77; Richard C. Cook, “Naval Stores: The Forgotten Industry in Tar Heel State,” Naval Stores 
Review 77 (July 1967): 8; Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 
1789-1861” (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 59.
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America.”67 By this time, North Carolina was unquestionably the most important turpentine 
producer not only in the United States but in the world, far exceeding Finland and Russia which 
continued to specialize in tar. In I860, North Carolina produced 96.7 percent of the naval stores 
made in the United States. The total value of crude and distilled turpentine produced that year, 
$5,311,420, represented a more than two hundred percent rise from ten years earlier.68
As with stills, transportation improvements—plank roads, opened rivers, steamboats, and 
railroads—also facilitated the naval stores industry’s expansion by regularizing shipping and 
reducing transportation costs. Commercial traffic on the Cape Fear River faced a considerable 
challenge. Although steam boats came into general use nationally in the 1830s, through the next 
decade most naval stores traffic continued to move by raft and pole boats, with each raft carrying 
anywhere from twenty to three hundred barrels. The Cape Fear was commonly too low for 
steamboat navigation during the summer. Often, naval stores had to wait at landings until winter 
rains brought the river to a passable level. Wilmington’s port’s activity therefore depended on the 
Cape Fear’s water level. Its market was busiest after heavy rains when the valley’s creek and 
river levels rose high enough for inland producers to launch their rafts, weighted with naval 
stores, lumber, and other commodities.69 But when water was too low, no products could come 
through. The example of Wilmington’s 1845 commercial cycle illustrates this situation. On
67 “Turpentine Business in North Carolina and Georgia,” 364.
68 Hautala, “European and American Tar,” 115; Abstract of the Statistics of 
Manufactures. According to the Returns o f the Seventh Census (Washington, DC: Department of 
the Interior, 1858), 116; Manufactures o f the United States in 1860 (Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, 1865), 438.
69 Thomas Gamble, “Pages From Wilmington’s Story as America’s First Great Naval 
Stores Port,” in Naval Stores: History. Production. Distribution and Consumption, ed. Thomas 
Gamble Savannah: Review Publishing & Printing Company, 1921), 31-32; Percival Perry, “The 
Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861,” (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 
1947), 85-87, 89-90, 99-100.
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April 18 the Wilmington Journal reported that “owing to the very low state of the river, but very 
little produce, o f  any description, have reached this market within the past week.” After a month 
of low water the paper reported with hope that they had “noticed a rise in the north-east prong of 
the Cape Fear river, and also a slight rise o f the north-west.” But it was not enough o f a rise for 
many commodities to get through. The Wilmington commission merchants waited with 
anticipation for they understood “that from 8000 to 10,000 barrels of Naval Stores are on the way 
to market—down the north-east prong. Some say 20,000 barrels are expected to reach the market 
in a few days.” But not until August 7 was commercial traffic flowing freely. After a week of 
heavy rains “the Cape Fear river has swollen several feet; it is now as full as it has been any time 
during the last six months, and the atmosphere clearly indicates more rain yet.” According to the 
paper, the rise in the river level brought large quantities o f timber into Wilmington, “likewise 
Naval Stores.” In mid-December of the same year the river was up once again and nearly 40,000 
barrels of naval stores entered to port. The wide fluctuation in turpentine availability was 
reflected in a situation that occurred in Wilmington in 1846. By mid April, with the previous 
year’s harvest nearly all into market, the raw turpentine supply ran out. Distilleries did not have 
enough to continue operating and five sat idle. They could only wait for the new crop to find its 
way to market when the river cooperated.70
In the 18S0s, the Cape Fear and Deep River Navigation Company, supported by 
innovative Wilmington interests concerned with increasing the port’s activity, set about making 
the Cape Fear River navigable as far north as Chatham County. Initiated to provide access to 
coal beds in Chatham County, the resulting improvements consisted of a series o f dams and 
locks. Because this newly navigable stretch of river passed through the longleaf belt, it provided 
cheap transportation for an area that had previously been effectively cut off from the coastal
70 “Wilmington Market.” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 18 April 1845; 16 May 
1845; 8 August 1845; 19 December 184S; 17 April 1846.
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market. Enterprising men constructed stills at the landings that dotted the newly open stretch of 
the Cape Fear, permitting the naval stores industry to extend into the far western reaches of the 
longleaf pine belt.71
By the 1850s, new light-draft steamers were able to navigate the Cape Fear’s low water 
level during the summer months and helped make naval stores marketing a year-round activity. 
Most of the steamers that operated on the Cape Fear measured one hundred to one hundred, 
thirty feet long and fifteen to twenty-five feet wide. Steamboats could carry from three hundred 
to five hundred barrels of naval stores, but most often the products were transported aboard large 
flats, called lighters. Pulled behind steam boats, the lighters could carry from 300 to 1,100 
barrels, depending on their size and the depth of the river. When Frederick Law Olmsted 
boarded a steamboat in Fayetteville headed for Wilmington, he discovered that “the bulk of our 
freight was turpentine.” Introduction of river boats and navigation improvements gave 
Wilmington another advantage over New Bern and Washington. The Tar and Neuse Rivers that 
serviced the latter port communities were too shallow and sluggish to allow steam navigation, 
forcing producers to continue using carts, wagons, and flatboats to transport their commodities to 
market.72
Just as navigation improvements and steamboats improved water transportation, plank 
roads, which radiated from Fayetteville into the pine forests, facilitated better overland 
transportation. These roadways were constructed of heart pine planks, cut nine to sixteen inches 
wide, at least eight inches long, and three to four inches thick, laid at a ninety degree angle over
71 Percival Peny, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861,” 
(Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 97.
72 Gamble, “Pages From Wilmington’s Story,” 32; Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores 
Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861” (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 85-87, 89- 
90, 99-100; Frederick Law Olmsted, The Cotton Kingdom (1861: reprint, New York: The 
Modem Library, 1984), 150.
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heavy sills which rested on a graded road bed. Ditches and culverts provided adequate drainage 
to keep them dry. With these roads producers could haul their naval stores during any type of 
weather, even the most rainy periods when work in the forest slowed and time was best spent 
transporting their goods to market. The first road built was the Fayetteville and Western, also 
known as the “Appian Way o f North Carolina.” Incorporated in 1849, completed in 1854, and 
reputed to be the longest plank road ever constructed, it extended for 129 miles from 
Fayetteville, toward the northwest, and ended at the Moravian settlement o f Bethania in Forsyth 
County. Its success as a toll road, especially from naval stores traffic, lead to the construction of 
other such roads radiating from Fayetteville. One ran from Fayetteville through the western 
section of Cumberland County. Another which was supposed to connect Fayetteville with 
Raleigh by passing through Harnett and into Wake County never was completed. However, the 
finished portion provided access to areas of the pine forest that before had been too remote for 
profitable turpentine production.73
Plank roads facilitated the naval stores industry’s spread into inland forests and funneled 
a considerable portion of the new production toward Fayettville. In 1852 the Fayetteville 
Observer reported “that within the last three years the lands along the line of the Fayetteville and 
Western Plank Road in this country,. . .  have risen in value far more than the cost of that road 
through the country.” Land prices rose because “the country, for sixty miles, has been thrown 
open to the production of various articles which previously could not be brought to market. We 
may instance [sic] Turpentine which is too heavy for transportation long distances over bad
73 Hugh Talmadge Lefler, ed., North Carolina History Told by Contemporaries (Chapel 
Hill: The University o f North Carolina Press, 1948), 229; Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores 
Industiy in the Old South, 1790-1860,” The Journal o f Southern History 34 (November 1968): 
514, 519-520; Ashe, Forests. Forest Lands, and Forest Products. 77; William S. Powell, North 
Carolina Through Four Centuries (Chapel Hill: The University o f North Carolina Press, 1989), 
305; Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861” (Ph.D. 
diss., Duke University, 1947), 116, 118; “The Tide Turned,” Favettville Observer. 23 January 
1853.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
85
roads. But upon the Plank Road a number o f Distilleries have been put up, and one is now going 
up sixty miles from this place.”74 The Fayetteville Observer reported in 1853 that “the discovery 
of the value of our pines, aided by plank roads, has worked a wonderful change within the last 
years.”7S Plank roads made Fayetteville the center of wagon trade for the state and the inland 
seat for the handling of naval stores and distillation o f crude gum. Most of the products collected 
at Fayetteville were shipped down the Cape Fear to Wilmington for export.76 However, wooden 
roads, also referred to as “farmers’ railroads,” deteriorated rapidly, making their maintenance 
difficult and expensive.77 Not only did they fall into disrepair but the cost of moving goods on 
them was relatively expensive, like all over-land transportation, although not as costly as over 
dirt roads.
In the end, roads of iron worked the most lasting impact on the naval stores industry’s 
growth. In 1833 farsighted citizens of Wilmington, who believed correctly that their future 
prosperity depended on rail transportation, subscribed $400,000 for the Wilmington and Raleigh 
Railroad, which they chartered the following year. When Raleigh, which lacked Wilmington’s 
enthusiasm for the project, failed to raise its share of the capital, the projected route shifted 
northward to the Roanoke River. In 1836 the charter was revised and in 1837 construction began 
on the Wilmington and Weldon Railroad. By 1838 the line was already operating out of 
Wilmington along the right bank of the Cape Fear River for a distance of sixty-four miles. Upon
74 Percival Peny, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861” 
(Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 116, 118.
75 “The Tide Turned.”
76 Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861” 
(Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 116; Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Old 
South, 1790-1860.” The Journal of Southern History 34 (November 1968): 514, 519-520; Ashe, 
Forests. Forest Lands, and Forest Products. 77; Powell, North Carolina 305.
77 Powell, North Carolina 305.
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completion in April, 1840, the Wilmington and Weldon was 161.5 miles long, the longest 
railroad in the world. Edmund Ruffin, who traveled on the new line just after its completion, 
believed it to be “the most level and straight route of any of considerable length in the world; and 
being well planned and constructed, as well as on so remarkable and admirable a location, it 
necessarily is an excellent road.” It cut northward through the heart of the longleaf pine forest, 
crossing the regions that had historically relied on the Tar and Neuse Rivers for transportation.
As a result, much of the naval stores trade that had once flowed toward Washington and New 
Bern now rolled toward Wilmington, especially since railroads reportedly gave turpentine 
shipping priority. Cotton bales sometimes sat beside the tracks for two or three weeks before 
they were loaded, naval stores rarely had to wait as long.78
Wilmington sought to continue its hold on the naval stores trade in the 1850s by 
constructing other rail lines that would terminate at its port. The Wilmington to Manchester 
Railroad, completed in 1853, extended 158 miles through the pine forest of Columbus County to 
Manchester, South Carolina. By opening the forest in the southeastern tip of North Carolina and 
northeastern South Carolina, it helped develop the naval stores industry in these regions.79 In 
1850 De Bow’s Review reported that “the route contemplated for the Wilmington and 
Manchester railroad runs through the center of it [the pine forest]; and in anticipation of the 
success o f this enterprise, lands which once brought no more than ten to twenty cents per acre, 
have risen to $1 and Sl.50.”80
78 Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Old South, 1790-1860,” The Journal 
of Southern History 34 (November 1968): 519-521; Ashe, Forests. Forest Lands, and Forest 
Products. 77; Ruffin, “Notes of a  Steam Journey,” 243; Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores 
Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861” (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 110.
79 Powell, North Carolina. 285-289; Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the 
Old South, 1790-1860.” The Journal o f Southern History 34 fNovember 1968): 519-521; “The 
Manufacture o f Turpentine in the South,” 451; Ashe, Forests. Forest Lands, and Forest Products.
77.
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The next major North Carolina railroad project, although it did not run to Wilmington, 
was nevertheless designed to protect that town’s shipping volume. Fearful that a proposed line 
from Danville, Virginia, through Charlotte, North Carolina, and on to Columbia, South Carolina, 
would take trade away from North Carolina’s ports, particularly Wilmington, W. S. Ashe, a 
Democratic congressman from New Hanover County, introduced a bill in the North Carolina 
General Assembly in 1849 chartering the North Carolina Railroad Company. The state 
subscribed two million o f the three million dollars needed for the project. Completed in 18S6, 
the new rail line ran for 223 miles from Goldsboro, North Carolina, through Hillsborough, 
Greensboro, Salisbury, and ended in Charlotte. Its eastern leg provided more access to the 
western reaches of the pine barrens.
Wilmington sponsored yet another railroad in 1855. The Wilmington, Charlotte, 
Rutherfordton Railroad was projected to run westward from Wilmington, through Bladen, 
Robeson, and Richmond Counties. By the eve of the Civil War, however, the line was completed 
only a few miles beyond Lumberton, a distance o f only eighty miles. It nevertheless opened up 
the pine forests of the region south of the Cape Fear River and permitted turpentine production in 
that area until the Civil War interrupted it (fig. 2.3).81 As Percival Perry, the recognized expert 
on antebellum naval stores, has observed “improved transportation and the expansion of the
80 “The Manufacture of Turpentine in the South,” 451.
81 Powell, North Carolina. 285-289; Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the 
Old South, 1790-1860.” The Journal o f  Southern History 34 (November 1968): 519-521; Ashe, 
Forests. Forest Lands, and Forest Products. 77.
Figure 2.3: United States Department of the Interior, Manufactures of the United States 
in 1860 (Washington. DC: 1865), 2-14, 57-82, 168-204, 285-294, 420-438, 552-579.
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naval stores industry in North Carolina went hand in hand, and each greatly influenced the
other.”82
These transportation improvements—clearing the Cape Fear River, steamboats, plank 
roads, and railroads—raised Wilmington’s prominence in the naval stores trade. Producers 
preferred to send turpentine to Wilmington by railroad than by boat to Washington. The railroad 
offered a more reliable and regular means of transportation to a more established market where 
prices were higher because of lower shipping costs to northern ports. But while the railroad 
linked Wilmington to previously inaccessible (ongieaf pine stands, it also made outside markets, 
particularly those of the north, accessible to the individual producers. Consequently a portion of 
the new turpentine production in the Cape Fear bypassed Wilmington and traveled directly to 
inland distributors. However, the railroad channeled a larger portion o f this new production to 
Wilmington, which became the trading center of North Carolina naval stores, eclipsing both New 
Bern and Washington. In 1837 Wilmington had exported but 81,872 barrels o f naval stores. In 
1855 it handled 698,780 barrels and in 1860 777,691 barrels (fig. 2.4).83 In the mid 1850s, a 
British traveler explained that “nearly the whole trade of the town is derived from the produce of 
the pine forests. The Wharves display immense quantities of pitch and resin barrels, and stills
82 Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Old South, 1790-1860,” The Journal 
of Southern History 34 (November 1968): 514. In 1855 the manager of one Grist operation 
requested that James Grist “Hire me fore negroes . . .  for I cant get but fore or five over hear for 
thair is more men over hear after negroes than ever was before and hire running high from 200 to
225 for the railroads[.] I shant hire but about 14 with the fore I ask of you to hir ” W. J. Grist
to Brother, 31 December 1855, Grist Papers.
83 Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861” 
(Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 257; Powell. North Carolina 285-289: Percival Perry, “The 
Naval Stores Industry in the Old South, 1790-1869,” The Journal o f Southern History 34 
(November 1968): 519-521; “The Manufacture of Turpentine in the South,” 451; Ashe, Forests. 
Forest Lands, and Forest Products. 77; Cook, “Naval Stores,” 8; For figures related to antebellum 
naval stores exports from the United States see Appendix A.
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Richard C. Cook, “Naval Stores: The Forgotten Industry in the Tar Heel State,” Naval Stores 
Review 77 (July 1967): 8-9.
for the manufacture of turpentine are numerous. Pitch and turpentine afford an export trade of 
nearly one million sterling.”84 This trade made Wilmington’s population the fastest growing of 
any town in North Carolina. In 1840 it was the largest town in the state with a population of 
4,744. Fayetteville was second with 4,285 and New Bern third with 3,690. By 1860 
Wilmington’s population had grown to 9,552, doubling in size since 1840, New Bern had 5,432 
residents, and Fayetteville, which remained an important inland naval stores market but was 
bypassed by all the main railroad arteries, had 4,790.8S Yet by most standards, Wilmington 
remained a small town. In 1860, over one million people lived in New York, 565,000 in 
Philadelphia, and 169,000 in New Orleans. One visitor to Wilmington found that ‘’the houses are 
chiefly built of wood, and a little plot of garden ground surrounds the best o f them. There is only
84 Robert Russell, North America: Its Agriculture and Climate (Edinburgh: Adam and 
Charles Black, 1857), 158.
85 Guion Griffis Johnson, Ante-Bellum North Carolina: A Social History (Chapel Hill: 
The University of North Carolina Press, 1937), 117.
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one street paved, and the other are no better than the loose sand can make them. The numbers o f 
mean negro huts, in some parts, are by no means a pleasing feature o f the place.”86
Except for Wilmington’s domination of naval stores exports, there was little consistency 
by which these products were marketed. Turpentine producers had a choice of ways to sell their 
product. One means, used especially by small farmers, was to sell their raw turpentine to a 
distillery owner. “Those collecting but a small quantity [of turpentine],” Olmsted observed, sell 
to large producers who own stills “or to custom distilleries, owned by those who make distilling 
alone their business.”87 Small producers in areas where turpentine was of little importance and 
located a considerable distance from a distillery could sell their few barrels of gum to a large 
planter who marked it themselves. For example, in the 18S0s, William R. Smith, a planter from 
Halifax County, North Carolina, handled small quantities of locally produced gum. Smith 
maintained accounts for producers whose turpentine he purchased and offered them either cash 
or such supplies as coffee, pork, com, bacon, and turpentining tools. Other small producers, who 
could get their gum or spirits to market, sold them to speculators who bought naval stores on 
commission for northern firms. Speculators commonly worked on a small scale because they 
lacked wharf accommodations and worked only during the busiest time of the marketing season. 
Tar shipments into Wilmington peaked from January to May and turpentine from June to April, 
but the latter was present in its greatest quantity from November 20 to February 1. If a producer 
rafted his own turpentine to the market, he might serve as his own agent, finding a buyer and 
making the sale while the barrels remained on the raft. By custom, the buyer purchased the 
whole raft as landed, which could contain from twenty to as many as three hundred barrels of 
naval stores. The buyer subtracted the cost o f handling, inspection, and cooperage, a charge of
86 Russell, North America, 158.
87 Olmsted, Joumev in the Seaboard Slave States. 343.
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from ten cents to fourteen cents per barrel. If the producer could not accompany his product, it 
was not uncommon before the mid-1840s for an inspector to serve as his agent for the sale.88 
However, this arrangement proved unsatisfactory to many producers. In 1843 forty turpentiners 
explained “that great dissatisfaction exists among turpentine makers with regard to the mode o f 
inspecting that article in the town of Wilmington, the way in which it is disposed of, and the 
manner generally o f conducting the business connected with its sale, leading to the belief that
they are not fairly dealt with ” They requested a change in either the inspection laws or the
manner of selling.89 When the practice of inspectors serving as agents ended in 1844, some 
inspectors quit their posts and became agents.90
Most producers, however, especially the large ones, employed the services o f a 
commission and forwarding merchant, or factor, who, upon the naval stores’ arrival in port, saw 
that they were unloaded, inspected, and sold. In the 1840s distillers and factors competed for 
gum. The stiff competition gave producers such an advantage that they often had the option of 
contracting their product in advance, which guaranteed them the highest market price at time of 
delivery and saved them the commission fee. As the amount of individual inland distilling 
increased and the volume of distillation in Wilmington waned in the latter 1840s and 18S0s, 
competition loosened and the business for factors grew. Most producers chose to sell their naval 
stores through factors, because factors proved so adept at marketing their commodity to the 
producers’ best advantage and offered a variety o f other helpful services. Despite producers’
88 William R. Smith Memorandum Book, 1852-1853, Special Collections Library, Duke 
University; Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861” 
(Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 148-149, 152; Gamble, “Pages from Wilmington’s Story,”
31-32.
89 “To Turpentine Makers,” Wilmington. North Carolina Chronicle. 27 December 1843.
90 “To Turpentine Makers,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 21 September 1844; 
“Notice,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 30 May 1845.
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reliance on unfree labor, profitable market trade remained their principal concern Wilmington 
factors were reputed to have had the best knowledge of the naval stores trade. And they provided 
prompt sale of naval stores and avoided speculation unless directed to do so by their client. They 
also advanced capital to producers whose wealth was tied up in slaves and pine land. Unlike 
banks, which were few in the region did not lend on the security of pine timber tracts or still 
facilities because of their temporary and transient nature, factors supplied the necessary 
operating capital. If an account went unsettled, they would simply extended the balance to the 
next year; they rarely called in debts. Finally, the factor defended the producer against any 
complaint from the buyer.91
To attract clients, factors advertised that they offered the most accommodating service 
and the finest facilities for marketing naval stores. In 1844, James 1. Bryan, a Wilmington factor, 
promised to give his clients needed attention for a modest charge. “When the price is depressed 
and owners wish to hold for an improvement, he will furnish a WHARF, and make suitable 
ADVANCES either in CASH or GOODS, to enable them to do so. Those wishing to SHIP will 
have every necessary facility.”92 In 1852, Miles Costin, another Wilmington factor, notified 
producers that he had “leased for a term of years, o f  R.W. Brown, Esq., his fire-proof store, with 
his wharves, and is now in a condition to take especial care o f Spirits Turpentine and other Naval 
Stores committed to his care.” Not only that but “the lower wharves have on them four large 
new sheds, where Spirits can be safely kept from the rain and sun.”93
Factors were not unique to naval stores marketing. Historian Harold Woodman explains 
that factorage houses served as the most common means by which antebellum southern planters
91 Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861” 
(Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 148-149, 152, 157-158; Hayes, “General History,” 98.
92 “Notice to Turpentine Makers,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 4 October 1844.
93 “To the Public,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 4 March 1853.
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marketed their cotton crop. The factor bought, sold, received, and forwarded goods, for which he 
received a commission. The 2.5 percent commission that both cotton and turpentine factors 
received for their services was a  carryover from the standard used by London factors who 
handled American tobacco sales in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. As the producers 
representative in the market, factors possessed the skill, experience, and information sources to 
make the proper judgments in their clients’ best interest. Because the factor had to be an expert 
on market fluctuations, crop size and quality, and the producer’s needs, he most often specialized 
in only one commodity. However, it was not uncommon for factors dealing in turpentine also to 
trade timber and lumber. Factors also ensured that producers received their needed supplies. If 
they did not actually stock what was needed, they acquired it from elsewhere, paid the bill, and 
charged the producer’s account. Factors usually extended a line of credit. Producers who 
required funds turned to their factor rather than to banks, although ultimately it was the bank that 
supplied the credit. Planters could only draw a note on the bank with the factor’s endorsement.94 
Woodman explains that “this, o f  course, changed the whole nature of the loan: banks were 
lending not on the security o f a plantation, slaves, or cotton but on the liquid assets o f a city 
merchant. In a word, by adding his endorsement to the planter’s note, the factor was 
guaranteeing the payment of the note at maturity.”95 Woodman emphasizes that the factor, far 
from holding producers in debt peonage, provided an essential service in the South’s plantation 
economy. Not only did they bring capital into the region, but with their knowledge o f price and 
market conditions, they were the most effective brokers to sell commodities and, with their 
connections in port towns to keep the inland producers supplied with goods. But, as with cotton,
94 Harold Woodman, King Cotton and His Retainers: Financing and Marketing the 
Cotton Crop o f the South. 1800-1925 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1968; reprint, 
Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1990), 6, 14,22,26, 32, 39,41,
49, 114; “Agency for the Sale o f Timber, Lumber, and Naval Stores,” Wilmington. North 
Carolina Journal. 5 January 1849; “Notice.” Wilmington. North Carolina Chronicle. 1 June 1849.
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the real locus o f power in financing, marketing, and pricing o f naval stores was not found in the 
Southern port cities where factors and shipping firms handled these commodities, but in New 
York and Liverpool, where trading firms monitored the world supply and set prices.96
As with cotton, the cost of marketing turpentine, which included, on top o f the 2.5- 
percent factor’s commission, cost for freight drayage, inspection, storage, cooperating, and 
insurance, consumed more than a small portion o f the products gross value. Into the 1850s 
schooners remained the most common means o f transporting naval stores from North Carolina to 
New York. Bulky naval stores were not valuable enough to justify the more expensive shipping 
rate charged by steamers or railroads. New York was the most popular and the least expensive 
shipping destination, the freight rate from Wilmington to Philadelphia and Boston ran twenty to 
thirty percent above that to New York. However, trading at Wilmington could entail one added 
expense. Ships entering the port could not draw more than ten to twelve feet if they expected to 
clear the sand bar. Often lighters had to move the cargo down river, below the bar, before it was 
loaded aboard the ship, a costly and time consuming procedure. Shipping cost varied for spirits, 
gum, and rosin. Between September 1859 and September 1860 the cost of shipping spirits from 
Wilmington to New York ranged between 450 and 700 per barrel. In the same period shipping 
cost for gum ran between 350 and 550 and rosin between 350 and 500. Spirit shipment costs ran 
more, about 22 percent more, because the barrels had to be carried below deck to prevent 
evaporation from exposure to the sun. Rosin and gum, both less valuable, were transported on 
deck which carried a cheaper rate. However, the insurance for goods shipped on the deck ran 
higher because during storms, these items commonly fell overboard first. When marketing their
95 Woodman, King Cotton. 115-116.
96 Ibid., 130, 174-175.
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naval stores producers paid around 120 per barrel for inspection, wharfage, cooperage, and
loading.97
Turpentine shipped through R. W. Brown & Son, a Wilmington factor, serves as an 
example of the expenses involved in marketing naval stores. In October 1835 the firm shipped 
seventy-seven barrels of raw turpentine aboard the Regulus from Wilmington to New York. In 
addition to the freight cost, handling charges included $2.34 to transport the barrels around the 
Wilmington dock, S1.54 to land the shipment when it first arrived at the port, 600 to deliver the 
barrels to the schooner for the trip to New York, and twenty cents to load them aboard the ship. 
To inspect the shipment cost $2.20 and to repair either deficient or damaged barrels cost $3.04. 
The fee for storage at the wharf was 760. The commission paid to the factor for handling the 
shipment was 5 percent, $ 13.79, double the usual fee. Total cost of marketing the turpentine 
shipment amounted to $24.47, a little more than nine percent of the shipments gross value of 
267.51. This is similar to the minimum cost of marketing cotton, six to ten percent o f the gross 
proceeds.98
For the few producers who remained in North Carolina’s northern counties, transporting 
naval stores to New York cost considerably more. William B. Wise of Murfreesboro in Hertford 
County, a dry goods merchant and naval stores trader, had to spend over forty percent of a sixty- 
eight barrel shipment’s gross value to get it to New York. Valued at $171.51, the shipment first 
went to Norfolk by ship at a cost of $19. The cost of hauling, cooperage, inspection, wharfage, 
and the 2.5 percent selling commission totaled $42.07. Thus, when the shipment was ready to 
leave Norfolk for New York, its net value had been reduced to $129.44. The cost o f shipping the
97 Ibid., 176; Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789- 
1861” (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 131, 135, 136, 146; Gamble, “Pages From 
Wilmington’s Story,” 32.
98 Shipping Receipt, 17 October 1835, Oliver H. Jones Papers, Special Collections 
Library, Duke University; Woodman, King Cotton. 177.
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sixty-eight barrels by railroad to New York was $ 19.44 and the handling, cooperage, wharfage, 
and a 1 1/4 percent commission ran an extra $9.20 for a total cost o f $28.64. Wise received 
$ 100.80 for a naval stores shipment that was valued at $ 171.51."  Woodman explains that ‘"those 
planters and fanners who sold locally to stockeepers or itinerant merchants could escape the 
direct assessment of these charges, but since local buyers had no option but to resell through a 
factor, the price they offered had to include the added expenses.”100
Marketing naval stores could not only be costly, but confusing as well. Until the naval 
stores developed into a big business within its borders, North Carolina neglected to create a 
uniform marketing code for these products. For most of the antebellum period there existed only 
chance consistency in weight and product standards among the several ports that handled naval 
stores. Once North Carolina attempted at last to bring some order to this chaotic situation, the 
dealers in Washington, New Bern, and Wilmington proved less than eager to relinquish their 
virtual autonomy and cooperate with measures imposed by the state. A 1784 state inspection act 
served as the basis for North Carolina’s naval stores inspection legislation. Because there was no 
systematic revision o f the 1784 inspection act, the additions and amendments over the years 
created an amorphous inspection code in which some acts applied to some ports, but not others. 
Under the law the county courts had almost complete control over the inspection system. They 
appointed the inspectors and designated the places of inspection. Originally, inspectors, upon 
their appointment, were required to post a five-hundred-pound bond, but the legislature raised it 
to one thousand dollars. If a complaint was brought against an inspector, he was to be tried by 
the court and if found guilty the court would replace him. And they could be sued for damages 
for a period of three years after leaving their post. While serving, inspectors were prohibited
99 Receipt for sale of turpentine, July 31, 18SS, William B. Wise Papers, Special 
Collections Library, Duke University.
100 Woodman, King Cotton. 176.
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from holding an office and could not be elected to the General Assembly. Legislation limiting 
the number of inspectors per town was revised as the industry grew. An 180S law restricted the 
number of inspectors in any town to six. However, the increased naval stores traffic through 
Wilmington soon strained the ability o f these six as well as the five to six additional inspectors 
who worked in districts around New Hanover County. An 1852 law permitted the New Hanover 
County Court to appoint eight or more inspectors for Wilmington. In 1831 an earlier law 
limiting the appointment o f Wilmington inspectors to one year was revised to allow them to 
serve two-year posts. In most cases, however, inspectors were reappointed; between 1842 and 
1860, the term for Wilmington inspectors averaged slightly less than six years.101
The appointments could prove to be very lucrative. Inspectors did not receive a salary, 
but were paid a commission for each barrel they inspected. The usual fee was 20 for a barrel of 
tar, 2.50 for each barrel of pitch or turpentine, and ten cents for each certificate of the number 
and quality of the barrels they inspected. In 1858 the eleven Wilmington inspectors received an 
average of $1,176 in fees, one making as much as $2,265 and another only $410, still a living 
wage for this time.102 With the promise o f such profits at stake, many inspectors competed for 
business through newspaper advertisements. In 1844 C. B. Morris posted a notice advertising 
that he had “lately been appointed Inspector o f Naval Stores, and respectfully solicits a share of 
patronage from his Country friends and the public generally.”103
Inspectors employed relatively arbitrary standards in their duties because the legislature 
provided only vague guidelines. They examined barrels to determine how free the product was 
of dirt, wood chips, bark, straw, leaves, and water. They also decided if  the raw turpentine was
101 Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861” 
(Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 161-165, 171-173,198-199.
102 Ibid., 161-165, 171-173.
103 “Notice,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 30 May 1845.
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“hard” or “soft,” hard being the scrape removed from the face and soft the gooey resin dipped out 
of the box. The standards for soft and hard gum were well established. However, barrels 
containing a mixture of hard and soft turpentine were more difficult to grade. Typically, hard 
turpentine sold for half the price o f soft, so unscrupulous producers mixed soft and hard gum in 
hopes that the mixture could be sold as soft. Others mixed hot water, scrape, and dip to achieve 
the same result. In such cases inspectors had few guidelines by which to judge the quality, a 
situation that often led to disputes between buyers and sellers. Inspectors also checked to see 
that barrels were branded with the producer’s initials. Inspections were valid only for twenty 
days before export. If the barrels sat for longer, they had to be reinspected to determine if 
exposure to the sun’s heat had damaged the material or made it more viscous causing it to leak 
from the barrels.104
Contributing to the confusion over grades was the inconsistency in the size of the state’s 
turpentine barrels. The barrels used in the northern counties and at Washington and New Bern 
weighed 280 pounds gross, but those shipped through Wilmington weighed 320 pounds gross. 
Although the resulting complication created in the export market by this situation was recognized 
early, neither region would conform to the other’s standard. One writer to the New Bern 
Carolina Centennial, who believed Wilmington’s standards should become universal, wished “to 
impress on the minds o f the Turpentine makers, who look to this place for a market, the necessity 
of paying more attention than they usually do to the quality and thickness of the Staves and 
strength of the Hoops, as well as to the size and proper proportion of the barrels, so as to raise the 
reputation of our Inspection to an equality with that of Wilmington.”105 Against this writer’s 
wishes, the state legislature, in 1846, passed a law calling for all turpentine barrels to weigh 280
104 Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861” 
(Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 165, 167, 179.
105 Ibid., 177.
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pounds gross, the northern county standard. The same law also required that the barrels o f soft 
gum to be sealed with twelve hoops and branded with an “S” and those with hard fastened with 
ten hoops and branded with an “H.”106 There was to be no mixing. Despite the new law, 
producers felt little obligation abandon familiar standards. Not only did the act impose no 
penalty against producers who did not conform to the legal standard, but Wilmington marketers 
agreed to continue accepting 320 pound barrels. At worst the inspector could condemn 
fraudulent turpentine and keep it off the market. Inspectors, however, faced a steeper penalty. 
They could be fined fifty dollars for each offense of deceitful work. Turpentine dealers in the 
city objected to the new smaller barrel size. Because freight was paid per barrel, regardless of its 
size or weight, a smaller size would require more barrels and would bring a rise in freight costs. 
In response to this situation producers, inspectors, and dealers decided to ignore the law and set 
out to develop their own code or rules and standards. In May 1847, a month before the state 
regulations were to take effect, the Wilmington dealers drafted their own regulations. They 
called for a 320-pound barrel, turpentine to be brought to market at the producer’s expense, the 
seller and producer to split the cost of inspection, and penalties for substandard packaging.107 
The three parties also refused “to compromise for fraudulent mixture as heretofore, that we deem 
chips, straw, billets o f wood, limbs, dirt, &c., as a fraudulent mixture, and that we shall abide by 
the strict letter of the law in all such cases.”108 But despite Wilmington’s domination o f  the 
turpentine trade, the 280-pound barrel was more reasonable for the export market. Because the 
northern counties had first supplied the bulk of the turpentine trade, the New York market had 
established their 280-pound barrel as the standard trade weight and continued to do so. After ten
106 Ibid., 185.
107 Ibid., 185-188, 190-193; “Notice to Dealers in Turpentine & Tar.” Wilmington. North 
Carolina Journal. 25 June 1847; “Turpentine—The New Law,” Wilmington. North Carolina 
Journal. 21 May 1847.
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chaotic months o f dual barrel sizes and price scales, the Wilmington dealers, in 1849, finally 
submitted and accepted the smaller barrel.109
During the antebellum era, naval stores production, especially turpentine manufacturing, 
grew into a large-scale business dominated by a wealthy class of entrepreneurial producers who 
required the services o f  factorage houses to financially sustain their businesses as well as 
consistent quality standards to ensure their products’ marketability. In the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries naval stores production languished as a marginally profitable business 
which no state, save North Carolina, wanted. Prevented by its poor soils from participating in 
the cotton boom that other southern states enjoyed, North Carolina’s economic development 
stagnated through the 1830s, earning it the unfortunate distinction as the “Rip Van Winkle 
State.” But as demand for turpentine outstripped that of tar and its price persisted at relatively 
high levels, spirits developed, in a sense, into a substitute for cotton which attracted the attention 
of some of the state’s wealthier men. Their ability to construct their own stills, coupled with 
transportation improvements, permitted the industry to expand into previously inaccessible areas 
of southeastern North Carolina. The growth and prosperity that turpentine production brought 
many North Carolinians rested, however, on the backs o f black slaves who performed the 
particularly strenuous work the industry required. The conditions under which they and the 
white piney woods inhabitants lived represented a distinctive way of life for slaves and poor 
southern whites.
108 “Turp—The New Law.”
109 In 18SS it was agreed that the purchaser would pay the inspection fee, which was 
lowered to one cent per barrel. Although producers were pleased to be freed of this expense, in 
some cases it could bring the inspector’s interest too close to the merchants, a situation that 
raised suspicion among many producers. Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante- 
Bellum South, 1789-1861” (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 190-193; “Notice to Dealers in 
Turpentine & Tar.”
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Chapter Three
A South Apart:
Life and Labor in the Piney Woods
Southerners—poor whites, small piney woods fanners, and slaves—who occupied the 
antebellum pine forest and labored in some capacity in the turpentine industry, all lived an 
existence different from that of most southerners engaged in agriculture. Poor whites, who lived 
a relatively isolated and subsistence-based existence in the pine barrens, either harvested small 
quantities of gum, which they sold for finished goods or food, or worked on an irregular basis for 
larger producers. Other, more middle class whites worked on a somewhat larger and more 
regular schedule to produce turpentine for the market, sometimes with the help of several slaves. 
Unlike the piney woods whites, however, large naval stores operators often did not reside in 
areas quite so isolated, but rather close by small population centers or at least near major 
transportation routes. They lived lives more similar to large plantation owners than other 
southern whites who produced on a smaller scale with their own labor. Because big producers 
came to dominate the industry, slaves performed the vast majority o f labor. For them, the 
expansion of naval stores manufacturing after 1830, the various procedures involved in 
harvesting turpentine, the size and location of the turpentine forests, and the ways that these three 
factors effected slave management practices created a distinct “work and . . .  manner o f life.”1 In 
fact, turpentine slaves endured harsher working and living conditions than bondsmen on a typical 
agricultural plantation.
1 William J. Parham to James R. Grist, May I, 1854, James Redding Grist Papers, 
Special Collections Library, Duke University.
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Poor whites who lived in the pine forest often engaged in turpentining in some way, 
whether producing small quantities on their own or laboring for a large producer. Unfortunately, 
as Percival Perry explains, little is known of the smaller-scale producers. Illiterate for the most 
part, they left scant written record. It is known, however, that the few white dwellers of the 
piney woods lived in near isolation. The longleaf pine prefers light, sandy soil and a clay 
subsoil. These soil conditions could not sustain agriculture and, consequently, made settlers 
bypass the pine barrens. Any farmers who attempted to grow cotton on land that formerly grew 
only longleaf pines experienced a decline in yield by over fifty percent from the first year to the 
third.2
Mid-nineteenth-century travelers commented on the dearth of inhabitants in the region. 
When reporter David Hunter Strother (pen name Porte Crayon) turned from the main road to 
explore the countryside, he could not “resist the feeling of loneliness that creeps over one on 
entering these silent forests, or to repress a sentiment o f superstitious dread as you glance 
through the somber many-columned aisles, stretching away on every side in interminable 
perspective.”3 Olmsted described the road which he traveled upon in the same region as “a 
narrow opening through a forest of long-leafed pine.” The pine branches, fully tipped with 
needles, formed a dense canopy that shaded the forest. “In ten miles,” he claimed, “I passed half 
a dozen cabins, one or two small clearings, in which com had been planted, and one turpentine 
distillery, with a dozen sheds and cabins clustered about it.”4 Still another traveler reported that
2 Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861” 
(Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), vi; Rupert B. Vance, Human Geography of the South: A 
Study in Regional Resources and Human Adequacy (Chapel Hill: The University o f North 
Carolina Press, 1935), 112; Thomas D. Clark, The Greening of the South: The Recovery of Land 
and Forest (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1984), 15.
3 Porte Crayon, “North Carolina Illustrated: The Piney Woods,” Harper’s New Monthly 
Magazine 14 (May 1857): 746.
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one could journey fora day anywhere in the region between Wilmington and Raleigh and not 
pass more that one or two houses. Signs of life and development reportedly increased as one 
approached the Wilmington to Weldon Railroad.s Yet even there William C. Corsan, an 
Englishman touring the Confederacy in 1862, found the countryside along the railroad 
“depressing.” “Low swampy levels, intersected with turbid streams,” he explained,” were 
followed by long stretches of poor, sandy, monotonous country, covered with pitch pines, and 
destitute apparently of inhabitants.”6
Poor whites occupied the unwanted clay bottom lands and sand-hills. Known by other 
whites as vagabonds, clay eaters, dirt eaters, tallow-faced gentry, crackers, and sandhillers, they 
had the reputation for being lazy, ignorant, and hard-drinking. Across the South, from the 
Carolinas through the Gulf South, they either occupied an empty log cabin with the owner’s 
consent or constructed a log hut on land on which they squatted. The infertile land was of such 
low value that poor white families could, with little harassment, find small tracts on which to 
live. Here they worked small garden plots and did occasional odd jobs on neighboring 
plantations. Their houses often consisted of rude log cabins furnished with just a few chairs, a 
bench, one or two beds, a comer cupboard, an oven, and a skillet and hying pan. In their garden 
they grew com, sweet potatoes, peas, col lards; their hogs foraged for themselves in the forest. 
They supplemented their diet with such game as they could shoot in the forest—wild hogs, deer, 
wild turkey, squirrel, raccoon, and opossum. They probably suffered from hookworm disease, 
which might explain their reputed laziness and habit of eating dirt.7
4 Frederick Law Olmsted, A Joumev in the Seaboard Slave States (New York: Dix & 
Edwards, 1856), 326.
s Dugall McMillan to Southern Cultivator. 14 April 1846. Southern Cultivator 4 
(November 1846): 122.
6 W. C. Corsan, Two Months in the Confederate States (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1996), 68.
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Historian Bill Cecil-Fronsman argues that “Common whites did no t. . .  live in a purely 
subsistence economy in which they never bought or sold anything.”8 Bradley Bond agrees that 
piney-woods people did not live in complete isolation or by self-sufficiency, but participated in 
the market economy. Most used the market to acquire finished goods and probably to 
supplement the grain they grew. To acquire the money for what they needed to buy, small 
farmers produced crops for the market economy or engaged in home manufacturing. In the piney 
woods turpentine production often provided a family of small means the only staple they could 
produce from the sandy pine land. Despite little capital, the father and older boys could still cut 
boxes and chip while the wife, girls, and younger boys dipped. Such a family operation could 
turn a profit—even if it had to rent the boxes, buy the barrels, and pay to have the product hauled 
to the market or to a larger operator who would buy the gum. Edmund Ruffin observed that 
white families living in the piney woods relied almost solely on tar and turpentine for a 
marketable product. They cleared only small patches for cultivating sweet potatoes, the only 
crop that grew well in the sandy soil.9
Piney woods folk not only produced naval stores themselves but worked for large 
operators as well. At Richiands Plantation, for example, poor white families aided with fire
7 Guion Griffis Johnson, Ante-Bellum North Carolina: A Social History (Chapel Hill: 
The University of North Carolina Press, 1937), 69, 72; Grady McWhiney, “Crackers and 
Cavaliers: Shared Courage,” in Plain Folk of the South Revisited, ed. Samuel C. Hyde, Jr. (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1997), 190; Grady McWhiney, “Antebellum Piney 
Woods Culture: Continuity Over Time and Place,” in Mississippi’s Pinev Woods: A Human 
Perspective, ed. Noel Park (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi), 47; Paul H. Buck, “The 
Poor Whites of the Ante-Bellum South,” American Historical Review 31 (October 1925): 43, 45.
8 Bill Cecil-Fronsman, Common Whites: Class and Culture in Antebellum North 
Carolina (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1992), 100, 102.
9 Bradley G. Bond, “Herders, Farmers, and Markets on the Inner Frontier: The 
Mississippi Piney Woods, 1850-1860,” in Plain Folk of the South Revisited, ed. Samuel C. Hyde, 
Jr. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1997), 81, 86; Cecil-Fronsman, Common 
Whites. 10; “Turpentine: Hints for Those About to Engage in Its Manufacture,” De Bow’s 
Review 19 (October 1855): 488; Johnson, Ante-Bellum North Carolina. 486; Edmund Ruffin, 
“Notes of a Steam Journey,” The Farmer’s Register 8 (30 April 1840): 246, 250.
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prevention. With insurance impossible to obtain for such a combustible business, the only 
protection from fire was for piney woods whites to police the forest and extinguish any flame as 
soon as possible. Log cabins in which the families lived dotted the expansive forest o f twenty 
thousand acres. They lived rent-free and could cultivate as much land as they chose, which was 
rarely more than a garden. Typically the women worked their plot and raised children while the 
men hunted and fished and the children gathered wild berries. In return, these families rendered 
several services to the plantation, most importantly guarding against fire. Whenever fire broke 
out, it was the families’ responsibility to extinguish it. If flames got out of control, they were to 
blow horns to summon the other families in the forest to assist. Their secondary task was to tend 
the plantation’s livestock which grazed loose in the forest. Once a week they provided salt and 
care to the cattle herd, and each night they drove the sheep into a pen for protecting from 
predators. The white families also cared for the plantation’s bees and gathered the honey for the 
big house. When the plantation’s roads required repairs, they performed the work. To earn cash 
they sold their game, poultry, and berries to the plantation. Avirett reported that these poor 
whites kept to themselves. “They never mingle with the more thrifty white people,” he 
explained, “while the negroes on the estate look down upon them, calling them, most 
disdainfully, ‘poor white trash.’”10
Travelers through the piney woods also spoke despairingly of its white residents. 
Edmund Ruffin described them as “generally poor and indolent” despite ample opportunity for 
profit from naval stores.11 Strother described their homes as “little better in appearance than the 
huts of our Western borders.”12 The yards of all piney woods houses, he added, included a well
10 James Battle Avirett, The Old Plantation: How We Lived in Great House and Cabin 
Before the War (New York: F. Tennyson Nedy Co., 1901), 70-71.
11 Ruffin, “Notes o f a Steam Journey,” 250.
12 Crayon, “North Carolina Illustrated: The Piney Woods,” 746.
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with a cypress bucket, fodder stacks, consisting of com leaves held above the ground by tall 
poles, three well-protected sweet potato hills, and empty gourds used for martin houses. Most 
yards had fhiit trees or a  scuppemong grapevine. Strother characterized the people who lived 
these homes as lazy and thieving. As an example o f a typical piney woods family, he reported a 
domestic fight which he had witnessed in which a woman chased her husband around the yard 
yelling and beating him with a broom stick. “It seems,” Strother recounted,” that the man having 
got through the proceeds o f the last sale of turpentine, instead of gathering more, as he was 
ordered, had robbed two o f madam’s sitting hens and sold the eggs, the proceeds whereof he had 
invested in whisky.”13
Where Strother described the piney woods people’s backwardness with lighthearted 
amusement, Olmsted delivered a scathing criticism of them, painting them as “entirely 
uneducated, poverty-stricken vagabonds.”14 “They are poor,” he wrote, “having almost no 
property but their own bodies; and the use of these, that is, their labor, they are not accustomed to 
hire out statedly and regularly, so as to obtain capital by wages, but only occasionally by the day 
or job, when driven to it by necessity.”15 He observed that piney woods whites commonly 
squatted on a plot where they built a log cabin which they never bothered to seal on the sides. 
They cultivated a little com, potatoes, and soybeans and owned a few hogs which lived in the 
forest. The men spent most of their time hunting.16 “If they have need of money to purchase 
clothing ect., they obtain it by selling their game or meal. If they have none of this to spare, or an 
insufficiency, they will work for a neighboring farmer for a few days, and they will usually get
13 Ibid., 747.
14 Olmsted, Journey in the Seaboard Slave States. 348.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid., 348-349.
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for their labor fifty cents a day, funding themselves.”11 However, Olmsted added, farmers did 
not like to hire them because they could not be relied upon to finish a job or perform it as 
directed. They also could not be driven to work as fast and as hard as slaves.18 In fact, Olmsted 
concluded that slaves “are superior in every moral and intellectual respect to the great mass o f 
the white people inhabiting the turpentine forest.”19
Small, independent farmers and turpentiners occupied a slightly higher status in piney 
woods white society, but as Cecil-Fronsman explains, ‘The line between poor whites and their 
more prosperous yeoman neighbors was never rigid.”20 Many small producers lived in cabins, 
although better constructed than those belonging to the poorer whites, and some inhabited framed 
houses. Their houses still had no glass windows, but did contain more abundant furniture than 
those of the poorest classes; their yards included a vegetable garden with collards. These small 
piney woods farmers also owned a few dogs, more hogs, raised more com than the poor whites, 
but cultivated very little in way of staple crops. Their property holdings, which in some cases 
could be surprisingly considerable, consisted mainly o f slaves. One small producer worked three 
slaves, at least one he hired. Because of his farm’s poor soil he grew only a little cotton, just
17 Ibid., 349.
18 Ibid., 349-350.
19 Ibid., 348. In Alabama the poorer class o f piney woods whites was “distinguished
alone for their ignorance and poverty, living almost entirely by the rifle ” The introduction of
the turpentine industry, producers in that state hoped, would provide “a means of employment for 
this class and thus allowing them not only the necessities, but the comforts o f life, including 
schools.” Turpentine, they argued, could create “an industrious, well-fed and well-clad people, 
adding not only to their own comforts by their labor, but elevating themselves into a sober, 
moral, and intelligent class of citizens, contributing in no small degree to the strength and wealth 
of the State.” “The Southern Pine Forest—Turpentine,” De Bow’s Review 18 (February 1855): 
189.
20 Cecil-Fronsman, Common Whites. 17.
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enough for his family to make cloth for their own clothes, and instead concentrated on 
turpentine.21
Large, specialized operators, whose numbers grew sharply during the three decades after 
1830, produced far more turpentine than did yeoman farmers. James Avirett o f  Richlands 
Plantation in Onslow County, for example, produced more turpentine than nearly any one else in 
the business. Although Avirett raised tobacco, rice, sorghum, cotton, wheat, oats, rye, and com, 
as well as several hundred head of hogs and sheep, his thirty-thousand-barrel-a-year turpentine 
operation consumed the largest portion o f Richlands’ labor. The plantation’s twenty-two 
thousand-acres o f pine forest provided enough boxes to keep busy 125 slaves, 2 turpentine 
distilleries, and several cooperage shops. Bom in 1797, John Avirett was descended from 
German Huguenots who settled in the area in the 1740s and who had become prominent enough 
by 1791 to host George Washington during his southern tour. As a powerful member of the 
planter class, Avirett served a term in the state senate and nearly twenty years as Onslow 
County’s sheriff. In his forties when turpentine demand swelled, he used the industry to make 
his short-lived fortune. His expansive operation lay on the stage road fifty-eight miles north of 
Wilmington and forty-two miles south o f New Bern and occupied level terrain except for a creek 
that cut through the fields. An avenue o f elms, 1,200 feet long and 40 feet wide lead to the big 
house, which rested on a five-foot high brick pillars. A piazza extended around his three-story 
residence whose large windows opened to the floor. The out buildings included a kitchen, which 
was connected to the house by the piazza, three smoke houses, a flour house, a  cotton house, and 
a large storage house. Located to the rear o f these buildings were the chicken coops that John 
Avirett’s son James explained, were “well fenced in, secure from the egg-sucking cur of the 
negro quarter, as well as from mink or weasel at night.” Near the poultry yard was a one-acre
21 Olmsted, Journey in the Seaboard Slave States. 350; Robert Russell, North America:
Its Agriculture and Climate (Edinburgh: Adam and Charles Black, 1857), 160-161.
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vegetable garden and a weaving room where slaves wove the cotton and woolen cloth used on 
the plantation. Beyond the quarters was the Richlands’ ginhouse, with shed rooms built around it 
where carpenters worked. Down the hill from it stood a storage building for groceries and 
wagons and a corral for the one hundred, fifty horses and mules used on the estate.22
James R. Grist was another representative large producer, who, like Avirett, lived in 
relative grand style for the area. While traveling through North Carolina in 1857 the only object 
that caught Strother’s eye in Washington was the Grist residence, located “at the end o f the main 
street, with beautifully-improved grounds.”23 In the early 1850s Grist o f  Washington, North 
Carolina, entered the turpentine business with his father in Beaufort County but later moved to 
areas near the Cape Fear River and South Carolina. Grist became a wealthy and influential 
businessmen in eastern North Carolina. He assisted the Banks brothers’ steamboat company by 
endorsing their loans and using his influence to convince a Wilmington factorage house to use 
the Banks to carry their freight. Out of gratitude, the Banks in 1854 named their new steamer the 
James R. Grist.24
The experiences of Sarah Hicks Williams offers insight into the life of women married to 
large turpentine producers, like Grist and Avirett. Sarah Hicks o f New Hartford, New York had 
known Benjamin Williams for five years when he first proposed marriage in 1850. Although she 
was certain of his affection for her, she disliked two characteristics about him—“his owning of 
slaves” and his “not being a professed Christian.”25 However when Williams renewed his offer
22 Avirett, Old Plantation. 22-25, 36-41, 51-54, 64-66 (quotation on page 40); David 
Cecelski, “The Rise and Fall of the Rich Lands,” Coastwatch (January/February 1997): 22;
David S. Cecelski, “Oldest Living Confederate Chaplain Tells All?: Or, James B. Avirett and the 
Rise and Fall of the Rich Lands,” Southern Cultures 3 (Winter 1997): 10.
23 Crayon, “North Carolina Illustrated: The Piney Woods,” 750.
24 Pervical Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861” 
(Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 95, 523.
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three years later, Sarah, for unknown reasons, agreed to overlook these qualities and accepted . 
An ambitious North Carolina doctor, Williams had served in the state legislature, invested in 
both forest and cleared land, and operated a turpentine operation about seven miles from his 
Greene County home. After moving to her new home in the North Carolina pine barrens during 
the fall, she was struck by the region’s isolation and lack o f  development. During a twenty mile 
journey from her home to the town of Wilson, she did not “think we passed over a half dozen 
houses. The road on both sides was bounded by woods, mostly pine, and the trees are much 
taller and larger than ours [in New York].”26 She was also surprised to find that North 
Carolinians “live more heartily” than northerners, always serving two or three different kinds of 
meats for breakfast and dinner. Although the portions were more plentiful than those issued to 
the slaves, Sarah’s diet, which included com bread, biscuits, and sweet potatoes, resembled that 
of the bondsmen who labored at her husband’s turpentine operation. But while the slaves 
probably received salt hog meat, the Williams enjoyed fresh pork prepared in traditional Carolina 
fashion. “Red pepper,” she observed, “is much used to flavor meat with the famous ‘barbarcue’ 
of the South and which I believe they esteem above all dishes is roasted pig dressed with red 
pepper and vinegar.27 The Williamses also ate peaches and apples when they were in season. 
Sarah occupied her time attending church, receiving visitors or visiting in other’s homes, and 
helping with housework and even management of the plantation. She shared the doctor’s two- 
story, wood frame house with her mother-in-law, who acted as mistress o f the home. Sarah had 
her own room, furnished with her belongings, in which she could read and write in privacy.28
25 Sarah F. Hicks to Parents, 7 March 18S3, Sarah Hicks Williams Papers, Southern 
Historical Collection, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
26 Sarah Hicks Williams to Parents, 7 November 1853, Ibid.
27 Sarah Hicks Williams to Parents 10 December 1853, Ibid.
28 Sarah Hicks Williams to Parents, 10 October 18S3, 17 November 1853; 10 December 
1853, Ibid.
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When not engaged with church or visits, she assisted the doctor’s mother in sewing cloths for the 
slaves who worked about the plantation. Sarah explained that although many plantations “keep a 
seamstress to do th is,. . .  Mother Williams has always done it herself with the assistance of her 
daughters when they were home.” They did not, however, sew for slaves who labored at the 
distant turpentine operation.29 Sarah persisted in her opposition to slavery, but admitted that she 
found “no unkind treatment o f the servants, indeed I think that they are treated with more 
familiarity than many northern servants.” The slaves’ consistent presence “in the parlor + in 
your room, + all over” unnerved her.30
After a couple of years in North Carolina, Sarah gained more responsibility for her home 
and the plantation, especially when her husband was absent on his frequent trips to tend to his 
turpentine operation. During his absences, “I see to his business,” she explained in 18S5. “I am 
up before sunrise to give out the keys, he told me how to order, + sometimes I steal Mother’s 
thunder I watch, and see what her hands are doing + then I order ours as if I knew it all.”31 She 
played an increased role in the plantation’s management when she moved with her husband to 
south Georgia in the late 1850s. By 1859 her responsibilities had become so great that she 
complained “my mind is so filled” with the care of the slaves. She was in charge of “sixteen here 
[Carleton County], + five up in Ware Co + over thirty getting Turpentine though these latter do 
not come to me for clothes, or food, still they call this their home + several of them always are 
here Sundays.”32 She also tended sick slaves who labored at the house as well as those who 
worked for the turpentine operation several miles away. In October 1860 she was not only
29 Sarah Hicks Williams to Parents, 10 December 1853, Ibid.
30 Sarah Hicks Williams to Parents, 10 October 1853, Ibid.
31 Sarah Hicks Williams to Parents, 22 May 1855, Ibid.
32 Sarah Hicks Williams to Parents, 25 March 1859, Ibid.
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tending to her sick cook, but “Jim was sent home from the still half sick, so now I have two to 
take care of.”33
A foundation o f slave laborers like Jim supported the turpentine boom of the 1830s, ’40s, 
and ’50s.34 As larger producers entered the business, adequate labor became a constant concern. 
Correspondence between members of the Grist family and their overseers is filled with frequent 
complaints that “we bearly have enough to work the business.” When in February 1861 three 
hired hands failed to work out, the overseer explained that he would “manage to work the 
business with the hands I have, but would be more than glad if you could hire me 4 or 5 hands at 
once for balance o f this year + the next.”35 Producers could either hire slaves or use their own, 
and many chose to do both. Mining, lumber, transportation, and turpentine concerns all made 
considerable use o f each kind. Such combined work forces were more common in southern 
industry than in agricultural enterprises.36 In 1859 Ben Williams employed “about thirty or 
thirty-five hands besides his own.”37 Hired slaves were vital to the Grist Alabama operation, 
which n 1851 worked thirty-five slaves belonging to six different owners.38 Hiring slaves 
enabled men of moderate means to enter the expanding turpentine business by freeing them from 
making heavy initial investments in slave laborers. It was common for producers who were
33 Sarah Hicks Williams to Parents, 21 October 1860, Ibid.
34 Donnie D. Bellamy, “Slavery in Microcosm: Onslow County, North Carolina,” The 
Journal of Negro History 62 (October 1977): 343.
35 James R. Grist to Father, 4 February 1851, Grist Papers.
36 Kenneth M. Stampp, The Peculiar Institution: Slavery in the Ante-Bellum South (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1989), 71; Robert S. Starobin, Industrial Slavery in the Old South (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1970), 12, 129-130, 138; Rosser Howard Taylor, Slaveholding in 
North Carolina: An Economic View (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1926), 38- 
40.
37 Sarah Hicks Williams to Parents, 7 November 1859, Williams Papers.
j8 Benjamin Grist to Allen Grist, 21 January 1851, Grist Papers.
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starting in the business to purchase or rent several hundred to a thousand acres and hire slave 
laborers. After a few years they could make enough money to buy slaves and possibly a still.
The ability to hire slaves strengthened the institution by increasing small slaveholders’ and 
nonslaveholders’ dependence on the labor of bondsmen.39 One producer, however, discouraged 
using hired slaves, “for they will invariably put more mean tricks into the heads of your own 
negroes than they ever knew before.”40
Both purchased and hired slaves in the naval stores industry lived distinctive lives from 
bondsmen laboring in agriculture. Historians have offered two interpretations of the lives of 
industrial slaves. Ronald L. Lewis and Charles B. Dew question whether industrial slavery was 
“the most brutal phase o f the regime.”41 Dew, who studied slaves in the iron foundries in 
Virginia, and Lewis, who examined slave labor in the coal and iron industry in Virginia and 
Maryland, argue that Starobin’s generalizations do not apply to life and labor at the forge. Lewis 
shows how industrial slaves challenged their masters’ authority and consequently improved their 
quality of life by negotiating extra rations, gaining more autonomy, and receiving payment for 
work performed beyond their normal tasks. Similarly, Dew’s work, especially his Bond of Iron. 
demonstrates that in iron manufacturing the slaves’ skill and determination, combined with 
southern iron producers’ desire to maintain an appeased, and thus more reliable, labor force, 
created a middle ground in which those in bondage could exercise some control over their 
working conditions, family affairs, and livelihoods. Lewis and Dew convincingly substantiate 
their conclusions about iron manufacturing and coal mining; these findings may be valid for
39 Pervical Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861” 
(Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 42; Starobin, Industrial Slavery. 135.
40 G.W. Perry, A Treatise on Turpentine Farming. (New Bern, NC: Muse & Davies,
1859), 120.
41 Ronald L. Lewis, Coal Iron and Slaves: Industrial Slavery in Maryland and Virginia. 
1715-1865 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1979), 8.
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cotton mills, salt works, and the chemical industry as well. But they do not hold entirely true for 
the naval stores industry, an enterprise that operated in isolated forests and was less “industrial” 
than iron manufacturing.42
Their experiences conform more to Robert S. Starobin’s generalized description of 
industrial slavery.43 Industrial slaves, he argues, were men, although a few women and children 
also labored in such enterprises. The majority of industrial slaves lived not in large cities but in 
rural areas, small towns, or on plantations. Generally their employer owned them; only one-fifth 
were hired. But in extractive industries, such as turpentine making, an integrated workforce of 
owned and hired slaves and a few white laborers became common. As with agricultural slaves, 
overseers or drivers commonly managed industrial slaves, not their owners or employers. 
However, Starobin writes that “working conditions were usually worse than those for laborers
42 Ibid., 8; Charles B. Dew, Bond of Iron: Master and Slave at Buffalo Forge (New York: 
W. W. Norton, 1994); also see Charles B. Dew, “David Ross and the Oxford Iron Works: A 
Study o f Industrial Slavery in the Early Nineteenth-Century South,” William and Mary 
Quarterly. 3d Ser., 31 (April 1974), 189-224; Charles B. Dew, “Disciplining Slave Ironworkers 
in the Antebellum South: Coercion, Conciliation, and Accommodation,” American Historical 
Review 79 (April 1974): 393-418;” Charles B. Dew, “Sam Williams, Forgeman: The Life of an 
Industrial Slave in the Old South,” in Region. Race, and Reconstruction: Essays in Honor of C. 
Vann Woodward, ed. J. Morgan Kousser and James M. McPherson (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1982), 199-239.
43 Such a study supports Ira Berlin and Philip D. Morgan’s argument that “the legacy of 
slavery cannot be understood without a full appreciation o f the ways in which slaves worked.” 
These historians maintain that, because slavery was above all an institution o f  forced labor and 
slaves spent most o f  their time at work, studies that focus on slave families, religion, and culture, 
while important, describe only a portion of the bondsman’s life. If work was the central 
component o f the slaves’ existence, it should become the center of scholarship on slavery. New 
studies, Berlin and Morgan argue, should examine the various labor requirements and the 
numerous and complex factors that shaped slave work and should consider “the requirements of 
particular crops and crafts, which shaped the nature of the workforce, the organization of 
production, and the division of labor.” These factors should be studied in relation to the 
geography o f the production site, the size of the slave labor force, the proportion o f slaves, free 
blacks, and whites in the labor group, and the system of slave management used. Ira Berlin and 
Philip D. Morgan, “Labor and the Shaping o f Slave Life in the Americas,” in Cultivation and 
Culture: Labor and the Shaping of Slave Life in the Americas, ed. Ira Berlin and Philip D. 
Morgan, (Charlottesville: University Press o f Virginia, 1993), 1-45 (quotation on page 3).
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engaged in southern farming, since industrial development often demanded longer and harder 
working days than did plantation agriculture.” Starobin argues that “the tendency to drive 
industrial slaves to the utmost, and to feed, clothe, and shelter them at subsistence levels, as well 
as the inadequate medical knowledge of the time, contributed to a tragic incidence o f disease and 
fatality in virtually all industrial occupations.” “The rigors o f bondage and the hazardous nature 
of southern industries,” Starobin concludes, revealed that the conditions experienced by 
industrial slaves were very different from those o f plantation laborers.44
More than anything else, the longleaf pine’s seasonal growth cycle shaped the 
turpentiner’s work schedule. In large trees the center, dark-colored wood, the heartwood, is 
physiologically dead. Its cells no longer function and it does not grow. Sapwood, a younger and 
lighter colored wood, surrounds the heartwood and facilitates the movement o f nutrients and 
water between the roots and the needles. A thin layer o f cells called cambium surrounds the 
sapwood which is in turn encased in a layer of inner bark called phloem. Trees grow each year 
by the division of cambium cells which create a layer o f new wood called xylem. All pine trees 
contain resin ducts, tiny tubes that run horizontally and vertically, creating a network in the 
sapwood that extend from the inner layer o f bark to a depth of one inch or more into the tree. 
When the tree reaches maturity, these passages become lined with a tissue, epithelium, from 
which resin is secreted. The resin serves as a protective outer coating in case the bark is 
damaged and falls away from the tree. In such instances resin oozes from the ducts over the 
wound to create a protective layer that diseases and insects are unable to penetrate and thereby 
provides time for the bark and cambium layer to heal. Resin is not sap. The epithelium cells 
manufacture resin only when required to protect the tree; it does not circulate through the tree as 
sap, a water-based solution that does. Resin ducts are particularly large and abundant in longleaf
44 Starobin, Industrial Slavery. 11-12,36, 37, 63, 138.
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pines. The intersection o f vertical and horizontal ducts may number more than fifty million per 
cubic meter. Moreover the gum of this species does not harden as rapidly when exposed to air 
and water and flows more freely over the wood than in other southern pines.45
The longleaf s resinous quality was widely recognized in early America. Naturalist F. 
Andre Michaux reported that its “resinous matter, which is abundant, is more uniformly
distributed than in the other species 1,46 He argued that, whereas the loblolly pine afforded
"turpentine in abundance,” it did so “in a less fluid state than that of the Long-leaved Pine.”47 
When beginning a turpentine operation, producers attempted to identify pine acreage that they 
believed would yield the most abundant resin. G. W. Perry, a producer from Craven County, 
North Carolina, recommended that turpentiners concentrate their efforts on healthy, straight trees 
with large tops. In 18SS turpentine producers in Alabama were informed that thick stands would 
not produce as much turpentine as those more sparsely placed and therefore free to grow with 
less competition.48 Another producer agreed that “the best trees are young, thriving, on pretty
45 Howard E. Weaver and David A. Anderson, Manual o f Southern Forest (Danville, 
Illinois: The Interstate Printers and Publishers, Inc, 1954), 33,35; A. J. Panshin, E. S. Harrar, J. S. 
Bethel, and W. J. Baker, Forest Products: Their Sources. Production, and Utilization (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1962), 439-440; Karl Peteraschak, “The Further Development of 
the Technique of Turpentining Pines,” 1920, Austin Cary Memorial Forstry Collection, 
Department of Special Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries, University o f Florida, 4; 
Nelson Courtlandt Brown, Forest Products: The Harvesting. Processing, and Marketing of 
Materials Other Than Lumber. Including the Principal Derivatives. Extractives, and Incidental 
Products in the United States and Canada (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1950), 183-184; 
M. D. Mobley and Robert N. Haskins, Forestry in the South (Atlanta: Turner E. Smith & Co., 
1956), 230; Eloise Gerry, “The Production o f Crude ‘Gum’ by the Pine Tree,” in Naval Stores: 
History. Production. Distribution and Consumption, ed. Thomas Gamble (Savannah: Review 
Publishing & Printing Company, 1921), 152; Peter Koch. Utilization of the Southern Pines 
(Washington, DC: United States Department o f Agriculture Forest Service, 1972), 1476.
46 F. Andre Michaux, The North American Svlva (Philadelphia: D. Rice & A. N. Hart,
1857), 108.
47 Ibid., 125.
48 Perry, Treatise on Turpentine Fanning. 94; “Turpentine Product of the South,” De 
Bow’s Review 18 (January 1855): 61.
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good soil, o f quick growth, having the most sap-wood. If found on low, level, or moist lands, 
they will yield all the better. Dry seasons are unfavorable for a large crop of turpentine, and, of 
course, trees on lands that suffer easily from drouth are least profitable for market.”49 Other 
observers also commented on the importance o f soil quality. Perry explained that the sandy and 
gravely land was the best for making turpentine because land with a good clay foundation 
produced straighter trees. He argued that poor, moist soil grew less resinous trees that would fill 
the boxes only slowly. And he was sure that mountainous or hilly land would never make much 
turpentine.30 One report observed that “the soil best adapted to the production of the turpentine 
pine should be of light and porous nature, with a subsoil o f clay, capable of retaining moisture.”51 
Along with soil type, producers realized precipitation influenced resin production. Perry 
reported that during dry periods trees produced less resin but that excessively wet periods could 
have a similar effect. Turpentine ran best with moderate ground moisture. In areas where water 
drained slowly, Perry recommended ditching and furrowing before beginning a turpentine 
operation. Properly prepared land, he argued, would yield twice as much turpentine.52
Once producers had selected a likely forest, beginning in November and ending around 
the first of March, workers performed the first and most important procedure, boxing. During 
these cooler months the sap was stored in the roots and would not rise to the needles until spring, 
so the procedure did not immediately interfere with the pine’s vitality. Ideally hands cut boxes 
during November, December, and January so the tree could have more time to adjust to its 
wound before the resin began to flow in the spring. Using a special ax with an elongated head,
49 “Turpentine: Hints for Those About to Engage in Its Manufacture,” 486.
50 Perrv. Treatise on Turpentine Farming. 18,84, 134, 154.
51 “Turpentine Product of the South,” 61.
52 Perry, Treatise on Turpentine Farming. 9-10,20.
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workers cut a  hole or box, as it was called, eight to fifteen inches wide and three to four inches 
deep, at the base o f a pine tree trunk. The boxes were cut down at an angle and could hold one to 
two quarts o f raw turpentine. Laborers had to use care when cutting boxes. First they decided 
the number o f boxes to cut into the pine, which depended on the tree’s size. Pines less than one 
foot in diameter could not support a box as readily as larger trees could. If smaller ones were to 
be tapped, they could have only one small box; a full quart-size box would cause the tree to fall 
or to decay prematurely. In no case were workers to allow the box to extend deep into the tree’s 
heart. Larger trees could support larger boxes, and trees of great size could support multiple 
boxes, usually around three. One Harnett County man believed that very large trees could hold 
as many as twenty boxes. In such cases the ideal placement of the boxes was side by side with 
four inches o f bark between them, with a third or more of the tree’s face left uncut for circulation 
of sap between the needles and the roots. Some producers, instead of cutting all the possible 
boxes at one time, worked only one side of the tree for five or six years, then back boxed the 
opposite side when the yield of the old boxes diminished.53
Second, workers had to adapt boxing methods to their employer’s particular 
specifications. Some producers preferred the boxes cut at the swell of the root so they would 
remain safely away from the heart. For smaller trees the box began six to eight inches from the 
ground. Other producers found boxes cut as high as eighteen inches from the ground more 
beneficial. Although increasing the risk that the heart of the tree might be cut, putting the box
53 “The Pine Forests o f the South,” De Bow’s Review: After the War Series 3 (February 
1867): 196; Edmund Ruffin, “Notes o f a Steam Journey,” 250; “The Manufacture of Turpentine 
in the South,” De Bow’s Review 8 (May 1850): 454; “Turpentine: Hints for Those About to 
Engage in Its Manufacture,” 486; Johnson, Ante-Bellum North Carolina. 487; “Production of 
Turpentine in Alabama,” De Bow’s Review 7 (December 1849): 560-561; “Product of 
Turpentine at the South,” De Bow’s Review 11 (September 1851): 303; “Turpentine Product of 
the South,” 61; John MacLeod, “The Tar and Turpentine Business of North Carolina,” Monthly 
Journal of Agriculture 2 (July 1846): 14; Description of turpentining, John McLean Harrington 
Papers, Special Collections Library, Duke University.
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farther off the ground insured against rain washing into it. Boxes that sat damp during the winter 
months could cause disease and decay at the tree’s base.
Finally, the position of the box also depended on the configuration of the tree. If a tree 
leaned, the best location for the box was on the side opposite the direction of the lean. Not only 
did this side generally have the most prominent root, but it was also the only position that 
guaranteed a sufficient amount o f raw turpentine would reach the box. If a box was located 
anywhere else on such a tree, the gum would fall outside the box in increasing amounts as the 
scarred face moved up the trunk with every harvest season. When the shape of the tree 
permitted, producers found that placing boxes on the north side was beneficial. This protected 
gum in the box from evaporation caused by the sun’s heat and ensured a higher grade of gum, 
which would produce more spirits.54
Boxing required not only care but strength, skill, and experience. Strong men could be 
trained to become adequate boxers in several days, and the amount o f work performed by box 
cutters varied with the skill of the worker and the demands o f the producer and overseer. All 
agreed that new hands could not cut as many boxes as experienced ones and that driving them to 
do so would result in Iow-quality boxes and inadequate yield from the orchard.55 People 
planning to enter the business were advised that “beginners will not cut at first more than SO 
boxes a day, and there is nothing gained by tasking them too high, until they have got well used 
to the proper shape and size of boxes.”56 Producers valued slaves skilled at boxing. In 1851
54 “The Manufacture o f Turpentine in the South,” 452-53; “Turpentine: Hints for Those 
About to Engage in Its Manufacture,” 486; A. W. Schorger and H. S. Betts, The Naval Stores 
Industry (Washington. DC: United States Department o f Agriculture, 1915), 16.
55 “The Pine Forests o f the South,” 196; Ruffin, “Notes o f a Steam Journey,” 250; “The 
Manufacture of Turpentine in the South,” 454; “Turpentine: Hints for Those About to Engage in 
Its Manufacture,” 486; Johnson, Ante-Bellum North Carolina, 487; “Production of Turpentine in 
Alabama,” 560-561; “Product of Turpentine at the South,” 303.
56 “Turpentine: Hints for Those About to Engage in Its Manufacture,” 486.
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Grist’s manager reported that he was “cutting boxes with all of the best hands + giting timber + 
distiling with the batlans I have a good many green hands + they ar hard to learn to cut boxes.”37 
In 18S3 James R. Grist purchased a slave named Dick who was skilled at box-cutting. Dick’s 
former master informed Grist that he was a potentially “very valuable boy, he is certainly one of 
the best axe-men I ever saw, but his disposition is too irascible to work any kind of horse or 
mule.”58 White managers accepted the idea that “Negroes are generally expert with the axe.”59 
An experienced laborer was expected to cut 75 to 80 boxes a day or 450 to 500 a week.
However, exceptional workers could cut 90 to 100 a day. On one operation the best boxers 
reportedly cut 125 a day. The number o f boxes cut in a day also depended on the number of 
daylight hours. As days grew longer, workers were usually expected to cut more boxes. The size 
of the pines and their distance from each other also determined the hand’s task. Because larger 
trees could support more than one box, laborers could spend more time cutting and less time 
walking from tree to tree. The distance of the trees from one another also influenced walking 
time. If trees grew far apart, workers spent a larger portion of their time walking to them. On 
average an acre contained about 100 boxes.60
After the boxes were cut they had to be cornered. Usually performed around the first of 
March with an ordinary ax, cornering involved removing a one-inch triangular chip from the top 
two comers of the box. Each comer could usually be cut with two strokes. One gash rose
57 Benjamin Grist to Allen Grist, 21 January 1851, Grist Papers.
581. C. Sutherlan to James R. Grist, 27 August 1853, Ibid.
59 “The Pine Forests of the South,” 196.
60 Johnson, Ante-Bellum North Carolina. 487; “Turpentine: Hints for Those About to 
Engage in Its Manufacture,” 486; MacLeod, “Tar and Turpentine Business,” 14; “Product of 
Turpentine at the South,” 303; “Production of Turpentine in Alabama,” 561; “The Manufacture 
of Turpentine in the South,” 452; “The Pine Forests of the South,” 196; Avirett, Old Plantation. 
67; Professor Percival Perry, interview by author, notes in author’s possession, Wake Forest 
University, Winston-Salem, NC, 9 April 1991.
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diagonally from the apex of the box and the other rose perpendicularly from the comer of the 
box. The ax cuts had to be precise, because the angle o f the comers guided the gum into the box. 
While some producers calculated that workers should comer 500 to 600 boxes a day, others 
reckoned the task at 600 to 800 boxes.61
Once they had been cornered, the boxes began to fill with gum and had to be dipped.
The number of dippings per season varied from four to seven, with more dipping performed 
during the tree’s first two years o f harvesting. This operation required a  dipper, an instrument 
with a spade-shaped blade and a handle. The harvester collected gum by thrusting the dipper into 
one end of the box, pushing it to the bottom, and bringing it up to the opposite side—all in one 
quick motion. The sticky contents o f the box adhered to the flat surface of the dipper. As 
laborers dipped each box, they carried the gum to one o f two buckets. The buckets usually held 
eight gallons and had bases wider than their tops, making them less likely to spill. A strip of 
hoop-iron attached to the edge of the bucket served as a scrapper that cleaned the gum off the 
dipper. When the first bucket was full, the slave carried it to a forty-gallon barrel, turned it 
upside down, and left it to drain while they went back to fill a second. When the second bucket 
was full, it took the place of the first. Although dipping was a light task requiring little physical 
strength, it was a dirty operation that smeared the workers’ hands and clothing with gum.62
Many factors influenced the number of boxes that could be dipped and the consequent 
amount of gum that could be harvested. Weather conditions, for one, affected the dipping
61 MacLeod, “Tar and Turpentine Business,” 14; Schorger and Betts. Naval Stores 
Industry. 16; “Product of Turpentine at the South,” 303; “Turpentine: Hints for Those About to 
Engage in Its Manufacture,” 486.
62 “Turpentine: Hints for Those About to Engage in Its Manufacture,” 486-487; 
“Production of Turpentine in Alabama,” 561; Ruffin, “Notes o f a Steam Journey,” 250; “Product 
of Turpentine at the South,” 303-304; MacLeod, “Tar and Turpentine Business,” 14; “The Pine 
Forests of the South,” 197; Schorger and Betts, Naval Stores Industry. 17; Avirett, Old 
Plantation. 68.
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frequency. Temperature influenced the raw turpentine’s consistency and thus the ease and speed 
with which it could be dipped. In hot weather it had a viscous quality but when the thermometer 
dropped it stiffened. G. W. Perry explained that “by the continuance o f cool weather, the dipper 
will be hard to get down in the box, and if the turpentine be left therein, it will remain stiff until 
the return of warm weather in the following spring.”63 Dry weather also affected gum yield.64 
The manager of the Grist operation observed that “all of work is going on well but it is too dry 
for the pines to run well.”65 Wet weather also slowed dipping. One producer explained that “an 
early or backward spring or fall, long drouths, during which the tree almost stops running, or 
heavy driving rains which fill the boxes with water and float out the turpentine, all have their 
effect on the number o f  drippings [sic], which depends otherwise on the frequency and care with 
which chipping is done.”66 Perry recommended that in bad weather, the forest workers be put to 
assisting the coopers hoop barrels. When it rained continuously one March day in 1856, the 
coopers at G. I. Germond’s turpentine operation in the region o f south Georgia and north Florida 
continued to work in their shop, but the other hands were put to shelling seed com. Finally, the 
dippers’ task depended on the age of the boxes. Because newer boxes produced more gum than 
older ones, more time was required for emptying the buckets and fewer boxes could be dipped. 
Workers could manage dipping 10,000 to 12,000 older boxes and perhaps as few as 8,000 new 
ones a week.67
63 Perry, Treatise on Turpentine Farming. 32, 123.
64 Ibid., 116-117.
65 Benjamin Grist to James R. Grist, 17 July 1860, Grist Papers.
66 “Turpentine: Hints for Those About to Engage in Its Manufacture,” 487.
6718 March 1856 entry, Gilbert Isaac Germond Work Journal, Department o f Special 
Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries, University o f Florida; Perry, Treatise on Turpentine 
Farming. 88; ”The Pine Forests of the South,” 197; Johnson, Ante-Bellum North Carolina. 488; 
William Kauffman Scarborough, ed., The Diarv of Edmund Ruffin, vol. 1, (Baton Rouge:
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Because some stands produced more gum than others, which meant the hardest worker 
could actually bring in less gum, P e n y  advocated not tasking dippers by the barrel but by the 
number of boxes. The amount of barrels dipped in a day was not necessarily an indication of a 
slave’s effort.68 In March 1856 G. I. Germond observed that his “boxes are not filling well,” 
consequently, the seven hands who had been dipping “could not get their task.”69 In fact the 
amount of gum collected by individual dippers could vary significantly. In 1855 fifteen slaves 
labored for one week dipping boxes and collected an average of 44.5 barrels of gum. Two 
collected as much as 48 barrels and one collected only 32 barrels. Like boxing, the size of the 
task varied with the individual producer. Some expected workers to fill from four to seven 
barrels with raw turpentine a day. Truly exceptional dippers could fill ten. Of turpentiners who 
tasked by the box, some found 1,800 boxes a day sufficient, others apparently tasked their 
laborers as high as 3,000.7°
Once gathered, producers strove to get their resin, especially the highest quality and most 
valuable gum, to distilleries quickly before it deteriorated. Virgin dip possessed a thin, oily, 
transparent quality and produced the highest quality rosin. Every year a tree was worked, the dip 
became thicker and darker, moving from a light cream color toward an orange. Contemporary 
observers explained the phenomenon as a result of light wood forming around the box and
Louisiana State University, 1972), 52; MacLeod, “Tar and Turpentine Business,” 14-15; 
“Turpentine: Hints for Those About to Engage in Its Manufacture,” 487; McMillan to Southern 
Cultivator. 172; Michaux, North American Svlva. 141.
68 Perry, Treatise on Turpentine Farming. 116-117.
69 24 March 1856 entry, Gilbert Isaac Germond Work Journal.
70 Michaux estimated that three thousand trees could yield seventy-five barrels o f raw 
turpentine and twenty-five of scrape a season if they were dipped five or six times. Michaux, 
North American Svlva. 141; M. Jones to James R. Grist, 30 October 1855, Grist Papers; “The 
Pine Forests of the South,” 197; Johnson, Ante-Bellum North Carolina. 488; Scarborough, Diary 
of Edmund Ruffin. 52; MacLeod, “Tar and Turpentine Business,” 14-15; “Turpentine: Hints for 
Those About to Engage in Its Manufacture,” 487; McMillan to Southern Cultivator. 172.
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staining the gum which flowed into i t  Because lightwood did not form until the first winter after 
the box was cut, the virgin turpentine was not discolored. Since virgin dip was much more 
valuable than gum harvested from older boxes, it was important for hands to keep it separate and 
best to get it to market quickly.71 Spirits evaporated rapidly from the gum, especially in hot, dry 
weather. Sofi gum was the most susceptible to the effects of heat. It was recommended that “as 
fast as they are filled the dip barrels should be hauled to the still and emptied into it. If left in the 
woods they lose by leakage, and the quality o f the gum for yielding spirits o f turpentine is 
impaired.”72 Strother explained that “the produce is carried to market on a sort o f  dray or cart 
which holds but two barrels, consequently the barrels are always seen setting about in the woods 
in couples.”73 One strong hand with a wagon and two mules could haul the turpentine dipped by 
ten hands for an average of three miles and also be able to supply the workers with provisions 
and empty barrels. Hauling in wet weather could be difficult especially down the muddy cart 
paths that wound through the pine forest.74 An overseer managing an Alabama operation 
reported that “the ground is so wet we cannot run the wagon to any advantage hence I stop.”75 
A pine would bleed only as long as its wound was fresh. Within seven or eight days the 
gum crystallized at the opening of the wounded resin ducts, and so fresh wounds were required 
about once a week in warm weather, less often during cooler periods.76 Chipping, as this
71 “Product of Turpentine at the South,” 304; Perry, Treatise on Turpentine Farming. 
124; Description of turpentining, Harrington Papers; “The Manufacture of Turpentine in the
South” 453.
72 “The Pine Forests of the South,” 197.
73 Crayon, “North Carolina Illustrated: The Piney Woods,” 745.
74 “Turpentine: Hints for Those About to Engage in Its Manufacture,” 487; Perry, 
Treatise on Turpentine Farming. 110.
75 Thomas F. Strikney to Allen and James R. Grist, 26 February 1861, Grist Papers.
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operation was called, was done with a hacker or shave, a circular piece of iron with a sharp lower 
edge and a two-foot handle. It involved cutting the bark away just above the box and extending 
the cut to the comers or outer edges of the box. Each new chip, located just above the last one, 
extended the face o f the box upwards after each task. With each stroke, the chipper cut a one- 
fourth inch furrow-like gash through the bark and into the sapwood. A narrow scar, one-half 
inch up the surface, would suffice, however, the chip length was commonly one inch broad, 
causing the face in some cases to rise two feet each year. Because each chip was cut at the upper 
edge of the last one, the oldest orchards contained trees with faces extending up twelve to fifteen 
feet. When the face reached shoulder height, workers switched to using a puller, a long-handled 
tool with a metal scrapper on the end, which allowed them to reach the high faces. Perry warned 
that some hands tried to pull early because it was easier than using the hack. This practice 
should be discouraged, he argued, because the puller caused the face to rise faster than did the 
hack. “Hacking,” he explained, “is to strike with the tool, and it requires a slight stoop to cut the 
right quantity, and do it well. I have found it necessary to threaten some hands before I could get 
them to hack my low faces.” Producers sought well-trained workers for the task since the skill of 
the chippers determined how many years an orchard could be harvested. If the gashes were too 
deep, the tree's life was shortened; if the cut was too broad, the face would soon rise out o f reach 
and the tree could no longer be harvested. Moreover, producers required that this difficult task 
be executed with considerable speed. Although some producers calculated that chipping 800 to 
1,000 faces a day for average laborers and 1,200 to 1,500 for better workers was standard, others 
found that 12,000 to 17,000 faces a week were possible for the average chipper. A few
76 In fact, sixty-seven percent of the total resin flow occurs within twenty-four hours of 
the cut and tapers off sharply afterwards. Cold weather, 45° F. or below, could either slow or 
stop gum flow. Brown, Forest Products. 184; Description of turpentining, Harrington Papers; V. 
L. Harper and Lenthall Wyman, Variations in Naval-Stores Yields Associated With Weather and 
Specific Days Between Chippings (Washington, DC: United States Department o f  Agriculture, 
1936), 10, 15.
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extraordinary laborers were reported to have chipped 20,000 faces a week.77 In the most 
sophisticated operations hands specialized in either dipping or chipping. It was recommended 
that “the dipping should be done by hands employed for the purpose, and the hackers should 
continue their work without changing the proper interval between the hackings of each tree.”7* It 
was also suggested that chipping be “done by the strongest and most expert hands, these should 
be kept at it regularly through the season, while women or inferior hands can dip very well.”79 
Four to six chippings were required to fill a box with turpentine.80
The season’s last chipping occurred in mid-October and the last dipping around the first 
of November. After this, scraping began. Scrape was gum that had hardened to the face, lost 
much of its spirits in evaporation, and was therefore only half as valuable as liquid gum. It was 
important to remove the scrape promptly before high winds could cause the pine to sway so 
violently that the hardened turpentine fell off. Workers used a small blade attached to a long 
handle to dislodge scrape from the face. They then gathered it in a specially designed box that 
measured about two and one-half feet square and was open at the top and one end. The bottom 
of the opened end was supported by the tree and the closed end sat on two constructed legs or 
sometimes wheels. When collecting scrape, laborers would drag or roll these boxes through the 
forest, lean the open end against the tree, just below the face, and pull the scrape down into them.
77 Ruffin, “Notes o f a Steam Journey,” 250-251; “Product of Turpentine at the South,” 
304; “The Manufacture of Turpentine in the South,” 453-454; Nollie Hickman, Mississippi 
Harvest: Lumbering in the Longleaf Pine Belt 1840-1915 (University: The University of 
Mississippi, 1962), 123-124; “Turpentine: Hints for Those About to Engage in Its Manufacture,” 
487; MacLeod, “Tar and Turpentine Business,” 15; Olmsted, Joumev in the Seaboard Slave 
States. 342; Avirett, Old Plantation. 67-68; Schorger and Betts, Naval Stores Industry. 17; 
Description of turpentining, Harrington Papers; Perry, Treatise on Turpentine Farming. 78.
78 “The Pine Forests o f the South,” 197.
79 “Turpentine: Hints for Those About to Engage in Its Manufacture,” 487.
80 “Product o f Turpentine at the South,” 304.
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Each box held 100 to 150 pounds o f scrape. After the boxes were full o f scrape, it was 
transferred into rosin barrels, pounded in, and hauled to the still. Scrape collecting was usually 
completed around December or January.'1
When the boxes stopped filling and the scrape had been collected, the turpentine 
laborers’ work was still not finished. If new pine forests were to be opened for the next season, 
the strongest and most skilled laborers began cutting boxes immediately. The laborers who were 
not boxing cleared grass, pine straw, and tree limbs from the bases of trees and burned the debris. 
Still others collected the timber needed to make the barrels for the next season. At one operation 
a tar kiln was fired in mid December when the turpentine work was almost completed.82 In 1851, 
De Bow’s Review reported that, “like the engagements of a farm-hand, in always finding 
something needful to be done in every day of the year, and something that should not be 
neglected; so with the turpentine hand, the whole year has its various demands upon him in their 
proper season, so that there is no time to spare from his turpentine crop.”83 Similarly, in 1846, a 
producer writing from Washington had noted that “the hands who tend turpentine have no time 
for any other business.”84 But if the turpentine production was part o f the operation of a 
traditional agricultural plantation, some laborers were used for work unrelated to turpentine. A 
sample of operations listed for sale in the 1840s and 1850s indicates that less than half included
81 MacLeod, “Tar and Turpentine Business,” 15; “The Manufacture of Turpentine in the 
South,” 453; “Product of Turpentine at the South,” 304-305; Ruffin, “Notes of a Steam Journey,” 
250- 251; Schorger and Betts, Naval Stores Industry. 18; Perry, Treatise on Turpentine Farming.
109.
82 Benjamin Grist to Allen Grist, 21 January 1851, Grist Papers; “Turpentine: Hints for 
Those About to Engage in Its Manufacture,” 488; John Carr to Sir, 15 December 1858, Thomas 
David Smith McDowell Papers, Southern Historical Collection, The University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill.
83 “Product of Turpentine at the South,” p. 305
84 McMillan to Southern Cultivator. 172.
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any crop land. O f those that did, there was an average of just over 240 acres which could 
potentially be cultivated. The most common crops grown included com, peas, potatoes, oats, and 
wheat. Few operations produced any cotton.85 Joining the field hands, turpentine laborers 
sometimes opened ditches, cleared new ground, trimmed hedgerows, mended fences, and 
repaired roads. On February 27, 1856 G. I. Germond had three slaves—Dick, Moses, and Adam— 
getting timber for a pig pin. The next day his slaves cleared a field for planting and burned of 
another tract. The day after that they burned over another area.86 James Battle Avirett, whose 
father owned Richlands Plantation, wrote that only “by joining these two industries, the 
[turpentine] orchards and the plantation,” could the plantation be maintained.87
85 “Land for Sale on Cape Fear River,” Wilmington. North Carolina Chronicle. 10 
November 1841; “Lands for Sale.” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 27 June 1845; “Real 
Estate for sale,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 4 July 1845; “Plantation for Sale,” 
Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 24 April 1846; “Valuable Turpentine Land For Sale,” 
Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 20 November 1846; “Valuable Real Estate.” Wilmington. 
North Carolina Journal. 26 February 1847; “Valuable Lands For Sale.” Wilmington. North 
Carolina Journal. 22 December 1848; “Lands For Sale,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 29 
December 1848; “Valuable Farming and Turpentine lands For Sale,” Wilmington. North 
Carolina Journal. 2 March 1849; “Valuable Land For Sale,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 
11 May 1849; “For Sale.” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal.” 10 August 1849; “Notice.—A 
Valuable Plantation For Sale,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 23 November, 1849; 
“Valuable Plantation For Sale.” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 23 November 1849; “Land 
For Sale,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal.” 19 July 1850; “A Great Bargain,” Wilmington. 
North Carolina Journal. 4 October 1850; “Land and Negroes For Sale,” Wilmington. North 
Carolina Journal. 4 July 1851; “10,000 Acres o f Land For Sale,” Wilmington. North Carolina 
Journal. 21 November 1851; “For Sale.” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 29 October 1852; 
“Valuable Cape Fear Plantation For Sale,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 24 June 1853; 
“Valuable Real Estate For Sale,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 4 November 1853; 
“Valuable Real Estate For Sale,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 10 March 1854; “Land 
For Sale,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal 13 October 1854; “A Valuable Tract o f Land For 
Sale,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 4 January 1856; “Turpentine Land For Sale,” 
Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 21 March 1856; “For Sale, Valuable Turpentine and 
Farming Lands in Bladen County.” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 21 March 1856; 
“Turpentine Lands in Florida For Sale,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 21 March 1856;
“A Turpentine Farm For Sale or Rent,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 29 August 1856.
86 27,28, and 29 February 1856 entries, Gilbert Isaac Germond Work Journal.
87 Avirett, Old Plantation. 68-69 (quotation on page 69).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
130
Certainly, distillers, who were the most skilled turpentine workers, were too busy for 
such tasks. To insure a  high-quality product, they distilled the gum and scrape as quickly as 
possible. Distilleries were often two-story structures. A wood or occasionally an oil furnace was 
at ground-level, and a copper still sat above it on the second floor. They were located near 
streams, which provided water to cool the condensing tube, or worm—the long, coiled tube in 
which the spirits o f turpentine were transformed into a liquid. Although these stills ranged in 
capacity from five to thirty barrels, most had a capacity o f between ten- and twenty-barrel 
capacity. To charge or fill them, workers brought barrels o f  gum to the second floor, often by 
rolling them up a ramp, and the distiller removed the head of the still and dumped in the gum.
He then replaced the head, connected it to the condensing tube, and put the tube in its tank to 
cool while the turpentine distilled. When everything was ready, he fired the furnace. Generally 
the distilling process lasted two or two and one-half hours. The first turpentine to flow from the 
worm had a green tint from the oxidation o f the copper, even when the still was fired regularly.88 
The frequency with which a still was fired depended on the volume of gum coming from the 
woods. At the peak o f the season the operator of the Grist Alabama operation had “to run my 
still three times a day keep up.”89
Because of the primitive nature o f mid-nineteenth-century distilling technology, still 
operators faced significant challenges in successfully processing a charge of gum. Distillers first 
needed to bring the still temperature to a steady, gradual rise to ensure that the gum heated
88 Olmsted, Journey in the Seaboard Slave States. 344; “The Pine Forests o f the South,” 
197; “Production of Turpentine in Alabama,” S61; Although Tatum is describing experiences at a 
pine woods distillery in the early twentieth century, the still was the same as those used in the 
antebellum era. Fitzhugh Lee Tatum, interview by Ruth L. Stokes, 19 October 1974, transcript, 
Southern Oral History Program, Southern Historical Collection, The University o f North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1; Panshin et al., Forest Products. 4S3; Schorger and Betts, Naval Stores 
Industry. 29; A. David King, ID, interview by author, notes in author’s possession, Georgia 
Agrirama, Tifton, GA, 14 June 1996.
89 Benjamin Grist to James R. Grist, 7 July 1860, Grist Papers.
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evenly and distilled thoroughly. Heating the kettle too quickly would result in the bottom 
becoming excessively hot and burning the gum. When adding wood, distillers needed to know 
the direction of the temperature in the kettle. Oak wood burned slower and held the heat longer, 
but pine wood, which was consumed much more quickly, was easier to control. When heating 
the still distillers also needed to consider the quality of the gum that they were about to distill 
since different grades of gum distilled at slightly different temperatures. Higher grades required 
less heat than lower ones; scrape required the hottest temperatures. Because antebellum 
producers had not learned to add water, which would have aided the distilling process, distillers 
had to cope with serious difficulties. In the absence of water, raw turpentine, which is seventy- 
five percent rosin and twenty-five percent spirits, does not boil until it reaches around 363° F. 
However, rosin begins to decompose when it reaches 392° F., coloring the spirits yellow and thus 
lowering the quality. Therefore, the distiller had a margin of error of only 29° F. Making his 
task even more challenging, the property of resin that causes its temperature to rise rapidly as it 
distills. Only rarely, then, was more than a portion of the turpentine distilled before the rosin 
began to decompose. If the temperature fluctuated too far the disastrous consequences could 
threaten life and property. In cases when the fire grew too low, the distilling mass began to cool 
trapping the spirit vapor within the rosin causing the volume in the still to increase, boil over, and 
create a danger o f five. If the still temperature rose too quickly, causing the vapor to grow in the 
still to grow too abundant, a similar situation could occur. Because the temperature of the rosin 
was critical in the process, distillers needed to know exactly when to extinguish the furnace.
Since stills had no gauges, however, workers had to rely on other methods to monitor the 
progress of the gum. They could collect the distilled emissions from the worm in a clear 
drinking glass and then examine the proportion o f water and turpentine. Gum releases water as it 
distills and the longer the still ran, the more water it emitted. Or the distiller could place his ear
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
against the lower end of the worm to listen to the gum boiling. An experienced worker could 
determine from the sound what stage the gum had reached.
The distillation of gum resulted in two products: rosin and spirits of turpentine. Crude 
turpentine yielded from six to eight gallons of spirits per barrel of gum, depending on how soon 
it was stilled and its purity. Generally five gallons o f gun yielded one gallon of spirits. During 
distillation a mixture of ninety to ninety-five percent spirits of turpentine and five to ten percent 
water flowed from the worm into a fifty-gallon barrel. Because turpentine is lighter that water, it 
floated to the top where it could run off into another barrel or be dipped off. Rosin remained in 
the still. When the distilling of a charge was completed, the rosin was drained from the still 
through a gate at the bottom. It flowed through a series of screens, which filtered out wood 
chips, dirt, and other foreign matter, and into a cooling vat. If the hot liquid rosin did not cool 
and become more viscous before it was put into barrels, considerable loss could occur through 
leakage. After the liquid had cooled sufficiently it was dipped into barrels for shipment.
Workers who could perform the complicated distilling process were scarce and 
expensive. A white distiller earned between $500 and S600 a year, and a  hired slave distiller cost 
generally more than a less-skilled turpentine worker. Evidence suggests that whites usually 
served as head distillers, although their assistants were likely to be skilled slaves. At a fifteen 
barrel still, Olmsted found “one white man and one negro employed under the oversight of the 
owner.” As the naval stores industry grew during the 1840s and 1850s, distillers became harder 
to find, and producers advertised for their services. Some producers even attempted to train their 
own slaves to operate a still.90
90 King, interview; Schorger and Betts, Naval Stores Industry. 12-14,30-31; Panshin et 
al., Forest Products. 453; Robson Dunwody, “Proper Methods o f Distilling and Handling in the 
Production of Turpentine and Rosin,” in Naval Stores: History. Production. Distribution and 
Consumption, ed. Thomas Gamble (Savannah: Review Publishing & Printing Company, 1921), 
128; Tatum interview, 1,4; Hickman, Mississippi Harvest. 126; Olmsted, Journey in the 
Seaboard Slave States. 345-346 (quote on page 346); “Production of Turpentine in Alabama,”
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The great volume o f naval stores refined at stills required a large number of barrels for 
use as shipping containers. Without them, turpentine operators had no way to package their 
product. In 1850 J. I. McRea complained from Elizabethtown in Bladen County that he had 
“been trying to make some turpentine this year and find that 1 will not have hoop poles enough to 
make my barrels.” He hoped to buy one thousand poles so he could finish his job.91 In 1853 J.
W. Wheeler ran into similar trouble when he explained that “I am don my crop and I cant get 
barels to do any thing with turpentine.”92 When the cooper at one operation ran away, the 
remaining coopers could not keep up with the demand, and the still had to stop for lack of spirit 
barrels. To alleviate the barrel shortage problem, during the 1840s and 1850s, producers began 
importing spirit barrels from the North. Commonly these casks were second-hand barrels that 
had been used to transport naval stores to New York or Boston and were returned for resale in 
lots of five to six hundred.93
Because barrels were essential and required in such large numbers, as a general rule, 
every fifth man in a naval stores operation worked as a cooper. Unlike distillers, most coopers in 
the turpentine industry were slaves. Constant demand for them made them among the more 
expensive turpentine laborers. As early as the 1780s, Johann Schoepf found that “A cooper, 
indispensable in pitch and tar making, cost his purchaser 250 Pd., and his 15-year old boy, bred
561; Pervical Peny, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861” (Ph.D. 
diss., Duke University, 1947), 45; “Notice,” The New Bern. North Carolina Newbemian. 6 
January 1852.
91 J. I. McRea to Thomas S. D. McDowell, 16 September 1850, McDowell Papers.
92 J. W. Wheeler to Thomas S. D. McDowell, 12 July 1853, Ibid.
93 James to Grist, 23 August 1853, Grist Papers; Pervical Perry, “The Naval Stores 
Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861” (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 79; 
Shipping receipt, 30 June 1859, William H. Turlington Papers, Special Collections Library, Duke 
University; Thomas S. D. McDowell Account with H. H. Robinson, October 1855 entries, 
McDowell Papers.
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to the same work, fetched 150 Pd.”94 In the mid 1850s the cost of hiring slave coopers ran from 
$1.50 to $2.00 a day. They labored ail year. They constructed barrels during harvest season, 
some reportedly singing as they worked: during the off season they collected timber for the next 
year’s staves. Since rosin hardened once it cooled, making it highly unlikely to leak, cheaply 
made barrels with loose pine staves could suffice. And because craftsmanship was not 
important, a cooper could make eight to ten rosin barrels in a day. Raw turpentine barrels, 
though, were more carefully constructed. With a forty-gallon capacity, these barrels were made 
from good pine staves and fastened with six light iron hoops. Coopers commonly constructed 
dip barrels from higher grade staves than those used in hauling scrape. Spirits o f turpentine 
barrels usually held forty to forty-five gallons and were also built with great precision. They 
were made of well-seasoned white oak staves and were tightly looped with strong iron hoops. To 
protect against leakage, these barrels were given a coat o f glue, and the exteriors were thickly 
varnished or painted. While ordinary coopers could be trusted to make rosin and gum barrels, 
only expert coopers could make spirit barrels, which normally required half a day to assemble.93
As during the colonial era, however, naval stores barrels were not always properly 
constructed. In 1860 J. H. Richardson’s factor in Wilmington informed him that the barrels 
containing his spirits o f turpentine had leaked badly in transit and required new casks when they 
arrived in Wilmington. The original ones, he wrote, were “good for nothing but for Rosin,” the 
least viscous naval stores product.96 That same month Richardson learned that “This lot of spirits
f  Johann David Schoepf, Travels in the Confederation (1788: reprint, New York: Burt 
Franklin, 1968), 148.
95 Olmsted, Journey in the Seaboard Slave States. 340; “Turpentine: Hints for Those 
About to Engage in Its Manufacture,” 488; Pervical Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the 
Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861” (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 45; “The Pine Forests of 
the South,” 197-198; “Production of Turpentine in Alabama,” 561; MacLeod, “Tar and 
Turpentine Business,” 16; Avirett, Old Plantation. 65.
96 William H. Turlington to J. H. Richardson, 17 July 1860, Turlington Papers.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
135
had leaked a good deal owing to its long duration on the river[.] You will see it took nearly two 
brls to fill up the lot - Every brl of this was in same bad condition.” His factor sent back “10 
casks that you can use for [raw] turpt but dont put any more spts in them.”97 However, even the 
best turpentine casks occasionally leaked. Olmsted reported that evaporation was inevitable 
given the volatile nature o f spirits. Stave making machines, first introduced during the 1830s, 
made smoother, more uniform staves which resulted in tighter barrels and reduced problems with 
leaking. By at least the early 1840s mechanically-dressed staves were available in North 
Carolina.98 However, not many producers used these machine-made staves. While traveling 
through the South, a northern agent for barrel-making machinery passed the Grist turpentine 
works. Upon inspection of the cooperage house, he reported that he could “improve your 
coopers by working with them one week that they can make three or four more barrels per day to 
the man[.] They are far behind the times.”99 He also claimed that he could "furnish a machine to 
cut heads ready for putting in the barrel and one hand will cut from six hundred to 1000 per day, 
Price $150.00.”'°° No more is said regarding the barrel technology, but it is safe to assume that 
Grist, like other turpentiners of his day, continued to rely on the labor-intensive, traditional 
method.
From barrel-making to boxing, the turpentine production schedule hinged on the longleaf 
pine’s seasonal growth cycle. Workers cut boxes during cool weather, when the trees entered
97 William H. Turlington to John H. Richardson, 25 July 1860, William A. B. and John 
H. Richardson Papers, Special Collections Library, Duke University.
98 Olmsted, Joumev in the Seaboard Slave States. 345-346; Pervical Perry, “The Naval 
Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861” (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 80; 
Carroll B. Butler, Treasures of the Longleaf Pines: Naval Stores (Shalimar FL: Tarkel 
Publishing, 1998), 106.
99 C. L. Benson to Mr. Grist, 1 October 1855, Grist Papers.
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their dormant period, and began chipping faces and dipping gum once wood growth and resin 
ducts activity resumed in the spring. As the pines’ resin production peaked during the hottest 
summer days, the pace of chipping and dipping increased. Rainy periods, during which water 
soaking the ground and standing in the boxes rendered efficient work impossible, and drought 
conditions, which reduced the pines’ resin-production ability, could lower labor intensity even 
during this peak period. In autumn, once temperatures cooled and the daylight hours grew 
shorter, the pace of work in the forest slowed. But as the intensity of gum harvesting declined 
during the colder months, the energy of naval stores laborers shifted to such other necessary tasks 
as raking around the base o f trees, gathering wood for staves, and coopering. Thus the seasonal 
labor pattern, shaped by the iongleafs twelve-month cycle, provided for the most efficient labor 
use.
Naval stores producers turned to slave management techniques to organize and control 
their labor force around this annual schedule. Under slavery, two distinct methods o f labor 
management developed: the task system and the gang system. Under the latter, plantation 
owners gave a gang of slaves an allotment of work that they were expected to complete as a 
group. This system worked best in the open fields where the overseer had a clear view o f their 
performance. Where slaves could not be closely supervised, producers preferred the task system. 
Under it, individual slaves worked at an allotted task. Each slave could set the pace, taking as 
little or as much time as necessary to complete the assignment, as long as it was performed to the 
producer’s satisfaction.101
Because dipping, chipping, and boxing required workers to fan out in ail directions 
through the expansive pine forests, producers found that the task system worked best for 
harvesting turpentine. Many o f these forests were large and isolated, such as the one at
101 Stampp, Peculiar Institution. 54-55.
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Richlands Plantation which covered twenty-two thousand acres. De Bow’s Review described '‘a 
suitable place for operations” as one “where one or two thousand acres of proper pines lie in an 
unbroken body, convenient to water transportation.”102 To organize the tasks, producers marked 
off turpentine orchards in grids o f continuous blocks. They created these blocks or crops by 
blazing a line of trees and further dividing each crop with rows of stakes placed at fifty-yard 
intervals, cutting the forest into half-acre squares. Tasks consisted of ten thousand boxes or 
roughly one hundred acres. In most instances laborers had approximately one week to complete 
work in the task area103 Without such a division, reportedly, “the overseer of several hands 
cannot possibly inspect their work with any accuracy, nor can the hands, however faithful, avoid 
skipping a great many boxes in cornering, dipping, cmd chipping.”10*
Even though their workers were organized under the task system, producers expressed 
concern that isolation in the forest would allow laborers to work slowly and carelessly. Some 
worried that, unless they were carefully watched, their chippers would cut only the obvious trees 
around the perimeter o f their allotment and would neglect those in the center that were more 
difficult to detect.105 A producer who explained that “Watchful care will be necessary in 
attending to the hands, or the cunning old negroes will frequently neglect to chip the pines 
regularly,” believed that the work was best monitored by “looking on the surface for the chip 
which has lately fallen, as that will retain its new color long enough to enable you to discover
102 “The Pine Forests o f the South,” 196.
103 Avirett, Old Plantation. 64; Hickman, Mississippi Harvest. 122; “Turpentine: Hints 
for Those About to Engage in Its Manufacture,” 486-487; Johnson, Ante-Bellum North Carolina. 
487; Cecelski, “The Shores o f  Freedom,” 187; Bellamy, “Slavery in Microcosm,” 344; “Product 
of Turpentine at the South,” 303; Adam Hodgson, Remarks During a Journey Through North 
America in the Years 1819. 1820. and 1821 in a Series of Letters (New York: Samuel Whiting, 
1823), 112; Scarborough, Diary of Edmund Ruffin. 52; Russell, North America. 159.
104 “Turpentine: Hints for Those About to Engage in Its Manufacture,” 487.
105 Johnson, Ante-Bellum North Carolina. 487; Hickman, Mississippi Harvest. 124-125.
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whether the tree has been recently chipped or not.”106 Turpentiners were also concerned that 
“streaks on the face would be made too short, the chip too shallow, or trees chipped only on one 
side, the side the producer or overseer would see when they passed.”107 De Bow’s Review 
warned producers that “it is important. . .  to see that the hands perform their task properly, and 
not allow them to mislead you, as they will frequently do, by saying they perform their task, 
without half doing so.”108 Producers were also advised that “in task work like this [turpentine], 
constant watchfulness will be necessary to insure faithful execution o f the work.”109 In 1851 
James R. Grist believed that he had a “good lot o f boys + they will do well with proper 
attention.”110 In late summer 1852 he “rode over a portion of the boxes . . .  + will go over the
Ballance with Mr James to day — I find them well faced + well chipped.”111 After similar
inspections, G. W. Perry advised that good hands should not be confronted about trees that they 
may have missed for it would shame them. He believed that producers should instead mark the 
missed trees so slaves would not “lose confidence in their owners, and fail frequently to do their 
duty, when they would not have done so otherwise.”112 It was also suggested that producers 
mark the trees where the next chip should come so the slaves would know they were being 
closely watched.113 Perry also recommended that producers not show excessive anger over poor 
work or too much gratification for improvement. “This treatment,” he explained, “keeps them in
106 Perry, Treatise on Turpentine Farming. 75.
107 Ibid., 114.
108 Manufacture of Turpentine in the South,” 453.
109 “The Pine Forests of the South,” 196.
110 James R. Grist to Father, 4 February 1851, Grist Papers.
111 James R. Grist to Father, 17 September 1852, Ibid.
112 Perrv. Treatise on Turpentine Farming. 115.
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their proper places; and as they perceive, by your daily conduct, that things pass over and are 
settled at the same time, a confidence is engrafted in the negro toward his owner. Masters may 
rely upon it that hands will work better from firm conviction than any other way.”114
The task system also aided owners and overseers in organizing their labor force into 
multi-unit work groups. Because harvest season for turpentine was limited to the warmer months 
when the tree produced resin, none o f the directly related operations—chipping, dipping, 
scraping, and distilling—could wait until the slower season. Therefore, in the more active periods 
different hands performed a variety of tasks. Olmsted witnessed an operation employing two 
men at a still, twenty-five chippers and dippers, two coopers, and several wagoners.115 In 
October 1855 a Grist overseer had “ten hands dipping turpentine + four hands getting timber, 
five hands at the still, six hands coopering, one hand cutting wood, one heading rosin + four 
hands helping.”116 But by November the overseer had altered the tasks. He had “five hands 
scrapping. . .  + ten hands dipping, six hands getting timber, seven hands at the cooper shop, five 
hands at the still, one hand cutting wood, [and] three wagoning.”117 By assigning tasks to the 
forest hands, such potentially chaotic arrangements were better organized.
In most situations slaves preferred the task system to gang labor, for it afforded a relative 
degree of autonomy. This system worked best in areas such as rice fields and turpentine forests 
where the tasks were clearly marked. Laborers could work at their own pace and enjoy free time 
if their job was completed early. Although their work was inspected, they escaped the persistent 
driving that gang laborers endured. Under this arrangement, each hand’s work was more easily
113 Ibid., 114.
114 Ibid., 118.
115 Olmsted, Joumev in the Seaboard Slave States. 346.
116 M. Jones to James R. Grist, 24 October 1855, Grist Papers.
117 M. Jones to James R. Grist, 5 November 1855, Ibid.
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monitored. Despite their preferences, agricultural slaves most commonly worked in gangs. They 
remained under the constant surveillance o f a driver or overseer who kept them working at a 
brisk pace. All laborers, no matter how well or fast they worked, continued their labor until all 
workers in the gang were discharged in the evening. They had no way o f earning incentive 
payment for hard work or free time for work completed early. Nor did the gang laborers have 
any opportunity to develop self-reliance or to exercise control over their work schedules; every 
workday was the same as the one before.118
Many producers believed that their slaves preferred task work in the turpentine forest 
over gang labor in agriculture. One remarked, “no set o f  hands have ever been known to 
willingly leave it and go back to cotton.”" 9 Olmsted found “the negroes employed in this branch 
of industry . . .  to be unusually intelligent and cheerful.”120 Accepting these claims, the leading 
historian o f the naval stores industry, Percival Perry, writes that “once trained in turpentine 
operations, blacks preferred turpentining to other forms o f  farm labor because it was based on the 
task system and they were somewhat more independent in their work.”121 He also finds that 
‘"turpentine plantation slaves worked as part of a production team, yet at an individual task, rather 
than in gang labor. This may have contributed to a sense o f independence, responsibility, and 
greater contentment.”122 While Perry accurately describes labor under the task system, his
118 Stampp, Peculiar Institution. 54-56.
119 “Turpentine Making,” Soil o f  the South 5 (December 1855), 357-358, quoted in 
Pervical Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861” (Ph.D. diss., 
Duke University, 1947), 39.
120 Olmsted, Journey in the Seaboard Slave States. 348.
121 Charles Reagan Wilson and William Ferris, eds. Encyclopedia o f  Southern Culture 
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1989), s.v. “naval stores.”
122 Randall M. Miller and John David Smith, eds. Dictionary of Afro-American Slavery 
(New York: Greenwood Press, 1988), s.v. “naval stores industry.”
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general conclusion that this made work in the turpentine forest more pleasant than agricultural 
labor is questionable. Both the task and gang systems had advantages and disadvantages, but “in 
the long run,” as Kenneth M. Stampp maintains, “the rigors o f either system were determined by 
the demands o f masters and overseers.”123 The type of work and amount of labor expected of 
turpentine slaves greatly affected the relative difficulty o f their tasks. Moreover, Perry fails to 
consider important factors related to the isolation of the camps—the realities of work that 
significantly shaped the lives o f slaves.
Although turpentine workers did not endure the same drudgery that gang laborers did, 
the task system, as used by naval stores producers, denied the slaves the “community in labor as 
well as in life generally” that they so desired.124 On many agricultural plantations the task system 
facilitated close contact among bondsmen. Slaves who received allotted rows to hoe in cotton 
fields worked closely with other slaves, as did those laboring in adjoining rice patches.
However, in the turpentine forests, workers encountered a different situation. Because producers 
marked their tasks in half-acre squares, and boxers, dippers, and chippers were assigned several 
tasks, laborers were placed at considerable distances from one another and lacked social 
interaction to break the monotony of their work.
For many turpentine laborers, loneliness did not end with their work day. Producers, 
taking advantage of mid-nineteenth-century transportation improvements, purchased virgin 
forests and moved their stills, overseers, slaves, and equipment into isolated camps. The camps 
were commonly so far away from agricultural plantations that men in the labor force had no 
regular contact with their families and, for the most part, no female companionship. Only a few 
women and children worked in the antebellum naval stores industry because, except for dipping,
123 Stampp, Peculiar Institution. 56.
124 Eugene D. Genovese, Roll. Jordan. Roll: The World the Slaves Made (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1976), 324.
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the tasks required strong arms and backs. Most o f  the jobs—boxing, chipping, and cornering— 
demanded considerable strength; therefore, men dominated the labor force.125 As the Southern 
Cultivator reported in 1846, “the same boxes will stand tending or chipping from eight to ten 
years, which labor is performed by males, both white and slave, women and children not being 
very serviceable.”126 At Benjamin Williams’ operation in southeast Georgia, the slave women 
and children stayed at his home where his wife was in charge.127 Men were deprived of the 
emotional support o f their relatives and friends. In discussing the lamentations o f lonely slaves, 
Genovese writes, “Their hollers provided a counterpart to plantation work songs, but ranged 
beyond a direct concern with labor to a concern with the most personal expressions of life’s 
travail. As such, they created a piercing history o f the impact o f hardship and sorrow on solitary 
black men.”128 Some turpentine slaves, however, took measures to alleviate their loneliness. At 
Williams Georgia operation, it was reported that without permission or passes to leave, “some of 
our turpentine hands will work all day + then walk eight or ten miles to dance all night.”129
Labor incentives were commonly used in the naval stores industry to stimulate lonely 
and unhappy workers to greater productivity and to encourage them to work during their own 
time. Incentives came as cash rewards for completing more than their assigned tasks and as time 
off for finishing tasks early. Because such tasks as boxing and chipping were vitally important 
and overseers had difficulty monitoring each hand’s work, incentives helped to assure that slaves
125 “The Pine Forests of the South,” 197; Johnson, Ante-Bellum North Carolina. 488; 
Account Book, 1846-1849, Daniel W. Jordan Papers, Special Collections Library, Duke 
University.
126 McMillan to Southern Cultivator. 172.
127 Sarah Hicks Williams to Parents, 11 March 1860, Williams Papers.
128 Genovese, Roll. Jordan. Roll. 324.
129 Sarah Hicks Williams to Parents, 25 March 1859, Williams Papers.
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performed work properly. In 1854 Williams was so pleased with his workers that he paid some 
of them as much as fifty dollars during the season. In the winter o f  1856, eleven slaves at one 
operation in the vicinity of south Georgia and north Florida earned an average of $8.23 for extra 
work cutting boxes. The most made was $ 19.20 and the least was $ 1.69. At Richlands 
Plantation, laborers could earn from 400 to 600 by continuing their work on Saturdays. To 
encourage speed, tasks were designed to allow a free day (usually Saturday) in the work week.'30 
James B. Avirett explained that laborers “must be stimulated to their best work . . .  by so 
regulating their work that a portion of each week is their own to do as they please with.”131 
Turpentine producers, like virtually all slave masters, also employed punishments, 
especially the whip.132 Slaves received beatings for not working fast enough, for failure to 
complete tasks, for complaining, and simply because their master arbitrarily decided to punish 
them. G. W. Perry found that his turpentine slaves “required whipping every time after dipping 
when chipping was commenced.”133 As a solution to poor work, he considered whether the slave 
“knows how to course pines well or not, and whether his tool is in good order or not, and 
thrash[ed] him accordingly.”134 In May 1856 G. I. Germond punished one slave for allowing his 
horse to get away and then lying about it. That same month he found three slaves had been 
negligent with their hacking and each received forty lashes. Germond did not always resort to
130 Genovese, Roll. Jordan. Roll. 314; Starobin, Industrial Slavery. 100-102; Hickman, 
Mississippi Harvest. 124; Miller and Smith, Dictionary of Afro-American Slavery. 521; Sarah 
Hicks Williams to Parents, 20 December 1854, Williams Papers; Avirett, Old Plantation. 68; 16 
February 1856 entry, Gilbert Isaac Germond Work Journal.
131 Avirett, Old Plantation. 70.
132 Thomas D. S. McDowell Account with R. H. Riualdi, 2 June 1860 entry, McDowell
Papers.
133 Perry, Treatise on Turpentine Farming. 98.
134 Ibid., 114.
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the whip to punish his slaves. When he suggested that one hand had not cleared around his task 
of trees, he “told him that I had no confidence in his Honesty + that I should watch him very 
close + if I detected any such thing in him again that I would Punish him (or any other one for a 
similar offense) by not allowing to Work at task work any more for the year.”135 In March 1856 
he “Brought Lymons home with hands tied behind him + locked him up in the Smokehouse till 
night to punish him for going to Mr. Simpsons without a pass on Saturday.”136
Observations by scholars on slavery and supervision help explain why the turpentine 
industry’s form o f labor organization and combination of incentives and punishments took the 
shape that they did. Economist Stefano Fenoaltea explains that in managing slave labor, pain and 
reward incentives were best used in various combinations for different types o f work. Pain 
incentives were the most effective at generating greater worker effort but did not promote 
carefulness. For labor-intensive activities where brute effort, not precision, was important, as in 
breaking rocks, slaves most often worked in gangs and were punished with physical pain if they 
fail to work fast or hard enough. Because the threat of pain produces high anxiety levels, it does 
not facilitate carefulness. Not only did anxiety impair the slaves’ ability to work carefully, but 
threats could generate ill-feeling among the slaves and lead to intentional carelessness. Rewards, 
which tended to cause a reduction in work effort and productivity, however, did lead to labor 
with greater care. Slaves who worked by reward incentives, Fenoaltea continues, were more 
typically self-supervised and less likely to work as part of a gang. In this case, by allowing the 
slaves to retain a portion of their production they could be made to work with less supervision. 
Fenoaltea maintains that masters typically used a combination of pain and reward incentives. 
They adjusted the levels of each until the maximum benefit for the specific job was reached.
135 15 March 1856 entry, Gilbert Isaac Germond Work Journal.
136 10 March 1856 entry, Ibid.
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Fenoaltea also argues that slavery was most likely used in occupations where the working 
conditions were unpleasant and free workers would require a high percentage of the product 
produced in order to voluntarily perform the labor. Economic historian Ralph Shlomowitz makes 
similar points in his study o f southern sharecropping. Slaves, he explains, could be made to work 
long hours and intensely under hard conditions and at a higher level o f participation than fiee 
labor. Like Fenoaltea, Shlomowitz finds that the character o f slave supervision was largely 
determined by the nature o f the work they were to perform.137
The difficult work involved in turpentining, carried out in the isolation of the southern 
piney woods, required slaves to provide reliable and adequate work force. Physical punishments, 
such as the whip, were needed to force the slaves to perform the long hours of such backbreaking 
work as boxing and chipping. However the workers, spread out across the forests could not be 
closely monitored. Yet the slave workers absolutely had to carry out tasks with precision. If the 
boxes were improperly cut, they could permanently ruin the turpentine harvest for those trees. 
Poor chipping could diminish the turpentine yield and at worst kill the trees. Incentives such as 
time off and small cash payments were therefore required to ensure that the work these slaves 
were forced to perform was done well.
As with expansive agricultural plantations, large turpentine operations relied on 
overseers or foremen to be watchful. Usually referred to as “woodsriders,” these men rode 
through the forest on horseback inspecting each worker’s task. Given the distance of each 
laborer from other workers, a single overseer could supervise no more than twelve slaves.138
137 Stefano Fenoaltea, “Slavery and Supervision in Comparative Perspective: A Model,” 
The Journal of Economic History 44 (September 1984): 636-640, 644-648,655; Ralph 
Shlomowitz, “Origins o f Southern Sharecropping,” Agricultural History n.s. 3, vol. 53 (1979): 
572-573.
138 Sandra Jo Forney, “Kin to Kant: Naval Stores Production Was a Major Industry of the 
Nineteenth Century,” Women in Natural Resources n.s. I, vol. 9 (1987): 17; “The Pine Forests of 
the South,” 196.
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Producers sought overseers familiar with turpentine production. One North Carolina turpentiner 
desired “’some competent person who thoroughly understands the business, to over see hands in 
getting Turpentine.”139 In 1850 a producer near Wilmington sought “A Man of sober, industrious 
habits, an experienced farmer, with some knowledge o f the Turpentine business.”140 James 
Avirett complained about the overseers at his plantation, Richlands. He described them as low 
class whites who could not be relied upon to run the turpentine operation well and who by their 
third year acted as if they owned the enterprise themselves. Consequently, Avirett relied also on 
black drivers.141 Because the overseers’ success was often measured by the amount produced 
under their supervision and not by the health o f the slaves under their care, they usually drove the 
hands hard. In August 1854 an overseer employed by James R. Grist reported: “I shall dow all in 
my power to make all I can for I am Working for my self as well as for Grist + Daves for my 
work has to be my recommendation in the State sow it is to my interest to make all I can.”142 
Another letter reports that “I am driving a head + doing all I can to get as much done [of] the 
turpentine as feasible.”143 This fast-paced driving was especially true in the case of hired slaves. 
While their labor was highly valued, their welfare was only of temporary interest to their 
employers and overseers.144
“The hired slave,” so commonly used by producers, according to Kenneth Stampp, 
therefore “stood the greatest chance of subjection to cruel punishments as well as to
139 “Notice,” The New Bern. North Carolina Newbemian. 6 January 1852.
140 “Overseer Wanted,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 30 August 1850, 1.
141 Avirett, Old Plantation. 117-118.
142 R. M. Wadsworth to James R. Grist, 11 August 1854, Grist Papers.
143 Benjamin Grist To James R. Grist, 21 October 1855, Ibid.
144 Stampp, Peculiar Institution. 82-84.
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overwork.”145 Their employers had little incentive to treat them kindly. Peter Kolchin explains 
that being hired out placed slaves “under the authority o f someone who lacked the owner’s 
incentive to treat them decently; the hirer-slave relationship was far more fundamentally 
utilitarian than that between master and slave.”146 Because the slaves’ time was the commodity 
purchased and the value and overall well-being of the slaves was of financial concern only to 
their owners, employers generally sought to extract as much work as possible from hired slaves 
and gave little attention to their welfare. This meant that their work hours were long and their 
shelter, clothing, and provisions lean. Robert S. Starobin writes that under these circumstances 
“conflicts between masters and employers of industrial hirelings occasionally arose.”147 Too, the 
use of hired slaves in an isolated setting, combined with the environment o f the turpentine forest 
and the migratory nature of the industry, created living conditions for the naval stores slaves that 
were comparably worse than those of bondsmen in agriculture. Because o f their isolation, 
turpentine operations were often hidden from travelers and were seldom visited by anyone but 
the owner of the operation. With no witnesses to their treatment of laborers, naval stores 
producers experienced little outside pressure to provide properly for them.
The owners of slaves hired to turpentine producers expressed concern for their hands’ 
safety and health. One irate owner from Wake Forest wrote that his slaves, John and Albert, had 
run away because they were overworked and underfed. It was his “expectation that those who 
hire them will see that they are taken proper care o f in every respect. The plan of giving up the 
management o f hands entirely to overseers who have no feeling, is to my mind most 
shocking.”148 The owner requested that Grist “deal leniently with the runaways, as they are first
145 Ibid., 185.
146 Peter Kolchin, American Slavery. 1619-1877 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1993), 110.
147 Starobin, Industrial Slavery. 131.
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of my negroes which have left you, and I feel confident—there was some improper oppression 
which drove them to it.” He requested a report on the condition of his other slaves in Grist’s 
hire.149 When one slave owner hired his laborers out to a turpentine operation only to learn that 
they got so sick they were unable to work, he became “very much displeased with the business + 
is anxious to take them home.”150
One facet of the turpentine slaves’ poor living conditions was housing. In the decades 
before the Civil War the quality o f plantation slave quarters ranged from relatively roomy 
cottages with brick or stone fireplaces and glazed windows to one-room log cabins with dirt 
floors and chimneys crudely fashioned o f clay and sticks.131 The latter were, in the words of 
Stampp, “cramped, crudely built, scantily furnished, unpainted, and dirty”;152 housing for 
turpentine laborers was probably even worse. Plantation quarters were built for extended use (as 
long as the plantation operated), but turpentine operations, which were in a forest and usually 
distant from the plantation, lasted for no more than ten years. Therefore housing was intended to 
be temporary, and was often little more than sheds. In similarly transitory operations such as 
fishing, shingle, and lumber camps, the quarters were only crude lean-tos.153 Ruffin described 
the living quarters of shingle-getters in the Dismal Swamp as “houses, or shanties . . .  barely 
wide enough for five or six men to lie in, closely packed side by side—their heads to the back
148 L. F. N. to James R. Grist, 18 August 1853, Grist Papers.
149 Ibid.
150 Thomas F. Strikney to Allen and James R. Grist, 26 February 1861, Ibid.
151 Kolchin, American Slavery, 114; Robert William Fogel and Stanley L. Engerman, 
Time on the Cross: The Economics o f  American Negro Slavery f Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1974), 115-116.
152 Stampp, Peculiar Institution. 294.
153 Starobin, Industrial Slavery. 60; Porte Crayon, “The Dismal Swamp,” Harper’s New 
Monthly Magazine 8 (September 1856): 451.
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wall, and their feet stretched to the open front, close by a fire kept up through the night. The roof 
is sloping, to shed the rain, and where highest, not above four feet from the floor.”154 Cabins 
built to house turpentine workers in the early 1900s, reported to be much like those inhabited by 
enslaved turpentine laborers, “were one room huts, made of pine poles and possessing neither 
floors, doors, nor windows.”155
The housing arrangement at Avirett’s Richlands Plantation was atypical of turpentine 
cabins, being of relatively high quality and situated in close proximity to the master’s house. The 
cabins were to be found on the right side o f the elm-lined drive leading to the big house. The 
forty or more cabins were built back from the drive and arranged along a seventy-foot long street, 
in the middle of which was a communal well. The cabins’ sizes varied, Avirett assigning the 
larger ones to the larger families. The average cabin size was approximately thirty feet long and 
twenty-two feet wide with two rooms downstairs, one for cooking and living and the other for 
sleeping. These houses had an upstairs and most had fire places. The two most comfortable 
houses Avirett reserved for the two foremen. Housekeeping standards varied. Some cabins were 
kept neat and well-maintained with Spanish moss mattresses made by the slaves and covered 
with blankets furnished by the plantation store and quilts and comforters the slaves made 
themselves. Avirett made efforts to keep the quarters sanitary. Every week the plantation 
foreman inspected the cabins and demanded cleanliness. He also expected the yards to be clean 
and the trash collected on a compost heap. Twice a year he ordered the cabins whitewashed. 
During the malarial season, Avirett had old salt vats dating to the War of 1812 filled with rosin
154 Edmund Ruffin, “Observations Made During an Excursion to the Dismal Swamp,” 
Farmer’s Register 4 (January 1837): 518.
155 While the cabins described were built for laborers in the Mississippi turpentine 
forests, they serve to illustrate the most likely conditions o f housing for slaves in the North 
Carolina operations. Hickman, Mississippi Harvest 147 (quotation) and 152; Forney, “Kin to 
Kant,” 17.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
150
and burned in the quarters and around the big house. It was believed that the burning rosin 
would not only kill the mosquitoes, but the fumes would purify the air.156
Some producers provided for religious services in these crude quarters. In 1855 
Germond “attended services at the Negro quarters at 11 0 ’clock[.] I read from the 12 chapter of 
Matthew + tried to explain its contents as best I could.”157 At Williams’ Greene County, North 
Carolina operation the slaves “can go to Church (Preaching, as they say) on the Sabbath. Indeed, 
a majority of the congregation is colored. On Sundays they dress up and many of them look very 
nice.”158 A distance of six miles from the producers home, the church was “a rough framed 
building in the midst of woods. With a large congregation consisting of about equal numbers of 
white + black ” Meetings were held twice a month and lead by uneducated preachers.159
Turpentine slaves appear to have been more poorly clothed than those working in 
agriculture. Each plantation hand commonly received four shirts, four pairs of pants, and one or 
two pairs of shoes each year. Every several years they were issued a hat or blanket. Some 
turpentiners followed a similar pattern. Each year Avirett provided his slaves with three suits of 
clothing, three pairs of shoes, two blankets, one wool hat, one straw hat, and wool and cotton 
from which the slave women made socks and stockings. Those who had to work in bad weather, 
such as coachmen, also were given overcoats and those who labored at ditching received a pair of 
brogans. Slaves spun thread, wove cloth, and sewed clothing on the plantation. They used barks 
to dye the material.160 But in the naval stores industry, producers did not always use this
156 Avirett, Old Plantation. 58-59.
157 30 January 1855 entry, Gilbert Isaac Germond Work Journal.
158 Sarah Hicks Williams to Parents, 22 October 1853, Williams Papers.
159 Sarah Hicks Williams to Parents, 10 October 1853, Ibid.
160 Avirett, Old Plantation. 58-59.
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distribution pattern, especially not for the slaves they hired.161 Owners tried to ensure that their 
slaves received proper clothing by including instructions in their contracts. The Francis Harper 
heirs required that whoever hired their slaves had “to furnish the males Three Suits Cloths one to 
be of woolen, one pr. shoes, and two if worked in Turpentine one pr. o f  stockings + one Hat + 
blanket.. . .  All to be new and well made.”162 But these instructions were not always followed. 
An angry slave owner wrote to the turpentine producer who had hired his slaves, “My Negroes 
told me they had not got all their clothing, their hats Blankets & c.”163 One turpentine producer 
in Fayetteville presented his slaves with cloths as needed, which caused clothing to be unevenly 
distributed. One slave, Bill, received two pairs o f pants, two shirts, a pair o f shoes, and a 
blanket. Another, Obey, received two pairs o f  pants, two shirts, a pair of shoes, and a coat. But 
Lewis was given only one pair of pants.164 G. W. Perry complained that his turpentine slaves 
would make it known when it was time for their clothing allowance or when their clothes and 
shoes had given out. He reported that he “had them to walk by me, and let the old shoes drop off 
their feet, so that I should notice it, and at other times to complain that their feet were badly cut 
up, for want of shoes.” When one slave persisted in demonstrating how his worn out shoes 
would easily drop off his feet, Perry “let him repeat it until I felt satisfied that he knew I noticed 
it: I then had him whipped, without telling him the cause, and whether he understood it or not, he 
never tried a repetition of the maneuver.”165 Slave cloths were usually made o f “Negro Cloth.”
161 Kolchin, American Slavery. 114; Fogel and Engerman, Time on the Cross. 116-117; 
Starobin, Industrial Slavery. 54-57.
162 Contract to Hire Slaves, 2 January 1849, Francis Harper Papers, Special Collections 
Libraiy, Duke University; Miller and Smith, Dictionary of Afro-American Slavery. 521.
163 Starobin, Industrial Slavery. 57.
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Family Papers, Special Collections Library, Duke University.
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Manufactured primarily in northern mills, this cloth was durable and sturdy but uncomfortably 
rough. Plantation mistresses often sewed their slaves’ clothes, but larger and more organized 
operations employed slave women for this task. In some cases the slaves made their own clothes. 
Evidence suggests that clothes for turpentine workers were made at the forest camps. On Ben 
William’s Georgia plantation the white women made clothes for the agricultural laborers but not 
for the turpentine workers. James Grist shipped cloth directly to one of his turpentine operations 
in Columbus County. He also shipped in shoes.166
Holidays, especially Christmas were important to slaves. Masters customarily gave them 
at least one or two days off and sometimes a week or more. Many masters allowed their slaves to 
have a feast and some gave them presents. But hired slaves, who worked some distance from 
their homes, and workers such as turpentine slaves, who labored in camps many miles from their 
master’s house, were often not allowed to return home on special occasions.167 One slave owner 
wrote to the turpentine producer who had hired his slaves, “I am quite willing. . .  that they 
should remain with you during the Christmas holidays. It can do them no good to come home...  
and . . .  their stay will be so short, that they cannot expect to enjoy themselves much.”168 
However, evidence suggests that producers permitted limited holiday celebrations in the camps. 
For Christmas 1860 the slaves in one turpentine camp received “2 hogs + a barrel o f Flower +
166 “Production of Turpentine in Alabama,” 561; M. Jones to James R. Grist, 5 
November 1860, Benjamin Grist to James R. Grist, 21 October 1855, and List of Negroes 
belonging to Mr John W. Grist Worked by Grist + Striknev during the year of 1860. Grist Papers; 
Stampp, Peculiar Institution. 290-291; Genovese, Roll. Jordan. Roll. 551; Sarah Hicks Williams 
to Parents, 10 December 1853 and 25 March 1859, Williams Papers.
167 Stampp, Peculiar Institution. 365; Genovese, Roll. Jordan. Roll. 573; According to 
Sarah Williams in Georgia, the slaves who worked in the distant turpentine orchards still 
considered their master’s plantation their home. Sarah Hicks Williams to Parents, 25 March
1859, Williams Papers.
168 Starobin, Industrial Slavery. 95.
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potatoes so they can have a dinner.. .  .”169 The overseer promised to “due my best to keep the 
negros all strat [straight] + satisfied[.] I hope that they will behave well.”170
This Christmas dinner menu differed little from the provisions issued to turpentine slaves 
for every other day o f the year—commeal flour, salt pork, and often potatoes. On some small 
operations, producers worked in the forest with their slaves and also engaged in agriculture.
Some larger operators attempted both farming and turpentining but most often they gave more 
attention to turpentine and agriculture was only to supply the turpentine operations. It appears 
that the Grist operation produced their com and some of their pork. A portion of their pork was 
supplied by hogs which ranged freely in the pine forest and which were frequently hit by the 
train. In one day eight were killed. Another operator also raised hogs as well as potatoes. 
Although some turpentine producers tried to provide com and bacon for their own needs, most 
operators typically purchased provisions for their work force.171 Olmsted observed, “few 
turpentine-farmers raise as much maize as they need for their own family; and those who carry 
on the business most largely and systematically, frequently purchase all the food of their hands.
maize and bacon are, therefore, very largely imported into North Carolina ”172 He found
that, “the farmer in the forest, makes nothing for sale but turpentine, and, when he cultivates the 
land, his only crop is maize.”173 When these supplies arrived, usually by boat or railroad, they
169 Benjamin Grist to James R. Grist, 25 December 1860, Grist Papers.
170 Ibid.
171 Taylor, Slaveholding in North Carolina. 39; James R. Grist to Father, 4 February 
1851, M. Jones to James R. Grist, 5 November 1855 and 5 November 1860, Grist Papers ; 24 
January and 18 February 1856 entry, Gilbert Isaac Germond Work Journal; Stampp. Peculiar 
Institution. 282; Olmsted, Journey in the Seaboard Slave States. 338; Avirett, Old Plantation. 87; 
Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861” (Ph.D. diss., 
Duke University, 1947), 42.
172 Olmsted, Joumev in the Seaboard Slave States. 338.
173 Ibid.
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were locked in storehouses. Because purchasing food was the largest cost of supporting a slave, 
producers kept rations at a subsistence level, especially when they hired slaves and therefore had 
less self-interest in their workers’ welfare. Avirett issued his slaves their food rations on 
alternate Saturday afternoons. For two weeks each slave received one-half bushel of commeal, 
seven pounds of pork, potatoes, rice, sorghum, and tobacco. Another source o f provisions for 
Rich lands slaves was from a small store that a slave named Philip ran from his cabin. He traded 
in such basic goods as coffee, tea, sugar, cheese, cakes, peanuts, calico, and home brewed beer. 
The slaves paid with the money they earned for extra work and often with raccoon, rabbit, and 
squirrel pelts. The slaves did their own cooking. In warmer weather it was done outside under 
brush shelters. Plantations, where food was more often produced, afforded slaves greater 
opportunity to raid smokehouses, chicken coops, orchards, dairies, gardens, and com fields. 
Turpentine workers found stealing food more difficult. But naval stores laborers did have one 
advantage over plantation slaves, who during their free time, commonly hunted and fished to 
supplement their diet. Because they worked in the forest, turpentine slaves had more opportunity 
to catch wild animals and collect edible herbs. Squirrels, possums, raccoons, rabbits, and turtles 
were plentiful in the turpentine orchards and occasionally supplemented the workers’ diet.174 In 
exceptional cases slaves raised some o f their own food. Behind their cabins at Richlands 
plantation the slaves maintained chicken yards and garden plots in which they grew cabbage. 
Some slaves raised pigs in pins behind their cabins and some raised com, peas, and cotton.
James Avirett explained that slaves worked these plots “On Saturday afternoon or by moonlight.
174 Avirett, Old Plantation. 63-65; Olmsted, Joumev in the Seaboard Slave States. 338; 
M. Jones to James R. Grist, 5 November 1860 and 12 November 1860, Grist Papers; Starobin, 
Industrial Slavery. 51; Stampp, Peculiar Institution. 282; Genovese, Roll. Jordan. Roll. 486-488, 
599-606; Hickman, Mississippi Harvest 150; Fogel and Engerman, Time on the Cross. 110-111.
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. .  instead of going coon hunting.” They could either sell their produce in New Bern or to the 
plantation.175
Drinking water, unlike wild game, was often scarce in the forests. Where clear, flowing 
streams ran through the pines, workers had little difficulty obtaining water; but, often there were 
no such streams. Many workers justifiably feared drinking from the murky, slow-moving 
streams that they commonly found in the woods. Instead, they carried a hollow reed straw that 
they used to suck the water collected in turpentine boxes after rains. But during particularly dry 
seasons, rain water was not available. In the summer of 1860 Alabama experienced a dry spell. 
At the Grist operation near Mobile it was necessary “to keep Dave hauling water with the carte 
all the time in the woods to the hands.”176 Although it was difficult for workers to obtain 
adequate water in this manner, the water they drew from the boxes, when able, was probably 
unhealthy to drink. Evidence suggests that laborers suffered from digestive problems probably 
caused by ingestion of turpentine.177 James Battle Avirett reasoned that the water from the resin 
boxes was safe, “impregnated as it is with the turpentine,” because it “reaches . . .  his liver and 
keeps him healthy.”178 Although Avirett’s assertion is doubtful, scholars have either accepted or 
refused to question the claims o f observers and producers that “the turpentine business is 
considered a very healthy employment for hands.”179 Historian Donnie D. Bellamy writes: “It 
appears that the naval stores industry was not hazardous to the slaves’ health. The authorities
175 Avirett, Old Plantation. 48.
176 Benjamin Grist to James R. Grist, 17 July 1860, Grist Papers.
177 Hickman, Mississippi Harvest 150; Avirett, Old Plantation. 69; Benjamin Grist to 
James R. Grist, 17 July 1860, Grist Papers
178 Avirett, Old Plantation. 69.
179 “Turpentine: Hints for Those About to Engage in Its Manufacture,” 488; Olmsted 
reported that “turpentine business is considered extremely favorable to health and long life.” 
Olmsted, Joumev in the Seaboard Slave States. 346.
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agree with John B. Avirett that the slaves of the turpentine orchards were generally healthy.”180 
In his 1947 dissertation Percival Perry states that “the turpentine business was considered
extremely favorable to health and long life  ”IS1 But the nineteenth-century accounts that
provided the evidence for assumptions were either based on inaccurate observations or were 
simply biased promotional literature. Turpentine is a local irritant and a central neural 
depressant that is easily absorbed from the gastrointestinal tract. Its ingestion probably induced 
flux, a form of dysentery common among turpentine workers, which was characterized by 
abdominal pain, inflammation of the intestine, and frequent stools. However, because the lethal 
dose of turpentine for adults is four to six ounces, ingestion through the drinking water was 
rarely fatal.182
Laborers came into contact with turpentine in other ways. When laboring in the forests, 
workers’ “hands and clothing become smeared with the gum . . .  .”183 Raw gum is extremely 
sticky and difficult to clean off clothes and skin. While traveling through North Carolina in 
1856, D. W. Kyle reported that he “got turpentine all over me.” Unable to clean it off, he had to 
throw away his suit and buy a new one.184 While its adhesion to workers’ clothing was only a 
nuisance, its contact with their skin could cause dermatitis. Treatment of this skin irritation is
180 Bellamy, “Slavery in Microcosm,” 344.
181 Pervical Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861” 
(Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 39.
182 Robert E. Gosselin, Harold C. Hodge, Roger P. Smith, and Marion N. Gleason, 
Clinical Toxicology of Commercial Products. 4th ed. (Baltimore: The Williams & Wilkins Co., 
1976), s.v. “turpentine;” Hickman, Mississippi Harvest. 151; Dorland’s Illustrated Medical 
Dictionary. 25th ed. (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders, 1974), s.v. “dermatitis” and “flux;” Sarah 
Hicks Williams to Parents, 11 March 1860, Williams Papers.
183 “n jg  pjne porests of the South,” 197.
184 D. W. Kyle to John Buford, 29 March 1856, John Buford Papers, Special Collections 
Library, Duke University.
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ineffective until the offending agent is removed. Laborers who found themselves afflicted during 
the harvest season had to wait until November for a cure.1*5
Fumes were another problem, especially around the still, which emitted a pungent 
turpentine smell.1*6 Even workers handling barrels in the pine forest were exposed to spirit 
vapors. A twentieth-century reporter explained that “it’s like nothing you’ve ever smelled 
before. Sweet, spicy, raw. Something like sassafras tea but magnified to a degree that almost 
clears your sinuses.”187 Fitzhugh Lee Tatum recounted that a still in Bladen County “smelled 
awful turpentiney!” “After you’d inhale it a while you could feel it all down in your throat.. .  
.”188 While no direct evidence indicates physical harm from such exposure, current medical 
research indicates otherwise. Twentieth-century workers have developed occupational asthma 
when exposed to such high concentrations of these fumes, which are readily absorbed through 
the respiratory tract Some have shown neurological damage and intellectual impairment. 
Moreover, laboratory test reveal a higher mortality rate among the progeny of rats exposed to 
turpentine fumes. With these discoveries, strict regulations of such solvents are recommended to 
prevent tissue lesions in workers and to protect pregnant women.1*9
185 Michael G. Carraway, telephone interview by author, April 6, 1991, Museum of the 
Cape Fear, Fayettville, North Carolina; Percival Perry interview; Industrial Toxicology. 3d ed. 
(Acton Massachusetts: Publishing Sciences Group, Inc., 1974), s.v. “wood dust;” David N. 
Holvey, ed. The Merck Manual of Diagnosis and Therapy. 12th ed. (Rathway, New Jersey:
Merck, Sharp, and Dohne Research Laboratories, 1972), s.v. “contact dermatitis;” Gosselin et al., 
Clinical Toxicology. 315.
186 Carraway, interview; Tatum, interview, 5; One of the Grist slaves suffered from sores 
in his throat, but the cause was not reported. Thomas F. Strikney to Allen and James R. Grist, 26 
February 1861, Grist Papers.
187 Kathy Hawk, “Turpentine: An Ancient Technology Almost Tapped Out in St. Johns 
County,” Ancient City Beacon (St. Augustine, FL), 25 June 1982,1.
188 Tatum, interview, 5.
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Turpentine slaves reportedly complained o f “headache, pain in the eyes, arms and legs, 
their knees hurting them, pain in the back, stiff neck, feet and hands feeling dead, pain across the 
breast, and a severe griping in the bowels.” All these ailments are easily explained as the result 
of either fume exposure, over work, or turpentine ingestion through the water. G. W. Perry 
recommended that producers not listen to complains, initially, “just tell them it is a busy time, 
and you will not allow any such sickness, and that will be sufficient.” He believed that if a slave 
was actually ill the producer could tell easily enough and should give the slave the proper 
medicine and see that he takes it.190 Turpentine laborers often sought to cure themselves of 
maladies by relying on medicines made from forest products. A tea made from the leaves of the 
yellowtop plant treated flux. The leaves o f the dollarleaf plant were also supposed to remedy 
dysentery and those from the boneset plant relieved vomiting. Butterfly weed was thought to 
cure diarrhea, while sufferers of rashes, bums, and other skin ailments drank smartwood tea. 
Black snakeroot tea remedied fever.191
In some cases overseers reluctantly permitted sick or injured slaves to return to their 
owner’s home plantation for care and rest or visit a doctor. In I860 one sick slave at Williams’ 
Georgia operation was sent to Williams’ residence where his wife looked after him.192 After 
“boy Moses,” who worked at another operation, had suffered from sores in his throat for several 
weeks, his overseer wrote, “though I regret very much to have him off the place[,] —  I would
Gregersen et al., “Neurotoxic Effects o f Organic Solvents in Exposed Workers: An 
Occupational, Neuropsychological, and Neurological Investigation,” American Journal of 
Industrial Medicine 5 (1984): 214; Joaquin Garcia-Estrada, Antonio Rodriguez-Segura, and 
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Thinner and Turpentine Inhalation,” General Pharmacology 19 (1988): 470; Gosselin et al., 
Clinical Toxicology. 315.
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suggest to let him go back to the doctor at once as he is not fit to work in turpentine.”193 He
stayed with the Doctor for several months during which time he drove the doctor’s buggy. In 
return for Moses’ service to the doctor Grist received S25 a month and was not charged for his 
medical care. In October 1855, five slaves laboring at one Grist operation got sick and were 
allowed to miss work. In 1860 one slave working for Grist in Cumberland County missed work 
because of a cold, and another, Ruffin, was allowed to rest from his work for a week. When a 
hand was kicked in the face by a mule and badly cut, he also rested a week and received care 
from the doctor. A doctor made regular visits to one o f Grist’s North Carolina operations. 
Between October 13, 1853 and July 29, 1854, a Dr. P. D. Mott saw thirty-eight slave patients at a 
total cost of $59.50.194 When the owner of slaves hired by Grist learned that one had died and 
another was down with fever, he requested that Grist spare no expense for the welfare and 
comfort of his other slaves who remained at work for Grist. Also, the owner wrote, “allow me 
kindly to request you to adhere strictly to the Doctors instructions relative to the administration 
of stimulants and food. For any thing furnished extra you shale be paid.”I9S
Another hazard to slaves was the explosive nature of stills and their flammable contents. 
Given the difficulty o f regulating these crude devices, distillers could not always determine the 
pressure generated by the evaporating spirits of turpentine. Therefore, explosions and fires were 
common and could kill or seriously injure anyone close by.196
193 Thomas F. Strikney to Allen and James R. Grist, 26 February 1861, Grist Papers.
194 M. Jones to James R. Grist, 30 October 1855, 12 November 1860, and 16 December
1860, P. D. Mott to James R. Grist, Bill for doctor’s visits, 13 October 1853; Thomas F. Strikney 
to Allen and James R. Grist, 26 February 1861, Ibid.; Sarah Hicks Williams to Parents, 21 
October 1860, Williams Papers.
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The wilderness conditions of the turpentine forests contributed further to harsh working 
conditions. Wild animals, poisonous snakes, malarial mosquitoes, ticks, and chiggers found in 
the pine woods could make turpentine production a miserable, and sometimes hazardous, 
occupation. The heat and humidity of the southeastern North Carolina coastal plain added to the 
difficulties. In 18S4 turpentine laborers fainted in the forest from these extreme conditions. 
Moreover, workers could easily lose their direction in the expansive pine forests. In 18S9 a hand 
in a Georgia operation became lost in the woods and wandered for nearly six days before finding 
his way home. Despite a week of nursing care, he died o f fever brought on by hunger and 
exposure. Because he worked in a turpentine forest, his master had not noticed his absence for 
three days. In another instance, a hired slave, Willis, who worked for Grist, drowned and another 
slave, Jack, almost drowned when they tried to remove turpentine casks from a remote platform 
near a swollen river.197 A defensive James R. Grist explained that “we have not worked or 
employed Willis by water on the Contrary he was ordered not to go by Mr. Shile our agent; 
therefore Mr. Pammerly [Willis’ owner] Cannot expect us to pay for him.”198 In such cases, the 
isolation and loneliness of the turpentine forests, combined with heavy work demands, poor 
housing, inadequate clothing and food, and unhealthy and dangerous labor conditions, made the 
slaves’ already difficult work and manner o f life unbearable. It is no wonder that the turpentine 
industry had the reputation for having “ruined more hands than anything else in this country.”199 
Some slaves reportedly resisted these terrible conditions. According to Edmund Ruffin, 
producers believed the fires that occasionally roared through the pine forests were “committed by
197 Starobin, Industrial Slavery. 42; Clark, Greening o f the South. 22; James R. Grist to 
Father, 17 September 1852 and R. M. Wadsworth to James R. Grist, 11 August 1854, Grist 
Papers; Sarah Hicks Williams to Parents, 25 March 1859, Williams Papers.
198 James R. Grist to Father, 17 September 1852, Grist Papers.
199 Perry, Treatise on Turpentine Farming. 116.
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the negroes who would have to attend the trees, to collect turpentine, which labor they dislike 
very much, because it is solitary.”200 Further evidence o f the discontent comes from the stories 
of runaway turpentine slaves. Although it is impossible to determine the frequency o f escapes, 
evidence of slaves fleeing the James R. Grist operations suggests such acts were not uncommon. 
In all cases these slaves cited harsh living and working situations as their reason for flight. Two 
hired slaves, John and Albert, ran away from a turpentine operation in 1853 because they were 
“over worked and not well fed.” John reached Greenville, North Carolina, “in a most exhausted 
condition,” but Albert lost his way. Their owner blamed their harsh treatment for their escape.201 
That same year a turpentine cooper ran away when he and his partner were whipped for working 
too slowly.202
The most dramatic story of escaped turpentine slaves involved two brothers, Ned and 
Colin, who were purchased from their owner in Sussex County, Virginia, by a slave trader in 
Richmond. When James Grist bought them, “they were sent off into the pine woods to make 
turpentine.” But they “could not stand the work and the life before them and ran away” in 18S4. 
While they were fleeing across a bridge near Fayetteville, someone shot at them and probably 
wounded Colin. The two slaves then ran in different directions and became separated. Colin 
reached Greenville and worked on the Seaboard Railroad until eventually caught by a search 
party later that year. Ned reached the home of a planter, William Parham, who was a  neighbor of 
his former master in Sussex County and lived not far from Ned’s wife and child. When Ned 
reached Parham, he was very sick and Parham nursed him back to health. While Ned recovered, 
Parham wrote to Grist, informing him of Ned’s condition. According to Parham’s letter, Ned
200 Scarborough, Diarv o f Edmund Ruffin. 52.
201 L. F. N. to James R. Grist, 18 August 1853, Grist Papers.
202 James to Grist, 23 August 1853, Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
162
vehemently disliked the work in the turpentine forest. Parham reported that “the work and the 
manner of life in making turpentine he cannot stand, it is hard work and would kill him by 
piecemeal, and he had rather be killed at once.” Parham advised Grist “not to put him to getting 
turpentine again, he will cause you more trouble than profit, but sell him at once.” He concluded 
that Ned would be best suited for the New Orleans slave market where a sugar producer would 
likely buy him.203
“The work and the manner of life in making turpentine” from which Ned and Colin fled 
was much like that o f  other industrial slavery occupations described by Robert S. Starobin. They 
tended to labor for absentee producers, were worked excessively hard by overseers, and received 
food, clothing, and shelter of an inferior quality to agricultural laborers. It is also necessary to 
consider the type and amount of work expected of turpentine slaves and the realities o f life in 
isolated camps, both o f which Percival Perry fails to do. Contrary to assertions made by Perry 
and others, work in naval stores tended to be more grueling than labor in agriculture. 
Environmental factors played a major role in the harsh conditions of turpentine making. As 
geographically isolated and expansive enterprises, turpentine orchards possessed spatial 
attributes considerably different from those of agricultural operations. Given the size of the pine 
forests and the methods of harvesting resin, producers could not permit workers to labor in 
groups. Instead, slaves were forced to spread out widely throughout the forest where their tasks 
were individually assigned. Since tasks were clearly marked in half-acre blocks, overseers could 
effectively monitor and evaluate each worker’s performance. Although slaves generally 
preferred task work because of the relative degree o f autonomy it offered, in the naval stores 
industry this independence was accompanied by solitude. The industry denied social interaction 
that would have broken the monotony of the job. Such loneliness did not end with the workday.
203 William F. Parham to James R. Grist, 1 May 1854, 14 November 1854, 20 November 
1854, Ibid.
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The camps were commonly so far away from agricultural plantations that the male-dominated 
labor force was prevented from regular interaction with their families and largely denied female 
companionship. Too, because few visitors journeyed to the isolated camps, production operators 
and overseers received little social incentive to care properly for their slave laborers, especially 
for the many hired bondsmen. This lack of supervision contributed to relatively poor housing 
and food provisions for laborers. The natural setting o f the turpentine orchards also accounted 
for these conditions. Most owners found it infeasible to raise food at the camp sites. Instead, 
food was hauled into the forests by producers who tended to keep rations at a subsistence level. 
Unlike many plantation slaves, turpentine laborers lacked the opportunity to supplement their 
diets with food raided from local smokehouses, chicken coops, and cornfields and gathered from 
their own garden plots. However, because they labored in the forest, workers possessed more of 
an opportunity to hunt wild animals and collect edible herbs. The migratory nature of the 
industry discouraged producers from constructing substantial cabins to house their workers. 
Instead, laborers could take refuge only in crude shed-like lean-tos that could be easily 
dismantled, moved, and reconstructed. The unique attributes of the naval stores industry created 
conditions greatly inferior to those on agricultural plantations, conditions that inevitably led to 
misery and discontent among the slaves, who after the first decades of the nineteenth century, 
made up most of the industry’s work force.
The isolation of the pine forest also influenced the lives of its white inhabitants. In the 
remote forest, poor landless whites found plots where they could squat, construct a cabin, and 
cultivate a small garden with a minimum of harassment. They also harvested small quantities of 
gum for themselves to trade or worked on an irregular basis for larger producers. Small farmers 
likewise lived in the piney woods and cultivated a few crops and barrels of turpentine for the 
market, sometimes with the help o f several slaves laborers. The output of these smaller 
producers, however, paled in comparison to that of the larger operators who made thousands of
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barrels of turpentine annually. For such naval stores men as Avirett, Williams, and Grist, the 
experience of managing a large-scale operation with scores of slaves and several overseers 
differed little from that of plantation owners. Their intensive exploitation of the longleaf pine 
matched their heavy reliance on unfree labor.
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Chapter Four
A Destructive Harvest:
Forest Degradation and the Turpentine Industry’s Move Southward
By the 1850s turpentine-harvesting practices had severely devastated the North Carolina 
iongleaf pine forests, causing the industry to migrate southward in search o f fresh stands. After 
ten years of boxing, chipping, and burning, a large percentage of turpentined trees succumbed to 
reduced vitality, weakened truck structure, insect infestation, and disease. Once gone, the 
Iongleaf failed to reproduce itself and a different vegetation replaced the once nearly solid pine 
growth. As they witnessed their eastern pine forests’ disappearance, some North Carolinians 
turned against the turpentine industry despite its continued profitability. Beginning with the 
state’s older naval stores region, producers increasingly switched to staple cotton production 
which the introduction of new fertilizers made possible. Not all turpentine producers, however, 
so willfully abandoned their business. Those who refused to make the switch to agriculture 
moved with their slave labor forces to other southern states and continued the destructive 
harvesting practices that had driven them out o f North Carolina.
The changing nature of the turpentine production from a small-scale business dominated 
by casual producers who also dabbled in agriculture to one controlled by large and highly 
specialized operators contributed to more wasteful and destructive practices. When a  turpentine 
operation was a small part of a larger farming enterprise, producers probably used more care to 
extend the life and efficiency of the forest so that it would not wear out more quickly than the 
agricultural land. Turpentiners who operated on a large scale and specialized in the business had 
less incentive to prolong their use of the pines and ran more exploitative operations. The 
increasing number o f such producers in the 1840s and 1850s meant more widespread forest
165
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degradation. The lease system further encouraged destructive harvesting practices. Because the 
price of the lease was determined by the number o f boxes worked, the system encouraged 
producers to cut as many boxes as possible in each tree. And because the producers paid for the 
number of boxes, not the amount produced, they tried to maximize their yields by making 
frequent and deep chippings. As the practice of leasing became more common, it too led to 
greater inefficiency and waste.1
Harvesting practices themselves caused considerable harm to the pines. Boxes were 
responsible for a variety of problems. Producers instructed their laborers to cut boxes in the 
swell of the pine’s most prominent root. By placing the box here more gum could be collected 
from trees that leaned. Otherwise gum began dripping outside the box as the face grew higher 
and extended over the base. Laborers preferred to cut boxes here because they could be made 
with the greatest o f  ease and in the least time. But because boxes were usually cut seven inches 
deep into the root, they could seriously interfere with the flow o f sap. In larger roots, which 
represented a substantial portion of the pine’s root system, the box caused the greatest injury to 
the tree. Although precise mortality statistics were unknown in the antebellum years, in 1909 
forester A. L. Brower estimated that seven percent of boxed trees died from reduced vitality 
before a stand was worked to its fullest potential. Boxes also weakened the stability of the pines, 
making them more susceptible to wind. Larger trees were not as vulnerable, but in smaller pines 
if more than one box was cut into the base they were sometimes nearly severed. Brower reported 
that a hurricane or strong windstorm could down ninety percent o f  boxed timber whereas only 
thirty percent o f round timber would fall. Boxes also collected rain water. In stands where gum 
harvesting continued this was not o f considerable consequence, for not only did the continuous
1 Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861”
(Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 46; Donald Fraser Martin, “An Historical and Analytical 
Approach to the Current Problems o f the American Gum Naval Stores Industry” (Ph.D. Diss., 
University o f North Carolina, 1942), 98-99.
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gum flow provide the wood with some protection from the moisture, but in dipping the gum out 
of the box most of the water was removed as well. Standing rainwater, however, could be 
especially damaging in abandoned turpentine orchards where the wood's continuous contact with 
moisture encouraged fungus growth and subsequent decay. Another problem was the occasional 
practice of trying to deter fire by filling old boxes with dirt at the conclusion o f a forests’ use. 
The dirt, which acted like a sponge, held water that might otherwise have evaporated in the box, 
hastening decay.2
Fire, often intentionally set by the turpentiners themselves, posed a particularly 
dangerous threat to boxed trees. Historian Stephen Pyne explains that “perhaps nowhere in the 
country were Indian burning practices more thoroughly adopted and maintained than in the piney 
woods, in the sand hills, and on the sandy soils where rice or cotton plantations failed to 
penetrate.”3 Like the Indian, white settlers and turpentiners used burning to reduce fuel as a 
means of preventing conflagrations, to open the choked woods for easier passage, to encourage 
more abundant grazing grasses, and to reduce pests.4 Despite efforts by turpentiners to guard 
against the damaging effects o f fires on their forests, accidental tree burning was all too frequent. 
Edmund Ruffin observed that although producers took care to control their burning, “they cannot 
always command the progress of the fires; and from that, or other less carefully made fires, great 
havoc is often made among the boxed trees.”3 Olmsted found that burning in round timber rarely
2 Asa L. Brower and John O. LaFontisee, “Report of the Investigation on the Naval 
Stores Industry and Statistics of the Production o f Turpentine and Rosin for the Seasons of 1907- 
8 and 1908-9,” Olustee Experiment Station Files, Georgia Agrirama, Tifton, GA, 17-21; A. W. 
Schorger and H. S. Betts, The Naval Stores Industry (Washington, DC: United States Department 
of Agriculture, 1915), 26; Charles H. Herty, “A New Method of Turpentine Orcharding,” 
(Washington, DC: United States Department o f Agriculture Bureau of Forestry, 1903), 12-13.
3 Stephen J. Pyne, Fire in America: A Cultural History of Wildland and Rural Fire. 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), 144.
4 Ibid., 145-146, 149.
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harmed the trees. In such forests the fire “bums slowly, and with little flame, and the living 
trees, the bark of which is not very inflammable, are seldom injured.” Where the trees had been 
boxed, however, great harm could result. “The chips lie about it, these take fire, and bum with 
more flame; so that frequently the turpentine in the box, and on the scarified wood above it, also 
takes fire.. .  .”6
Such fires either greatly reduced the tree’s productivity or, as was often the case, killed 
it. Perry explained that “in cases where pines are much burned by the fire, they will never make 
as much turpentine afterward; it makes the wood dry and tough, kills many o f  them, and finally 
renders them useless for turpentine, or so much so that will never run enough to pay.”7 Perry 
believed that even raking could hurt the pines, by exposing their roots to the elements.8 Ruffin 
noted in 1840 that “without other cause or decay or destruction, the trees will live and yield well 
until the sides can be shaved no higher. But the spreading of accidental fires seldom fails to kill 
the tree earlier. For the entire face o f  the cutting being encrusted with turpentine, and the wood 
below being converted to solid lightwood, no trees can be more inflammable; and the fire bums 
so deeply in, as to kill the strips of living bark by heat, or to weaken the trunk so much that it 
yields to, and is prostrated by, the next storm.” The trees or parts of trees that escaped being 
burned, he reported, were cut into pieces and burned in tar kilns.9 While on another trip through 
North Carolina in the late 1850s, Ruffin attended a tea at which the talk was “of much recent
5 Edmund Ruffin, “Notes o f a Steam Journey,” The Farmer’s Register 8 (30 April 1840):
250.
6 Frederick Law Olmsted, A Journey in the Seaboard Slave States (New York: Dix & 
Edwards, 1856), 341.
7 G. W. Perry, A Treatise on Turpentine Farming. (New Bern, NC: Muse & Davies,
1859), 16-17.
8 Ibid., 28.
9 Ruffin, “Notes o f a Steam Journey,” 250.
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destruction of the long-leaf pine trees, ‘boxed’ to collect turpentine, in this neighborhood, by 
firing the woods.”10
Fires in abandoned turpentine forests caused the most damage. Such stands were highly 
flammable after three to five years o f sitting unattended. With no one to rake around their bases 
or bum off the yearly collection of debris, trees here often sat surrounded by a thick mass o f pine 
straw, limbs, resinous chips, and pools of resin. Moreover, the turpentined pines, their faces 
covered with hardened gum and their boxes and bases coated with resin, were incredibly 
flammable. A fire, started either by lightening, an arsonist, or human carelessness easily ignited 
the box and climbed up the face. When it did, the dried gum of the face often melted and ran 
down into the box, increasing the fires’ intensity. If such fires did not destroy the tree, they at 
least burned away much o f the fresh growth of new wood around the box and face, thus slowing 
the pine’ recovery from turpentining.11
As the problem persisted through the 1850s, turpentiners sought tighter controls on 
burning. Perry proposed an elaborate remedy for controlling wildfire. His plan involved cutting 
down all dead trees and hiring a man to stay in the forest as a lookout. He also believed, 
neighbors needed to make agreements that no fire would be allowed without the consent and 
presence of each area landowner. Finally, he recommended “above all, never allow hands to 
carry fire into the forest at night, under the pretext o f hunting, nor in the day-time, under penalty 
of thirty-nine lashes, which will be found a good preventive.”12 Another producer, who also
10 William Kauffman Scarborough, ed., The Diary of Edmund Ruffin, vol. 1, (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1972), 52.
11 Guion Griffis Johnson, Ante-Bellum North Carolina: A Social History (Chapel Hill: 
The University of North Carolina Press, 1937), 486; Herty, “New Method of Turpentine 
Orcharding,” 13; Brower and LaFontisee, “Report on the Investigation of the Naval Stores 
Industry,” 20-21.
12 Perry, Treatise on Turpentine Farming. 131.
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identified fire as a great threat, believed that “the state ought to protect this important interest, by 
enacting severe penalties against those who set out fire where it can extend among trees boxed 
for turpentine.”13 Where some producers probably heeded Perry’s advice, the state took no 
action to discourage fire.
Fires that did not kill longleafs could weaken them, making them susceptible to other 
problems. One ailment that plagued turpentined Iongleaf pines was a condition known as dryface 
in which pitch soaked the inner bark and wood. Pines with this affliction experienced a 
permanent cessation o f gum flow from ail or part o f the face. In severe cases, lesions formed 
above and beside the dry area and resin oozed through the bark. Fire contributed to dry face 
when it burned the gum on the face, killing the living tissue above the face. Poor chipping 
practices could also exacerbate the problem. Cutting a face wider than half of the tree’s 
circumference, chipping too deeply into the wood, or working two or more faces on the same tree 
could weaken the pine by taxing its capability to produce gum and thus lower its vitality.14 Also, 
as Perry warned, “if they chipped immediately after burning, the turpentine which is brought 
down by the fire will run out and leave the grain of the wood open, which will fill them full of 
dry faces, and occasion the death of many which would have lived had they not been chipped.”
He believed that chipping in the late fall as the sap was going down left “the grain o f the wood 
open to receive the cool, dry air.”15
However, drought was probably the most significant factor in weakening pines and 
making them susceptible to dry face. In the Iongleaf belt the soil posses relatively low water-
13 “Turpentine: Hints for Those About to Engage in Its Manufacture,” De Bow’s Review 
19 (October 1855): 488.
14 C. S. Schopmeyer and Otis C. Maloy, “Dry Face of Naval Stores Pines,” Forest Pest 
Leaflet 5 1 (Washington DC: United States Department of Agriculture, 1960), 1-3; R. P. True, 
“Dry Face of Turpentine Pines,” The Forest Fanner 8 (August 1949): 6,14.
15 Perry, Treatise on Turpentine Farming. 17, 28.
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retaining capability, making the region acutely susceptible to periodic precipitation declines. 
During the average growing season, June through August, nearly all precipitation is lost through 
evaporation or transpiration. The quantity of available water is not affected by long-term carry­
over. Consequently, stream and lake water accumulations remain low except during periods of 
unusually excessive precipitation. The sandy soils can hold sufficient moisture to sustain 
vegetation growth for only a few weeks during this season. Thus the moisture level o f the soil 
constantly fluctuates with precipitation. Although both surface and subsurface water supplies are 
usually lower by the growing season’s end, from then, through the cooler months, to the next 
season, precipitation replenishes depleted surface and subsurface levels.16
During the summer, dry spells stressed turpentined trees’ vitality, increasing their 
susceptibility to dry face. Pines growing in wetter areas closer to ponds and streams were the 
most at risk because these trees tended to have more shallow root structures than those growing 
in areas with lower water tables and consequently suffered more from dry stress. Dryfacing also 
plagued more trees in crowded stands where pines were less vigorous and consequently had 
narrower growth rings and a narrower band of sapwood. Such trees were less able to withstand 
the constant flow of gum and interference with the flow of sap. Older pines could also 
experience dryfacing. In them the sapwood was narrower and commonly cut through during 
heavy turpentine work. Young Iongleaf with an abundance o f growing space rarely suffered 
from dryface. These pines were more healthy with substantial seasonal wood growth and longer 
healthier crowns. Yet deep chipping could weaken even these healthy specimens to the degree 
they too deteriorated with dry face. If left standing, dryfaced pines commonly became the host to
16 Schopmeyer and Maloy, “Dry Face,” 3; John C. Hoyt, Droughts of 1930-1934 
(Washington, DC: United States Department o f the Interior, 1936), 15-16.
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various species o f sap rot fungi and with time frequently yielded to strong wind. Weakened 
pines were also susceptible to another menace, insect infestation.17
Because wood-boring insects are attracted to the wounded areas of trees, turpentine 
faces, especially on weakened pines, were particularly vulnerable to attack. Ips beetles are the 
most common pine bark beetle and probably killed more turpentine pines than the other bark 
beetles combined. They are especially attracted to chipped and fire-scarred trees. Infested trees 
are commonly scattered throughout the forest, but with favorable breeding conditions the ips 
beetle can kill trees in groups. Because there actually are three different varieties o f ips beetles, 
each with its own preference for part of the tree, they can attack a pine from its crown to the base 
of its trunk. The smaller-sized, 1/8-inch Ips avals, attacks the crown and sometimes the trunk.
The medium-sized Ips grandicollis, approximately 3/16 inches long, prefers the middle and 
upper trunk. At 1/4 inches long, Ips calligrophus most commonly attacks the lower trunk. But 
all three can be found in any part o f the tree. They may work together in the same tree, their 
tunnels overlapping, or they might work separately or even in secession. Hundreds o f beetles 
attack at the same time. They become active when the weather turns warm in the spring, boring 
through the bark until they reach the wood. Then they begin tunneling between the bark and 
wood, their borrows running up and down the tree in a roughly Y or H pattern. As it bores the 
beetle lays eggs spaced about 1/16 inch apart along each side of the tunnel. The cream colored 
worms which hatch from these eggs, bore their own tunnel out from the beetle’s tunnel. They 
hatch in such numbers that in feeding on the cambium layer they essentially girdle the tree.
When these larvae stop feeding after a few weeks, they rest, and metomorphisize into adult 
beetles. They then burrow out o f the tree in search o f other trees in which to start the cycle
17 Schopmeyer and Maloy, “Dry Face,” 3-5; True, “Dry Face o f Turpentine Pines,” 6; 
Lenthall Wyman, Experiments in Naval Stores Practice (Washington, DC: United States 
Department of Agriculture, 1932), 10.
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again. The ips beetle carries with it a blue-stain fungus that spreads throughout the burrows and 
into the wood. Once weak and unhealthy trees have been eliminated, the beetles move on to 
infest more vigorous species. During the summer when breeding conditions are at their best, a 
new brood is produced about every four to six weeks. Each tree that they attack and kill 
produces enough beetles to attack at least five more. As the ips beetles breed though the spring 
and summer their numbers, by fall, grows enormous. If the winter is mild and dry, the adults 
remain alive and active, causing considerable tree deaths by late spring and by the next fall the 
damage may be severe. Normal winter temperatures, however, considerably reduce the ips 
population and in cases where drought is associated with the infestation, soaking rains usually 
stop their activity. Trees weakened by ips beetle attacks sometimes attract southern pine beetle 
and the black turpentine beetle.18
Turpentine borers take advantage of fire-scared and dryfaced pines as well. They rarely 
attack healthy trees. These grayish-brown and I-l/4-inch-long beetles lay their eggs only on 
trees where wood has been exposed by a scar or wound. When the whitish gray grubs with broad 
flat heads emerge from these eggs, they borrow into the inner wood, often riddling it. This 
activity can continue within the tree for three years or more, filling it with hollow galleries, thus 
weakening the tree’s stability and making it susceptible to wind. After about three and a half 
years the life cycle is complete and the adult beetles emerge from the trees in the spring.
18 William H. Bennett, Charles W. Chellman, and William R. Holt, Insect Enemies of 
Southern Pines (Washington, DC: United States Department of Agriculture, Southern Forest 
Experiment Station, 1958), 7-9; R. J. Kowal, “Ips Beetles Are Killing Pines: What Shall We Do 
About It?,” Research Notes (Asheville, NC: United States Department o f Agriculture, Forest 
Service, Southeastern Forest Experiment Station, 1955), 1; R. J. Kowal and Harry Russel, 
“Beetles in Your Pines?: How Good Cutting Practices and Management Stop Beetles from 
Killing Your Timber” (Ashville, NC: United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, 
Southeastern Forest Experiment Station), 3-4; Ralph W. Clements Manual: Modem Gum Naval 
Stores Methods (Ashville, NC: United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, 
Southeastern Forest Experiment Station, 1960), 29.
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Elliptical emergence holes in dry turpentine faces are the first signs o f attack. For trees already 
undermined and broken off, the beetles’ tunnels indicate their work.19
The black turpentine beetle also takes advantage o f Iongleafs stressed by turpentining. 
The dark brown or black 1/4- to l/3-inch-long beetles prefer freshly cut stumps, but also invade 
weakened as well as apparently healthy trees. The most sever infestations occurred in slash and 
loblolly pines but because it is attracted to fresh resin and scorched bark, Iongleafs that had been 
overworked through excessive turpentining offered an acceptable home. The black turpentine 
beetle’s habits are different from those of any other bark beetle. They rarely attack above the 
tree’s bottom six feet and usually only the bottom two feet. The adult beetles borrow through the 
outer bark and stop when they reach the soft phloem. Then they begin to make a vertical gallery 
1/2- to 3/4-inches wide, and around twenty inches long, usually in a downward direction. Along 
the sides of the gallery they lay groups of seventy to two hundred or more eggs. The eggs are 
laid on a soft cushion o f pulverized bark which may serve as an incubator as well as protection 
from predators. When the eggs hatch in ten to fourteen days, the creamy white 1/3-inch-iong 
grubs begin to feed in groups, side-by-side, on the cambium, working their way from the egg 
gallery. They eventually eat out an irregular fan-shaped patch that may be twelve inches across. 
Where several broods occur at approximately the same height on the trunk, the larvae can 
actually girdle the tree. After ten to fourteen days the new adults bore out through the bark and 
start a new generation. From two and a half to four months are required for the development o f 
the turpentine beetle from egg to adult. Two generations usually develop each year. Attacks on 
single trees last four to seven months.
19 F. C. Craighead, “Insects That Attack Southern Pines,” Austin Cary Memorial Forestry 
Collection, Department o f Special Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries, University of 
Florida, 2; Bennett, Chellman, and Holt, Insect Enemies. 16.
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The black turpentine beetle kills more slowly than other bark beetles. Usually only a few 
beetles attack each tree, making their buildup to outbreak proportions slow. They are most active 
from early in the spring to late fall but during mild winters, especially in the gulf South, they may 
remain active all year. When the beetles first attack a stand they most commonly concentrate in 
a small number o f trees, usually no more than one half dozen. By the end of the season they may 
be in ten to fifteen percent o f the trees. After the beetle attacks the trunk it quickly moves 
against the lateral root. If the root’s infestation becomes sever it an hasten the tree’s death. The 
beetles work slowly and persistently through the year. Light attacks will not kill the tree. 
Turpentine beetle can infest, attack, and kill trees, almost without being noticed until a large 
number of the trees begin to die. First, the needles begin to fade from their normal green color, 
to a yellowed green, and finally to a reddish brown. Fading will begin four to eight months after 
the first attack, but in some cases it may take twelve months or longer. When the fading begins it 
takes about one month for the tree to change fully to red and about two more months for the 
foliage to fall off. Only rarely does the population grow quickly enough to cause sudden high 
mortality in an area. When they attack forests disturbed by fire, logging, or wind, the beetle 
seldom persists at high levels o f population for more than one or two years. But in stands boxed 
for turpentine the activity could continue for three to five years. Intensely worked trees in dense 
stretches were particularly susceptible to their attack.20
Although the southern pine beetle is also a dangerous enemy in the turpentine region, its 
most vigorous activity is in the piedmont region. Only occasionally are huge tracts in the coastal
20 Bennett, Chellman, and Holt, Insect Enemies. 10-12; R. H. Smith and R. E. Lee III, 
“Black Turpentine Beetle,” Forest Pest Leaflet 12 (Washington, DC: United States Department 
of Agriculture, 1972), 1-6; Richard H. Smith, “Benzene Hexachloride Controls Black Turpentine 
Beetle,” reprint from Southern Lumberman. 15 December 1954, Olustee Experiment Station 
Files, Georgia Agrirama, Tifton, GA, 1-2; R. H. Smith, “A Control forthe Black Turpentine 
Beetle in South Georgia and North Florida,” Research Notes (Asheville, NC: United States 
Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Southeastern Forest Experiment Station, 1955), I; 
Clements, Manual. 28; Kowal and Russell, “Beetles in Your Pines,” 7-8.
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plain attacked. The most severe outbreaks occurred after deficiencies in rain, the beetles first 
infecting the higher and dryer tracts and spreading to other pine stands from there. The pine 
beetle is the size of a grain o f rice and it attacks and kills healthy trees o f all ages. They attack in 
great numbers, boring through the bark, usually in the upper and middle portions of the trunk. 
They then tunnel through the soft layer o f inner bark, making S-shaped galleries along which 
they lay their eggs. The tiny larvae that hatch from these eggs feed on the inner bark until they 
are fully grown, a period of about two to three weeks. They then bore into the bark where they 
developed into new beetles that borrow out and fly away. Three to five generations may be 
produced in a year. By attacking in such large numbers, these beetles quickly destroy the 
cambium layer causing the trees rapid death. Often the blue stain fungi follows the pine beetle 
infestation, causing even more weakening o f  the tree.21
A v a r ie ty  of other insects made the weakened turpentine trees their home for breeding as 
well. The southern pine sawyer, a large, gray, molted beetle with very long feelers, lays eggs in 
small oval pits which it gnaws in the bark. Their eggs hatch into larvae which bore into the bark 
and through to the sapwood on which they feed. The larvae remain beneath the bark for about 
twenty days during which time they cause complete destruction o f the wood. The pitch moth has 
a similar breeding pattern. This small moth lays eggs along the edge of faces and when the eggs 
hatch the larvae bore into the tissue. Although frequently abundant, they cause little serious 
injury. However, in association with other insect infestations, they can contribute to the trees’ 
death. Damage from all these insects could be considerable, even if they did not directly kill the 
trees. The fungi that often accompanied them could cause considerable decay o f the wood above 
the face.22
21 Craighead, “Insects That Attack,” 4-5.
22 Ibid., 3,10; Schopmeyer and Maloy, “Dry Face,” 1.
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It is difficult to know precisely which insects plagued the mid-nineteenth-century North 
Carolina turpentine forest. Twentieth-century entomology and forestry research, however, 
provide clues as to what probably happened. Yet historians can only speculate because the 
contemporary observers’ limited knowledge of insects resulted in vague descriptions. In his 
Treatise on Turpentine, for example, G. W. Perry identifies a “black bug” as one such invading 
beetle. That he is describing some form of bark beetle is clear, but the insect that he discusses 
has attributes of turpentine borers, black turpentine beetles, and ips beetles. He explains that this 
black bug laid eggs which hatched into a “cutting worm,” that fed on the sapwood. He goes on 
to create such descriptive terminology for the worm as “Ramming worm, Laboring worm, or 
Forward-moving worm.” Clearly this “worm” is the larvae stage of the black bug, but Perry 
seems to consider it to be another species of insect. He also identified a “black worm,” 
apparently the larvae of another beetle that he believed “is caused by a black fly laying its eggs 
on the edge of a scar,” and a “straw worm,” which lives in the boughs of the tree on the green 
straw attacks pine trees. Perry admits that he is “not able to give the origin of this insect, but 
have no doubt, from the time of its appearance, that it is produced by some large fly.”23
An example of the devastation that insects could cause in turpentined forests occurred in 
the late 1840s. In 1848 both boxed and round pines in the eastern half of North Carolina began 
mysteriously and rapidly dying in great numbers. The greatest damage appears to have occurred 
below the Cape Fear, especially in Brunswick County. One timber owner there reportedly lost
130,000 tress, the task for about twelve hands. Another owner’s loss was estimated at an 
astonishing 750,000 pines. Symptoms of the blight also appeared in several counties to the 
north. That summer a traveler on the road from New Bern to Kinston and Waynesboro (probably 
Goldsboro) reported seeing tracts o f pine either dead or dying. The death of so many trees
23 Perry, Treatise on Turpentine Farming. 103-107.
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threatened the entire region’s economy. One writer in the Wilmington Journal wondered what 
the area would do if the problem continued. Many people “are in debt for turpentine land, and 
that, too, at a high price,” he explained. “Turpentine is the controlling commodity in this section, 
and regulates the price of everything else. Turpentine itself is very low—Turpentine land has 
already depreciated more than one-half, and everything else in proportion.” The Journal and 
other newspapers speculated about the cause of the trees’ death. The Mobile Herald attributed 
the blight to atmospheric conditions. The Tar boro Press thought it was caused by a bug which 
laid its eggs in the tops of pines. These bugs, the paper theorized, were attracted to the smoke of 
burning rosin which turpentine stills emitted, a theory that seemed logical to some because the 
decline o f the pine forests came on the heels of the increased number of small back-woods stills. 
When in July the pines around Wake Forest College, then located just north of Raleigh, began to 
succumb, Professor John D. White’s investigations found that two kinds of small bugs were the 
culprit. White observed that these beetles entered the bark by boring a small hole and tunneling 
between the inner bark and sapwood. The beetles small size, their ability to kill the trees quickly, 
and White’s claim to have identified two different varieties, seem to point more toward ips 
beetles as the cause. The problem apparently began in early 1848 when eastern North Carolina 
enjoyed a mild winter, which allowed the beetle to continue breeding. By the spring and summer 
of that year their numbers were huge and they began killing pines en masse These insects 
continued to thrive into the spring o f 1849 until the area suffered a freak snow storm. On April 
14 the temperature dipped and the next day sleet began falling. Within five or six hours the 
precipitation turned to snow which continued to fall into the night. Before daybreak the weather 
cleared and the next day the sun melted the snow, but the brief storm stopped the attack by 
reducing the number of adults and larvae. Still, for the year that the insect’s numbers had
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increased unchecked, tremendous tree loss resulted and as turpentining continued into the 
twentieth century infestations would reoccur with similarly disastrous consequences.24
By the beginning of the 1840s the damage to the turpentine forests, brought on by 
reduced tree vitality, structural weakening, dryface, and insects, was becoming clear. In 
northeastern North Carolina where naval stores production had continued the longest, the number 
of Iongleaf pines was declining.25 Fourteen miles outside o f Plymouth, North Carolina, on his 
way to New Bem, Ruffin observed that the pine trees were “deformed by being skinned for
extracting turpentine ”26 In 1843, William Cullen Bryant, a New York City editor and poet
traveling from Richmond, was astonished at the number o f boxes in North Carolina pines. “This 
is the work of destruction,” he reported, “it strips acre after acre of the noble trees, and, if it goes 
on, the time is not far distant when the long-leaved pine will become nearly extinct in this 
region.”27 William D. Valentine o f Oaklawn Plantation in Hertford County, apparently 
recognized the consequences o f excessive boxing. He not only warned against cutting too many 
boxes in a pine, but he also suggested chipping only every other year so the tree could “recover 
from the drain o f its fluid which is its blood.”28 No one, it appears, heeded his advice.
As the Iongleaf stands died from the effects o f turpentining, they failed to replace 
themselves. In 1840 Ruffin found that the pines around Wilmington had vanished. Although in 
this particular case the clearing was probably the result o f a demand for timber for fences,
24 Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861” 
(Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 261-270.
25 W. W. Ashe, The Forests. Forest Lands, and Forest Products of Eastern North Carolina 
(Raleigh: North Carolina Geological Survey, 1894), 18.
26 Ruffin, “Notes o f a Steam Journey,” 253.
27 Quoted from Jack Temple Kirby, Poquosin: A Study of Rural Landscape and Society 
(Chapel Hill: The University o f North Carolina Press, 1995), 32-33.
28 Ibid., 31,33.
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houses, and firewood, rather than from turpentining, the result gave an early indication of how 
removal of the Iongleaf pines could transform the region’s vegetation.29 The Iongleaf was not 
replaced by a second growth of more Iongleaf, but rather by what Ruffin described as an “almost 
unmixed growth of thickly set dwarfish ‘scrub’ oaks which rarely rose higher than six feet.”30 In 
other areas further inland, Ruffin found a second growth of shortleaf pine, but no Iongleaf. He 
recognized that turpentine production was the principal destroyer of the Iongleaf and explained 
that “where vicinity to market, or cheapness o f carriage, permits this business to be in full 
operation, it cannot last long, as the long leaf pines will be destroyed and will not be renewed. 
The other kinds o f pines are not worth working for the purpose.”31 In the more western reaches 
of the pine belt, John MacLeod of Johnson County observed, “where pines are destroyed by 
blasts, hurricanes, or turpentining, a growth o f oak, hickory, ect. arises in their stead, not a 
solitary instance of the Iongleaf.”32 Olmsted questioned whether there ever would be a revived 
growth of iongleaf given its slow growth and its apparent inability to reproduce itself. He 
reported that “when the original long-leafed pine has been destroyed, and the ground cultivated a 
few years, and then ‘turned out,’ a bastard variety springs up, which grows with rapidity, but is 
of no value for turpentine, and of but little for timber.”33 In 1855 yet another observer reported
29 Ruffin, “Notes o f a Steam Journey,” 245; Thomas D. Clark, The Greening of the 
South: The Recovery o f Land and Forest (Lexington: The University Press o f Kentucky, 1984),
143.
30 Ruffin, “Notes o f a Steam Journey,” 245.
31 Ibid., 250.
32 John MacLeod, “The Tar and Turpentine Business o f North Carolina,” Monthly 
Journal o f Agriculture 2 (July 1846): 13.
33 Olmsted, Joumev in the Seaboard Slave States. 346-347.
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that “from Rocky Mount to Wilmington (with now and then an exception to the rule) the country 
presents the appearance of a dreary desolate pine barren waste.”34
Longleaf pines failed to come back for two reasons, one of which contemporary 
observers understood. Hogs, Ruffin believed, were the primary reason for the slow-growing 
iongleaTs inability to reproduce itself. Hogs eagerly devoured the pine’s large cones, allowing 
few seeds to sprout into seedlings. For those that did escape and germinate, hogs posed a 
continued threat. Ruffin reported that “of the few that do sprout, scarcely any of the young trees 
survive the after attacks of the hogs, which root up the young trees, to eat the roots, even when 
the trees are several years old. Hogs ranging in the woods are quite fond of the tender roots, and 
the bark of the roots o f older trees, and live on this food principally in the winter and spring, after 
the pine seeds are consumed.”35 G. W. Perry likewise blamed hogs for eating the bark off the 
roots of saplings. Second, the absence of regular low-burning fires contributed to the longleaFs 
failed reemergence. As unwanted and neglected property, old and dying turpentine forests 
received little if any management such as yearly undergrowth firing, a practice that had originally 
created and sustained the southern Iongleaf forest by killing off competing species. Without fire, 
loblolly and shortleaf pines quickly shaded out any Iongleaf seedlings fortunate enough to escape 
the ravenous hogs. When abandoned turpentine forests burned by accident, the fires blazed so 
intensely they killed off all vegetation, including the young Iongleafs.36
The rise and decline of the Richlands Plantation turpentine business typifies the 
consequence of the Iongleafs destruction. Although turpentine was probably produced on the 
tract in Onslow County as early as the eighteenth century, it did not become the plantation’s
34 Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861” 
(Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 10.
35 Ruffin, “Notes of a Steam Journey,” 250.
36 Perry, Treatise on Turpentine Farming. 27.
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focus until John Avirett undertook it on a large scale in the 1840s. As turpentine prices climbed, 
so did Avirett’s output and profits until his annual income eventually reached $60,000. But 
Avirett failed to diversify his business, focusing his slaves’ energy on the plantation’s pine land, 
and did little to develop his agricultural operation. By the early 1850s the business’ exploitative 
harvesting practices began to take their toll on the Richlands forests. In 1850 Avirett first 
advertised the sale of the entire operation, even the 125 slaves who labored to make his naval 
stores, in North Carolina newspapers. Avirett even tried to divest himself of the 125 slaves who 
labored to make his naval stores. He found no buyers, however, and in 1857 Richlands failed, its 
pine forest destroyed. Deeply in debt, Avirett at last sold off all his property, including his 
distillery and even the family graveyard. By 1860 he was living in Goldsboro where he allegedly 
died in 1863 in either a poor house or an insane asylum. His son James, who was bom at 
Richlands in 1835 and was raised in the big house, received no inheritance with which to 
continue the family legacy. He became an Episcopal priest and served as chaplain under 
Stonewall Jackson’s chief cavalry officer.37 In his memoir of his youth at Richlands he 
postulated that “It would have been far better for the landed estates o f the South if the timber, 
especially the hardwood, had been more carefully guarded and economized.”38
As turpentining’s destruction of the North Carolina longleaf pine stands proceeded and it 
became more obvious that the industry could continue only for a limited time, many North 
Carolinians began to condemn turpentine production and emphasized the need to raise cotton 
instead. Whereas the area’s poor soils had earlier discouraged staple crop production, the
37 James Battle Avirett, The Old Plantation: How We Lived in Great House and Cabin 
Before the War (New York: F. Tennyson Neely Co., 1901), 26,69; David Cecelski, “The Rise 
and Fall of the Rich Lands,” Coastwatch (January/February 1997): 22-24; “Valuable Real Estate 
for Sale,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 16 August 1850; David S. Cecelski, “Oldest 
Living Confederate Chaplain Tells All?: Or, James B. Avirett and the Rise and Fall of the Rich 
Lands,” Southern Cultures 3 (Winter 1997): 21.
38 Avirett, Old Plantation. 29.
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introduction o f lime, manure, super phosphate, and guano fertilizers now made this shift to 
cotton cultivation feasible.39
The older turpentine region o f Edgecombe and Pitt Counties led the drift back to cotton. 
In Edgecombe County in the early 1850s cotton began to replace turpentine, a trend that 
continued into the late 1850s. The North Carolina Planter encouraged it with its report that 
“throughout the entire region hitherto devoted to the production of turpentine, cotton may be 
cultivated at great advantage. Even our sandy lands, aided by compost and other manures, 
produce it finely, and will give to planters a better remunerating crop than turpentine has ever 
done.”40 In 1853 one commentator, in a discussion on Edgecombe’s shift to cotton, called 
turpentining “that great curse to our state” which had seduced farmers with the promise o f great 
profits but proved “to be only a temporary resource.” “When this resource failed,” the writer 
continued, “they then, through necessity, turned their attention to the cultivation of their farms 
and began to look around to discover the advantages which where in their midst, but hitherto 
unobserved.”41 There was sound understanding that success would require patient labor and 
judicious manuring, but the eastern part of the state had little choice but to shift to cotton and 
com cultivation.42 In Pitt County, The North Carolina Planter reported in 1860, “cotton is manic 
here; larger plantations devoting most of their time and attention to it.” Planters believed that 
their crop that year would be larger than ever before.43
39 Percival Perry, “The Naval-Stores Industry in the Old South, 1790-1860,” The Journal 
of Southern History 34 (November 1968): 509; Richard C. Sheridan, “Chemical Fertilizers in 
Southern Agriculture,” Agricultural History 53 (January 1979): 308-309.
40 Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861” 
(Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 287.
41 Ibid., 286.
42 Ibid., 287.
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Southeastern North Carolinians also began to question their heavy reliance on turpentine 
production, But because the vast iongleaf stands were slower to disappear than the more sparsely 
growing stands in the old turpentine region, residents there were slow to make the shift to cotton 
planting. As early as 1848 a Duplin County farmer complained that farmers of that area placed 
too much emphasis on turpentining and not enough on agriculture. Because the strongest hands 
were used in turpentine production, he explained, farms had fallen into disrepair and producers 
had to buy com and pork because they no longer supplied their own food staples.44 Three years 
later the Fayetteville North Carolinian asked if “it were not better for our farmers in this 
neighborhood to turn their attention to raising stock and making com, and not devote so much 
time to getting turpentine.” Whereas in earlier years Fayetteville had supplied Wilmington with 
com and pork, now these supplies moved in the opposite direction, through Wilmington and into 
the of the Cape Fear Valley. Since the turpentine industry’s expansion the area’s importation of 
com and bacon had quadrupled.45 This decline in food production is reflected in one traveler’s 
report that “in passing over the railroad leading to your enterprising and flourishing town of 
Wilmington, the eye o f the planter is particularly struck with the absence o f all Agricultural 
improvements in its vicinity.”46 In 1853 a Beaufort County farmer advocated a shift to 
agriculture where the turpentine industry was in decline. He explained that “our means of 
transportation have greatly increased, but the resources that have been operated upon chiefly— 
namely: Naval Stores—are becoming very limited and used up, while those of agriculture and
43 “Cotton Growing in the Old North State,” The North-Carolina Planter 3 (August
1860): 263.
44 Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861” 
(Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 255.
45 Ibid., 256.
46 Ibid., 10.
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horticulture, the ones mostly to be relied on, have not been developed.”47 The Wilmington 
Journal agreed, arguing that “it is a great mistake that when once the turpentine falls we must fall 
too. It may be the best thing for us when staple agriculture is substituted for a dependence upon 
the products of the forest.”48 In 1854 the Farmer’s Journal urged that North Carolinians explore 
available land opportunities in their own state before giving up and moving to South Carolina 
and Georgia in pursuit of fresh turpentine orchards.49
Little advancement in southeastern North Carolina agriculture resulted from this 
encouragement and by the late 1850s area agricultural organizations took up the cause. In 
November 1858, William A. Allen addressed the Duplin Agricultural Society on that county’s 
need to concentrate on agriculture. He spoke on the need for improved agricultural methods: 
proper drainage and fertilizing. That Duplin lacked the agricultural development that 
Edgecombe County enjoyed was because its citizens paid too much attention to turpentining and 
not enough to their farms. He was “fully persuaded that if there never had been a barrel of 
turpentine made in the county, the people would have been better off, and the county would to­
day have been recognized . . .  as perhaps the richest agricultural county in North Carolina .”50
The editor of the Wilmington Journal, who was in audience, agreed with Allen that the Cape 
Fear counties required “the devotion of a larger degree of attention to the cultivation of the soil, 
and a loss reliance upon mere products o f the forest—naval stores and lumber—since agriculture is 
reliable, progressive, self-sustaining, while the other business which had at one time usurped its
47 Quoted from Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 
1789-1861” (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 278.
48 Ibid., 291.
49 Quoted from Ibid., 278-279.
50 Ibid., 288.
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place is necessarily exhausting and inevitably tends to work itself out.”51 In Onslow County, 
where agriculture was of only moderate importance, a group of farmers in 18S9 organized an 
agricultural society, hoping “to create a spirit o f  improvement among the farmers . . .  and that 
better crops may be made thereby.” The organizers aspired for Onslow to become more o f a 
farming county. That it was not, they believed was because “we make Naval Stores extensively, 
thereby neglecting the more important o f all the farming interest by omitting to properly fertilize 
and improve the soil.”52 That same year a Brunswick County farmer believed that the area had 
reached a crossroads. “This county heretofore has been almost exclusively engaged in getting 
timber, lumber, and Naval stores for market,” he explained, “but now, all the choice timbered 
and lumber making growth within reach o f market, is gone, turpentine trees worked up, and our 
citizens must either move off to a fresh country or turn their attention to agriculture.” He hoped 
they would choose the latter. The soil was poor, he admitted, but the available abundance o f 
lime from oyster shells and marl could enrich the earth enough to support agriculture.53 Yet 
despite such encouragement, cotton cultivation increased only slightly in the southeastern 
counties. Although it was clear by October 1860 that North Carolina's cotton crop that year 
would be larger than ever before, most o f the production coming from the northeastern counties 
while excitement over turpentine continued in those to the southeast. In 18S9 naval stores 
exports from Wilmington reached their highest level ever.54
51 Ibid.
52 “Organizing an Agricultural Society in Onslow County,” The North-Carolina Planter 2 
(October 1859): 311.
53 Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861” 
(Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 292.
54 “Cotton Crop in North Carolina,” The North-Carolina Planter 3 (October 1860): 320; 
Sam Bowers Hilliard, Atlas o f  Antebellum Southern Agriculture (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1984), 71; Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum 
South, 1789-1861” (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 291.
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While some producers looked for new pine land, others turned to cotton. Evidence 
suggests that producers who concentrated almost exclusively on turpentine production and only 
in a small way on agriculture were more likely to remain in the business by moving South. Both 
Benjamin Williams and James R. Grist engaged in little if any crop cultivation in North Carolina 
and largely avoided it once they moved to Georgia and Alabama respectively. Slightly less than 
half of turpentine operations appear to have included as much as two hundred acres o f farmable 
land. Although most such cultivated plots grew mostly grain crops in the 1840s and 1850s, 
fertilizer applications could have enabled cotton production on them by the 1850s, providing 
turpentiners whose exhausted forests yielded small returns with an alternative staple commodity. 
As in John Avirett’s case, producers who refused to move to the fresh pine tracts further south 
but remained so dedicated to turpentine that they failed to shift to agriculture, faced almost 
certain financial ruin. Few North Carolina operators appear to have possessed Avirett’s 
dedication to both place and the turpentine business. Small producers with less capital invested 
in specially trained slaves and stills commonly opted to remain in the state and switch their 
efforts to cotton cultivation. Large producers, whose financial dedication to naval stores 
prevented such flexibility typically chose to move south, demonstrating the same relative 
disregard for community and the land as the plantation cotton farmers who between the 1830s 
and 1850s moved from their exhausted fields in the East to the black belt and Mississippi Delta. 
One observer of the naval stores industry has argued that “turpentine represented the extensive 
and exhausting practices that had long characterized use of southern land. Like tobacco in 
Virginia in the seventeenth century and indigo in South Carolina during the eighteenth century, 
turpentining stood for the maximum exploitation of land and labor in the short run.”5S
55 G. Terry Sharrer, “Naval Stores, 1781-1881,” in Material Culture of the Wooden Age. 
ed. Brooke Hindle (Tarrytown, NY: Sleepy Hollow Press, 1981), 260.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
188
North Carolina producers who wished to remain in the business began buying virgin pine 
forests in states to the south and moving their slaves, who were already familiar with turpentining 
practices, there to begin production.56 In fact North Carolinians were responsible for much of the 
industry’s antebellum expansion into other southern states. Immigrant producers possessed the 
experience in this unique industry that the natives of other pine-rich states lacked. One 
Wilmington man doubted that anyone without practical experience could make a success of 
turpentining. He advised that if “you have any idea of going into the business, you had better 
employ a young man from North Carolina to superintend for you the first year; at least one 
accustomed to the business, who can put your hands in the way of making, coopering, &c.”S7
A state-by-state analysis reveals that South Carolina, Georgia, and Alabama attracted the 
most North Carolina turpentine producers, however Florida, Louisiana, and Mississippi lured a 
few. As early as 1840 production began to increase in the Palmetto State, largely as a result of 
North Carolina producers drifting across the border in search of fresh pine land (fig. 4.1). That 
year South Carolina manufactured only 73S barrels o f tar, pitch, turpentine, and rosin combined. 
The early activity in South Carolina essentially represented an extension o f that in its northern 
neighbor, the product being made by North Carolinians who marketed it mainly through
56 Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861” 
(Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 276
57 Dugall McMillan to Southern Cultivator. 14 April 1846, Southern Cultivator 4 
(November 1846): 122, 172.
Figure 4.1: United States Department of State, Compendium o f the Enumeration of the 
Inhabitants and Statistics of the United States as Obtained at the Department of State. From the 
Returns of the Sixth Census. 1840 (Washington. DC: 1841), 158, 170, 182, 194,206,218,230, 
242, 254, 266, 338.
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Wilmington, especially after completion of the Manchester Railroad.58 Agricultural journals of 
the day assured them of the South Carolina pines’ productivity. An 1846 Monthly Journal o f  
Agriculture article reported that “very recently several enterprising individuals have engaged in 
this business in South Carolina.” The writer was confident that turpentine “will add considerably 
to the other resources of the State.”59 He assured consumers and potential producers that pines of 
South Carolina differed in no way from those found in North Carolina and yielded resin in equal 
abundance. De Bow’s Review agreed, reporting that “travelers through the middle and lower 
districts of the State, agree in pronouncing the pine forests o f these sections as well adapted as 
those of North Carolina for the manufacture of turpentine.”60 Such claims apparently convinced 
some North Carolinians. While traveling through South Carolina in the 1850s, Olmsted reported 
that North Carolinians had been working turpentined trees there for several years.61 Shortly after 
the Civil War, Whitelaw Reid, too, reported that “turpentine growers have for many years been 
abandoning” North Carolina’s depleted forests “for the more productive forests of upper South 
Carolina.”62
58 Martin, “Historical and Analytical Approach,” 74; Percival Perry, “The Naval-Stores 
Industry in the Old South, 1790-1860,” The Journal of Southern History 34 (November 1968): 
522; Jeffrey R. Dobson and Roy Doyon, “Expansion o f the Pine Oleoresin Industry in Georgia: 
1842 to CA. 1900,” West Georgia College Studies in the Social Sciences 18 (June 1979): 44; 
Compendium o f the Enumeration of the Inhabitants and Statistics of the United States. Sixth 
Census (Washington DC: Department of State, 1841), 194.
59 “Notes on the Long-Leafed Pine,” The Monthly Journal of Agriculture 2 (July 1846):
12-13.
60 “The Manufacture of Turpentine in the South,” De Bow’s Review 8 (May 1850): 451.
61 Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861” 
(Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), p. 277.
62 Whitelaw Reid, After the Wan A Tour of the Southern States. 1865-1866 (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1965), 28.
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From the late 1840s to 1860, South Carolina’s naval stores industry grew steadily (figs. 
4.2,4.3,4.4, and 4.S). By 1848 Charleston had a turpentine distillery with a one-hundred-barrel 
per day capacity and plans were underway to double the facility. In the late 1840s, Robert I. 
Hyslop moved from North Carolina to South Carolina and began teaching people in the Barnwell 
district how to make turpentine. In 1849 one producer whom he had instructed reportedly netted 
$398.84 with the help of just one hand. Another man in Ridgeville, South Carolina, about thirty- 
five miles northwest of Charleston, made $3000 from the work o f forty hands who together 
dipped 5000 barrels o f turpentine. At the time turpentine prices were relatively low at $2 per 
barrel. By at least the early 1850s one S. T. Cooper operated a large thirteen-crop operation 
along Black Mingo Creek in the Georgetown, South Carolina area.63 In some areas of South 
Carolina the industry drove up land prices. “In the vicinity of Orangeburg,” The Commercial 
Review reported in 1850, “the range is from $1.50 to $5, Many o f  the neighboring planters have 
embarked in the business, and at present it is difficult to obtain suitable locations.”64 However, 
affordable pine land was still available in other areas. Near Summerville, a village twenty-two 
miles northwest o f  Charleston, pine land had sold for as low as seventy-five cents to a dollar and 
in a couple of instances fifty cents per acre.6S In the lower part o f  Barnwell, Colleton, and 
Charleston districts good land sold for from fifty cents to two dollars per acre. The Edisto River
63 Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861” 
(Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 273-274; “Great Yield of Turpentine,” Wilmington. North 
Carolina Chronicle. 9 May 1849; “The Manufacture o f Turpentine in the South,” 454; “A 
Turpentine Farm for Sale or Rent,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 29 August 1856.
64 “The Manufacture of Turpentine in the South,” 452.
65 Ibid.
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Figure 4.2. Barrels of Tar, Pitch, Turpentine, and Rosin Produced, Southeastern United States, 
1840
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Figure 4.4. Number o f Naval Stores Establishments by State, Southeastern United States, 18S0 
and 1860
United States Department o f the Interior Abstract of the Statistics of Manufactures. Accordine to 
the Returns of the Seventh Census (Washington, DC, 1850), 116; United States Department of 
the Interior Manufactures of the United States in 1860 (Washington. DC: 1865), 2-14, 57-82, 
168-204, 285-294,420-438, 552-579; For figures related to chart see Appendix B.
ran through the region providing water transportation to the coast. Also, the South Carolina 
Railroad ran through the center of the region, crossing the Edisto at Branchville in Orangeburg 
County.66 By 1855, a distillery operated at Reevesville, beside the South Carolina Railroad, 
fifty-two miles northwest of Charleston. At that time 150,000 to 180,000 boxes were worked in
66 Ibid.
Figure 4.5: United States Department o f the Interior, Manufactures o f the United States 
in 1860 (Washington. DC: 1865), 2-14, 57-82, 168-204, 285-294,420-438, 552-579.
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the area.67 A North Carolina producer found that the South Carolina lands, as well as those in 
Georgia, offered the best opportunities for turpentine production of any “region of the world.” 
“The trees,” he believed, “in many sections, are so numerous as to be almost inexhaustible, and 
the yield, both in respect to quantity and quality, equal to any he ever found in the best regions of 
North Carolina. The location of these lands, in the immediate vicinity o f railroads, navigable 
streams and sea-port markets, offers the best facilities of transportation and ready sales.”68 With 
these advantages South Carolina’s naval stores industry grew at a fierce pace during the 1850s. 
The number of turpentine operations more than doubled, from forty in 1850 to ninety-five in 
1860. Even more dramatic, the capital invested in these businesses jumped fourteen times; the 
number of hands grew six times, from 220 to 1359; and the product value increased 450 percent 
from $235,836 to $1,076,725 69
In the late 1840s and early 1850s turpentining also began along the Savannah and 
Altamaha Rivers in Georgia. The first producers appear to have been mostly young, single, 
native Georgians who began operation on a modest scale. In 1850, 14 producers manufactured 
turpentine in Georgia with the aid of a total of 202 laborers (figs. 4.4 and 4.6). Of the eight 
producers that historians Jeffrey R. Dobson and Roy Doyon discovered in the 1850 census, five 
were slaveholders with a combined holding o f fifty-six male slaves. Six worked in Camden 
County, which then included most of present day Charlton County, in the extreme southeastern 
comer of the state. McIntosh and Wayne Counties, each straddling opposite sides o f the 
Altamaha River, had one producer each. That year Georgia produced an estimated 28,000
67 “Notice.^ Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 21 March 1856.
68 “The Manufacture of Turpentine in the South,” 454.
69 Abstract o f the Statistics of Manufactures. According to the Returns of the Seventh 
Census (Washington, DC: Department of the Interior, 1858), 116; Manufactures of the United 
States in 1860 (Washington. DC: Department o f the Interior, 1865), 559.
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barrels of turpentine and distilling increased as well. Savannah had a large distillery, and 
throughout the state there were ten distilleries either erected or ordered and seven to eight new 
producers were thought to have entered the business.70 In 1850 De Bow’s Review reported that
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Figure 4.6. Number of Hands Employed in Naval Stores Production, Southeastern United States, 
1850 and 1860
United States Department of the Interior Abstract o f the Statistics o f  Manufactures. According to 
the Returns of the Seventh Census (Washington. DC, 1850), 116; United States Department of 
the Interior Manufactures of the United States in 1860 (Washington. DC: 1865), 2-14, 57-82,
168-204, 285-294,420-438, 552-579; For figures related to chart see Appendix B.
“if its production goes on increasing, for a few years longer, as rapidly as during the last year or 
two past, it will not take long to transfer the general head quarters o f  the turpentine trade from
70 Percival Perry, “The Naval-Stores Industry in the Old South, 1790-1860,” The Journal 
of Southern History 34 (November 1968): 522; Dobson and Doyon, “Expansion of the Pine 
Oleoresin Industry,” 45,47; Abstract of the Statistics o f Manufactures. According to the Returns 
of the Seventh Census. 116; “Turpentine Business in Georgia,” De Bow’s Southern and Western 
Review 9 (July 1850): 119.
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North Carolina to Georgia. So far as we are informed, most o f  those who entered upon the 
business of producing turpentine in Georgia, have had as good success as could reasonably be 
expected.”71 However, despite these increases and the claims made by boosters, in 18S0 
Georgia’s turpentine industry was of relatively little significance, contributing only $55,000 to 
the state’s $7,000,000 gross manufacturing product.72
Yet conditions were right for the industry’s expansion, mainly due to the immigration of 
North Carolinians to Georgia’s pine belt during the 1850s. Hundreds o f thousands of the finest 
longleaf pine acreage remained available. As one 1849 advertisement explained in Georgia 
“companies engaged in the Lumber and Turpentine business will, upon examination, find the 
above Lands much more favorably located than any in the [other] Southern States, being in such 
large bodies and accessible to market by navigable streams.”73 The tracts were enormous.
10,000 acres were offered in Camden County, 87,000 acres in Ware County, and a contiguous 
tract of 72,000 acres in Wayne County. An 18,000-acre pine tract on the Satilla River in Ware 
County promised to “be sold cheap” in 1850. By the late 1850s demand for Georgia pine and 
improved access to it made the lands of southeastern Georgia marketable. The Georgia Land 
Agency of Macon began selling off parcels o f 150,000 acres which it owned in the Satilla River 
basin. The land company had received the titles from the state in 1850, a period when except for 
transportation up the river, there was no access to the region and very little was even known 
about it.74 Promotional literature explained that it was said to be “the ONLY UNCULLED PINE
71 “Turpentine Business in Georgia,” 118.
72 Ibid., 119; Dobson and Doyon, “Expansion of the Pine Oleoresin Industry,” 47.
73 “To Lumber and Turpentine Companies,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 7 
September 1849.
74 Ibid.; “ 18,000 Acres Turpentine Land for Sale,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal.
28 June 1850; James R. Butts, 150.000 Acres Yellow Pine Timber. Turpentine and Cotton Lands 
(Macon: Georgia Land Agency, 1858), 3.
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FOREST NOW EXISTING IN THE ATLANTIC WATERS, that is situated convenient for river 
carriage.75 During the 1850s railroad lines extended into the region from Brunswick and 
Savannah improved access. Making the land even more attractive was its low tax, 7.50 an $100 
value.76
During the decade, North Carolina producers continued to move to the region. One 
Richard Cogdall left North Carolina because the pines there were exhausted and established a 
new turpentine operation on the Altamaha River, ten miles above the town of Davis. He was one 
of five or six North Carolinians to have purchased land in the area and begun operations. The 
combined harvest of these producers was expected to yield 10,000 to 12,000 barrels. As 
producers steadily expanded into Georgia between 1850 and 1860, the industry grew. The 
combined capital o f naval stores producers rose from $110,000 to about $200,000 in 1860 and 
although the number o f operations decreased from fourteen to thirteen, the number of wage 
earners rose from 202 to 307, indicating the operations were growing larger in size (figs. 4.4 and 
4.6). The product value, however, experienced a remarkable rise. It appears that high 
productivity and a concentration on distilled spirits over raw gum caused the value of 
manufactured turpentine to jump over four hundred percent from $55,068 to $236,111. Yet 
despite the turpentine industry’s advancements, by 1860 Georgia’s wiregrass region remained 
relatively undeveloped. The area lacked a deeply rooted planter class, most o f the sparse 
population consisting o f yeoman farmers and livestock herders.77
"Butts, 150.000 Acres. 13.
76 Ibid., 13.
77 The move to Georgia was difficult and expensive and thus not feasible for all who 
wished to make the move. In 1853 W. H. Turlington wrote from Wilmington to his brother 
explaining that “I expect to try this place a while longer though if I had money I would go to 
Georgia and make and distill turpentine.” W. H. Turlington to A. J. Turlington, 11 December 
1853, A. J. Turlington Papers, Special Collections Library, Duke University; Percival Perry,
“The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861” (Ph.D. diss., Duke University,
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Dr. Benjamin Williams, a producer from Greene County, North Carolina, illustrates the 
process of moving from the older turpentine region and establishing themselves in Georgia where 
they could take advantage o f the abundant pine forests. In January 1855 in preparation for the 
move, Williams sold o ff253.5 acres of farm land and the remainder of his pine land. As the 
turpentine season for that year concluded in November, he hurried to complete the harvest and 
begin the move with his wife to Charlton County, Georgia, located in the extreme southeastern 
comer of the state and covered largely by the Okefenokee Swamp. By November L858 his new 
Georgia operation, which he apparently shared with a partner, was going well. With relief his 
wife reported that “we are now out of debt, + in the Turpentine business[.] they are able to pay 
for their land, their still, their wagons + mules + the hire of their hands, + have about ($3000) 
three thousand to divide.” Not only that, but Williams had purchased some land in Ware County, 
the adjacent county, and possibly part of the tract offered by the Georgia Land Agency. This 
490-acre parcel, which cost $1,000, slightly more than $2 per acre, reportedly contained beautiful 
pine timbers and was conveniently located by the Albany and Gulf Railroad, which passed 
through one comer of it. Moreover, because it appeared healthier and relatively convenient to 
Savannah, which was about a four or five hour ride away, it promised to make a more appealing 
home than theirs at Burnt Fort in Charlton County. By September 1859, Williams had purchased 
property at St. Johns Bluff, Florida. Here there were “about six thousand young fruit trees of 
different kinds, which have been carefully selected from the best nurseries, and a good dwelling 
house, which cost $5000.00 when built twenty years since.” He desired to live there if it were 
not so distant from his concerns in Georgia.
1947), 277; Dobson and Doyon, “Expansion o f the Pine Oleoresin Industry,” 47; Abstract of the 
Statistics of Manufactures. According to the Returns of the Seventh Census. 116; Manufactures 
of the United States in 1860. 82; Mark V. Wetherington, The New South Comes to Wiregrass 
Georgia. 1860-1910 (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 1994), 28-30.
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Williams was by this time selling timber along with producing turpentine, and he 
continued to plan a move to Ware County. Not only was transportation better there, but he 
believed the fresh trees yielded gum capable of make high-grade rosin. He felt that he could 
make better rosin at the new location at transportation was better. He hoped to divest himself of 
the Charlton County operation, which he anticipated he could sell for more than it cost him when 
he began it two years earlier. Within a month and a half later, Williams found a prime tract of
3,000 acres in Ware County on the Satilla River. The Albany and Gulf Railroad ran through it, 
just as it did the 490-acre parcel he purchased the year before, and the nearest depot and post 
office were only two and a half miles away. He planned to erect a still beside the railroad and 
already had a distiller, overseer, and between thirty and thirty-five slaves ready to be sent to the 
location. By January Williams had forty-five hands, who came from Virginia, North Carolina, 
and Georgia, at work in Ware County and he and his partner, a Mr. Becker, were working thirty- 
five hands at the old operation in Charlton County, which he had not yet sold. Around this time, 
Williams’ acquaintances from North Carolina also moved to the area; one purchased a cotton 
plantation for $10,000 farther up the railroad line and another purchased a turpentine operation 
thirty miles below Williams on the same line. Later that winter, Williams oversaw the 
construction of his still in Ware County and set out four or five hundred fruit trees that he 
ordered from a nursery in Savannah. In late May the new Ware County operation produced 
turpentine and the still was up and running. Williams also began shipping timber to New York. 
As the turpentine harvesting season continued in the fall of 1860, Williams rushed to complete 
the house in Ware County that he had been planning for some years. He had just recently sold 
his Chariton County place, and his wife busily packed their belongings for the move. By early 
December the Williams were finally living in Ware County. Ben’s patient wife reported that 
they were “living in the kitchen and the house is going up slowly, but I had rather wait longer & 
have it more convenient.” The acquisitive doctor had recently purchased yet more land, five
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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hundred acres, at the point where the Savannah, Albany, and Gulf Railroad and the Brunswick 
and Florida Railroad intersected. His wife explained that “he considers it a  good investment.” 
“You see,” she wrote her parents from Georgia, “the Dr believes in negroes + pine land.” 
Benjamin Williams’ case shows how some producers, determined to remain in the turpentine 
business, were willing to sell their entire North Carolina holdings and begin anew hundreds of 
miles away in another state. As with Williams, it was not uncommon for turpentiners to 
purchase different parcels o f  land scattered across several counties, usually near a transportation 
source, run separate operations on them, or to enter a related business such as timber cutting.78
Turpentining probably began in Alabama in the late 1840s, most likely in the Mobile 
vicinity. One Col. R. D. Jones o f Clarke County, due north o f Mobile and serviced by the 
Alabama River on its east side and the Tombigbee on its west, reportedly began experimenting 
with turpentine in 1847. The area not only offered high quality pine land, but excellent river 
access to the port at Mobile. A North Carolina producer interested in starting an operation there 
received a very favorable report from Mobile that “there is plenty plenty of Pine Land in the 
whole South as well Adapted to the making of Turp as the finest sections are in the Old North 
State and as far as I can judge it can be got to market equally as cheap as the charges are at 
present on the Will Rroad.” The writer believed that “the freights on the River are very low + 
from here to N York not ‘on an average’ over 20 pr ct higher from Wilmington.”79 In 1849 an 
article in the Mobile Planter argued that operators could start with twelve hands and produce 
$4,857 per year, within three years he could increase production and make $18,920 with thirty-
78 Sarah Hicks Williams to Parents, 21 January 1855,26 November 1855, 16 January 
1858,23 November 1858, 7 November 1859, 18 January 1860, 11 March 1860,21 October I860, 
6 December 1860, Benjamin F. Williams to Samuel Hicks, 25 September 1859,31 May 1860, 
Sarah Hicks Williams Papers, Southern Historical Collection, The University o f North Carolina 
at Chapel Hill.
79 S. H. Gaines to Grist, 23 March 1854, James Redding Grist Papers, Special 
Collections Library, Duke University.
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eight hands. For a planter to make the same profit, cotton would have to sell at 250; it then 
brought somewhere between 110 and 120.*°
In December 1854 turpentine producers met in Mobile to discuss ways to encourage the 
industry. A report offered at the meeting claimed that Alabama yielded 1,060,000 gallons of 
turpentine and 130,000 barrels o f rosin worth $750,000. $2,000,000 of capital was invested in its 
production. At the same convention a Mr. Price estimated “that with the same rates o f increase 
for the next five years, it will amount to the sum of many millions of dollars, provided the
inducements and encouragement can be afforded ”81 Price assured his fellow conventioneers
of the favorable profits “o f naval stores over that of cotton.” “The region’s forest resources,” he 
explained, remained “uncultivated, and utterly worthless in a pecuniary point of view, both to the 
general government and the State.” His report centered on the increased volume of business the 
turpentine industry could give to Mobile factorage houses and merchants over cotton. Whereas 
the average slave could produce four bales o f cotton per year from which receivers in Mobile 
realized $10, the average turpentine laborer would produce 170 barrels o f  rosin and 30 casks of 
spirits from which the city would make $87.50 in wharfage, drayage, storage, insurance, 
cooperage, and commissions, $45 on the spirits and $42.50 on the rosin. Profits for railroads, it 
was predicted, would be as great; $6 for transporting four bales of cotton, but $73.50 for 
transporting 170 barrels o f  rosin at 300 each and 30 casks of spirits at 750 each. Moreover, Price 
predicted, “the laborer in turpentine will consume of the merchandise o f Mobile, to an amount 
equivalent to five hands engaged in cotton, from the fact that his occupation precludes the
80 “The Southern Pine Forest—Turpentine,” De Bow’s Review 18 (February 1855): 188; 
Percival Perry, “The Naval-Stores Industry in the Old South, 1790-1860,” The Journal of 
Southern History 34 (November 1968): 523; “Production of Turpentine in Alabama,” De Bow’s 
Review 7 (December 1849): 560-562.
81 “The Southern Pine Forests—Turpentine,” 189.
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possibility of his producing any of the necessaries of life.”*2 The convening producers were 
justifiably excited about their industry’s prospects. Between 1850 and 1860 the number of 
turpentine-making establishments grew from 4 to 37 (fig. 4.4). The rise in the number o f 
laborers and production value indicate that and the average size of operations doubled. In 1850 
33 workers labored in turpentine. By I860 that number had risen to 614, a more than eighteen 
hundred percent increase (fig. 4.6). The value of turpentine produced jumped thirty-six times, 
from $17,800 to over $642,000 (fig. 4 J ) .83
James R. Grist’s turpentine operation well represents the industry’s spread from North 
Carolina into the deep South. Grist entered the turpentine business with his father in the older 
turpentine region of Beaufort County, North Carolina. When the demand for turpentine grew, he 
purchased 6000 acres of pine land in Brunswick County, south of the Cape Fear River. When he 
had exploited that tract, he moved up the Cape Fear, but with the completion of the Wilmington 
to Manchester Railroad in 1853, he once again moved south of the Cape Fear, to a place in 
Columbus County. However, by the mid 1850s the unexploited pine tracts which had brought 
Grist his fortune had grown increasingly limited; he was forced to search elsewhere for pine 
acreage to maintain his business. In 1854 he received a  favorable report on the opportunities for 
turpentine in Alabama, and four years later he sent his cousin Benjamin Grist, who had managed 
one of his North Carolina plantations, to open a new operation on the Fish River in the Mobile 
Bay area. With the labor o f around one hundred slaves, the Alabama operation in the 1859-60 
season yielded 26,337 barrels of crude turpentine from which was distilled 3020 barrels o f spirits 
and 15,118 barrels of rosin, producing gross revenues o f  more than $70,000.**
82 Ibid., 188-191.
83 Abstract of the Statistics o f Manufactures. According to the Returns of the Seventh 
Census. 116; Manufactures of the United States in 1860. 14.
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Although the Florida turpentine industry reemerged at about the same time that it picked 
up in Georgia, the Sunshine State attracted few producers like Williams or Grist. In 1847 
seventy barrels o f turpentine produced near Pilatka, Florida, reached Jacksonville for export. It 
was believed to be the first to be collected in Florida since it had become part of the United 
States in 1819. One year later, thirty pounds of Florida tar were shipped to the Savannah 
market.85 By 1851 it was “no longer a matter o f doubt that Turpentine can be profitably made in 
this section of country, as there are already a number o f persons largely and successfully engaged 
in the business.”86 Yet production did not gain the momentum that industry boosters hoped. One 
complained that Florida “is exporting considerable lumber and turpentine; but where one is 
engaged in either o f these branches of business, there should be at least twenty.”87 Not only did 
Florida possess an abundance of good pine timber, but easy access to the coast. In order to 
increase turpentine and rosin production, De Bow’s Review argued that “we need only look to an 
accession of laborers in this productive field, for it to become a most valuable and important 
resource of the state.”88 More workers, however, were difficult to come by in the sparsely 
populated and underdeveloped state. A plantation economy based on cotton and tobacco existed 
in some areas of Florida. However, significant areas o f the state, especially the piney woods 
region, saw little plantation activity. For example, in 1860 St. Johns County, which possessed an 
abundance of longieaf pines, had only three plantations with more than thirty slaves; small 
planters and subsistence farmers dominated the area. But despite this obstacle, timber and
84 Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861” 
(Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 95, 523.
85 Ibid., 273.
86 “ 12,000 Acres o f Turpentine Land for Sale,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 10 
January 1851.
87 “Florida,” De Bow’s Southern and Western Review 10 (April 1851): 411.
88 Ibid., 412.
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turpentine did grow in importance in the region, stimulated by cheap and abundant pine land.89 
In 1851 an attractive 12,000-acre tract reportedly “peculiarly adapted to the Turpentine business, 
being covered with a  thick growth of pine, and having a River front of more than five miles” 
came up for sale on the St. Johns River.90 Throughout the 1850s land in this region remained 
relatively cheap, selling for between $1 and $1.25 per acre. By the mid 1850s, a 50,000-box 
operation was located on 1,200 acres south o f Tallahassee on the St. Marks River. Such a 
relatively large-size operation was typical o f the few Florida turpentine businesses of the time. 
Although only five concerns operated in both 1850 and 1860, over the decade their size grew 
from an average capitalization of $5600 to $28,200 (fig. 4.4). The total number of laborers also 
increased five hundred percent, from 82 to 127, and their production value jumped nearly three 
and a half times, from $29,671 to $100,676 (figs. 4.6 and 4.3 ).91
In Mississippi and Louisiana the naval stores industry developed even more slowly.
Peter Hammond, for whom Hammond, Louisiana was named, began producing these 
commodities soon after arriving in the state from his native Sweden around 1820. He purchased 
land from the government in the piney woods region of present day Hammond for a few cents an 
acre. The tar, pitch, and turpentine that he produced had to be hauled to Springfield, Louisiana, a 
town about five miles southwest of Hammond with river access to Lake Maurepas, and from 
there shipped to New Orleans. He reportedly prospered from his naval stores operation. Few 
producers joined Hammond in naval stores manufacturing. Both the 1850 and 1860 Census list
89 Historic Properties Survey of St. Johns Countv (St. Augustine, FL: Historic St. 
Augustine Preservation Board, 1985), 31.
90 “ 12,000 Acres o f Turpentine Land for Sale.”
91 Felix Livingston to Alex MacRae, 21 January 1850 and 5 September 1859, Hugh 
MacRae Papers, Special Collections Library, Duke University; “Turpentine Lands in Florida For 
Sale,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 21 March 1856; Abstract of the Statistics of 
Manufactures. According to the Returns o f the Seventh Census. 116; Manufactures of the United 
States in 1860. 60.
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only one Louisiana turpentiner. In 1842, Fairfax Washington, a North Carolina naval stores 
operator, tapped trees in Mississippi. By the late 1840s several distilleries operated along the 
gulf coast area, one relatively large facility built a few miles above the mouth of the Pearl River 
by Nathaniel Mitchell in 1847. But in 1849 his business failed, in part because Mitchell and his 
manager argued and eventually fought a duel. By 18S0 naval stores were produced in all three of 
Mississippi’s coastal counties. One distillery in Jackson County sat on a bluff high above the 
Pascagoula River. A rail track ran from the bluff to a landing on the river, and a hand wench was 
used to lower the turpentine and rosin to it. However, between 1850 and 1860 the number of 
operations actually dropped from five to just one. Correspondingly, the number o f laborers fell 
from thirty-three to four and the product value tumbled from $19,680 to $1,700. Several 
handicaps help explain the turpentine industry’s slow beginning in southern Mississippi and 
Louisiana. Few North Carolina producers and their slaves moved to the area, and the native 
slaves, accustomed to agricultural labor, where completely lacked turpentining skills. Would be 
producers also found it difficult to acquire capital since they had to compete for resources with 
the lumbering industry, which was growing important in the region during the years before the 
Civil War.92
By the Civil War, destructive harvesting practices had pushed a portion of the turpentine 
industry out o f North Carolina and into states further south. Boxing and chipping seriously 
weakened the trees’ bases and left them vulnerable to decay and dryface. Fire badly scorched the 
flammable faces and boxes, especially in abandoned stands where hardened gum coated the old 
wounds and flammable debris carpeted the forest floor. Pines, weakened in these various ways,
92 Isabel Nelson Lovel, “Hammond, Louisiana, and Its Swedish Founder,” The Swedish 
Pioneer Historical Quarterly n.s. 4 (1967): 221-222; Abstract o f the Statistics of Manufactures. 
According to the Returns of the Seventh Census. 116; Manufactures o f the United States in 1860. 
203, 294; Nollie Hickman, Mississippi Harvest: Lumbering in the Longleaf Pine Belt 1840-1915 
(University: The University o f Mississippi, 1962), 127-129.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
207
were left susceptible to insects which invaded the tree’s bark and sapwood, nibbling at the live 
wood until too little was left to support the tree. As North Carolina’s longleaf pines yielded to 
windfall, rotting, fire, insects, and wild hogs, a cessation o f regular burning in used up tracts 
prevented a regeneration o f this once expansive forest. As the pines disappeared, many North 
Carolinians turned against the turpentine industry and switched to agricultural production which 
new fertilizers made possible in the eastern counties’ sandy and infertile land. Other producers, 
determined to continue in the business, purchased fresh pine tracts in South Carolina, Georgia, 
Florida, and Alabama. To these new locations such men as Benjamin Williams and James R. 
Grist moved their slaves and continued the same destructive harvesting practices that had forced 
them from North Carolina. After the Civil War this southward migration continued.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter Five
North Carolinians on the Move:
The Turpentine Industry’s Continued Migration Southward
The naval stores industry quickly recovered after the Civil War as producers rushed to 
take advantage of high prices. With the revival, North Carolina operators continued their 
southward movement in search of unexploited timber stands in Georgia and Florida. Railroad 
expansion in these states made more and more fresh timber land accessible just as stands 
previously available to turpentiners deteriorated from the destructive harvesting practices. 
However, unlike their situation in the antebellum years when forest lands were plentiful, 
producers now had to complete for timber with large, well-financed lumber companies. The 
men, who came from the Carolinas to make turpentine in Georgia, Florida and the other Gulf 
states, contributed to the rise o f the New South’s middle class. They migrated southward so 
rapidly that by 1900 the industry was firmly centered in the deep South states, with North 
Carolina and South Carolina responsible for only a small fraction of the county’s naval stores 
production.
The Civil War devastated the turpentine industry and interrupted its southward 
movement out of North Carolina. Even before the first shots were fired, pre-war political 
conflict took its toll on the business by upsetting commodity markets. A week and a half after 
Lincoln’s election, concern over the South’s ability to sell and export its goods sent prices in the 
region’s coastal markets tumbling. A New Orleans factor reported to James R. Grist that “The 
past week has been a remarkably bad one for trade of all kinds, the principal cause which is to be 
found in the late Presidential election and its effects upon the South.”1 Naval store prices fell to
208
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such low levels that producers were encouraged to hold their barrels off the market as long as 
possible. Moreover, the fear of bank failures, compounded by the lingering effects o f the Panic 
of 1857, forced lenders to severely reign in their loans. “Money is almost impossible to get out 
of our Banks and . . .  on the street is bringing 2 or 3 per cent a month,” Grist’s factor reported.2 
By January 1861 the southern market had grown even worse as supplies accumulated. Grist 
learned that his New Orleans factor was “afraid we shall find difficulty in selling [your one 
hundred barrels of turpentine], as our market now goes, but hope for better times soon, if Politics 
assure.”3 Money remained tight; when the Grist operation became indebted for $3000, it was 
warned not to ask for more. Buyers also feared that they could not transport the product out of 
the region, and since most naval stores were consumed outside of the South, they were only of 
value outside of its boarders. To make matters worse, in late February the cost of marketing 
naval stores rose when the Confederate Congress passed an export tax on such goods as cotton, 
tobacco, tar, pitch, turpentine, and rosin to secure the principal on a fifteen million dollar loan for 
the war effort.4
As war approached, turpentine producers threw their full support behind the 
Confederacy. Grist’s partner in Alabama wondered “why don’t the good old north state take a 
bold stand? put her shoulders to the (or rather) Our Wheel (Southern Confederated) + let the 
miserable fanatics see we cannot be run over.”3 A producer in Georgetown County, South
1 Marxhall J. Smith and Company to Allen and James R. Grist, 17 November 1860,
James Redding Grist Papers, Special Collections Library, Duke University.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Thomas F. Strikney to Allen and James R. Grist, 26 February 1861, Ibid.; Douglas B. 
Ball. Financial Failure and Confederate Defeat (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1991), 207- 
208.
3 Thomas F. Strikney to Allen and James R. Grist, 26 February 1861, Grist Papers.
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Carolina, who also believed North Carolina should secede, wondered in March 1861 if  the three 
crops of boxes his slaves were then cutting would ever pay off. “The affares of the Country,” he 
wrote, “are such, that every kind of business depends so far as sucess is concerned, upon the 
great + very important dicision waiting to be made by the U.S. + the Confederate States.”6 
Although the nation’s division upset him, he was “ready as an officer o f the Sampit Rangers to 
die on the battlefield in trying to guard + difend the rights of this Southern Confederacy.”7 Even 
Sarah Williams, the wife o f Georgia turpentine producer Benjamin Williams and a transplanted 
Yankee, felt “the Spirit of 76” and prepared to aid the Confederate cause. Two weeks after the 
firing on Fort Sumter, she was busy knitting and sewing clothes. “Before we shall buy of Black 
Republicans,” she proclaimed, “we shale go barefooted and wear homespun.” The Williamses 
and their neighbors began planting more food crops than usual and “if necessary we shall take 
hands out of turpentine in order to insure a good crop.” The Williamses also began building new 
pens for their two hundred head of cattle.8
During the war, prices in southern ports sunk to their lowest levels. In New Orleans a 
factor replied that “The war has almost put a stop to business here the past week, + Naval Stores 
have suffered along with the rest.” No rosin sold and the few barrels of spirits that moved sold at 
low prices, which brought no profit to the producer. However, on the New York market prices 
soared for the same reason that they fell in the South. Ever-growing fear that southern 
commodities could not leave the region set prices for such goods as naval stores at a premium, 
especially after Lincoln ordered a blockade o f southern ports on April 19. Gum rose to between
6 C. C. Mercer to Brother, 9 March 1861, Mercer Family Papers, Southern Historical 
Collection, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
7 Ibid.
8 Sarah Hicks Williams to Parents, 28 April 1861, Sarah Hicks Williams Papers, 
Southern Historical Collection, The University o f North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
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$4.50 and $5.00 per barrel and spirits climbing to 750 to 800 per gallon. As prices climbed, 
northern buyers held their naval stores off the market, waiting for them to go even higher. If, 
under these circumstances, southern producers could locate a ship heading north, it was to their 
advantage to pay freight prices as high as five times the normal amount to get their naval stores 
to northern ports.9 At the beginning of May, a New York factor advised James Grist to ship his 
Alabama naval stores to New York at once. “You can afford to pay very high freight now as the 
price of Spts + Rosin is so high—Ship Immediately—this is no doubt the best place in the World 
to get the high prices now.” Barring that, if a foreign vessel was available he should ship to 
Europe, preferably London or Liverpool.10 Grist, desperate to take advantage of this market, 
requested that the trade house of R. M. Blackwell & Co. of New York charter a ship to bring his 
Alabama naval stores there. They informed him, however, that the Union government forbade 
any vessel from leaving a northern port for the South. Because naval stores was low in value 
relative to its bulk, it was not worth the risk o f running the Union blockade. The blockade and 
restrictions on vessels in northern ports sailing south, which was firmly in place by the end o f 
1861, also prevented turpentiners from receiving such needed supplies as pork and spirit barrels 
which were commonly shipped through northern posts.11 “God grant that such a state of things 
may soon be over,” Grist’s factor commented.12
During the war production ground to a halt. Neglected turpentine boxes lost much o f 
their productive capacity and in some areas whole orchards burned. The railroad system’s
9 Marxhall J. Smith & Co. to Allen and James R. Grist, 27 April 1861, April 30, 1861, 
and New York Commodity Price Listing, 4 May 1861, Grist Papers.
10 R. M. Blackwell & Co. to Allen and James R. Grist, 2 May 1861, Ibid.
11 R. M. Blackwell & Co. to Allen and James R. Grist, 30 April 1861 and 24 May 1861, 
Ibid.; Percival Perry, “The Naval-Stores Industry in the Old South, 1790-1860,” The Journal o f  
Southern History 34 (November 1968): 525.
12 R. M. Blackwell & Co. to Allen and James R. Grist, 2 May 1861, Grist Papers.
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destruction left producers with no means o f transporting their products. These problems were 
aggravated when, in their search for supplies of desperately needed metal, the Confederate army 
seized the copper stills.13 In many cases turpentine that had been harvested before the war 
simply sat unattended in its barrels. While traveling by train through southeastern North 
Carolina during the war, an Englishman observed that “at every stopping place, this valuable 
staple [gum] was piled in thousands on thousands of barrels, apparently belonging to, or cared 
for by nobody, hoops off, staves loose, and the resin melted by the hot sun into enormous masses, 
and plainly left to take care of itself until the war is over.”14 A few producers, however, went to 
great lengths to preserve their gum. When Simon Temple from the Starke, Florida, area heard 
that northern troops were approaching, he ran his stored resin through a trough into a cypress 
pond to hide it. When the threat had passed, he and his laborers chopped the hardened resin off 
the top of the water and carried it back to be stored. Some stubborn southerners continued 
efforts to market their naval stores throughout the war. In 1864 M. J. Parker of Washington 
made efforts to get five gallons o f turpentine to Philadelphia, and Joseph V. Smedly searched for 
a low cost means to ship his rosin. But despite such endeavors, by 1865 the disruption in trade, 
loss of stills, and especially the emancipation of the slaves, whose labor had made the turpentine 
possible, had effectively destroyed the southern naval stores industry.15 By the spring of 1865
13 Percival Perry, “The Naval-Stores Industry in the Old South, 1790-1860,” The Journal 
of Southern History 34 (November 1968): 525; William McKee Evans, Ballots and Fence Rails: 
Reconstruction on the Lower Cane Fear (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press,
1966), 36; “The Pine Forests o f  the South,” De Bow’s Review: After the War Series 3 (February 
1867): 197.
14 W. C. Corsan, Two Months in the Confederate States (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1996), 69.
15 Zonira Hunter Tolies, Shadows on the Sand: A History of the Land and the People in 
the Vicinity o f Melrose. Florida (Gainesville, FL: Storter Printing Company, Inc., 1976), 183; M. 
L. Parker to C. Schrack & Co., 26 April 1864, C. Schrack and Company Papers, Special 
Collections Library, Duke University; Joseph V. Smedley to Wife, 10 July 1864 and 25 August
1864, Joseph V. Smedley Papers, Special Collections Library, Duke University.
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the southern forests formerly boxed for turpentine lay in unsalvageable ruin, and the region’s 
naval stores exports had dwindled to nearly nothing.
During the next five years, however, the naval stores industry began an impressive 
recovery. Market conditions made a return to naval stores production an attractive opportunity 
for many southerners. The United States’ rapid industrialization during and after the war 
expanded the demand for naval stores at the same time that the South was unable to provide the 
supply. Consequently, the prices of naval stores products reached record highs. In mid-January 
1866, spirits of turpentine sold on the New York market for an astonishing $ 1 to $ 1.03 per 
gallon, crude turpentine for $7.50 to $8.50 per 280-pound barrel, high grade rosin for $15 to $16 
per barrel, and even common rosin sold for around $6 a barrel. In the 1850s, producers rejoiced 
when spirit prices temporarily soared to 63 or 65 cents per gallon and gum to $3.90 to $4 per 
barrel. By 1870 the South’s production had returned to one half the value o f the naval stores 
made in I860.16
Of course the price actually paid to southern producers, reduced by the cost of 
transportation and marketing the products, was considerably lower than those in New York. 
These expenses, plus a reduction in market prices by July when the first naval stores produced 
since the beginning of sectional hostilities entered the market, brought prices paid to producers 
considerably lower, but they remained at attractive levels. In Wilmington, where prices were 
always lower than in New York, fine rosin brought $4.25, virgin turpentine $4.05, dip $3.05,
16 A. Stuwart Campbell, Robert C. Unkrich, and Albert C. Blanchard, The Naval Stores 
Industry (Gainesville: Bureau of Economic and Business Research, College o f  Business 
Administration, The University of Florida, 1934), 10; “The Quotation for Naval Stores Today,”
16 January 1866, Wooten and Taylor Company Papers, Special Collections Library, Duke 
University; “High Prices,” Fayetteville Observer. I February 1853; W. W. Ashe, The Forests. 
Forest Lands, and Forest Products of Eastern North Carolina (Raleigh: North Carolina 
Geological Survey, 1894), 76.
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common rosin $1.90, and spirits 38£.17 On the London market, inroads made by European naval 
stores producers kept prices at more normal levels. Only very pale American rosin brought high 
prices there. Like Egypt and India, which both took advantage of the South’s interrupted cotton 
trade, many European countries found an opportunity to boost their naval stores production 
during the Civil War. Corsica, Algeria, Spain, Portugal, and especially France developed their 
turpentine and rosin manufacturing during the war years.18
By March 1866 signs of renewed production appeared. That month a New York Tribune 
correspondent traveling on the Charleston and Manchester Railroad “saw vast numbers of barrels 
of turpentine and rosin, both in its crude and prepared state.”19 Yankees, as well as southerners 
reportedly took advantage of the high prices. While digging on a river bank in New Bern, some 
northern soldiers struck the hardened rosin which the town distilleries had discarded over 
decades and had been covered by sand and dirt over the years. The group reportedly made 
thousands of dollars by quietly mining the rosin and shipping it to the North. Another northerner 
built and burned a tar kiln on an occupied North Carolina plantation while the owner was locked 
in the Craven County jail.20
Prices leveled off after 1866 as naval stores products began arriving in markets, but they 
remained strong enough to continue to attract producers. On the New York market prices for soft
17 Alfred Mustru to Wooten and Taylor, 27 July 1866, Wooten and Taylor Papers.
18 Macleaumaris and Co. to John and Donald MacRae, 21 February 1866, Hugh MacRae 
Papers, Special Collections Library, Duke University; John Drew, “The Early Days of the Naval 
Stores Industry.” Naval Stores Review 91 (November/December 1981): 17.
19 “Wilmington-Business—The Turpentine Trade—How Turpentine is Obtained-The 
Pine Trees—Pitch and Tar—Speculations in Lumber,” New York Tribune. 17 March 1866.
20 Whitelaw Reid, After the War: A Tour o f  the Southern States. 1865-1866 (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1965), 30; M. H. Baker to D. W. Bell, 5 March 1866, J. H. Hunter to George 
Henderson, 8 December 1911, and H. A. Marshall to George Henderson, 21 December 1911, 
George Holland Collection, North Carolina State Archives.
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turpentine that reached as high as S5.49 per barrel in November 1866, by June 1868 had settled 
at around $4.25 to $4.50 per barrel of crude turpentine, 450 to 45.50 per gallon o f  spirits, $3.75 
per barrel of high quality rosin, and from $3.50 to $5.00 per barrel o f  tar. Such prices were 
remarkably high by antebellum standards. They remained high although prices did not remain as 
astonishingly high in the 1870s as in the 1860s. In August 1877 spirits sold on the New York 
market for 32.50 per gallon, the finest grade o f rosin—window glass—for $4.25 to $4.75 per 
barrel, and tar for $2.50 per barrel. As always, the cost of marketing naval stores consumed a 
sizable portion of the product’s gross value. A 100-per-gallon tax attached to the cost of 
marketing spirits in the late 1860s added an extra expense. When John MacRae o f  Shoe Heel, 
North Carolina, shipped twenty-four barrels o f various grades o f rosin out of Wilmington in 
August 1879, for example, the charges of $16.63 consumed eighteen percent o f the product’s 
gross value, leaving MacRae with $73.66 left o f the rosin’s original value o f $90.29.2I
Despite the high marketing costs, naval stores remained profitable commodities and the 
large number o f producers who rushed into their manufacture competed so greatly for land and 
labor that they drove production costs upward. During the winter boxing season o f  1866, the 
first season in which turpentiners had to rely on wage labor, “the expense o f boxing has been 
unusually great.” With virgin dip rosin selling at from $20 to $30 per barrel by the end of the 
war, producers rushed to open new orchards to cash in. The demand for box cutters drove up 
wage prices until, by January and February, wages, which included rations, ranged from $20 to 
$40 per month. This amounted to 10 to 20 per box, and in some areas the cost rose to as much as 
30 a box. The pay scale for different jobs reflected the difficulty of the labor and supply of
21 Ledgers for 1866 and 1867, Thomas David Smith McDowell Papers, Southern 
Historical Collection, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; Brown & Cuyler 
commodity quotations, 20 June 1868 and Office o f the Internal Revenue receipt, 20 June 1867 
and 25 June 1869, Wooten and Taylor Company Papers; New York Quotations, 1 August 1877, 
Account receipt from Carolina Central Railroad, 28 August 1879, John McKay Papers, Special 
Collections Library, Duke University.
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skilled hands to perform the tasks. For the whole 1866 turpentine season, boxers and chippers 
received wages of around $40 per month, coopers around $60 per month, distillers got the same 
as a coopers, teamsters received $40, and dippers little more than $27 per month. Most hands did 
not work all year, however, only the boxers and chippers. The dippers worked for seven months 
and the other workers for eight months, from April to November. Boxers and chippers received 
around $480 each year. Even working for just over half a year, dippers, who were the lowest 
paid workers, earned at least $189. In paying such high wages, producers spent in 1866 nearly 
twice as much for free labor as they did before the war on hired slave labor (fig. S.l). With the 
new paid labor force, wages were estimated to consume 52% of an operation’s annual operating 
expenses. Census figures indicate that although postbellum labor costs remained substantially
Annual Labor Cost Per Naval Stores Worker 
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Figure 5.1. Annual Labor Cost Per Naval Stores Worker, Southeastern United States, 1850-1900 
United States Department of Commerce and Labor, Bureau of the Census, Manufactures. 1905 
(Washington, DC: 1908), 649.
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higher than those before the war, such high wages as seen in 1866 did not persist. The annual 
wages that naval stores workers received ranged from around $150 to just over $200.“
The price of leasing timber for turpentining appears to have also risen above that of the 
antebellum period. In 1870 James H. Aycock of Richmond County, North Carolina, leased
200,000 boxes for $1,400, a cost of $7 per thousand This represented an almost 63% increase 
over what another North Carolina producer paid per one thousand boxes in 1854. However, the 
same pre-war arrangements between lessee and lessor continued. In 1871, Aycock’s second year 
leasing the tract, he paid $1200 for the lease of 171,300 boxes, the same rate o f $7 per thousand 
that he paid before. As in typical antebellum leases, Aycock agreed to cause no unnecessary 
damage to the trees and only cut as much timber as he needed for the barrels, fuel, and buildings 
required to carry on his business. He had the right to remove any stills and fixtures he 
constructed on the property. It also appears that as with antebellum lease agreements, producers 
only paid for the productive boxes and according to how much gum the boxes yielded. This 
meant that, for each year the boxes were worked, their leasing rate dropped. When the 
Richmond Naval Stores Company took over the Aycock lease in 1873, the rent price reflected the 
previously turpentined trees’ potential productivity. Richmond Naval Stores Company paid $4 
per thousand boxes that had been worked for two years and $4.50 per thousand boxes worked for 
only one. But the company paid $12 per one hundred new boxes, forty-two percent more than 
when Aycock began leasing three years earlier.23
22 “The Pine Forests o f the South,” De Bow’s Review 3 (February 1867): 197-198; List 
of Negroes belonging to Mr John W. Grist Worked by Grist + Striknev during the year of 1860. 
Grist Papers.
23 Some turpentine producers reportedly preferred leasing to buying because they leased 
by the box, meaning they only paid for what could be worked. John Avery Gere Carson to H. C. 
Harwood, 8 May 1897, John Avery Gere Carson Papers, Manuscripts Collection, Georgia 
Historical Society; W. W. Nettles to J. W. M. Nettles, 28 August 1869, Probate Record 1511, 
Darlington County Historical Commission, Darlington, SC; Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores 
Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861” (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 44; Leases
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The innovation of working turpentine tracts on shares appeared in the 1870s as a means 
to confront high production costs. Like undercapitalized southern fanners, small turpentine 
producers could finance their business by offering a portion of their product to the property 
owner as rent. In 1873, for example, William Knight of North Carolina rented boxes owned by 
Heck and Company. George S. Cole, a general merchandiser, oversaw the lease. As part of the 
agreement, Knight delivered all the gum to a still, probably run by Cole. Here Cole collected 
one-fourth of the barrels for rent payable to Heck and Company and paid Knight the current 
market price for the other three-fourths barrels. However, problems could arise from these share 
arrangements. Some producers were slow to hand over the landowners share. In 1870 one North 
Carolina timber owner received barrels o f turpentine on a weekly basis from several different 
turpentiners who worked his trees. Between May 1 and September 24, he received 222 barrels as 
payment from the different producers. But in early fall two producers began to falter in their 
payments, going for at least three weeks without paying any turpentine. Other share turpentiners 
failed to surrender any portion of the product. In the early 1880s, a South Carolina producer 
rented turpentine boxes and made an agreement with another man to work the boxes for him on 
shares. But after hauling gum that represented the work of four to five dippings to Darlington, 
the share worker sold the product and failed to pay the renter his portion.24
The post-war migration in fact picked up considerable momentum as producers 
continued their use of harvesting methods that killed the longleaf pine in their home state and
for turpentine boxes, 25 November 1869, 16 January 1871, and 14 January 1873, Dorothy 
Fremont Grant Collection, North Carolina State Archives.
24 Lease between William Knight and George S. Cole, 22 January 1873, Aaron Ashley 
Flowers Seawell Papers, Southern Historical Collection, The University o f  North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill; W. J. Wikeson to F. G. Smith, 24 September 1870, McDowell Papers; Testimony 
regarding working boxes on shares, 30 May 1883, Sessions 805, Darlington County Historical 
Commission.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
219
then sought out the fresh pines available to their south (figs. 4.5 and 5.2). These migratory North 
Carolina producers either purchased or leased timber lands in the still heavily timbered states to 
their south, typically forming partnerships with friends or relatives to start their businesses.25 As 
early as February o f 1871, their movement out of southeastern North Carolina made one man fear 
that ‘the Cape Fear [area] is doomed unless something be done to resurrect it. An apathy and 
despondency seems to pervade the whole region from Fayetteville to Wilmington.”26 That year, 
for example, a Mr. K. Hayeer o f Whiteville, North Carolina, in Columbus County, bought 1700 
acres of round timber on the Waccamaw River just across the South Carolina state line. His 
partner owned an adjoining 1600 acres of round timber. Although they had adequate land, these 
men lacked the capital to begin production and, as the time to begin boxing approached, they 
considered taking in a third partner who could supply the money. With his capital problems 
apparently solved, Hayeer spent two weeks in late December 1871 and early January 1872 in 
South Carolina recruiting labor and beginning work on the trees. As the gum harvesting season
25 Jane Twitty Shelton, Pines and Pioneers: A History of Lowndes County. Georgia.
1825-1900 (Atlanta: Cherokee Publishing Company, 1976), 184, 198-199; Wallace Leigh Harris, 
History of Pulaski and Blecklev Counties. Georgia. 1808-1956 (Macon, GA: The J. W. Burke 
Company, 1957), 574-577, 582-587, 589-591; Biographical Souvenir of the States of Georgia 
and Florida (Chicago: F. A. Battey & Company, 1889), 127-128; Karen Harvey, “Maguire Bom 
Into Turpentine Family: Industry Once Had Major Impact on County,” The Compass. 26 April 
1990, p. 8-9; Elliott Maguire, interview, Oral History Collection, Research Library, St. Augustine 
Historical Society, St. Augustine, FL; Elliott Maguire, interview by author, St. Augustine, FL, 5 
June 1996; William T. Kennedy, History of Lake County Florida. Lake County Historical 
Society, 1929, 101; Nollie Hickman, Mississippi Harvest: Lumbering in the Longleaf Pine Belt. 
1840-1915 (University: The University of Mississippi, 1962), 131-132; Martha Virginia McNair 
Evans Patterson Papers, Southern Historical Collection, The University o f North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill; J. A. G. Carson to J. P. Williams, 11 September 1888, Carson Papers.
26 H. W. G. to Thomas David Smith McDowell, 24 February 1871, McDowell Papers.
Figure 5.2: United States Department of the Interior, Census Office, The Statistics of the 
Wealth and Industry of the United States. Ninth Census. 1870 (Washington DC: 1872), 493-494, 
505-508, 537-538, 554-556, 568-569, 627, 637-638, 645-648,669-670, 674-678,685, 709-710, 
732-735.
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began, he was away in South Carolina most of the time for he was doing his own distilling. He 
proudly reported that he was making the best rosin in the area.27
The railroad’s expansion through the southeastern pine belt after the Civil War and the 
accessibility of large and inexpensive tracts o f mature longleaf pine permitted the naval stores 
industry to resume the southward trek it began before the war. Following the war, state 
governments under the control o f both Democrats and Republicans facilitated railroad 
construction as a means to economic growth. In fact, from the end o f Reconstruction to the end 
of the nineteenth century, southern railroad construction consistently outpaced that in the rest of 
the nation.28 Railroad construction through the pine region began in the 1870s and made 
impressive gains during the 1880s. Construction was especially impressive in Georgia. Mark 
Wetherington observes that “the railroad’s arrival marked the ‘take-off stage for the piney 
woods, a period of increasing rates of investment, industrialization, and commercialization.”29 
By the 1870s that state’s Wiregrass region, with dense stands o f longleaf pines, could be crossed 
by rail in less than a day. The journey previously required a week. The new rail lines opened the 
Georgia pine forest to market access. Encouraged by the accessibility the new railroad provided, 
naval stores operators moved into areas previously too landlocked to be profitably worked. By 
1880 virtually every county along the principal lines was producing naval stores (fig. 5.3).30
27 K. Hayrus to Thomas David Smith McDowell, 20 November 1871, January 8, 1872, 
and 6 May 1872, Ibid.
28 Edward L. Ayers, The Promise of the New South: Life After Reconstruction. (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 9; E.W. Carswell, Holmesteadine: The History of Holmes 
Countv Florida. (Tallahassee, FL: Rose Printing Company, 1986), p. 141-142.
29 Mark V. Wetherington, The New South Comes to Wiregrass Georgia. 1860-1910 
(Knoxville: The University o f  Tennessee Press, 1994), 73.
30 Ibid., 73; Jeffrey Dobson and Roy Doyon, “Expansion of the Pine Oleoresin Industry 
in Georgia: 1842 to CA. 1900.” West Georgia College Studies in the Social Sciences 18 (June
1979): 49.
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During the 1880s the naval stores industry continued to expand across the Georgia pine 
belt, aided by the ever-growing rail system, which by 1880, gave Georgia 2,616 miles o f line. 
One line, the Savannah, Florida, & Western Railroad, began in Savannah and ran for 237 miles 
across South Georgia to Bainbridge in the extreme southwestern comer of the state. One branch 
ran from Thomasville in Thomas County for 58 miles north to Albany, another ran from DuPont, 
Georgia in Clinch County southward for 48 miles to Live Oak, and a third branch stretched for 
74 miles from Waycross to Jacksonville, Florida. A second major line, the Macon and 
Brunswick Railroad, ran from Brunswick, on Georgia’s southern coast, for 189 miles to Macon, 
with a 10 mile branch from Cochran in Bleckley C ounty across the Ocmuigee River to 
Hawkinsville in Pulaski County. (A booklet published in 1881 to promote settlement in Georgia 
claimed that between then and 1876 the lumber and naval stores businesses had more than 
doubled along this line.) Another spur to Rome was completed in the early 1880s. A third major 
line also began in Brunswick and ran 171 miles virtually parallel to the Savannah, Florida, & 
Western Railroad and terminated in Albany. During the decade the line was extended westward 
to Selma, Alabama. In 1889 a fourth line covering the 153 miles from Macon to Valdosta 
opened.31
By 1890 Georgia’s railroad network reached every county in the piney woods. That 
same year the state had 228 naval stores operators which employed nearly 10,000 workers whose 
labor produced tar and turpentine valued at $4,000,000 (figs. 5.4,5.5, and 5.6). Ten years later, 
the number of producers had more than doubled to 524, the work force had nearly doubled to
31 Jack N. Averitt, Georgia’s Coastal Plain, vol. 2 (New York: Lewis Historical 
Publishing Company, 1964), 540; Joseph Tillman and C. P. Goodyear, Southern Georgia: A 
Pamphlet (Savannah. G. A.: Savannah Times Steam Printing House, 1881), 5-6,38; Shelton,
Pine and Pioneers. 182.
Figure 53: United States Department of the Interior, Census Office, Report on the 
Manufactures o f the United States at the Tenth Census (June 1. 18801 (Washington. DC: 1883), 
88-89, 103-106, 140-145, 159-161, 173-174, 193-194,206-210, 277-278,317-319,353-355
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over 19,000, and capital investment had risen by more than five hundred percent to $3,800,000, 
reflecting the growing cost of production, and the products value had doubled to more than 
$8,000,000. O f the 39 counties engaged in this business by 1900, all had railroad service.32
Florida developed its rail network more slowly than did Georgia. By the early 1870s 
Florida’s rail ways, the state’s Commissioner of Land and Immigration explained, was “grand in
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Figure 5.4. Value o f Naval Stores Production, 1870-1900
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32 Dobson and Doyon, p. 53; Report on Manufacturing Industries in the United States at 
the Eleventh Census, part 1 (Washington, DC: Department of the Interior, 1905), 308-309; 
Manufactures. 1905. part 3 (Washington, DC: Department of Commerce and Labor, 1907), 650.
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Department of Commerce and Labor, Bureau of the Census, Manufactures. 1905. Part III 
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design, but yet very partially complete ”33 Florida’s extensive coastline made railroads
less important for transportation. Roughly half o f the state’s counties possessed a shoreline and 
rivers that ran through a considerable portion of its pine forest. In many areas served by rivers 
and large streams, water ways offered a cheaper if  slower and less reliable means of moving 
naval stores to port cities. In 1873 only two rail lines served the state, one from Femandina, 
located just north of Jacksonville, to Cedar Keys in the Gulf of Mexico, about fifty miles south­
west of Gainesville. Another railroad ran from Jacksonville, through the panhandle’s northem-
33 D. Eagan, The Florida Settler (Tallahassee: Office of the Floridian, 1873), 11, 14.
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United States Department o f the Interior, Census Office The Statistics o f the Wealth and Industry 
of the United States. Ninth Census. 1870 (Washington DC: 1872), 627; United States 
Department o f the Interior, Census Office Report on the Manufactures o f the United States at the 
Tenth Census (June 1. 1880) (Washington. DC: 1883), 89-103,106, 141, 161, 174; United States 
Department of the Interior. Census Office, Report on the Manufacturing Industries in the United 
States at the Eleventh Census: 1890. Part III (Washington, DC: 1895), 308-309; United States 
Department o f Commerce and Labor, Bureau of the Census, Manufactures. 1905. Part III 
(Washington, DC: 1908), 650-652; For figures related to chart see Appendix B.
tier counties to the Choctawhatchee River. At Live Oak in Suwannee County the line connected 
with the Georgia Railroad. Both Florida lines provided better access to the pine forests and by 
1873 only lumber exceeded turpentine as Florida’s most valuable product. Cotton ranked third.34 
Promotional literature for attracting settlers to the state referred to its pine stands as “mines of 
Wealth” and the town of Live Oak’s newspaper felt “satisfied that there is no industry which can 
be started in our country, right here in Live Oak, which will pay as well as the production of 
turpentine.”35
34 Ibid., 11, 14, 22-28; Wetherington, New South Comes to Wiregrass Georgia. 63-64.
35 Ibid., 27.
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The major growth in Florida’s railroad network came in the 1880s and gave a  boost to 
both the naval stores and timber industries. The state possessed only 518 miles o f railways at the 
beginning of the decade; five years later it had 1,654 miles and, by 1890,2,489 miles. The 
introduction of a rail line could have a profound effect on an area’s industrial development. For 
example, before the first railroad was completed through Washington County, Florida in 1883, 
nearly all of the panhandle county was forested with virgin pine. With the improved access to 
port facilities and markets provided by the railways, the turpentine industry quickly established 
itself in the region. By 1890, turpentining was the county’s second most important industry, 
behind timber. Railroad expansion even permitted profitable turpentine manufacturing in Florida 
as far south as Lake County near present day Orlando. Produced on a commercial basis there in 
the early 1880s, its manufacture increased after the “Big Freeze” of 1894/1895 that destroyed the 
area’s orange groves. Until they could reestablish their groves, citrus producers supported 
themselves through turpentining. This far-flung rail system facilitated the naval stores industry’s 
explosive growth in the state during the 1890s. In that decade the number of establishments 
jumped more than twenty-four fold from 15 to 366, the number of workers leaped by thirty-one 
times from 484 to 15,073, and the value of tar and turpentine increased more than 3400 percent 
from $191,859 to $6,469,605 (figs. 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6).36
Although post-war war naval stores production in Alabama revived more quickly than in 
Mississippi, railroad expansion through the latter’s pine forest encouraged production there.
When first reported in 1850, Alabama produced turpentine valued at $17,800. By 1870 
production was up to $280,203. Only three years later the Mobile market received about 20,000
36 C. R. Clark, Florida Trade Tokens (St. Petersburg, FL: Great Outdoors Publishing Co.,
1980), 1; Carswell, Holmestcading. 141-142, 249; E. A. Ziegler, A. R. Spiders, and C. H.
Coulter, Financial Aspects of Growing Southern Pine. Washington County. Florida (Tallahassee: 
Florida Forest Service, 1931), 13; Kennedy, History of Lake County Florida. 25; Report on 
Manufacturing Industries in the United States at the Eleventh census: 1890. part I, 308-309; 
Manufactures. 1905. part 3,650.
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casks of spirits, between 75,000 and 100,000 barrels o f  rosin, and 100 barrels o f tar and pitch, 
together valued at around $750,000. Two years later, the state’s value rose to $1,200,000, but by 
1883 production showed a slight decline to $1,109,760 because of dwindling timber supplies 
accessible by the transportation routes. In Mississippi, where the naval stores industry was in its 
infancy in the 1850s, production recovered very slowly following the war. In fact the state 
produced less naval stores in 1870 than it had in 1850 when production was very small. During 
the 1870s, however, railroad construction and increased demand for naval stores led to the 
industry’s growth. By the late 1870s operations had begun along the major transportation routes 
in Mississippi’s southern counties near the Mobile & Ohio and the Louisville & Nashville 
Railroads and on the Pearl, Pascagoula, and Biloxi Rivers. In 1880 the state possessed 11 naval 
stores producing establishments which together employed 53 laborers who manufactured goods 
valued at $97,000 (figs. 5.4, 5.5, 5.6). Some o f  these operations were established by turpentiners 
in Alabama who were attracted by the fresh timber as their own became exhausted. In the late 
1890s producers from the older naval stores regions to the East were settling into Mississippi, 
which possessed, on average, one small distillery for every five miles of rail line. Over that 
decade the number o f producers rose six hundred percent from 24 to 145 and the number laborers 
increased three and one half times, from 645 to 2288. The value of the naval stores production 
rose nearly twice as fast, from $282,066 to $1,772,435, probably the result of an increase in 
distilled spirits over raw gum.37
37 J. M. Stauffer, “The Timber Resource o f ‘The Southwest Alabama Forest Empire,’” 
The Journal of the Alabama Academy of Science 30 (January 1959): 57-58; Hickman, 
Mississippi Harvest 129. 131: The Statistics o f  the Wealth and Industry of the United States. 
Ninth Census (Washington, DC: Department o f  the Interior, 1872): 494,538; Report on the 
Manufactures of the United States at the Tenth Census. (Washington, DC: Department of the 
Interior, 1883), 89, 141; Report on Manufacturing Industries in the United States at the Eleventh 
Census, part 1,308-309; Manufactures. 1905. part 3,650.
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Railroads actively encouraged naval stores producers to locate near their lines in order to 
add to their shipping volume. Railroad companies gladly built platforms by any still that located 
along its tracks, knowing that the facility’s success would bring thousands o f barrels o f spirits 
and rosin for shipping.3* In 1881 the Savannah, Florida & Western Railroad, the Brunswick & 
Albany Railroad, and the Macon & Brunswick Railroad published a pamphlet aimed at boosting 
the region by attracting travelers, farmers and especially naval stores and lumber producers. For 
example, the pamphlet reported that Pelham, a town in southwest Georgia, would “offer superior 
inducements to manufacturers o f naval stores. Timber plentiful and convenient to line o f 
railroad. Only one man engaged in the business here. Plenty of room for more. Hands are easily 
had that understand working the trees, such such [sic] as cutting boxes and hacking, ect.”39 That 
Pelham was a distant 224 miles from Savannah meant the railroad would be paid substantially to 
haul the product to market.
The expanding southern rail system which provided turpentine operators access to even 
such inland timber tracts as those around Pelham, Georgia also opened the forests to a competing 
interest, the northern-owned national lumber industry, which moved into the region in the late 
nineteenth century and hastened naval stores manufacturing’s southward movement. The 
lumbermen’s migration southward represented an continuation of their persistent movement 
around the country in search of fresh timber supplies. By 1860 the nation’s lumber production 
center had clearly passed from New England to New York and production was already growing 
in the Great Lakes region. After the Civil War the nation’s lumber production center shifted 
even more toward the Great Lakes region. Here, white pine forests were accessible by rail and a 
strong demand existed for its lumber, which carpenters found softer and easier to work.
38 “Turpentine Orchards,” The Northern Lumberman. 2 August 1896, in Turpentine 
Newsclipping File, Forest History Society, Durham, NC.
39 Tillman and Goodyear, Southern Georgia. 27.
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Historical Geographer Michael Williams explains that, like other industries, after 18S0 the 
northern pine forest product industries, began a period o f industrial capital development that led 
to expansion. The growing railroad network made transportation faster, cheaper, more reliable, 
and more flexible. Business concentration permitted the construction o f large lumber mills with 
steam power and steel tools. Fundamental changes in lumbering developed, including the 
concentration of ownership o f huge timber tracts and the systematic clear-cutting of these areas 
instead of harvesting individual trees. During the late antebellum period, the northern lumber 
industry’s technology, output, and business activity expanded while the vast southern pine forests 
lay relatively unexploited, except for those tapped for gum in southeastern North Carolina and 
small mills processing the limited number of trees felled for local consumption. Lackluster 
markets for southern pine, limited transportation routes through the longleaf pine belt, and a 
shortage of capital among southerners with which to buy large timber tracts and construct 
modem, high volume lumber mills prevented the widespread pre-war exploitation of southern 
woodland.40
Interest in relatively untouched southern forests began immediately after the Civil War’s 
end. Writing from Gainesville, Florida in June 1865, one man, who believed that the South 
could adjust to its new labor situation, reported that “the resources of Florida will soon be 
opened up anew. Dozens o f men o f my acquaintance are now turning their attention to Saw
Mills, Turpentine farms, Tar making, Timber getting + c  ”4‘ He believed that the war’s
disruption of the region’s business establishment offered an opportunity for him to secure a place 
in the marketing of South’s staple production. It was his hope that with his friend in Wilmington
40 Jeffrey A. Drobney, Lumbermen and Log Sawyers: Life. Labor and Culture in the 
North Florida Timber Industry. 1830-1930 (Macon: GA: Mercer University Press, 1997), 24; 
Michael Williams, Americans and Their Forests: A Historical Geography (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1989), 193-194.
41 S. Swamm to Donald MacRae, 23 June 1865, MacRae Papers.
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as his partner, he could create an unusually versatile and powerful factorage house which would 
handle lumber, naval stores, and cotton marketing in both North Carolina and Florida. All that 
Swamm’s grand scheme lacked was operating capital. He suspected that he “might be able to 
raise $6000 or $8000 to secure us until we can open up a respectable business.”42 In late winter 
1866 there was already a revived interest in timber tracts growing in Florida’s St. John River 
area. Some lumber and naval stores men wished to purchase the tracts, others were only 
interested in purchasing the timber, while a few simply stole from the property what they 
wanted. Speculators believed “that lands will go up in Florida as soon as quiet is restored in our 
Country.”43
After the Civil War, the Southern Homestead Act of 1866 slowed the expansion of large- 
scale lumber production in five states—Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Arkansas— 
for ten years. In an effort to make the act’s benefits as widely available as possible, Congress 
limited public homestead grants to eighty acres. Although a large number o f the 67,427 
homestead claims made from 1866 to 1876 were filed fraudulently by agents acting for large 
lumber companies, the legislation did successfully curb the large-scale taking of public land. By 
the mid-1870s, southern congressmen argued that the homestead restrictions unfairly limited 
their states’ abilities to use their timber resources for economic development and in 1876 
succeeded in getting Congress to revise the restrictive provision thus allowing open land 
purchases of the 47.7 million acres of public land in the five affected southern states.44
42 Ibid.
43 F. Livingston to MacRae, 6 March 1866, Ibid.
44 Drobney, Lumbermen and Log Sawyers. 36-37; Jeffrey A. Drobney, “The 
Transformation o f  Work in the North Florida Timber Industry, 1890-1910,” Gulf Coast 
Historical Review 10 (Fall 1994): 97; Thomas D. Clark, The Greening o f  the South: The 
Recovery of Land and Forest (Lexington: The University Press o f Kentucky. 1984), 15-16;
Albert E. Cowdrey, This land. This South: An Environmental History, revised ed. (Lexington: 
The University Press of Kentucky, 1996), 111.
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Northern investors quickly rushed in. These “timber carpetbaggers,” as forest historian 
Thomas D. Clark calls them, came primarily from New York, Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, and 
Kansas. Their buying spree began slowly, totaling only 2,095 acres in 1877,14,262 in 1878, and 
16,836 in 1879. By 1880, sales reached 86,873 acres and two years later increased to nearly ten 
times that. In 1883 sales topped one million, with much of the acreage selling for between SI 
and $ 1.25 per acre. As large northern concerns gobbled up the best timber land, southern 
congressmen hurried to reverse the 1876 change to the Homestead Act. But before the March 
1889 renewal of federal land purchase restrictions, lumber men pressed to take advantage of the 
liberal sales policies, purchasing a record 1,223,772 acres in 1888. Although some southern 
investors purchased some of these tracts, northern financiers and groups purchased the majority 
of the 5,692,259 acres sold between 1877 and 1888.45
Large tracts of state or privately held land could also be purchased cheaply. In 1872 a 
member of a family which controlled about 200,000 acres in the vicinity o f the Brunswick and 
Albany Railroad reported that the pine lands in his state could “be bought very cheaply at an 
average of $ 1.00 to $2.00 p acre.”46 Florida sold an enormous tract o f timber land to a New York
45 Between 1877 and 1888 the following number o f acres were sold in the five southern 
public land sale states: 1877 2095 acres, 1878 14,262 acres, 1879 16,036 acres, 1880 86,873 
acres, 1881 212,488 acres, 1882 835,710 acres, 1883 1,103,407 acres, 1884 891,836 acres, 1885 
212,863 acres, 1887 882,817 acres, and 1888 1,223,772 acres. Over these ten years the number 
of federal acres sold in Alabama was 878,413, in Arkansas 628,744, in Florida 1,021,112, in 
Mississippi 1,296,775, and in Louisiana 1,867,215. T. Clark, Greening o f the South. 16; 
Drobney, Lumbermen and Log Sawyers. 38-42; R. J. Duhse, “Timber Pirates to Tree Farms,” 
North Florida Living (March 1985): 44; C. L. Peek to Donald MacRae, 13 April 1886, MacRae 
Papers; Drobney, “Transformation o f Work,” 97-98; Frank Bedingfield Vinson, “Conservation 
and the South, 1890-1920,” (Ph-D. diss., University of Georgia, 1971), 101-102; Ayers, Promise 
of the New South. 124; C. Vann Woodward, Origins of the New South. 1877-1913. (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1951), 116-117; Cowdrey, This Land. This South. 111- 
112.
46 Henery C. Day to Judge Pierreporch, 29 February 1872, letter attached to James R. 
Butts, 150.000 Acres Yellow Pine Timber. Turpentine and Cotton Lands. (Macon: Georgia 
Telegraph Steam Printing House, 1858) in Special Collections Division, The University of 
Georgia Libraries, University o f  Georgia.
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lumber company for the bargain price of ten cents per acre. By 1886, the price o f privately held 
land in Florida sold for about the same as federal land. Even land located near a railroad line 
could be purchased for less than $2 per acre. As with the federally-owned timber lands, large 
lumber companies purchased most of these tracts. A few turpentiners, however, also took 
advantage o f the low land prices. By the early 1880s, one producer controlled 52,000 acres on 
which he worked 700,000 boxes with ninety hands.47 In the late 1890s, a factor advised a 
prospective buyer o f  Florida turpentine land that real estate prices there varied from fifty cents to 
two dollars per acre. The factor had purchased 20,000 acres within twenty miles o f Jacksonville 
for seventy-five cents an acre. He advised that o f  course “the value of lands in Florida, for 
turpentine purposes depends on a good many contingencies,. .  .distance from transportation and 
primary market: class o f timber on lands, whether sappy or heart: thickness o f timber per acre 
ect., and competition for same.”4* When considering working a stand of trees, producers wanted 
to know “how near the river—how much, if any is cleared, How many crops of turpentine trees on 
it. How many old + how many new.”49 Georgia land prices also remained low. In 1889,9,015 
acres in Coffee County sold for $3,OOO.so
The same developing rail network that aided naval stores producers also helped the 
lumber industry make its swift move to the region. Before railroads, large commercial lumber 
mills were located in port cities where they could collect timber sent down river from different 
sections of the interior. As railroad expansion coincided with frenzied land purchases during the
47 Tillman and Goodyear, Southern Georgia. 51-52.
48 J. A. G. Carson to H. C. Harwood, 8 May 1897, Carson Papers.
49 Kerrhners and Calder Brothers to Thomas David Smith McDowell, 6 February 1877, 
McDowell Papers.
50 Deed o f Conveyance, 8 July 1889, William C. Powell Papers, Special Collections 
Library, Duke University.
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1880s, the large lumber companies ran spur lines from the mine line into the timberiand. Now 
mills could be more conveniently located beside the main line. Michael Williams explains that 
not only did railroads serve as a  route to market, but also as a means o f exploiting the forests.51
The combination of southern railroad expansion, cheap timber, and well-financed 
northern investors created a burgeoning lumber industry. Southern lumber production grew 
steadily during the 1870s and 1880s and absolutely exploded by the 1890s. On the eve o f the 
Civil War, southerners cut only about half a billion board feet of longleaf pine a year. By 1870 
southern lumber production had surpassed output on the eve of the Civil War. In 1875 southern 
lumber production in the eight longleaf pine states reached one and a half billion board feet and 
in 1880 that figure reached two billion. Even with this rapid rise, the South in 1880 still 
contained twice as much pine timber as the rest of the nation. The number of southern saw mills 
grew correspondingly from 3,969 in 1860 to 5,304 in 1880. But these mills possessed a  small 
cutting capacity and only modest timber cutting was required to supply them. During the 1880s, 
as the large northern companies pushed headstrong into the region, not only did the size of the 
property holdings swell, but the mills grew larger and, unlike the earlier southern mills, which 
were dismantled and moved to the timber, remained in place while the logs were transported to 
them. Companies like the Georgia Land and Lumber Company, which controlled between
300,000 and 400,000 acres o f choice pine land in the early 1880s, came to dominate production.
51 By the late nineteenth century, most mills were located as near as possible to the 
timber supply. The expansion o f rail lines and the rise o f large scale lumber operations worked 
together. Historian Jeff Drobney explains that because only well-financed, large companies 
could afford spur lines, and large timber tracts were required to ensure enough timber to make 
the lines profitable, timber land became concentrated in fewer hands. Plus, the freedom to move 
away from the river courses enabled the heavily capitalized companies to grow and operate as 
year-round businesses, unhampered by freezing waterways. Williams, Americans and Their 
Forests. 253,280. Ida Belle Williams, History of Tift Countv (Macon, GA: The J. W. Burke 
Company, 1948), 44. Carswell, Holmesteading. 98-99; Drobney, Lumbermen and Log Sawyers. 
74. C. Clark, Florida Trade Tokens. 2-3; R. D. Forbes, “The Passing o f the Piney Woods,” 
American Forestry. 29 (March 1923): 135.
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Such businesses prized the region’s unspoiled longleaf belt. Its large pines were of common age 
and size and perfect for harvesting. In addition, the level ground made transportation out o f the 
forest relatively easy. With these larger companies in place, the South’s lumber output grew 
exponentially. In 1870 the South produced eleven percent o f the nation’s timber. By 1910 that 
amount had grown to forty-five percent.52
The lumber industry’s southward migration in the late nineteenth century pushed the 
turpentine industry ahead of it. The same desire for cheap accessible pine land that attracted 
northern lumber men also interested turpentiners. The two businesses were not, however, at first 
viewed as compatible. As historian Thomas D. Clark observes, lumber men and turpentiners had 
the same relationship in the southern pine forest that cattlemen and sheep herders had on the 
western prairie. Lumber companies and consumers incorrectly believed that turpentined timber 
made an inferior grade of lumber, so lumber men and turpentiners did not use the same timber 
and competed with each other for tracts. Because the lumber producers usually had better access 
to capital than the turpentiners, they could squeeze the naval stores operators out of areas where 
timber stands became scarce.53
Declining available pine acreage, especially near transportation lines, caused timber 
costs to rise. In April 1893 Savannah naval stores factor James Carson complained that, despite 
the decrease in the price of provisions, turpentine cost more to make than it had in the 1880s. He
52 W. G. Wahlenberg, Longleaf Pine: Its Use. Ecology. Regeneration. Protection.
Growth, and Management. (Washington, DC: Charles Lathrop Pack Forestry Foundation, 1946), 
8; Drobney, Lumbermen and Log Sawyers. 25; Gavin Wright, Old South. New South: 
Revolutions in the Southern Economy Since the Civil War (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1986), 
161; Clark, Greening of the South. 15, 25, 157-160; Thomas F. Armstrong, “The Transformation 
of Work: Turpentine Workers in Coastal Georgia, 1865-1901,” Labor History 25 (Fall 1984):
519; Williams, Americans and Their Forests. 238; Ayers, Promise of the New South. 125; 
Cowdrey, This Land. This South. 113.
53 Donald Fraser Martin, “An Historical and Analytical Approach to the Current 
Problems of the American Gum Naval Stores Industry” (Ph.D. Diss., University o f North 
Carolina, 1942), 94-95; Clark, Greening of the South. 23.
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explained that. By the late 1890s the cost o f  leasing turpentine tracts was also on the rise, from 
$100 to $200 per crop (10,000 boxes) in 1896 to around $500 in 1899. Producers had moved 
stills a greater distance from transportation sources to ease the expense of hauling the gum out o f 
the woods, but as the forests disappeared, production continued to move further away from the 
still. Consequently the cost o f  hauling increased. In 1896 The Northern Lumberman estimated 
that producers required $5,000 for a still, barrels, advances on labor, rent, houses, sheds, tools, 
wagons, and mules. To operate a single crop for four years required $2,808.50, much o f which 
went to labor costs. A twenty-crop operation, a large turpentine business by any standard, would 
therefore require $50,000 and would produce 120,000 gallons o f turpentine and 12,000 barrels of 
rosin, which would bring $60,000 for a profit o f just $ 10,000 over four years.54 The article 
reported that “profits are not large enough to attract any except men who have been brought up in 
the business and know no other.”55
It does in fact appear that North Carolina turpentiners and their descendants dominated 
the industry throughout the South in the late nineteenth century. Their relocation to other 
southern states predated the Civil War. In 1860 only three of the eighteen producers in Georgia 
had been bom in that state and, o f these three, two were sons o f North Carolinians. O f the 
remaining fifteen, however, more than half came from Virginia and probably had little 
knowledge of the naval stores industry. By 1880, immigrants from the old turpentine region
54 The practice of setting lease prices according to the number o f years a stand had been 
worked continued. A Lexington County, South Carolina timber owner leased his trees for 
turpentining by the year. Beginning in 1895 he leased virgin boxes for $200 per crop for the 
year. The second year the crop rented for $100 and the year after that for $50. Michael David 
Tegeder, “Prisoners of the Pines: Debt Peonage in the Southern Turpentine Industry, 1900- 
1930,” (Ph.D. diss., The University of Florida, 1996), 61; Lease for boxes, 14 January 1895,
Belton Decator Clark Papers, The South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina; John 
Avery Gere Carson to Editor Morning News. 17 April 1893, Carson Papers; “Turpentine 
Orchards.”
55 “Turpentine Orchards.”
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continued to dominate turpentine production in Wiregrass, Georgia. Seventy-three percent came 
from North Carolina and fifteen percent from Virginia. Moreover, the newly transplanted 
Georgia turpentiners shared many similarities with those still in North Carolina. Most were 
family men in their thirties and forties and many had other occupations such as merchants, 
factors, and lumber cutters.56
An analysis of individual turpentine producers reveals that not only did the majority 
originate from the turpentine area o f North Carolina, but that many pioneered the development of 
a middle class business community in the previously sparsely settled southern pine region. The 
Peacock brothers were such men. They helped introduce the naval stores industry in south- 
central Georgia and their children became early members of the piney wood South’s town-based 
middle class by opening factorage houses, banks, and helping to found towns. Albert Peacock, 
one of the first North Carolinians to come to Georgia as a turpentiner, was bom in 1826 in 
Wayne County, North Carolina. Peacock married Virginia O’Berry of Winfield, Virginia, in 
1859 and soon afterward the couple moved to south Georgia. They first settled in Burnt Fort, 
near the present town of Folkston and the same area where Dr. Benjamin Williams, a turpentiner 
from Greene County, North Carolina, settled a few years earlier. Here Peacock began operating 
one of the first turpentine distilleries in the state. Although he found adequate timber in the 
region, the river was often unreliable and prevented him from shipping his product to Brunswick. 
At the beginning of the Civil War, Peacock joined the Georgia forces and sent his wife and their 
young son to Suffolk, Virginia, where she soon died. In 1866 Albert married Ely Jane Wooten of 
Whiteville, North Carolina, who was twenty years his junior. Between 1867 and 1889 they had
56 Of the remaining fifteen, more than half came from Virginia. They probably 
represented naval stores producers who began the business in the Old Dominion around 1840 but 
moved southward into Georgia as the pines in their home state disappeared. Dobson and Doyon, 
“Expansion of the Pine Oleoresin Industry in Georgia,” 48; Wetherington, New South Comes to 
Wiregrass Georgia. 116-117; Campbell, et al., Naval Stores Industry. 10; P. L. Buttrick, 
“Commercial Uses of Longleaf Pine.” American Forestry. 21 (September 1915): 905.
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eight children, seven o f whom lived to adulthood. With the expansion o f rail lines through south 
Georgia, Peacock moved back there in 1875 with his rapidly growing new family. He began a 
turpentine operation near the town o f Eastman. When his oldest child was eleven he again 
moved the family to Cochran, Georgia, about twenty miles northeast of Eastman, where his 
children would have better access to education. Here Peacock died in 1890.57
Albert’s brother Peter Lewis Peacock arrived in Georgia in 1873. Bom in North 
Carolina in 1834, he attended Wake Forest College from 1856 to 1858 and later fought in the 
Confederate Army. In 1873 he and another man purchased a large tract o f  forest land near 
Cochran, Georgia, where they began a turpentine operation. They also built a horse track which 
wound through the pine woods and held races. Peter excelled in the turpentine business, 
progressing from producer to factor with the establishment o f the Peacock-Hunt Naval Stores 
Company in Savannah. Another Peacock brother joined Albert and Peter in Georgia in 1881 and 
although the brother does not appear to have entered the turpentine business, his son went to 
work for Peacock-Hunt.58
The other Peacock children joined the New South’s growing middle class. Albert’s son 
Zebulan Vance Peacock, bom in 1873, attended college in Georgia before organizing the first 
bank in Baxley, Georgia, the First National Bank in Cockran, and becoming president of the First 
National Bank of Hawkinsville after the turn o f the century. He served as state representative 
and senator and sat on the Hawkinsville board o f  education. Peter’s daughter, Virginia Peacock, 
bom in 1871 and Zebulan Vance Peacock’s cousin, married John Harris, who became a partner 
in the family factorage business. Harris moved to Jacksonville, Florida, where he organized 
Flynn, Harris, Bullard Company, Naval Stores Factor and served a director o f  the Atlantic
57 Harris, History of Pulaski and Blecklev Counties. 574-576.
58 Ibid., 582-585.
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National Bank of Jacksonville. Peter’s son John attended the University o f  Virginia and 
graduated with honors from The Johns Hopkins University Medical School. Dr. Peacock 
returned to Cockran and served as the president of the First National Bank o f Cockran, president 
of the chamber o f Commerce, mayor o f the town and, school board member.39
Other turpentine producers also helped the region develop economically. North 
Carolinian Arthur T. Wiggs, bom in Goldsboro in 1839, came to Pulaski County, Georgia, with 
Peter Peacock and J. E. Obery. He settled first in the town of Chauncy before finally moving to 
the community of Dubois. There he began acquiring farm and turpentine lands and, with his 
partner J. W. Hunt, established the firm Hunt and Wiggs, which ran a turpentine still, cotton gin, 
and store. The Bush Brothers of Bladen County, North Carolina, also sought the opportunities 
offered in south Georgia’s growing economy. Owen Bush, bom in 1841, and his brother 
Madison, bom in 1842, both served in the Confederate Army and entered into business for 
themselves afterwards. In 1876 Madison moved to Towns, Georgia, in Wheeler County, where 
he worked as a naval stores manufacturer and merchant. In 1878 his brother Owen moved to 
Chauncy, Georgia, about twenty miles from Towns, where he manufactured turpentine and 
entered general merchandising. In September 1883 he was elected the first mayor o f Chauncy.60
Yet another North Carolinian, Robert T. Gupton, moved with his wife Dolly and their 
daughter to south Georgia in 1899. At first he leased timber but later bought his own tracts. 
However his turpentine represented only a portion of his business, R. T. Gupton, Manufacturer 
of Naval Stores, Dealer in Dry Goods, Fine Shoes, General Merchandise. Gupton’s brother-in-
59 Ibid., 576-577, 586, 589-591.
60 Ibid., 687; Biographical Souvenir. 127-128.
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law operated the turpentine operation’s commissary and another brother-in-law served as the 
distiller.61
Not all Georgia turpentiners came from North Carolina. Edward P. Rentz, an Alabamian 
bom in 1862, was a  partner in an expansive naval stores operation by the time he was thirty. His 
business holdings spread across parts o f Georgia’s Emanuel and Montgomery Counties, and 
annually produced three thousand barrels o f spirits and eleven thousand barrels o f rosin. Seizing 
the opportunity to acquire one of the last substantial virgin pine stands in the region, he 
purchased a large tract in neighboring Laurence County and established a timber and turpentine 
camp named Rentz. To reduce the cost of transporting lumber and naval stores to the nearby 
town of Dillon, he constructed a rail line that, in the early twentieth century, he extended to 
Eastman, about thirty miles to the southeast.62
By the late 1890s, producers in areas o f South Carolina and Georgia, where the pine 
forests were entering decline just as they had earlier in North Carolina, relocated to regions 
where turpentine was less extensive and the pine forest more plentiful. Georgia was not the final 
destination of all North Carolina transplants. Elliott E. Edge, raised south of Fayetteville, tired 
of working for others in the North Carolina turpentine industry and moved with his wife to 
Georgia to begin a business for himself. After only a short stay in Georgia he sought out the less 
exploited pine forests in Lake County, Florida, midway down the peninsula. There, in 1893, he 
formed Edge Mercantile Company, which included a turpentine business, a  sawmill, and a citrus 
orchard. Edge raised enough capital to finance partnerships with men who knew the turpentine
61 A little is known about how the Guptons lived. The family made their home in a Civil 
War-era house to which they added a separate room, connected to the rest o f the house by the 
front porch, which served as a school room for their daughters. Two servants, a couple named 
Abe and Susan Mason who lived in separate quarters behind the house, tended to the Guptons. 
Susan kept the house and Abe cared for the yard and tended to the horses and mules used in the 
turpentine operation. Shelton, Pines and Pioneers. 198-199.
62 Wetherington, New South Comes to Wiregrass Georgia. 60.
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business but lacked the means to begin their own operation. His partners ran the operations 
while Edge took care o f marketing the product Edge’s operation lasted well into the twentieth 
century. In 1925, he entered a partnership with his son-in-law who carried the business into the 
1940s in S t John County, Florida. In 1899, a Mr. Both and Mr. Decker o f Columbia, South 
Carolina, began a five or six thousand acre operation near South Lake in Lake County. They 
hauled their turpentine for three miles to the lake and brought it by boat to the railroad station at 
Clermont Duncan Wilks, a South Carolina native who came to Holmes County, Florida seeking 
its pines, was so taken with the area’s opportunity for turpentining that in 1898 he named the 
little community that developed on the county’s west edge Prosperity. Others, like the Carr 
brothers who settled in Bond, Mississippi came from Georgia after the timber there grew scarce. 
In the fall 1896 one brother came ahead and leased timber for three years. The following spring 
the other brothers arrived in Mississippi with their equipment and twenty-six black workers. The 
Carrs worked ten or eleven crops as long as the timber in the region lasted and when leases were 
no longer available near Bond, they moved to a new area.63
The experience of Hervey Evans who, at the age of thirty-seven, moved from North 
Carolina to Florida, reveals much about the experiences of men who came south to enter the 
naval stores business. When Evans married businessman John McNair’s daughter Martha, 
McNair brought Evans into his business. In July 1899, after the wedding, Evans left North 
Carolina for Florida to oversee McNair’s turpentine business in Fairfield, about fifteen miles 
south of Gainesville, and prepare for his new wife to join him. Before making the trip Evans 
worried about health risks of Florida’s climate but was assured by a doctor that living there 
would not be hazardous. When Evans arrived he thought the region to be the prettiest he had
63 Harvey, “Maguire Bom into Turpentine Family,” 8-9; Maguire interview, St.
Augustine Historical Society, S t Augustine, FL; Maguire interview, author; Kennedy, History of 
Lake Countv Florida. 101: Carswell. Holmesteading. 99: Hickman. Mississippi Harvest. 131- 
132.
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ever seen; the undulating land covered with beautiful forests which, possessing no undergrowth, 
allowed clear visibility for long distances. But he found the weather hotter and more debilitating 
than he was accustomed to in North Carolina. After more than a week, he complained that 
Florida had more gnats, frogs, fleas, and mosquitoes as well. He was also surprised at how 
frequently it rained and how little business activity other than turpentining, lumbering, and 
phosphate mining took place in the state. He expressed amazement at the large number o f 
abandoned and dilapidated houses that dotted the countryside, no doubt the result of the transient 
nature o f Florida’s principle industries. The region’s population likewise failed to impress 
Evans. “All the people I have met are ignorant, indolent, and clever.. . , ” he reported.64
His house did little to lift his spirits o r arouse his wife’s anticipation about joining her 
husband in Florida. It sat on a large treeless tract which provided a full view of the turpentine 
operation’s still, commissary, and workers’ quarters. Nine windows provided ventilation for the 
house’s five small rooms and kitchen. Its three-foot wide hallway probably did not give adequate 
cross breeze to cool a  house that sat fully exposed to the sun. Not only was the house likely hot, 
but also filled with vermin. Its sparse furnishings included two beds, a dinning table, five chairs, 
a rocker, and mosquito nets. Hogs, chickens, and a cow provided meat, eggs, and milk. The well 
water was “awful” but Evans had a barrel o f  drinking water brought from Gainesville once a 
week and he planned to begin having ice brought in as well. Barreled water and ice represented 
the few minor luxuries available in only portions of the deep South’s pine forests. As Evans’ 
experience demonstrates, the turpentiners who moved into Georgia, Florida, Alabama, and 
Mississippi found themselves more isolated, their living conditions more primitive, and the
64 “Inventory,” 16, Hervey Evans to Mattie McNair, 5 June 1899, Hervey Evans to 
Mattie McNair Evans, 13 July 1899,30 July 1899, and 16 August 1899, Hervey Evans to Susan 
Murphy Evans, 22 July 1899, Patterson Papers.
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climate less comfortable than what they were accustomed to in North Carolina. The relocation, 
for many, represented nothing short of a move to the frontier.65
Some men moved to the piney woods not to begin turpentine operations but to establish 
support businesses for these enterprises. Men such as William A. Rough, who was bom in Ohio 
in 18S6, found a great need for barrels in the South. When he arrived in Charleston at age 
sixteen to sell peach trees, he noticed a demand for rice barrels in the port city. Familiar with the 
coopering business in which his family in Ohio engaged, he soon found local investors to help 
him start the Palmer Manufacturing Company. As the naval stores industry pushed southward 
out of North Carolina, in 1883 he began a turpentine barrel factory at Hartford, Georgia in 
Pulaski County. In 1889 he moved to Macon, where he and his brother-in-law established the 
Macon Cooperage Company, which became one of the largest cooperage plants in the Southeast 
Other businesses such as the Council Tool Company in North Carolina and Blount Turpentine 
Tool Company in Quitman, Georgia manufactured the instruments turpentiners required for their 
work. Another man who became a naval stores factor immediately following the war had also 
experimented with other emerging industries in the South before the Civil War. In the late 
antebellum period John Judge and his partner tried and failed to establish a paper mill in 
Wilmington. However, his sock and yam factory in Columbia, South Carolina succeeded in 
making socks for the Confederate soldiers.66
Southern businessmen involved in the late-nineteenth-century turpentine industry 
differed from those employed by the lumber companies in that they were only indirectly
65 Hervey Evans to Mattie McNair Evans, 21 July 1899 and 30 July 1899, Hervey Evans 
to Augusta Evans Currie, 31 July 1899, Patterson Papers.
66 Harris, History o f Pulaski and Blecklcv Counties. 580-581; Martha Green Hayes, 
“General History o f the Turpentine Industry,” Georgia Agrirama, Tifton, GA, 13; Collection 
Description, John Judge Papers, Southern Historical Collection, The University o f  North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill.
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dependent on the larger and more developed northern economy. The lumber industry’s growth in 
the South after 1880 supports C. Vann Woodward’s description o f the South as a colonial 
economy. Northern investors typically owned the companies whose regional operations 
employed local men as no more than middle managers. These managers, representative of 
Woodward’s new class o f southern businessmen, served as agents, retainers, and executives, but 
it was the northern owners who benefited from better capitalization and technical sources who 
were the principal figures in the operations. Turpentiners, on the other hand, were typically 
native southerners who operated independently o f a larger company, financed their operations 
through southern-owned factorage houses, and purchased barrels and turpentining tools made in 
the South. Yet, naval stores men were connected to the northern economy in important ways. In 
many cases the operating capital they obtained through the factors came from northern financiers 
and northern firms bought the majority o f naval stores which they used to manufacture finished 
products.67
Men involved in all areas of the turpentine business, as well as with the lumber 
companies with whom they competed for timber, revolutionized the piney woods economies in 
Georgia, Florida, Alabama, and Mississippi. Attracted by the plentiful and inexpensive land 
which the railroad made accessible, these entrepreneurs moved land-use practices in isolated 
areas o f the southern states closer toward a market orientation. Michael Williams explains that 
the railroads, which enabled the naval stores business’s expansion into the area, “introduced 
industry and industrial ways to remote and backward rural areas in what was a conservative 
society and culture that had not altered radically for nearly two centuries.”68 New South 
developers represented a shift in the region’s power from the independent subsistence farmer
67 Woodward, Origins o f the New South. 114-117, 292, 317.
68 Williams, Americans and Their Forests. 253.
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antebellum planter to the postbellum businessman. The railroad and timber industries were not 
integrated into the area’s traditional economy and therefore represented an invasion of both the 
forest and economic life.69 Not only did they help subvert the independent Wiregrass farmers 
dominant position, but they spurred the region’s shift toward a more market-oriented agricultural 
economy. In her socioeconomic study of six counties in Wiregrass Georgia, for example, Ann 
Patton Malone finds that in the 1880s and 1890s the railroads’, lumber companies’, and 
turpentine operators’ infusion o f capital, technology, and a wage-labor system challenged the 
area’s largely self-contained economy. Bypassed during the three decades preceding the Civil 
War by settlers seeking rich new cotton land, the typical Wiregrass farmer in the 1880s raised 
subsistence levels of com, oats, sweet potatoes, and rice as well as grazed cattle, hogs, and sheep 
on the open range. Only nine percent of farmers raised cotton. By 1880, however, eighty-nine 
percent o f farmers planted cotton and raised only half the amount of livestock as in 1850.70
69 Mark Wetherington describes the introduction of these new businesses, as well as the 
growth of cotton cultivation, as a “process that destroyed a local, self-sufficient culture o f small 
farmers and livestock herders and established in its place a society more commercial and market- 
oriented in outlook.” The naval stores industry, for instance, depended on the immigration of 
outsiders, particularly North Carolinians. Using the example of the Sugar Hill community in 
Georgia, he explains how the region changed. In 1860 this area was nothing more than a farming 
community of families who depended on open-range herding. One fifth of the farmers owned 
slaves, and blacks made up twenty-three percent o f the 151 residents. But, in 1880, he explains, 
“the homogeneous, antebellum farming community had been fragmented, first by the 
construction o f the Macon & Brunswick Railroad through the settlement in 1869 and 
subsequently by the arrival of newcomers.” The yeoman community was replaced by railroad 
agents, clerks, carpenters, coppers, and laborers. Black turpentine laborers made up seventy 
percent of the population. He argues that such post-war invaders as “railroad construction, in- 
migration, industrialization, town growth, and community farming—shattered the sense of 
community and ‘republican simplicity’ that had existed during the antebellum years.” 
Wetherington, New' South Comes to Wiregrass Georgia, xviii, xxii, 46, 116-117, 264-265; David 
L. Carlton, “The Revolution from Above: The National Market and the Beginnings of 
Industrialization in North Carolina,” The Journal o f  American History 77 (September 1990): 
446-447; Mart A. Stewart, “What Nature Suffers to Groe:” Life. Labor, and Landscape on the 
Georgia Coast. 1680-1920 (Athens: The University o f Georgia Press, 1996), 207,211.
70 The six counties in the study are Irwin, Berrier, Coffee, Colquitt, Wilcox, and Worth. 
Malone concludes that only a few o f the native Wiregrass residents became involved in the new 
industrial development and that most did not benefit substantially from the area’s economic 
transformation. Ann Patton Malone, “Piney Woods Farmers of South Georgia, 1850-1900:
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An analysis of state naval store production statistics reveals how rapidly the industry 
moved into these relatively economically undeveloped areas. When naval stores production 
resumed following the Civil War, North Carolinians held their dominant position in the industry, 
operating more turpentining establishments with a higher product value than all other naval 
stores-producing states—South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, and Mississippi—combined 
(fig. 5.4). By 1880, however, both the disappearance of the longleaf pine in the older turpentine 
areas of North Carolina and the spread of railroad lines, especially in Georgia, had pushed 
production southward. South Carolina, at this time, replaced North Carolina as the industry 
leader, producing naval stores valued at nearly $1,900,000. North Carolina manufactured 
turpentine valued at just over $1,750,000, a 25-percent drop from its 1870 production, and 
Georgia made $1,455,739, an impressive 1500-percent rise in production over the previous 
decade. The other producing states’ combined product was valued at nearly $765,000. 
Throughout the 1880s the naval stores industry continued its movement South so that by 1890 
Georgia lead the business, its manufactured value o f $4,242,255 representing over half of the 
total United States production. North Carolina ranked second with $1,705,833 worth and South 
Carolina, which only ten years earlier had ranked first, dropped to third place with $1,524,100. 
The other three producing states combined made just over $600,000 worth. Georgia maintained 
its leading position during the 1890s, nearly doubling its production value by the turn of the 
century. Florida, however, with an astonishing industry growth of nearly 3400-percent from 
$191,859 in 1890 to $6,469,605 in 1900, ran a close second and within the next ten years 
overtook Georgia. Alabama, which experienced a similarly impressive growth in 1890s, ranked 
third with a value o f $2,033,705. Mississippi was fourth with $1,772,435; North Carolina fifth 
with $1,055,695; and South Carolina, which just twenty years earlier had lead the industry,
Jeffersonian Yeomen in an Age of Expanding Commercialism,” Agricultural History. 60 (Fall 
1986): 56, 59-60, 81, 83.
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ranked second to last after Louisiana, which for the first time since the war reported production. 
This phenomenally rapid shift southward at the end o f the nineteenth century resulted from the 
culmination o f three influences—forest degradation, railroad expansion, (both of which had 
begun in the late antebellum period), and competition with the lumber industry for pine acreage, 
which accelerated the turpentiners’ movement. As forests disappeared, a trend started by the 
turpentiners and intensified by the lumber companies’ widespread southern logging activities, 
naval stores producers used the newly constructed railroads to relocate to areas where 
competition was not yet so intense.71
The naval stores industry’s southward movement influenced activity at southern ports. 
Wilmington, North Carolina had been North America’s principal naval stores port from the 
colonial period to the late nineteenth century. As the industry pushed into South Carolina, 
Charleston rose in importance, but it never surpassed Wilmington’s naval stores volume. The 
naval stores industry quickly exhausted South Carolina’s pines and turpentining there began to 
decline shortly after 1880. The volume of naval stores exported through the port at Charleston 
illustrates South Carolina’s rapid rise and fall as a  naval stores producer. In 1865/1866 3,000 
packages of naval stores (one package being either a cask of spirits or a barrel of rosin or gum) 
passed through Charleston. Five years later the volume reached 90,000 and rose to 366,000 by 
1882/1883. But as naval stores production declined in South Carolina, just as it had in North 
Carolina, Charleston’s importance in the trade faded. From its high in the early 1880s, 
Charleston naval stores exports declined to 200,000 in 1885/1886, 81,000 in 1895/1896 and
20,000 in 1900/1901. In fact, industry observer Thomas Gamble explained in the 1920s, South
71 The Statistics o f the Wealth and Industry o f the United States. 494, 503, 508, 538, 556, 
569; Report on the Manufactures o f the United States at the Tenth Census. 89, 103, 106, 141, 
161, 174; Report on Manufacturing Industries in the United States at the Eleventh Census, part 1, 
308-309; Manufactures. 1905. part 3, 650.
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Carolina represented merely a way station for North Carolina turpentiners who eventually ended
up in Georgia.72
As production continued to move southward, Savannah saw an increase in trade and in 
1882 its naval stores volume surpassed Wilmington’s.73 In fact Wilmington’s decline was so 
rapid (Fig 5.7) that in 1891 Garden and Forest magazine reported that “Wilmington, which was 
once the most important shipping-point in the world for naval stores and the principal shipping- 
point for southern hard pine, has now lost entirely its commercial importance as a point of 
distribution for forest-products, the North Carolina Pine-forests being no longer a considerable or 
even an important factor in the country’s supply.”74 The 1882/1883 season Savannah handled 
naval stores worth $4 million, representing a six hundred percent rise over the previous eight 
years. In 1891 Savannah’s naval stores volume reached one million barrels. By 1896/1897 the
72 After the war, Fayetteville resumed its role as North Carolina’s inland naval stores 
marketing center. A traveler found that post-war Fayetteville seemed to serve more as a business 
center for the surrounding countryside than as a place of residence. John R. Dennett, who 
traveled through the South one year after the war observed that “the chief business of 
Fayetteville is the shipment o f tar, rosin, and spirits of turpentine down the river to Wilmington, 
and the sale of manufactured goods to the farmers around about.” To Dennett it appeared “to be 
a busy and thriving town.” John Richard Dennett, The South As It Is. 1865-1866. (reprint; Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1995), 174-175; Shelton, Pines and Pioneers. 184; 
Dwight Wilson interview, Oral History Collection, Research Library, St. Augustine Historical 
Society, St. Augustine, FL; Campbell, et al., Naval Stores Industry. 9, 13-14; Richard C. Davis, 
ed. Encyclopedia of American Forest and Conservation History (New York: Macmillan 
Publishing Company, 1983), s.v. “naval stores;” Thomas Gamble, “Charleston’s Story as a Naval 
Stores Emporium,” in Naval Stores: History. Production. Distribution and Consumption, ed. 
Thomas Gamble (Savannah: Review Publishing & Printing Company, 1921), 35-36.
73 Campbell, et al., Naval Stores Industry. 13-14.
74 C. G. Pringle, “Waste in the Turpentine Industry,” Garden and Forest. 4 (4 February 
1891): 50; For figures related to late nineteenth-century naval stores exports from Wilmington 
and United States exports o f turpentine and rosin see Appendix A.
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Exports of Rosin and Turpentine from Wilmington, NC 
1873-1893
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Figure 5.7. Exports of Rosin and Turpentine from Wilmington, NC, 1873-1893
W. W. Ashe, The Forests. Forest Lands, and Forest Products o f Eastern North Carolina (Raleigh:
North Carolina Geological Survey, 1894), 81.
port of Savannah handled 1.6 million barrels o f naval stores, the largest volume ever handled by 
any port in the industry’s history.73 And in 1900 the port’s naval stores yards were said to 
contain barrels “as far as the eye could see.”76
The Florida naval stores industry’s growth, like Georgia’s, was reflected in the increased 
traffic of the state’s ports. Jacksonville saw a significant rise in activity, but the port at 
Femandina, just north of Jacksonville, handled the majority o f Florida’s early naval stores
751. James Pikl, Jr., A History of Georgia Forestry (Athens: Bureau of Business and 
Economic Research, The University of Georgia, 1966), 8.
76 Campbell, et al., Naval Stores Industry. 14; Thomas Gamble, “Savannah as a Naval 
Stores Port, 1875-1920,” in Naval Stores: History. Production. Distribution and Consumption. 
ed. Thomas Gamble (Savannah: Review Publishing & Printing Company, 1921), 60-61.
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exports. Whereas Jacksonville exported $83,366 of lumber and $2,249 o f naval stores in 1880; 
the same year Femandina handled $129,944 of lumber and $17,522 o f  naval stores. By the end 
of the nineteenth century, however, trade was shifting toward Jacksonville, which became the 
major one. Jacksonville’s growth began during the 1850s when its population grew four fold— 
from five hundred to two thousand people. During the same decade, Jacksonville began to gain 
importance in the lumber industry. In 1850 seven sawmills, mostly northern-owned, operated on 
the St. Johns River about a mile from the waterfront. By the eve of the Civil War, after * 
completion of a railroad from Jacksonville to Lake City, which lay to the south-east in Columbia 
County, the city became a link between Florida’s interior counties and the coastal market. Also, 
weekly steamboat service between Jacksonville and Savannah began. But it was Jacksonville’s 
growing importance as a railroad center after 1880 that increasingly attracted trade. During the 
1880s, three important new lines ran through Jacksonville: the Savannah, Florida, Western 
Railroad; the Jacksonville, Tampa, & Key West Railroad; and the Florida East Coast Railroad.
In the 1890s a fourth arrived when a lumber operator who ran a large mill at Fargo, Georgia, 
about eight miles from the Florida line in Georgia’s southeastern comer, tired o f using a 
primitive logging railroad to move his lumber, formed a partnership, and constructed a line from 
Valdosta to Jacksonville. With a brief interruption caused by an 1888 yellow fever epidemic, 
Jacksonville’s population grew steadily. By 1900, the population o f Duval County reached 
39,733, a forty-eight percent increase in ten years. O f this population, 28,429 lived in 
Jacksonville, which felt so confident about its growth and prosperity that, in 1900, it made an 
unsuccessful move to become the state capital.77
77 A. Stuart Campbell and Alvin Cassel, The Foreign Trade o f  Florida (Gainesville: The 
University o f Florida, 1935): 28,41, 83; Pleasant Daniel Gold, History o f  Duval Countv.
Including Early History of East Florida (St. Augustine, FL: The Record Company, 1929), 123- 
124,126, 178, 184, 196; William Thomas Cash, The Storv of Florida, vol. 1 (New York: The 
American Historical Society, Inc., 1938), 796-798.
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Pensacola handled the export trade for Florida’s western panhandle counties. Lumber 
export values climbed from $934,993 in 1870 to $1,913,731 in 1880. The rise in naval stores 
exports was even more impressive, from $300 to $15,751. The naval stores industry in Florida’s 
western panhandle received a  boost when the L&N Railroad completed its Pensacola and 
Atlantic line across the panhandle in 1883, providing easy access to the port city. The town of 
Chiply in Washington County, located between Pensacola and Tallahassee, served as that area’s 
collection point for naval stores and achieved notoriety as the world’s largest inland shipping 
center for these products. Pensacola served as the principal marketing and export center for the 
Gulf coast area producers. From 1870 to 1900, Florida’s export values consistently rose in 
relation to U. S. exports, largely because o f an increase in lumber and naval stores exports, much 
of which left through Jacksonville. In 1870, Florida exports were valued at approximately 
$1,346,000 or three-tenths percent of total U. S. exports. By 1880, the value had risen to 
$3,347,000 or four-tenths percent o f the U. S. total. By the late 1890s the amounts jumped 
substantially higher. In 1897 export values reached $11,400,000 and by 1900 $20,556,000 or 1.5 
percent of U. S. exports.78
The naval stores industry recovered rapidly after the Civil War and resumed its 
antebellum development patterns. The New South’s railroad building boom provided access to 
more and more previously isolated tracts o f  longleaf pine just as had the antebellum 
transportation improvements in the Caroiinas. The old harvesting process, which dated back to 
colonial times, persisted and, consequently, the destruction o f  the turpentined timber stands 
continued as well. These practices and their effect on the forest perpetuated the industry’s
78 Cedar Keys handled large quantities o f lumber and naval stores shipped from the 
Peninsula’s northwest comer. Jerrell H. Shofher, “Negro Laborers and the Forest Industries in 
Reconstruction Florida,’’ Journal o f  Forest History 19 (October 1975): 185-186; Campbell and 
Cassel, Foreign Trade o f  Florida. 11,33; E. W. Carswell, “‘Naval Stores’ Industry Came to 
Northwest Florida in 1883,” Pensacola News-Joumal file, Pensacola Historical Resource Center, 
Pensacola, FL.
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transient nature, forcing turpentiners to move, not only out o f the Carolinas and into Georgia and 
Florida, but throughout the pine forests o f Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana in search of new 
trees. Competition with the northern-owned and well-financed southern lumber industry, which 
grew rapidly after the 1870s, forced turpentine operators to seek out the region’s increasingly 
scarce timber supplies in more remote areas. Their efforts to keep ahead of the timber cutters 
drove them southwards at a quicker pace than before the war. Throughout the industry’s 
migration, North Carolinians and their descendants continued to dominate production. These 
Carolina turpentiners pioneered a middle-class business community in the thinly settled pine 
forests into which they introduced a more market-oriented economy. By the beginning of the 
twentieth century, the transient naval stores men were well-established in south Georgia and 
north Florida where the industry would remain centered. The turpentiners’ southward movement 
was, however, but one o f the industry’s several features that continued after the Civil War.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter Six
Trapped in the Past:
The Naval Stores Industry’s Failure to Innovate
In the late nineeenth century, naval stores men, who represented the initial wave of 
southern businessmen moving into the economically undeveloped piney woods South, were 
unsuccessful in their efforts to modernize the turpentine industry. Between the Civil War and 
1900, not just the southward migration of naval stores production, but two other of the industry’s 
most distinctive characteristics—reliance on factors and destructive practices—continued despite 
both unintended changes in the marketing of other southern commodities, especially cotton, and 
deliberate efforts to reform production methods. The role of factorage houses in turpentine 
marketing and production rose as they led moderately successful efforts to improve naval stores 
pricing methods, regularize product standards, and increase marketing efficiency. Though most 
southerners accepted forest loss as the inevitable consequence of industry, by the 1890s, the 
enormous timber depletion made it very clear that the naval stores business could not continue 
for much longer without significant changes in manner gum was collected. Efforts by the naval 
stores producers to alter these practices, however, failed completely and by the end of the 
nineteenth century the industry conditions remained remarkably similar those o f its antebellum 
past.
As the naval stores industry moved southward, factorage houses in the old turpentine 
region of the Carolinas lost business and new establishments appeared in the more southerly port 
cities: Savannah, Brunswick, Jacksonville, Pensacola, Mobile, and New Orleans. Factors in such 
ports as Wilmington and Charleston had to change their product focus or face certain financial 
ruin. Sprunt and Son of Wilmington, for example, in the 1870s began a  transition from naval
253
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stores to cotton marketing that it completed by the late 1880s. At the end o f the century, the firm 
controlled Wilmington’s cotton exports. In some cases the factors, just like many o f the 
turpentiners, came from North Carolina. The Peacock family who moved to Georgia from North 
Carolina in the 1870s established factorage houses in Savannah and Jacksonville. In 1876 Sprunt 
opened one of the most important houses in Brunswick, Georgia. After only three years in 
business he sold out to A. V. Wood, also of Wilmington. In 1883, the business was once again 
bought out, this time by Downing, Buck, & Company and, in 1890, it became just the Downing 
Company. By the early 1920s Downing Company remained the only factorage house in 
Brunswick.1
Naval stores factors such as Downing grew increasingly powerful between the Civil War 
and the turn of the century, the reverse of the development Harold Woodman describes in the 
cotton trade during the same years. The decline of the cotton factor after the Civil War 
represented a continuation o f  a trend already underway in the 1850s. Transportation 
improvements across the South during this decade made it possible for itinerant merchants to 
gather together the product from individual growers in the inland crop-growing regions and to 
send it to market. The merchants’ efforts made it easier for smaller growers to market their crops 
and gave large producers an opportunity to sell theirs more quickly than if  they had waited for 
the bales to reach their factor in a port town and for the factor to find a buyer. However, the
1 Richard C. Davis, ed. Encyclopedia of American Forest and Conservation History 
(New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1983), s.v. “naval stores;” Wallace Leigh Harris, 
History of Pulaski and Blecklev Counties. Georgia. 1808-1956 (Macon, GA: The J. W. Burke 
Company, 1957), 583-585, 589-591; C. Downing, “Brunswick as a Naval Stores Port and 
Market,” in Naval Stores: History. Production. Distribution and Consumption, ed. Thomas 
Gamble (Savannah: Review Publishing & Printing Company, 1921), 105; Robert J. Cain, 
“Cotton for the Kaiser. James Sprunt, Contraband, and the Wilmington Vice-Consulate,” The 
North Carolina Historical Review 74 (April 1997): 162-163.
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itinerant merchants worked in conjunction with the factors who continued ultimately to market 
the crop. Nevertheless, the factors lost strength as the merchants gained it.2
Woodman identifies four determinants that encouraged the cotton factors’ continued 
decline after the wan expansion of the railroad network, emancipation, development of the 
tenancy system, and the spread of the telegraph and later the telephone system into the South. As 
rail lines spread across the South, factors began securing cotton shipments by financing local 
merchants who bought as much of their area’s crop as possible and shipped it to the factor at 
their port location. As the merchants’ business rose, they were able to separate themselves from 
financial dependence on the factor and market the cotton directly to consumers or exporters. 
Consequently, cotton marketing moved inland. As the South’s transportation improvements 
enabled growers to get their supplies locally, they began to acquire their credit from local 
sources. Sharecroppers needed to obtain their own supplies and the merchants provided the only 
means to do so. These growers were required to market their cotton quickly to cover their debts. 
Not only did they lack the financial ability to delay sale while a factor searched for the best 
buyer, but it was cheaper to sell to a merchant and avoid the factor’s 2.5 percent commission.
The merchant also had the advantage over the factor of displaying ready-to-take-home 
merchandise and, living in close enough proximity to production, of seeing that the cotton came 
to them to be marketed. Technological improvements other than the railroad made this inland 
marketing more feasible. Beginning in the early 1870s, powerful gin presses were constructed in 
the interior which were capable of compressing cotton bales so tightly that they effectively 
doubled the cotton-carrying capacity o f railroad cars. Also, the telegraph, transatlantic cable, and 
later the telephone permitted inland merchants to keep abreast of moves in the cotton markets.
2 Harold D. Woodman, King Cotton and His Retainers: Financing and Marketing the 
Cotton Crop of the South. 1800-1925 (Columbia: University o f South Carolina Press, 1990), 84- 
85,95.
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As general merchandisers, creditors, and often land holders, the South’s merchants replaced the 
cotton factors to become the economic powers of the inland agricultural producing areas.3
But while the role of the factor declined in cotton marketing, special features of naval 
stores production required factors to continue serving as the financial and marketing agents for 
turpentine producers into the 1930s. Economist Donald F. Martin lists five reasons why the 
naval stores industry required factors. First, he argues, producers were relatively small and 
found it too expensive to establish their own marketing organization. Second, by the late 
nineteenth century, turpentiners were spread from North Carolina to Texas and thus located such 
a considerable distance from the principal areas of consumption outside the south that they 
required factors to sell to customers. Third, their products ranged widely in quality and required 
grading by uniform standards which the factor performed. Fourth, producers lacked storage 
facilities for their seasonal production and required the factorage houses’ port-side naval stores 
yards. Finally, producers needed agents who were better informed than they were about 
marketing conditions and procedures.4
Martin’s explanation appears inadequate because cotton growers faced strikingly similar 
situations, and yet the factor became obsolete in the making o f their product. The principle 
differences, which Martin fails to recognize, were the naval stores industry’s transient nature and 
different labor system. Where cotton production could be relatively guaranteed to remain in the 
local area, thus providing a stable business environment for merchants, the destructive turpentine 
harvesting practices, which rendered the pines useless after several years, required that producers 
continually search out ftesh stands. An operation might move only a few miles or a few hundred
3 Ibid., 96-97, 269-273, 282-285, 296-297, 301.
4 Donald Fraser Martin, “An Historical and Analytical Approach to the Current Problems 
of the American Gum Naval Stores Industry” (Ph.D. Diss., University of North Carolina, 1942), 
249-250.
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miles. Consequently, there was very little reason for a merchant to believe that local turpentiners 
would remain his steady customers for longer than several years. However, factors located in 
port cities could be relatively assured that turpentine producers, although located many miles 
inland and not necessarily working in the same area each year, would use the rail lines to ship 
their product to the factor’s location. Second, the industry’s unique post-war labor arrangement, 
which will be discussed in the next chapter, left the largely black work force dependent on the 
producers, not the local merchant, for supplies. Whereas tenant cotton farmers required the 
services o f the merchant, the turpentine worker did not. Third, the turpentiner had little to offer 
as collateral except his livestock and equipment. Merchants were not interested in securing loans 
with pine land which after a few years of turpentine work would be rendered virtually worthless. 
Moreover, turpentiners commonly worked leased tracts, which could not be used for collateral. 
For the same reason that merchants refused to finance producers, banks avoided them as well. 
Emancipation and the improvements in transportation, which led to a shift in cotton marketing 
away from factors, served to intensify the role of the factorage house in the production and 
marketing o f naval stores.5
Because factorage houses had to take relatively unsecured risks with their clients, they 
kept a careful watch over each producer’s activities and, through the last decades of the 
nineteenth century, increased their control over the industry. They sold producers all equipment 
and supplies, often on credit, and in many cases even leased them the timber tracts they worked. 
Factors also provided the advances that producers required to support themselves during the 
winter season, when work continued but no gum was harvested, to cover operating costs.6 In
5 A. Stuwart Campbell, Robert C. Unkrich, and Albert C. Blanchard, The Naval Stores 
Industry (Gainesville: Bureau o f Economic and Business Research, College of Business 
Administration, The University o f Florida, 1934), 13.
6 Martin, “Historical and Analytical Approach,” 256; Herbert L. Kayton, interview by 
Roy R. White, transcript, 7 October 1959, Forest History Society, Durham, NC, 4; Davis, 
Encyclopedia o f American Forest. 475.
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January 1900, for example, Hervey Evans complained that he was spending about $1000 a month 
with no money coming in and his workers were busy cutting boxes, not harvesting gum. “It will 
be two months before any thing will be coming in—it is all spend spend now.”7 As during the 
antebellum years, factors tended to focus on one commodity. In 1888 one Savannah factor
explained that “we have too large a naval stores business to occupy our minds with cotton ”*
Factors stayed informed on labor, weather, and market conditions, anything that could affect 
business, and remained in continuous contact with their clients regarding these matters. They 
advised producers on leasing and purchasing timber as well as on matters relating to their 
business operation policies. Because their enterprises depended on their clients’ success, factors 
encouraged a good business environment, and sound decisions.9 In 1891 one Savannah factor 
resigned as a member o f the Georgia Railroad commission’s Savannah branch when the 
commission voted to allow a rate increase for naval stores and lumber that he believed would
“injure the causes of the mill and naval stores men ” “As a naval stores factor,” he explained,
“I represent the producer to a certain extent and I do not care to remain in an association whose 
president’s interests are inimical to my own.”10
Although factors usually made a profit from each o f their clients, losses occasionally 
occurred. It was a common practice to roll accounts over year after year, but when the factor
7 Hervey Evans to Susan Murphy Evans, 6 January 1900, Martha Virginia McNair Evans 
Patterson Papers, Southern Historical Collection, The University of North Carolina at Chapel 
Hill.
8 John Avery Gere Carson to J. P. Williams, 10 September 1888, John Avery Gere 
Carson Papers, Manuscripts Collection, Georgia Historical Society.
9 Martin, “Historical and Analytical Approach,” 256; Kayton interview, 4; Davis, 
Encyclopedia of American Forest 475.
10 John Avery Gere Carson to Savannah Branch, Southern Travelers’ Association, 30 
May 1891, Carson Papers.
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sensed serious problems at an operation, he protected himself by taking possession o f the leases 
or mortgage on the land, animals, and equipment He then sought another producer to take over 
the operation. Factors ordinarily did not market naval stores directly to consumers. Rather, the 
majority of their sales were to dealers who resold the products mostly to the industrial 
manufacturers who ultimately used the goods.11
During the last three decades o f the nineteenth century, producers and factors, dependent 
on each other for successful business, began efforts, not always jointly agreed upon, to improve 
the naval stores market In 1874, a group of turpentiners met in Florence, South Carolina, to 
organize the Turpentine Manufacturing Association in an effort to coordinate business policies 
they hoped would improve the trade, which at the time was suffering from a recent economic 
depression. Like the Grange, which addressed farmers’ needs, this association hoped to improve 
the life of turpentine operators. Action was required, the producers argued, to protect themselves 
and their factors from a “common calamity,” they then set out to identify the principal causes for 
declining business. They complained that the world’s markets were “copiously supplied” with 
turpentine. The high cost of marketing and transporting their produce also cut into profits. Not 
only were the fees o f factors, railroads, and shipping lines excessively high, they complained, but 
“the irregular manipulations of inspectors and weighers together with the impervious regulations 
of the Chamber of Commerce, do not comport with the constant decreasing price of produce.” 
Finally, “the high rents, high labor and low prices for Turpentine are simply preposterous.”12
At the same meeting, organizers unanimously elected officers and adopted several 
resolutions, including a promise to discharge all workers laboring on old and unprofitable boxes
11 Martin, “Historical and Analytical Approach,” 256; Kayton interview, 4; Davis, 
Encyclopedia of American Forest. 475; Campbell, et al., Naval Stores Industry. 13.
12 “Turpentine Manufacture,” Marion. South Carolina Star. 15 July 1874, Darlington 
County Historical Commission, Darlington, SC.
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and any other unneeded workers. This measure probably represented an effort to raise market 
prices by reducing production. Members were to request rate reductions from transportation 
lines and commission merchants as well as relaxed regulation by chambers o f commerce. Any 
producers in the southern states not represented at the meeting were to organize themselves into 
councils, elect officers, and report to the Florence association, which would furnish them with 
information and instruction about the organization. Copies of the meeting proceedings were to 
be sent for publication to the Charleston and Wilmington papers and local papers in South 
Carolina.13
Most important, the Association recommended that producers and factors work together 
since their interests were intertwined. Because of declining prices, producers were becoming 
increasingly indebted which not only jeopardized their own business but threatened to bring the 
factors down with them. They recommended that producers put themselves in the factors’ hands 
and appealed to “the factors, transportation lines, and the good sense o f any party anywise [sic] 
connected with the turpentine business to do their utmost in restoring life to its wasting 
prosperity, in order to avert a pecuniary and commercial calamity to the whole country.. . . ” 
Their success with this organization, the producers believed, was assured by their past 
perseverance. “We belong not to any despondent or croaking class of men,” they declared, 
“having heretofore bravely withstood the most ingenious machinations of speculators, 
irregularities of weighers and inspectors, the reverses of Yankeedom, the uncertainties of 
negrodom, disease, disaster and almost death, yet in the face of defeat many by perseverance and 
energy have achieved splendid victories and established industry and economy in many wild and 
desolate places.”14 The success o f this organization is uncertain because nothing is heard about it
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
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again. Given the record o f cooperative schemes, however, the organization probably dissolved 
quickly. Not only did the factors of this period lack the size and coordination to effectively 
direct the market, but operators rarely adhered to their directives regarding production. Prices 
fluctuated widely over time and, when they declined, producers often decided to reduce the 
number o f boxes they would cut for the coming year. But an operator might plan to increase his 
production instead, planning to profit from the other’s inactivity. Many of his fellow producers, 
however, had the same idea and overproduction usually continued. Also, because the association 
was organized in northeastern South Carolina, an area which quickly passed from prominence in 
turpentine production after the 1870s, its organizers would have either left the business or 
scattered to other areas with fresh pines, making the group’s cohesion nearly impossible to 
maintain. It is known that Henry L. Morris o f Timmonsville, South Carolina, one of the leaders 
of the turpentine producers meeting, later joined other Darlington County men who moved to the 
Florida panhandle in the 1870s and 1880s to continue in the turpentine business.IS
When, in the late 1880s, factors initiated efforts to influence prices by controlling 
production, they met with little more success than had the turpentine producers in the previous 
decade. For much of the 1880s turpentine prices remained relatively steady, between 30.750 and 
34.50 per gallon, although they did dip as low as 28.750 cents in the 1884/1885 season.
Moreover, rosin prices dropped so low that speculators, almost certain values could not go any 
lower, were ordering thousands of barrels with the intention o f unloading them when prices rose. 
However increasing production costs rendered the industry less and less profitable. In 1888 
Savannah factors put out a circular asking producers to stop barreling their rosin. The factor’s 
plan would help those who would lose profits from reduced handling and commission fees, but 
benefit as the value of their rosin stock rose. In the long run producers would also benefit from
15 Richard C. Cook, “The Forgotten Industry in Tar Heel State,” Naval Stores Review 
(July 1967), 9; Horance F. Rudisill to author, 3 June 1996, letter in author’s files.
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the rise in prices, but in the immediate future take a loss by discarding, rather than selling their 
rosin, which would have brought in low returns but returns nonetheless. It is uncertain what role 
the factors’ program played in influencing market prices, but rosin values did indeed rise. 
Between 1889 and 1892 prices rose to an average o f 38.50, but dropped in 1893 with the 
depression of that year to around 270.16
In February 1894, Savannah factors tried a more direct approach to reduce production; 
they restricted capital advances to manufacturers. The factors feared that at the rate producers 
were cutting boxes that year, by mid-March there would be ten percent more new boxes than the 
year before, resulting in a glutted market of virgin turpentine and high grade rosin by late spring 
at a time when prices were already depressed from the Panic of 1893. From the factors’ 
perspective, production limits were necessary for two reasons: to prevent naval stores prices 
from sinking more, further reducing the value of their stock, and to help already-overdrawn 
producers avoid further credit problems. Producers, however, saw the factors’ move as 
strangulation and hoped to compensate for the lower prices by increasing their production of high 
grade turpentine and rosin by chopping new boxes. But despite the factors’ efforts, turpentine 
production continued to increase. By the last half of the 1890s, the value of naval stores 
production reached nearly $10 million with 2.5 million acres under harvest and nearly one 
million acres o f virgin boxes begun each year.17
In their effort to compensate for the low prices, turpentiners continued to overproduce, 
but since prices remained low, the business remained unprofitable. Conditions became so
16 John Avery Gere Carson to J. P. Williams, 11 September 1888 and John Avery Gere 
Carson to Editor Momine News. 17 April 1893, Carson Papers.
17 John Avery Gere Carson to F. W. B., 6 February 1894, Carson Papers; ‘‘Naval Stores 
History.’’ Naval Stores Review 100 (March/April 1990): 7; W. G. Wahlenberg, Loneleaf Pine: Its 
Use. Ecology. Regeneration. Protection. Growth, and Management. (Washington, DC: Charles 
Lathrop Pack Forestry Foundation, 1946), 18.
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desperate that producers agreed to work with factors to reduce the number o f boxes. As one 
factor explained, “the factors and operators realizing that they were fast using up their best asset 
(Virgin Pine Timber), without profit and without hope of replacing same, determined to bring 
about some united action that would put their business on a profitable basis once more.” Their 
dramatic plan called for cutting only one-third the number of boxes that producers cut for the 
previous season, thus reducing the production of fine turpentine and rosin by sixty-six percent. 
By reducing the number of new boxes so dramatically, the plan was expected to cut overall 
turpentine production in 1897 by twenty percent. Producers still had much of the current year’s 
high grades at their camps, but, with the support of the factors, agreed no to ship it out at the low 
prices. Even the few producers who worked using their own capital and “who are not 
controlled,” were reportedly agreed to this plan. “For the first time factors and manufacturers are 
united and in accord on this subject,” a factor explained.18
Their cooperative plan failed and prices dropped even lower than those of 1893. By May 
1897 they reached between 25.50 and 260.19 Persistent low prices and the continued reliance on 
factors for operating capital drove out many small producers. The Northeastern Lumberman 
reported that:
it looks as if this industry ought to give consistent independent work to every 
unemployed man in the South, as if a man need only to buy a few acres of pine land at $2 
to $3 an acre, or better yet, rent a tract for the purpose of ‘Turpentining’ it, as it is called, 
and be sure of making a good living for the next four years by tapping the trees all on his 
own account; in other words, to be as independent as the small farmer who raises his 
own crops. This was so once, but it is not the case now. Capital has been as busy with 
turpentining as it has been with the other industries, and it is practically impossible for a 
small owner to get even the price of his labor by turpentining his own little tract. The 
big producers set the pace, and there is no longer any chance for small operators.20
18 John Avery Gere Carson to J. P. Williamson, 21 September 1896, Carson Papers.
19 John Avery Gere Carson to Thomas Gamble, 8 May 1897, Carson Papers.
20 “Turpentine Orchards,” The Northeastern Lumberman. 22 August 1896, in Turpentine 
Newsciipping File, Forest History Society, Durham, NC.
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Whether initiated by producers or factors or through a cooperative effort by both, the 
failure of their schemes to raise prices by reducing production was not an uncommon result. 
Similar plans in other industries often yielded the same outcome. In general, the formation of 
specialized business associations occurred most frequently among industries, such as 
turpentining, in which the individual producers were evenly matched in manufacturing 
capabilities. Turpentiners also displayed typical behavior in that their voluntary agreements to 
reduce output tended to collapse during periods of depression when producers commonly tried to 
manufacture at full capacity to compensate for low prices. During such periods of economic 
decline, it was usual for evenly matched firms to continue production. According to this fixed- 
cost theory, Naomi Lamoreaux explains, “prices might hover indefinitely at a level too low to 
enable firms to break even, but too high to compel them to shut down.”21 Thus, during the 1870s 
and especially the 1890s, when low naval stores prices drove small producers out of the business, 
medium- and small-sized operators either held steady or increased their production.22
Since attempts to reduce production failed, factors looked for more efficient ways to 
handle and store turpentine to save both them and the producers money. As early as the late 
1870s, railroads began using 3,500-gallon tanks, originally intended to store kerosene, to 
transport turpentine, saving producers the cost of barrels and shipping them. In the 1890s the 
factors in Savannah, whose port in the early 1880s had replaced Wilmington as the largest naval 
stores exporter, began constructing a storage tank for their turpentine marketing. Their plan 
involved a 12,700-barreI-capacity tank, which would cost SI0,300 and reduced the need for and
21 Naomi R. Lamoreaux, The Great Merger Movement in American Business. 1895-1904 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 25, 27,45, 52.
^Although turpentine production declined by 6.3 percent between 1893 and 1894, from 
1895 to 1898 output rose nearly 37 percent over that o f the depression year. Joseph B. Hosmer, 
Economic Aspects o f  the Naval Stores Industry (Atlanta: Georgia School o f Technology, 1948),
35.
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expense associated with barrels. Orders for turpentine could be either sold in barrels, which the 
factor resold for 50 each and filled by an automatic system, or piped into a tanker waiting at the 
wharf. When a producer brought in his turpentine, the factor would issue him a tank receipt for 
the number of barrels negotiable with the dealer upon payment o f all charges. The factor stored 
the barrels in which the producers shipped their turpentine and opened a barrel account. Because 
an increasing number o f barrels were machine made, and thus nearly identical, it was 
unnecessary to keep track of each barreFs original owner.23
Both factors and producers benefited from the tank. Not only did the tank lower costs, 
but it made handling costs for producers more predictable. The cost o f  storing turpentine in the 
tank was fixed. Costs associated with turpentine leakage and the required cooperage to repair the 
barrel, however, depended on what condition the barrel arrived to the factor. The average cost to 
the producer for the factor to store a barrel of turpentine was to 36.50. Because of leakage, the 
cost rose in proportion to the length of time the barrel sat on the yard. However, the monthly 
charge for storage in a tank was only 26.50—130 for storage, 12.50 for labor, 10 for storing the 
empty barrel. The monthly revenue generated for the factor by the 12,700-barrel tank was 
estimated at $1714.5—$1587.50 for storage of 635,000 at .250 per gallon and $127 for storing
127,000 empty barrels at 10 each.24
Not only did Savannah’s naval stores interests demonstrate innovation and the growing 
efforts to limit production and improve marketing efficiency, but they also improved the pricing 
structure and standards for naval stores products. Savannah’s control o f the naval stores trade
23 Franklin B. Hough, Report Upon Forestry, vol. I, (Washington, DC: United States 
Department of Agriculture, 1878), 139; John Avery Gere Carson to J. W. Blount, 11 May 1894, 
Storage Tank descriptions and estimates in letter book 2, and Carson to G. F. Stahl, 19 June 
1893, Carson Papers.
24 John Avery Gere Carson to J. W. Blount, 11 May 1894, Storage Tank descriptions and 
estimates in letter book 2, and Carson to G. F. Stahl, 19 June 1893, Carson Papers.
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tightened as increasing amounts of turpentine moved through the port. In 1874 the city’s only 
daily paper began quoting rosin and turpentine prices. Only one factor specialized in naval 
stores, although other commission merchants would handle any naval stores products sent to 
them. The next year naval stores traders formed an informal association to maintain statistics on 
the trade and post prices. In the next five years, naval stores traffic through Savannah exploded 
and, by 1883, it was the busiest naval stores port in the world. To manage this increased trade, 
the port’s naval stores factors founded the Savannah Naval Stores Exchange in July 1882, but the 
next year amended the charter to create the Savannah Board of Trade which oversaw all the 
port’s activity. Three factors and three brokers or exporters sat on the Board’s division that 
handled naval stores. Board members served revolving terms so that every two months one 
factor and one broker were replaced. Their duties included enforcing inspection regulations, 
setting standards o f quality and grade, settling disputes among its members, promoting its 
members’ interests, and expanding Savannah’s trade facilities. However, their most important 
job was setting the daily price quotes. At the beginning of each morning, factors made offers and 
the brokers placed bids. From these figures the quotation committee made up of factors, brokers, 
and exporters, arrived at a quoted price for the day and posted the market’s “tone:” strong, firm, 
steady, quiet, weak, dull, etc. Savannah’s Board of Trade daily set the standard naval stores 
prices for United States until 1950.25
25 Thomas Purse, “How the Savannah Board o f Trade Fixes Prices and Regulates the 
Trade,” in Naval Stores: History. Production. Distribution and Consumption, ed. Thomas 
Gamble (Savannah: Review Publishing & Printing Company, 1921), 56, Thomas Gamble, 
“Savannah as a Naval Stores Port, 1875-1920,” in Naval Stores: History. Production. 
Distribution and Consumption, ed. Thomas Gamble (Savannah: Review Publishing & Printing 
Company, 1921), 59-61; Davis, Encyclopedia of American Forest. 478-479; I. James PikI, Jr., A 
History of Georgia Forestry (Athens: Bureau of Business and Economic Research, The 
University of Georgia, 1966), 8; Eldon Van Romaine, “Naval Stores, 1919-1939,” Naval Stores 
Review 100 (July/August 1990): 10.
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In the absence o f national naval stores standards, the Savannah Board of Trade made 
efforts in the 1890s to institute more uniform industry product regulations than the chaotic, state- 
by-state system that then existed. In the late 1870s North Carolina and Florida had the most 
extensive naval stores regulations. North Carolina’s standards differed little from its antebellum 
requirements. Turpentine barrels had to weigh 280 pounds gross and all naval stores products 
were to be free o f fraudulent mixtures. Barrels were to be well-made and o f specified 
dimensions and well-hooped. North Carolina also required that barrels be branded with either an 
“S” for soft or “H” for hard. South Carolina only asked that a barrel o f turpentine weigh 280 
pounds gross and Georgia had few requirements of its own, it only asked that naval stores were 
to be barreled “as in North Carolina.” Florida’s requirements were considerably more complex 
than even North Carolina’s. In the Sunshine State, barrels were marked with either a “V” for 
virgin gum, “D” for yellow dip, or “S” for scrape, and if the virgin or yellow dip was impure it 
was to be marketed with either a “V” or “D” and the letter circled. Barrels were to be the same 
size as those in North Carolina. Florida gave inspectors a number o f reasons to penalize 
producers for inferior naval stores. If the dip and scrape contained burnt cinders, sand, chips, 
straw, bark, or any other impurities, if virgin or yellow dip were mixed together or with scrape, if 
it contained water or had been injured by long standing or leakage or if  it was packaged in 
unmarketable barrels, inspectors would order deductions. To remedy this confusing system 
which resulted in product inconsistency, in 1894 the Savannah Board o f Trade established the 
Office of Supervisor to ensure naval stores standards. The requirements set up by this office 
applied only to naval stores leaving the port of Savannah. But as the most important exported of 
these products, Savannah’s standards increasingly set the rule for the whole industry. When the 
federal government established standards in the 1920s it would use Savannah’s .26
26 Hough, Report Upon Forestry. 139-140; Purse, “How the Savannah Board of Trade 
Fixes Prices,” 56; “Savannah as a Naval Stores Port,” 59-61; Davis, Encyclopedia o f American 
Forest 478-479; Pikl, History o f  Georgia Forestry. 8.
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Although the marketing of naval stores unproved in some respects during the late 
nineteenth century, production methods, except for slight advancements in distilling, remained 
essentially unchanged. There was one significant improvement to distilling after the Civil War, 
the addition of water during the distilling process. Without water, gum begins to distill at 363° 
F. Rosin, however, starts to decompose at 392° F, meaning that distillers, without the benefit of 
temperature gauges, were required to regulate the still temperature within a 29° range by 
listening to the sound o f the boiling gum and observing the rate of spirits o f  turpentine running 
from the worm. But by adding water, distillers did not need to bring the still temperature so 
dangerously high. Liquids boil when their vapor pressure equals or slightly exceeds the 
atmospheric pressure. Water boils at 212° F., spirits o f turpentine at 313° F., and gum, which is 
a combination of spirits and rosin, at 363° F. However, when mixed together, water and gum 
will boil when the sum o f their pressure equals the atmosphere vapor pressure. Thus the mixture 
of water and gum allowed turpentine distillation at a temperature of only 302° F. which not only 
increased the yield and quality of the turpentine, but also provided a fine, light-colored rosin.27 
After one-and-a-half hours of distilling, the original water ran out and more needed to be added. 
It was said that at this point the still had “gone to water.” After charging the still and heating the 
gum enough to melt it, the distiller began the flow of a small stream o f water from the 
condensing tank. Lower grade gum required more water to be added. The water continued to 
flow into the still until the spirits stopped flowing from the worm.28
27 A.W. Schorger and H.S. Betts, The Naval Stores Industry (Wahington, DC: United 
States Department o f  Agriculture, 1915), 12-14.
28 Charles Mohr, Timber Pines of the Southern United States (Washington, DC: United 
States Department o f  Agriculture, 1897), 70; Robson Dunwody, “Proper Methods of Distillation 
and Handling in the Production of Turpentine and Rosin,” in Naval Stores: History. Production. 
Distribution and Consumption, ed. Thomas Gamble (Savannah: Review Publishing & Printing 
Company, 1921), 128; James Berthold Berry. Farm Woodlands (Yonkers-on Hudson, NY: World
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But whereas the addition o f water allowed for the production o f a somewhat higher grade 
of spirits and rosin, distillers continued to face the challenges o f regulating the devices by the 
most primitive o f methods, necessitating a clear understanding o f their limitations. Forester 
Charles Mohr discovered that the average still in use in the 1890s had a capacity of about eight 
hundred gallons, which could hold a charge of twenty to twenty-five barrels of crude turpentine. 
Mohr estimated that each still required about four thousand acres o f pine forest or twenty crops 
to receive two charges a day during the gum-yielding months. At this rate such a still would 
produce 120,000 gallons of spirits and 2,800,000 pounds o f rosin in four years.29 The size of a 
charge a distiller loaded in was determined by the character of the gum. Generally, newer gum 
allowed for larger charges. When distilling virgin dip, the still operator could fill the still to 
three-fourths of its capacity, but for dip and scrape from boxes over four to five years old, one- 
third capacity was allowable. This limitation was a result o f the older dip and scrap’s tendency 
to rise and foam into the still head where it could force its way out through the collar which 
connected the worm head to the top o f the still body. Such a leak could result in a fire on the 
platform which could easily consume the entire facility.30 Mohr observed that distilling “requires 
care and experience to obtain largest quantities of rosin o f highest grade and to guard against 
overheating.”31
Book Company, 1923), 344; A. David King, ID, interview by author, 14 June 1996, Georgia 
Agrirama, Tifion, GA.
29 The term twenty or twenty-five barrel still referred to the still’s total capacity, not the 
number a barrels in each charge. Mohr, Timber Pines o f the Southern United States. 69, 71; 
Thomas D. Clark, The Greening of the South: The Recovery of Land and Forest (Lexington: The 
University Press o f Kentucky, 1984), 22; Schorger and Betts, Naval Stores Industry. 27.
30 Schorger and Betts, Naval Stores Industry. 27-28.
31 Mohr, Timber Pines of the Southern United States. 70.
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Harvesting and distilling practices used after the war and into the early twentieth century 
remained identical to those used during the antebellum period. Producers continued to instruct 
their laborers to cut multiple boxes in the pine’s bases and to chip the faces wide and deep. 
Conservation was never a consideration, only working one tract until it was exhausted and then 
moving on to the next. The tools and equipment also remained the same. Boxing axes, hacks, 
puller, dipper, scrapers, and stills were neither improved or replaced. This lack of advancement 
was not an unusual characteristic of southern industry. In the cases o f lumber and textile 
manufacture, both o f which employed the most up-to-date equipment, the technology was 
developed outside the South. Gavin Wright characterizes southern industry as low-wage, low- 
skill, and employing not only imported technology, but usually imported machines. The South 
did not develop an indigenous base o f mechanics and engineers who could develop the 
technology required by the region.32 “It was a ‘country’ that was not large enough or strong 
enough or cohesively organized enough to have its own technology, its own industrial standards, 
specifications, techniques,” Wright maintains.33 Because the naval stores industry was almost 
completely southern-owned and operated and had not existed outside the region since the 
colonial era, the techniques remained stagnant.
Not surprisingly, the continued use of traditional turpentining practices produced the 
same destructive results that they had in North Carolina before the war. To understand fully the 
potential environmental devastation caused by the turpentine industry, a late nineteenth-century 
observer argued, “it is only necessary to examine the condition of the Pine-forests in eastern 
North Carolina, where the turpentine industry was first established and has thus been longest
32 “The Changing Situation in the Naval Stores Field,” address to members of the 
Georgia Forestry Association, American Turpentine Farmers Association Papers, Georgia 
Agrirama, Tifton GA; Gavin Wright, Old South. New South: Revolutions in the Southern 
Economy Since the Civil War (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1986), 60-61, 173.
33 Wright, Old South. New South. 157.
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practiced, to realize the effect it has on our forests.”34 In the second half o f 1893, two 
particularly powerful storms significantly damaged North Carolina turpentine orchards. One in 
August harmed only abandoned orchards, but an October storm caused considerable damage to 
ail trees, especially boxed pines. Severe damage was scattered across southeastern North 
Carolina, but its force was not uniform, with the heaviest damage occurring in Columbus,
Bladen, Sampson, and Johnston Counties. Round timber survived surprisingly well, but boxed 
pines tended to break at the box. Several thousand acres o f abandoned turpentine pines blew 
down and most o f the timber was a total loss.35
Like the traditional harvesting methods, the folk practice of burning the forest also 
continued. Each spring piney woods people fired the woods to kill pests and vermin, drive out 
game, and encourage grass growth.36 One witness reported that when fires were set around the 
turn of the century “huge clouds of smoke would rise skyward and, depending on the wind 
direction, would come over our neighborhood for days.”37 As during the antebellum period, 
southerners raked the pine straw and debris from the trees’ base so that fire would not damage 
them. However, when these fires got out of control, they not only destroyed seeds and seedlings 
but injured the older trees as well. In the long run, they interfered with reproduction and, if hot 
enough to consume all vegetation, caused significant erosion.38 The South’s lower classes were
34 C. G. Pringle, “Waste in the Turpentine Industry,” Garden and Forest. 4 (4 February
1891): 50.
35 W. W. Ashe, The Forests. Forest Lands, and Forest Products of Eastern North Carolina 
(Raleigh: North Carolina Geological Survey, 1894), 92.
36 Clark, Greening o f the South. 7.
37 Erwin Duke Stephens, “Longleaf Pine Country,” 26 September 1984, Erwin Duke 
Stephens Papers, Special Collections Library, Duke University.
38 S. G. Thigpen, A Bov in Rural Mississippi and Other Stories (Picayune, MS: S. G. 
Thigpen, 1966), 181; Stephens, “Longleaf Pine Country;” Clark, Greening of the South. 9.
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viewed in the late nineteenth centuiy as the leading culprits in forest burning. W. W. Ashe in 
1893 maintained that “the danger and loss occasioned by fires in the forests is not sufficiently 
understood by the class o f persons who are generally the cause of them.”39 The poorer piney 
woods classes were not, however, the only ones burning the forest. Turpentine producers 
continued the practice as well and exhibited a similarly stubborn persistence in burning. Because 
their economic needs called for the practice and their cultural patterns encouraged its 
continuation, it was a difficult task for the increasing number of professionally trained foresters 
to end the burning.40
The combination of destructive gum harvesting practices and negligent burning had the 
same harmful effect on the southern pine forest that it did in the antebellum years. By 1860, the 
pines around Washington, North Carolina were nearly exhausted. New Bern, however, saw a 
flow of naval stores from the region served by the Neuse for a few more years. But just after 
production recovered following the war it soon began a decline and virtually ended by the 1880s. 
Within ten years, eighty percent o f the small amount o f naval stores still produced in North 
Carolina came from back-boxed trees. Whereas, in 1860 North Carolina produced 96.7 percent 
of the naval stores in the U.S., in 1870 that percentage had dropped to 65.2; by 1880 it had fallen 
to 29.9 and, in 1890, to 21.1.41
When forester W. W. Ashe surveyed eastern North Carolina’s forests in the early 1890s, 
he found that “the distribution of the pines and the respective area occupied by each in this State
39 Ashe, Forests. Forest Lands, and Forest Products. 91.
40 Clark, Greening of the South. 10; Thomas Hansbrough, “Human Behavior and Forest 
Fires,” in Southern Forests and Southern People, ed. Thomas Hansbrough (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1963), 23-24.
41 Ashe, Forests. Forest Lands, and Forest Products. 76; Cook, “Forgotten Industry,” 9; 
Michael Williams, Americans and Their Forests: A Historical Geography (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1989), 160.
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has changed a great deal since the first exploration of the country.”42 Much of the living longleaf 
stands in the state consisted o f abandoned turpentine trees left to the mercy o f the wind and fire 
and a small number o f round trees rapidly consumed by saw mills. As late as 1893, there were
718,000 acres of abandoned turpentine orchards in North Carolina. The greatest majority of 
these tracts were to be found in the Cape Fear Valley counties. Only 55,876 acres of round 
longleaf pine remained, less than ten percent o f the area covered by abandoned turpentine trees, 
down from the four to five million acres that grew in the state when turpentining first began to 
boom in the 1840s, and about the same number o f trees put into turpentine production on a yearly 
basis during the industry’s heyday. And just as late antebellum observers had reported, Ashe 
found that the destroyed longleaf forests were more often replaced by thickets and other pine 
species than by second-growth longleaf. The nature of the vegetation that replaced the pines 
depended on the area’s soil composition. Eastern North Carolina possessed two different soil 
types: level sandy loam soils and deep sandy soils, the latter located primarily in the sandhill 
region. Loblolly and oak replaced the longleaf on the level soils, but only scrub oak and an 
occasional loblolly grew in the sandhill. Whereas much of the former longleaf area came back in 
loblolly, over 400,000 acres had grown up into what Ashe termed “wasteland.” He explained 
that “owing to the grossest neglect, large portions of these forests have either been destroyed 
entirely or reduced to such a condition that there is neither mill not turpentine timber on them.. .  
.” He predicted that the declining North Carolina turpentine production in the 1890s would soon 
end forever because the remaining longleaf grew in such small and widely spaced bodies that 
they were not worth the cost o f boxing and because the longleaf was not reproducing itself.
These forests were disappearing at the rate that lumber companies cut them. Ashe estimated that
42 Ashe, Forests. Forest Lands, and Forest Products. 18.
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in 1880 there were over five billion board feet of marketable longleaf pine in North Carolina but 
between then and the early 1890s, that amount had dropped by two billion board feet.43
By the 1890s, North Carolina’s southern neighbors could foresee a similar devastation.
In fact South Carolina entered an advanced stage of depletion as early as the 1880s. The rapid 
destruction of that state’s longleafs was reflected in a pessimistic South Carolinian’s comment in 
1884 that “business this year is uncommonly dull + the outlook anything but cheerful. Many 
planters are forced into liquidation the area of new planting very small, +  the turpentine business 
almost at an end as the trees are skinned to death so our future is not rose-colored.”44 Even in 
Georgia producers by the 1880s moved after exploiting the original acres they had come to 
turpentine. In 1881 Joseph A. Backer & Company, which had begun turpentining land served by 
the Brunswick and Albany Railroad, had already exhausted fourteen thousand acres and was then 
working ten crops on about two thousand acres with twenty laborers.45
In states where turpentining remained vigorous, increases in production came at the 
expense of younger and younger pines as the virgin stands disappeared. In an 1897 report 
prepared for the Department of Agriculture’s new Division of Forestry, forester Charles Mohr 
explained that turpentine orchards were commonly abandoned after four years because the gum 
quality was not thought to be profitable enough to justify working the older boxes. As a result, 
larger trees were disappearing and producers were forced to use smaller pines. Before the late 
1890s, producers rarely boxed tress with a diameter smaller than fourteen inches. But by 1897 
they worked trees smaller than ten inches across. The disease, decay, and fire that commonly
43 Ibid., 42-44, 51-52, 86, 89.
44 T. P. Baily to Doctor, 16 February 1884, Thomas J. Makie Papers, Special Collections 
Library, Duke University.
45 Joseph Tillman and C. P. Goodyear, Southern Georgia: A Pamphlet (Savannah, GA: 
Savannah Times Steam Printing House, 1881), 49.
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killed abandoned turpentine trees prevented these smaller trees from maturing and reproducing. 
“In consequence,” Mohr explained, “the forests invaded by turpentine orcharding present, in five 
or six years after they have been abandoned, a picture o f ruin and desolation painful to behold, 
and in view of the destruction of the seedlings and the younger growth all hope o f the restoration 
of these magnificent forests is excluded.”46
Lumber companies, which had an economic incentive to cut the forests cleanly and 
rapidly, contributed even more to the South’s forest loss.47 Lumber companies added to the 
damage by not only cutting quickly, but clear-cutting as well. They paid high taxes on standing 
timber which, if felled, drastically reduced the property’s value. Selectively cut forests often 
failed to relieve the company’s tax burden because tax assessors were reluctant to reevaluate 
timber stands which companies only partially harvested. Also, clear-cutting provided the most 
efficient means to convert the timber stand to cash when companies became overextended. 
Finally, companies saw no benefit from allowing the fully mature trees, as most were, to 
continue standing. The longer they were left, the more opportunity rot and insects had to damage 
their value.48
46 Mohr, Timber Pines of the Southern United States. 69, 70, 72.
47 Stockholder investors, who financed the large lumber companies and expected 
dividends, made immediate profits more important than efforts toward sustainability. Also, 
many o f the large lumber companies were heavily indebted for the tens and hundreds of 
thousands of acres they purchased and were thus forced to cut as fast as they could to gain the 
quickest short-term profits needed to make payments on interest and principle. Moreover, states 
taxed farm and timber land at the same rate even though forests brought no annual return. To 
avoid another year o f taxes, timber companies cut their stands as soon as possible and then 
abandoned the property. Martin, “Historical and Analytical Approach,” 92-93, 101-103; 
Williams, Americans and Their Forests. 279, 283-284.
48 Lumber companies attempted to market cutover land as farm property. The plan was 
welcomed by states seeking to increase their tax base and by railroads hoping to haul the new 
farmer’s freight. Promoters of cutover land in Georgia claimed that “our pine lands have an 
intrinsic value for agricultural purposes not dreamed o f by their owners.” One even claimed that 
“the pine lands were worth more per acre with the timber off than with it on.” But much of the 
former timber land was too infertile to sustain agriculture and more farmers left such plots than 
stayed. Turpentiners faced a similar problem in their attempts to divest themselves of property
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Although the destruction associated with turpentining, lumbering, and burning the forest 
was widely recognized by nineteenth-century southerners, most viewed the forest clearance as a 
sign of spreading civilization and as the inevitable price o f progress. Thomas Clark explains that 
a large percentage of the population held the folk belief that untamed forests represented a 
barrier to civilized society, just as Europeans had thought centuries before.49 Agriculture, not 
timber product production, they believed, was the way to regional development. In fact they 
viewed the timber almost as a nuisance. One southern booster explained that “to utilize the land 
for agriculture the timber must be cut off. That is the timber and lumberman’s mission. It is 
fortunate that our timber has great commercial value, because the process of clearing the land 
brings a handsome return to the land owner, but if the timber was commercially valueless, we
should then be forced to cut it down and bum it ”s0
Many southerners saw the rapid and complete exploitation of timber as their only means 
of raising their standard o f living. Even if  they viewed the large companies as resource 
exploiters, lumber products were so central to the late-nineteenth-century way of life that both 
the public and the federal government saw no choice but to tolerate their practices.51 James C. 
Cobb explains that “in cases where residents o f the New South were expected to choose between
rendered essentially worthless through years o f harvesting. When two partners divided their 
holdings in a Manatee County, Florida operation after the timber was worked out, they argued 
over who would have to take the valueless property. James C. Cobb, Industrialization and 
Southern Society. 1877-1984 (Chicago: The Dorsey Press, 1984), 127; Karen Harvey, “Maguire 
Bom Into Turpentine Family: Industry Once Had Major Impact on County,” The Compass. 26 
April 1990, 8-9; Elliott Maguire, interview, Oral History Collection, Research Library, St. 
Augustine Historical Society, St. Augustine, FL; Elliott Maguire, interview by author, St. 
Augustine, FL, 5 June 1996.
49 Clark, Greening of the South. 14.
50 Tillman and Goodyear, Southern Georgia. 59.
51 Williams, Americans and Their Forests. 20.
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conservation and economic gain, the latter almost always won out.”52 While ignoring the 
problems of forest depletion, southerners, like the forest product producers, accepted the 
fatalistic view that exploitation was inevitable. A pamphlet promoting Georgia commented that 
turpentine orchards “already cover large areas, and the industry is not likely to slacken till the 
pine is exhausted.” The pamphlet admitted that “timber once cut from these lands cannot be 
replaced. It is the growth o f  centuries.”53 As late as 1921 Thomas Gamble, the editor o f the 
Weekly Naval Stores Review, argued that although lumbermen and turpentiners might have 
exploited the deep South’s timber resources, their activity was necessary to build up the region.
The pine trees of Georgia and Florida and Alabama brought fortunes to many 
among the factors and operators. There is a feeling, more sentimental than 
practical, that this section gave away its heritage in the sacrifice o f its forests and 
the sale of its timber and lumber and naval stores at low values. It is true that in 
some reasons the financial returns were unsatisfactory. But the states in question 
could not remain a wilderness of pines. The advancing wave o f humanity 
demanded homes and the fact that while the lands were being cleared thousands 
and tens o f thousands derived a livelihood from turpentining and saw milling, 
while many acquired a comfortable cometence and some large fortunes, and that 
the wealth thus derived was used for the upbuilding of this section in railroad 
construction and in agriculture and industrial development, compensated for this 
passing of the pine.54
Some producers simply ignored the reality of the pine’s consumption, incorrectly 
believing that ample resources remained and complete depletion lay only in the distant future.55 
For instance, prospective settlers to south Georgia were assured that although “the lands about
52 Cobb. Industrialization and Southern Society. 125.
53 Tillman and Goodyear, Southern Georgia. 48, 59.
54 Gamble, “Savannah as a Naval Stores Port,” 61.
55 Martin, “Historical and Analytical Approach,” 92-93, 101-103; Williams, Americans 
and Their Forests. 279, 283-284.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
278
Hoboken and Schlatterville have been turpentined and partially denuded by cutting for the m ill,.
. .  there is still a superabundance o f timber for all practical and desirable purposes.”56
By the late nineteenth century, however, the American public, including many 
southerners, began casting off their fear of the forest as a wild, threatening, and uncivilized place 
and adopted ideas that intellectuals and artists had begun advocating decades earlier.57 They 
started to view forests as national treasures which benefited man as well as nature. Not only had 
Americans witnessed the deforestation of New England, New York, and the Great Lakes region, 
but increasing numbers lived in cities where they could afford to cast o ff their fear of the 
unknown in wild areas and see them instead as quiet, peaceful places o f escape.58 Consequently, 
readers of tum-of -the-century muckraking periodicals were horrified to learn from exposes of 
the southern pine forest’s rapid disappearance. Writing in 1891 for the magazine Garden and 
Forest, published in New York City, C. G. Pringle revealed to a popular audience that “of the 
extravagant methods which prevail in the United States none certainly exceeds in extravagance 
than that under which the turpentine industry o f the south is conducted; and there is no business 
connected with the products of the soil which yields so little return in proportion to the 
destruction of material involved.” Pringle explained how the harvesting o f gum to supply one 
still for three years used up fifteen thousand acres. At the time, 266 turpentine stills operated in 
Georgia, therefore every three years nearly four million acres in Georgia alone was consumed for
56 Tillman and Goodyear, Southern Georgia. 52.
57 In 1864 George Perkins Marsh’s Man and Nature: The Earth as Modified bv Human 
Action introduced the understanding that the use of one natural resource had profound effects on 
other resources. The next year Frederick Starr published the first warning of a timber famine if 
American clearcutting practices continued at their mid-nineteenth-century pace. In 1877, Carl 
Schurz, Secretary of the Interior, predicted that at the existing rate of consumption, U.S. timber 
supplies would fall Short of needs in twenty years. Donald J. Pisani, “Forests and Conservation,
1865-1890,” in American Forests: Nature. Culture, and Politics, ed. Char Miller (Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 1997), 16, 18,23.
58 Williams, Americans and Their Forests. 18-19.
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turpentine.59 In a 1903 issue o f The World’s Work Overton W. Price, Assistant Forester for the 
Bureau o f Forestry, explained to reform-mined readers that “there is no more deplorable sight to 
the man who has a sense of the value of trees than the abandoned turpentine orchard—a grim 
array o f mutilated trunks, scorched and charred where the box is made, broken by the wind, 
infested by insects, and worthless except to illustrate the futility of killing the goose which lays 
the golden eggs. The South is full o f such pictures.”60 Revelations like this led Americans 
gradually shifted from understanding timber depletion as unfortunate but inevitable to viewing it 
as a national threat.
Alarmed by the rapidly approaching disappearance o f the longleaf pine forest, both the 
federal and state governments, as well as individual producers, made attempts in the late 
nineteenth century to improve the turpentine industry’s efficient use of the South’s declining 
timber supply. One of their few successful efforts was the use of turpentined timber for lumber. 
Until the mid-1890s both lumbermen and consumers believed that turpentined pines were unfit 
for lumber because the drain o f resin from the wood reduced its strength. The lumber and naval 
stores industries consequently used different timber tracts. The loss of wasted boxed timber in 
each of the states o f North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, and Mississippi 
amounted to between three and ten billion board feet, worth several million dollars, each year. In 
the 1890s the Department of Agriculture conducted investigations on the mechanical, physical, 
and chemical attributes o f turpentined and unturpentined wood. Tests showed that turpentined 
trees were just as strong as round timber, and that turpentining did not affect the wood’s weight 
or shrinkage. Also, bled trees contained the same amount o f resin as unworked pines because 
resin only flowed from the sapwood on the very outside of the truck, just underneath the bark.
59 Pringle, “Waste in the Turpentine Industry,” 49-50.
60 Overton W. Price, “Saving the Southern Forests,” The World’s Work 5 (March 1903):
3214.
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The experiments also revealed that the quantity of resin in pines varied greatly naturally, even in 
trees growing side-by-side. Thus the Agriculture Department concluded that turpentined timber 
was appropriate for the same uses as was round timber. The discovery made more timber 
available for sawmills, but did nothing to reduce the destructiveness o f gum harvesting.61
In a small area of the naval stores manufacturing region producers adopted sustainable 
harvesting practices based on the traditional methods. The change, however, was by forced 
necessity more than by choice. North Carolinians had almost completely eliminated the longleaf 
stands in the southeastern comer of their state, but, by the 1890s, the few remaining turpentiners 
had turned to more conservative practices. In the Cape Fear area small producers were said to 
work their trees for ten or more successive years, all the while protecting them from fire. After 
allowing the trees to rest for a few years, producers then cut new boxes in the space left between 
the old, or back boxing. These orchards had been harvested for twenty to thirty-five years. Some 
stands in Sampson and Bladen Counties were said to have been worked intermittently since 1845 
and by the early 1890s continued to yield considerable quantities o f gum.62
In areas where longleaf depletion was not yet as widespread as in North Carolina, a 
search continued for a way to harvest gum intensely without destroying the tree. Some efforts 
were more practical than others. An invention by a Savannah man in the early 1880s proved far
61 Martin, “Historical and Analytical Approach,” 91-92; Schorger and Betts, Naval 
Stores Industry. 40; Nelson Courtlandt Brown, Forest Products: The Harvesting. Processing, and 
Marketing of Materials Other Than Lumber. Including the Principal Derivatives. Extractives, and 
Incidental Products in the United States and Canada (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1950), 
181-83; Charles Mohr, “Effect o f ‘Boxing’ or ‘Bleeding,’” Austin Cary Memorial Forestry 
Collection, Department of Special Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries, The University of 
Florida, 1-2; Martin, “Historical and Analytical Approach,” 92; Asa L. Brower and John O. 
LaFontisee, “Report of the Investigation on the Naval Stores Industry and Statistics o f the 
Production of Turpentine and Rosin for the Seasons of 1907-8 and 1908-9,” Olustee Experiment 
Station Files, Georgia Agrirama, Tifton, GA, 26-27.
62 Mohr, Timber Pines o f  the Southern United States. 70; Ashe, Forests. Forest Lands, 
and Forest Products. 85-86.
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too technical and cumbersome to receive producers’ consideration. I t consisted of a steam boiler 
mounted on a set of wheels, that could be drawn through the woods by two mules. Ten forty- 
yard long flexible steam hoses were attached to the boiler and wound on reels. The inventor 
expected workers to move this apparatus through the forests, intermittently stopping to hook the 
hoses up to ten trees which, because o f the machine’s long hoses, could be spaced out over 
several acres. At the end o f each hose was a light frame that fit completely over boxes up to 
twenty-one inches wide and secured by four hooks driven into the tree. Once all the frames were 
in place, workers would run steam through the hoses to the boxes and melting the gun for 
effective harvesting. The inventor expected only four hands to be able to perform these tasks 
every three minutes. Not only would the steam system save on labor costs, he believed, but 
would improve gum quality because new gum would not have to flow over old gum. Since all 
the gum would be removed from the face by the steam jet, the trees would be rendered less 
flammable. The industry, however, never adopted the system, This remarkably complicated and 
cumbersome contraption reflected the inventor’s complete unfamiliarity with the pine forests’ 
unpredictable terrain, the turpentine producers’ undercapitalization, which prevented investment 
in such expensive technology, the industry’s unskilled work force, which would have to be 
retrained to incorporate this system into the existing work pattern, and the fact that blasting a box 
with steam would do nothing to melt gum dried at the top of a high face.63
A more promising improvement appeared at the 189S Atlanta Cotton States and 
International Exposition where several exhibits focused on southern trees and the naval stores 
industry. The Division o f Forestry exhibited the branches, flowers, foliage, fruit, and wood from 
280 species of southern trees. In another exhibit hall the Savannah Board o f Trade set up an 
instructional exhibit which, by the display of tools, a model of a turpentine still, and samples of
63 “A New Idea in Turpentine Orcharding,” Manufacturers Record. 6 October 1883, 
Turpentine Newsclipping File, Forest History Society, Durham, NC.
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different naval stores products, explained the industry’s method o f manufacturing. At yet 
another exhibit, J. C. Schuler, a  German-born turpentiner who had been producing in the South 
since the Civil War, displayed a method o f using clay cups to collect turpentine. The method 
was said by a reporter to have “the advantage of reducing considerably the danger which ‘boxed’ 
trees are subjected to by fire, while the quality of the product is improved and the individual tree 
is less injured than it is by the method now generally adopted in the United States.” The fair’s 
exhibit judges awarded Schuler’s invention the silver medal.64
Despite its acclaim, Schuler’s system was not new; French turpentiners had made regular 
use of a similar method for over thirty years. Until 1860, French producers collected resin in 
small holes that they dug in the sand at the base of the tapped trees. Not surprisingly, this 
method resulted in an inability to collect all the resin and the contamination o f what was gathered 
with sand and debris. The replacement o f sand holes with clay cups began in 1840, but failed to 
gain much attention until the early 1860s when world turpentine prices soared because of the 
interruption in the United States’ trade. As French production leapt into high gear the drive for 
greater productivity made the cup system popular. The system followed roughly the same 
production schedule as the box system. In February workers chipped off thin layers of bark at 
the tree’s base, where the cup would be placed, so bark would not contaminate the gum when it 
began to run. In March they made an incision at the tree’s base into which they hammered a 
gutter used to guide the gum into a one-quart clay pot, or sometimes a zinc cup hung at the end of 
the gutter. The French chipped the faces above the cup from forty to fifty times each season, 
around fifteen more times that U. S. producers. But in both countries the face rose to a height o f 
twenty inches because the French made smaller scares with each chipping. The French also 
differed from the Americans in their more restrained harvesting practice. In France trees were
64 “Exhibitions,” Garden and Forest 8 (November 1895): 449.
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worked for five years with only one or two faces per tree. Then they permitted the tree to rest for 
several years before the process began again. Their system had two distinct advantages over the 
American. It prolonged the tree’s use for turpentine by reducing injury to the trunk and it gave a 
higher grade product because the cups could be raised each year preventing the gum from having 
to run down the ever-increasing length of the face.65
Americans learned about the French innovation soon after the Civil War ended. In 1868 
a Mr. A. Pudigon o f Moncks Comer, South Carolina, a community about twenty miles north o f 
Charleston, patented a gum-catching receptacle based on the French method but abandoned his 
project for unknown reasons. Information o f the French system became more widely available in 
1878 when it was described in the Department o f Agriculture’s Report Upon Forestry, authored 
by Franklin B. Hough. In 1892 forester Charles Mohr performed a study, sponsored by the 
Division of Forestry, o f the French practice. Two years later, William Witland Ashe, a forester 
with the North Carolina Geological Survey, began experiments with the French method near 
Bladen boro, North Carolina, about fifteen miles east of Lumberton. Conducted at three different 
stations, Ashe’s experiments showed that cups produced one-seventh more turpentine by weight 
than boxes. This amounted to 3S.8 barrels o f dip per cup more than the 250 barrels usually 
yielded. However, other commitments prevented Ashe from completing his work with cups. In 
all, between 1868 and 1895 inventors, including Pudigon and Schuler, registered eleven patents 
for turpentine-collecting devices.66
65 Schorger and Betts, Naval Stores Industry. 19,32; Ashe, Forests. Forest Lands, and 
Forest Products. 94, 96-99; Charles H. Herty, “A New Method o f Turpentine Orcharding,” 
(Washington, DC: United States Department of Agriculture, 1903), 15-16.
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(January 1963): 7; Hough, Report Upon Forestry. 140-142; Davis, Encyclopedia of American 
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By 1895, Schuler’s Atlanta exhibit represented the only sustained effort to develop the 
cup system in the U.S. Beginning his experiments around 1870, he first tried collecting gum in a 
tin cup, but the rosin produced from this gum came out dark and therefore less valuable. The 
first earthen cup he tried could not withstand the gum’s acidity and came apart. Compressed 
paper cups held the gum well but burned when the forests were fired. After the failure of paper 
cups Schuler quit his experiments for a time, but resumed them in 1893 when after requests at 
forty-three different pottery plants he found one manufacturer who could produce a clay cup to 
his specifications. Working on a tract of land owned by a railroad company and located about 
twenty-five miles north of Lake Charles, Louisiana, Schuler experimented with the cup system in 
three crops. Within a year this cup proved a success and Schuler patented it. Using turpentine 
laborers from Georgia, who had to accustom themselves to covering the cup to prevent chips and 
bark from falling into the gum when they used their hacks, he was able to collect twenty-five 
percent more gum of a higher quality from his cup than from a box. This method of turpentining 
was, however, more expensive than using the traditional box method. The cost of working a crop 
for two seasons rose from $ 190 to $460. But this increased cost was expected to be offset by the 
cups increased yield and the higher turpentine and rosin grades that the gum produced.67 
Moreover, Schuler claimed that his less-damaging method made turpentining a sustainable 
practice. “There is no logic in the argument that a tree has only a certain amount o f sap, and 
when that is exhausted it dies,” he argued. “A tree will yield for an indefinite number o f years if 
proper precautions are taken.”68
67 J. C. Schuler to B. E. Femow, 5 October 1894, Turpentine Newsclipping File, Forest 
Histoty Society, Durham, NC; “Turpentine Orchards in South-West Louisiana—A New Process,” 
Southern Lumberman. (April 1895), Turpentine Newsclipping File, Forest History Society, 
Durham, NC; Mohr, Timber Pines of the Southern United States. 71-72; Herty, “New Method of 
Turpentine Orcharding,” 15.
68 “Turpentine Orchards in South-West Louisiana—A New Process.”
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Although Schuler received some coverage in timber industry periodicals, his limited 
means left him unable to continue his experiments or promote his system. He claimed to have 
made money in turpentining but lost these profits in “other investments.” In 1894 he wrote to B. 
E. Femow, the Division o f  Forestry director in Washington, describing his new process.69 
Schuler apparently received no support from Femow. By 1895 he was making his best effort to 
promote his system himself. His Atlanta exhibit was one method. It must have made somewhat 
of an impression for one visitor wrote that his system “either in its present form or with some 
further modifications seems destined to add millions o f dollars to the productive value of the 
Pine forests of the southern states.”70 Schuler also printed his own pamphlets advertising the 
benefits o f his “Great Timber Process of the South.” The fliers explained that his new method 
would not only prevent the extinction of turpentine timber, but would provide a better yield and a 
higher quality gum. One leaflet pictured the bottom portion o f a pine trunk with his round clay 
cup attached. Another depicted a dumbfounded and exhausted turpentine man gazing at his dead 
and fallen boxed timber juxtaposed with a contented and relaxed turpentiner surrounded by the 
bags of money he had made by using Schuler’s cups, which were seen attached to still-healthy 
pines in the background.71
But despite Schuler’s attempts, his cup system failed to attract wide attention and his 
efforts soon ended. Although his Louisiana experiment o f 1895 was considered a success, it was 
also expensive and his backers ended their support of the project.72 By the end of the nineteenth 
century, the old destructive box method remained alive and well. In 1897 the Jacksonville.
69 J. C. Schuler to B. E. Femow, October 5, 1894, Turpentine Newsclipping File.
70 “Exhibitions,” 449.
71 J. C. Schuler, “The Great Turpentine Saving Process o f the South,” Turpentine 
Newsclipping File, Forest History Society, Durham, NC.
72 Dunwody, “Proper Methods of Distillation and Handling,” 127.
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Florida Citizen reported that “many inventors have tried to devise an artificial box to be tacked or 
glued to the tree, in order to obviate the necessity o f  weakening the tree by the savage wound 
which is required to constitute a box. But all these inventions have proven a failure, and have 
been discarded by practical men.”73
The difficulty that the turpentine industry experienced in improving technologically was 
typical of other southern industries. Inadequate investment capital, absence of industry 
researchers and engineers, and producers who preferred traditional and proven methods made 
innovation unlikely. Most turpentine producers lacked the capital to invest in equipment like 
cups. By the 1890s especially, narrow profit margins prevented the accumulation o f  money 
necessary to purchase new technology. Furthermore, turpentine producers lacked the resources 
required to hire scientists and engineers to develop, demonstrate, and endorse improvements.
The newly created U.S. Bureau of Forestry and the state of North Carolina expressed interest in 
developing a new system but failed to follow through with experiments. It is true that J. C. 
Schuler developed a system, but he lacked the means to convince an understandably skeptical 
group of producers to pay a large sum and go through the difficulty o f converting to the system. 
Schuler had no special training in forestry or biology. He was merely a producer who claimed to 
have developed a new system through years of dabbling with different methods in his own 
operation. The fact that he eventually went broke did nothing to enhance the cup system’s 
financial feasibility. In 1921, naval stores researcher Robson Dunwoody recounted that “the 
advancement or reward o f individuals because of better methods introduced or results obtained, 
was seldom encouraged. As a consequence, few men o f technical or other training particularly 
fitting them for this work, were attracted to the industry, and this has no doubt accounted for the
73 “Big Florida Industry,” Jacksonville. Florida Citizen. 7 September 1897, Turpentine 
Newsclipping File, Forest History Society, Durham, NC.
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slow progress along these lines, that has always characterized the manufacture o f naval stores.”74 
Neither Dunwody’s observation, Schuler’s failure, nor the overall lack o f innovation in the 
industry undermines Donald F. Martin’s explanation that turpentining was a backwoods industry 
whose producers held the attitudes of “frontiersmen” and were therefore unreceptive to new 
ideas or advice which could improve their business.75
Asides from relatively minor changes in marketing procedures in Savannah, the naval 
stores industry of the latter third of the nineteenth century differed little from the antebellum 
period. Producers continued their reliance on factorage houses for financial support and 
marketing expertise. And despite efforts by both factors and producers to improve market 
conditions, prices and profit margins remained low. The old harvesting process, which dated 
back to colonial times, also persisted and, consequently, the destruction o f the turpentined timber 
stands continued as well. These practices and their effect on the forest perpetuated the industry’s 
transient nature, forcing turpentiners to move, not only out o f the Carolinas, but throughout the 
lower southeastern pine belt, in search of new trees. As a result, the timber supply which had 
seemed endless in the late 1860s was so seriously diminished by the 1890s that several inventive 
foresters and producers experimented with less destructive methods of harvesting gum. Their 
unsystematic and amateurish attempts, combined with the undercapitalized producers’ inability 
to afford equipment, however, doomed their efforts to failure. The use o f traditional harvesting 
practices represented just one of several connections the naval stores industry maintained with its 
antebellum past. Along with the domination by Carolinians, the role of transportation 
improvements in allowing the industry to spread, the continued reliance on factors, and 
persistence of primitive harvesting practices, the industry’s labor system and working conditions 
represent one more strand of continuity with its antebellum past.
74 Dunwody, “Proper Methods of Distillation and Handling,” 129.
75 Martin, “Historical and Analytical Approach,” 95,97-98.
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Chapter Seven
Narrow Freedom:
Coercive Labor Efforts in the Turpentine Industry
Despite the temporary interruption in production caused by the Civil War and 
emancipation, the lives o f naval stores laborers in the post-war years remained much unchanged 
from the antebellum period. In the absence of slavery, producers, who required cheap and 
reliable labor in the southern pine forests where few blacks lived, devised new methods to force 
newly-freed African American man and women to work for them. With the passage o f labor 
laws and the leasing of state and county convicts, blacks found their decisions regarding work 
narrowed. Moreover, the tasks they performed and the living conditions in the camps were little 
changed from those of antebellum days.
The turpentine producers who moved into the pine forests o f Georgia, Florida, Alabama, 
and Mississippi during the years from the end o f the Civil War to 1900 faced many challenges in 
securing adequate labor. Few native whites would agreed to the hard work, so blacks remained 
the bulk of the industry’s work force. But few blacks lived in the piney woods because the area 
had contained little antebellum plantation agriculture. In Georgia’s Wiregrass region, for 
example, the antebellum black population had been, in some cases, less than five percent of the 
total population and no more than twenty-five percent in others. By comparison, blacks 
represented over half the total population in many of Georgia’s Black Belt counties. Until the 
1880s the great majority o f the South’s pine belt residents were small white farmers who worked 
in turpentining infrequently and gladly left it when the opportunity for different work arose.1
1 E.W. Carswell, Holmesteadine: The History of Holmes County. Florida (Tallahassee: 
Rose Printing Company, 1986), 143; Ann Patton Malone, “Piney Woods Farmers o f South 
Georgia, 1850-1900: Jeffersonian Yeomen in an Age of Expanding Commercialism,”
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They viewed turpentine work as black work and most refused to have anything to do with the 
difficult and low-paying occupation. The manager o f several Florida turpentine camps in the late 
1870s and 1880s explained that turpentine “work is severe to a degree almost impossible to 
exaggerate, and it is very difficult to control a sufficient quantity o f free labor to properly 
cultivate any great number of trees.”2
Changes in black work habits following emancipation also challenged producers’ search 
for labor. Freedmen reduced their pace and the number o f hours they would work to levels 
closer to those o f  other free laborers. In addition, the amount of labor performed by black 
women and children, who had performed such relatively light tasks as dipping, declined 
significantly as freedmen attempted to create the same domestic work pattern enjoyed by whites 
and lifted the burden o f physically exhausting work from family members with less strength. As 
a result, by 1890 ninety-eight percent o f  laborers were men and only 1.9 percent were women. 
Women and children might perform odd jobs to supplement the family income, but families 
typically did not work turpentine forests together.3 Their actions created a severe labor shortage
Agricultural History 60 (Fall 1986): 51, 54, 75; Sam Bowers Hilliard, Atlas o f Antebellum 
Southern Agriculture (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1984), 32-34; J.C. Powell, 
The American Siberia or Fourteen Years’ Experience in a Southern Convict Camp (Montclair, 
NJ: Patterson Smith, 1970), 27.
2 Powell, American Siberia. 27.
3 Dobson and Doyon argue that Georgia’s turpentine labor force was not derived from 
the declining industry in North Carolina. Although they assert that most o f the workers were 
immigrants to the region, they find that only forty percent came from the Tar Heel State. In 1880 
the number of naval stores workers from North Carolina was either equal to or exceeded by those 
from Virginia. These figures, however, are not entirely reliable because many naval stores 
laborers apparently escaped the eye o f census takers. Dobson and Doyon find that for 1870 only 
48 of 138 workers were listed in the population schedule. Jeffrey R. Dobson and Roy Doyon, 
“Expansion o f the Pine Oleoresin Industry in Georgia: 1842 to CA. 1900,” The Southeastern 
United States: Essays on the Cultural and Historical Landscape 18 (June 1979): 49, 51; William 
Cohen, At Freedom’s Edge: Black Mobility and the Southern White Quest for Racial Control. 
1861-1915 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1991), 14; Thomas F. Armstrong, 
“The Transformation o f Work: Turpentine Workers in Coastal Georgia, 1865-1901,” Labor 
History 25 (Fall 1984): 529.
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for turpentine operators who, like other white southerners, expected blacks to work as long and 
as hard as they had as slaves and for almost as little compensation. A post-war De Bow’s 
Review article bemoaned that “before the war negroe women and boys used to be employed to 
dip. It is very difficult now to find any hands willing to execute this branch o f the business. 
Their hands and clothing become smeared with the gum, and even two dollars per diem will not 
now induce a piny [sic] woodsman or freed man to dip much turpentine.”4
Making the situation even more difficult for producers, laborers were not only hard to 
find, but difficult to keep. The postbelium turpentine industry suffered from challenges typical 
of southern manufacturing o f the period. It was a highly competitive industry which required 
successful producers to control strictly costs since profit margins remained low. Because labor 
was such a significant portion of the operators’ cost, the workers felt the brunt o f the sharp 
competition through lower wages. Low wages undermined worker loyalty as naval stores 
producers competed with the area’s growing number o f commercial farmers and lumber 
producers for the scarce labor. The migratory nature of the turpentine industry and the seasonal 
cycle of work also made it difficult for producers to maintain a steady and dependable labor 
force. During slack periods in the winter months and when an operator moved to fresh pine 
stands, some laborers took the occasion to seek other employment.5 In August 1867 Georgia
4 “The Pine Forests of the South,” De Bow’s Review. After the War Series 3 (February 
1867): 197.
5 Jerrell H. Shofner, “Forced Labor in the Florida Forests, 1880-1950,” Journal of Forest 
History 25 (January 1981): 14; Jerrell H. Shofner, “Mary Grace Quackenbos, A Visitor Florida 
Did Not Want,” The Florida Historical Quarterly 58 (January 1980): 273; Thomas F. Armstrong, 
“Georgia Lumber Laborers, 1880-1917: The Social Implications o f Work,” The Georgia 
Historical Quarterly 67 (Winter 1983): 439,444; Pete Daniel, The Shadow o f Slavery: Peonage 
in the South. 1901-1969 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1990), 9; Nollie Hickman, 
Mississippi Harvest: Lumbering in the Loneleaf Pine Belt. 1840-1915 (University: The 
University of Mississippi, 1962), 141; Mark V. Wetherington, The New South Comes to 
Wiregrass Georgia. 1860-1910 (Knoxville: The University o f Tennessee Press, 1994), 119; 
Stanley C. Bond, Jr., “The Development of the Naval Stores Industry in St. Johns County, 
Florida,” The Florida Anthropologist 40 (September 1987): 198; Dennis Eagan, The Florida 
Settler, or Immigrants’ Guide (Tallahassee: Office of the Floridian, 1873), 20; Gavin Wright, Old
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
291
turpentiner Benjamin Williams’ wife Sara complained about the high turnover among their 
operation’s new hired help. She explained that “three have run awav during the last few months 
that we had clothed up to be decent, they came to us naked, (all but)[.] They are an ungrateful 
race, they drive me to be tight and stingy with them.”6
The turpentine operators who left the Carolinas and formed the backbone of the industry 
in Georgia, Florida, Mississippi, and Alabama attempted to remedy one o f these problems, the of 
the scarcity of blacks in the piney woods South, by bringing their laborers with them. Producers 
such as George T. Holland, who moved from Virginia to Telfair County, Georgia in the late 
1880s, brought with him his foreman and twelve workers who labored on his farm and in his 
turpentine business. Not just the dearth o f available piney woods workers led producers to bring 
their own laborers with them. Turpentining was very specialized work, requiring skills learned 
in no other occupation. To increase their odds of success, producers preferred to bring along 
laborers already familiar with the tasks, rather than train new ones. Turpentine workers, for their 
part, perhaps moved willingly as the industry in North Carolina declined. Trained in turpentine, 
not in agricultural production, they commonly agreed to cast their lot with their employer rather 
than venture into a new occupation. It remains unclear as to whether their employers’ 
compulsion played any role in their decision to head southward.7
South. New South: Revolutions in the Southern Economy Since the Civil War (New York: Basic 
Books, 1986), 187; Hervey Evans to Susan Murphy Evans, 22 July 1899, Martha Virginia 
McNair Evans Patterson Papers, Southern Historical Collection, The University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill; Malone, “Piney Woods Farmers o f South Georgia,” 79.
6 Sarah F. Williams to Mother, 27 August 1867, Sarah Hicks Williams Papers, Southern 
Historical Collection, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
7 Dobson and Doyan offer the questionable argument that young black men chose to 
enter the turpentine industry because no special skills were required and the pay and fringe 
benefits were good. However, turpentine work did indeed require unique skills. Furthemore, the 
pay remained low, even compared to sharecropping. Dobson and Doyan also claim that black 
men liked the freedom for independent work offered by the pine forest. Yet workers actually 
possessed little freedom. The woodsriders constantly managed laborers and in many cases 
managers forced them to remain in their employment after they expressed a desire to leave.
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The influx of the turpentiners and their workers into the pine region helped alter the 
area’s demographics. Between 1870 and 1890, the Georgia Wiregrass region’s population 
doubled, and from 1890 to 1910, doubled again. In Georgia counties most active in naval stores- 
production, the black population grew at a rate that surpassed both the increase in the state’s 
white population and the overall rise in the state’s black population. From 1860 to 1880 the 
black population in the state’s southeastern counties that manufactured naval stores grew about 
225 percent while the state’s overall black population rose 155 percent. A 175 percent growth in 
the white population in the important turpentine counties also exceeded the state’s average of 
138 percent. The increase from 1880 to 1900 was considerably more dramatic. During these 
years Georgia’s naval stores-producing region saw an increase in black population of over 500 
percent when the state’s black population rose just 142 percent. Certain counties recorded 
increases in black population growth that far exceeded these averages. In Berrien County the 
black population increased 710 percent, in Coffee county 634 percent, and in Irwin County 874 
percent. Most amazingly, Colquitt County, which actually experienced a decline in black 
population from 1860 to 1880, saw a rise in its numbers from 1880 to 1900 o f3,430 percent, 
from 105 to 3,602. At the end of the period in 1900, most counties that produced naval stores 
had ten times the black population that they had in 1860. Since the expansion of the area’s white 
population, although higher than in the state as a whole, was at a  lower rate than that of the 
African American population, by 1900 forty percent of Wiregrass residents were black.8
Dobson and Doyan also maintain that blacks preferred forest work for it shared few 
characteristics with plantation agriculture which they associated with servitude. But it was gang 
labor, not crop production, that blacks opposed. Moreover, sharecroppers were most likely to 
enjoy more self management than turpentine workers who made no decisions regarding their 
work routines. Dobson and Doyon, “Expansion of the Pine Oleoresin Industry,” 51; 
Wetherington, New South Comes to Wiregrass Georgia. 86.
* Wetherington, New South Comes to Wiregrass Georgia. 76,119; Malone, “Piney 
Woods Farmers of South Georgia,” 75. Statistics of the Population of the United States at the 
Tenth Census (Washington, DC: Department o f the Interior, 1883); Population. Twelfth Census
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A profile o f  late nineteenth-century Georgia turpentine workers demonstrates their origin 
from other states and thus their influence on the region's population change. The typical 
turpentine laborer in Wiregrass Georgia in the 1870s was a young, single, illiterate, black man 
from North Carolina. Of 178 turpentine laborers working at camps along the Macon and 
Brunswick railroad in 1879, eighty percent were black, seventy percent were illiterate, sixty-six 
percent were single, eighty percent were in their teens and twenties, and seventy percent were 
bom in North Carolina. By 1900, this profile had changed only slightly. The typical worker 
remained black and from the Carolinas, but more came from South Carolina than North Carolina 
and more were married, their wives typically being native Georgians. Not only were most 
workers in the Georgia turpentine industry black, but the rate of labor participation in the 
business was higher among African-Americans than was their proportion of the general 
population. As before the war, the vast majority of forest laborers were black and the naval 
stores operators, distillers, and woodsriders were usually white. However, black producers were 
not unheard of. One African-American producer in Pierce County, Georgia, worked ten crops 
covering 2,500 acres, a relatively large operation which would have required the assistance of 
hired workers.9
A similar population shift occurred in other naval stores-producing states. Growth 
occurred in the black population o f Florida’s turpentine region but, because production took hold 
more slowly there than in Georgia, the rise in the number of blacks in the population also began 
later. From 1860 to 1880 the black population of Florida’s piney wood counties actually grew at
of the United States Taken in the Year 1900 (Washington, DC: Department o f the Interior,
1901); Armstrong, “Transformation o f Work,” 525.
9 Wetherington, New South Comes to Wiregrass Georgia. 119; Armstrong, 
“Transformation o f Work,” 525; Armstrong, “Georgia Lumber Laborers,” 440,447; Joseph 
Tillman and C.P. Goodyear, Southern Georgia: A Pamphlet (Savannah: Savannah Times Steam 
Printing House, 1881), 49.
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a slower pace than the state’s overall black population; some counties even saw a decline. After 
1880 a few counties experienced a surge in their number o f black residents. In Clay county, for 
example, the black population grew 265 percent, but in others, like Lafayette County, it grew 
only 138 percent After 1890, however, many piney woods counties experienced a  rise in black 
population of around 250 percent, well above the state average of 138 percent The white 
population growth o f the counties between 1890 and 1900, 131 percent was around the state 
average.10 In southern Mississippi, where the number o f blacks was small as well, forester and 
historian NoIIie Hickman explains that because of the growing naval stores industry in the late- 
nineteenth century, “trainload after trainload of black families arrived in the virgin pine country 
of South Mississippi.”11
Although turpentiners reduced the level of labor competition by bringing in their own 
workers, local farm owners did complain about their workers entering the employment of both 
turpentine and lumber producers.12 As early as 1875, the Hinesville. Georgia Gazette. 
complaining that “the loss of laborers” to the turpentine industry “works a greater injury” to the 
farmers “than many are willing to admit.”13 In 1899, the Wavcross. Georgia Weekly Herald 
expressed its regret “that the introduction o f such industries as mills and stills has had the 
unhappy tendency o f drawing away from the farms the younger element of the colored people.”14 
One year later the Brunswick. Georgia Call complained that “many [of the farm laborers] are
10 Statistics o f the Population of the United States at the Tenth Census: Population. 
Twelfth Census of the United States Taken in the Year 1900.
11 Hickman, Mississippi Harvest. 131; NoIIie Hickman, “Black Labor in Forest Industries 
of the Piney Woods, 1840-1933,” in Mississippi’s Pinev Woods: A Human Perspective, ed. Noel 
Polk (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1986), 29.
12 Armstrong, “Transformation of Work,” 524.
13 Quoted in Armstrong, “Georgia Lumber Laborers,” 447.
14 Quoted in Ibid., 447.
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going into the towns and villages and many more into districts where public works such as saw 
mills and turpentine stills, are in operation.”15
Although turpentine producers may have met with some success in attracting agricultural 
workers, competition for labor remained intense and they, along with other southern whites 
affected by the relative unavailability of reliable, cheap labor, sought to protect their businesses 
by assuming firm control over their employees. Although turpentine producers’ involvement in 
the passage of enticement, emigrant agent, vagrancy, and false-pretenses legislation is unclear, 
such laws served them well. These acts were first passed by state legislatures during 
Reconstruction, strengthened during the late nineteenth century, and by around 1900 reached 
mature development. Enticement acts outlawed one employer hiring a laborer away from 
another. This legislation intensified the employer’s control over a worker by establishing an 
owner-type relationship that resembled that between slave and master. It also outlawed whites 
from competing with each other in the labor market and thus driving up the cost. Adopted by ten 
southern states from 1865 to 1867, laws to restrict labor recruitment were the most commonly 
used measure to control black labor following emancipation. As companion legislation to the 
enticement acts, emigrant-agent laws imposed prohibitably high fees on labor agents who 
attempted to move workers from one state to another. Such laws first appeared in states that 
believed themselves most threatened by black out-migration. Like enticement legislation, 
emigrant-agent laws regulated black labor by controlling the activity o f whites. However, 
resourceful whites attempted to skirt the law by using black agents and informal recruiters who 
not only could enter and leave black areas with less notice than white agents, but knew the best 
places to find black workers willing to leave for a new employer. Another type of legislation, 
vagrancy laws, represented one of the earliest and most widely adopted black codes. These
15 Quoted in Ibid., 447.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
296
statutes enabled law enforcement officials to force unemployed blacks to work during periods o f 
labor scarcity and to sign and keep contracts. To ensure that blacks signed labor contracts, 
vagrancy laws criminalized the failure to make such agreements and those individuals convicted 
of the offense were hired out.16
Many turpentine operators encouraged debt among their laborers and used it to coerce 
them to remain in their employment. When a laborer began work for a new employer, he 
received an advance of tokens with which to purchase supplies and his payroll account was 
debited. Thus workers began their employment in debt. At month’s end the worker’s earnings 
were applied to his account; if  the credit for wages exceeded the debit for commissary purchases, 
he received the difference in commissary script. Many workers, however, borrowed on their 
account as fast as they earned wages. If a laborer broke even he had to borrow again to cover the 
next month’s expenses. Turpentine workers commonly owed their employers between $200 and 
$300, the balance of which they had to pay to end their employment. As long as the indebted 
laborer continued to work, his debt was of little concern to him or his employer. It only became 
an issue when the worker attempted to leave. In such an instance an employer could have one of
16 William Cohen identifies four stages o f legislation leading to limitations on black 
mobility and the establishment of rigid legal peonage. White southerners made the first attempt 
with the black codes immediately following emancipation. However Congressional 
Reconstruction undid much o f this legislation. From Reconstruction’s end to the mid 1890s, 
emigrant agent and contract enforcement laws arose. At the turn of the century legislatures 
enacted a flurry of enticement laws, legislation against breaking contracts, laws against vagrancy, 
and measures that made the activity o f labor agents all but impossible. Cohen, At Freedom’s 
Edge. 31, 202,228,245-246; William Cohen “Negro Involuntary Servitude in the South, 1865- 
1940: A Preliminary Analysis,” The Journal of Southern History 42 (February 1976): 33-36; 
Shofner, “Forced Labor in the Florida Forests,” 16,18; Georgia, which experienced 
exceptionally heavy black movement to the West, in 1876 passed the first o f the laws imposing a 
$100 annual tax for each county in which a labor recruiter worked. Soon afterwards it raised the 
tax to $500 a year. Other states followed Georgia’s example: Alabama in 1879, North Carolina 
and South Carolina in 1891, Florida in 1903, and Mississippi in 1912. In 1900, the United States 
Supreme Court confirmed the rights o f states to license emigrant agents at their discretion. 
Cohen, “Negro Involuntary Servitude,” 33, 39-42,47-51; Sylvia H. Krebs, “Will the Freedmen 
Work: White Alabamians Adjust to Free Black Labor,” The Alabama Historical Quarterly 36 
(Summer 1974): 158-159: Cohen. At Freedom’s Edge. 31.
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three general responses. He could allow the labor to leave peacefully as long as the new 
employer paid off his account. The producer could threaten the employee with violence and 
forced return, but then not cany out the action. Or the employer might physically prevent the 
worker from leaving or return him against his will if he did escape. One Mississippi turpentine 
laborer recalled that workers who had left their jobs owing as little as fifty cents were tracked 
with bloodhounds and returned to work off their deb t17 The turpentine workers plight under 
forced labor is captured in the late-nineteenth-century work song “Fse Gwine to Georgy.”
When I left old South Ca’lina,
I left in the winter-time.
“Where you gwine, nigger?”
“I’se gwine to Georgy, I’se gwine to Georgy,
To work in the turpentine.”
When I gits in Georgy,
They gimme a hack and stock 
And put me in a crop; they say,
“If you wants to see that double line,
You shorely got to chop.”
You see that Woodsman comin, ridin through the pine; 
He turns round and ‘gins to peep;
You hear him say to the black man,
“Old nigger, sink emin deep!”
The nigger pull off his hat,
And throwed it on the ground;
You hear him say to the Woodsman,
“Do you want me to cut em down?”
They worked this nigger all year long;
It’s time for him to go home.
You hear the Bossman say to the Bookkeeper,
“How do this nigger stand?”
17 Jane Twitty Shelton, Pines and Pioneers: A History o f Lowndes County. Georgia. 
1825-1900 (Atlanta: Cherokee Publishing Company, 1976), 201; Hickman, Mississippi Harvest. 
143-144.
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The Bookkeeper goes in the office,
He sit down and ‘gin to figger;
Then he say to the Bossman,
“That nigger’s just even now!”
When I libbed in Georgy I heard a lion sing,
And I didn’t have long to stay;
I got in debt, and I had to run away.
The Woodsman went to the Bossman,
And begin to fret; he said,
“I’ll bet that nigger has left in debt!”
The Woodsrider caught me and brought me back; 
He said, “If  you don’t work, I’ll beat your back!”18
It is often difficult to distinguish between the common situation of the indebted laborer 
and the peon, for only a thin line separate the two.19 Indebtedness to employers was the key 
component for holding laborers in peonage but, as historian J. William Harris points out, debt did 
not necessarily lead to peonage. “It is important to remember,” he explains, “that debt pervaded 
every level of postbellum southern agriculture, not just the bottom level of sharecroppers.”20 
Laws supporting peonage in no way indicate its widespread practice. Many sharecroppers were 
poor and indebted but were never tied to the plantation by their condition.21 Merely becoming 
indebted to an employer did not constitute peonage. Pete Daniel explains that “peonage occurred 
only where the planter forbade the cropper to leave the plantation because of debt.”22 He
18 Another version of the song has the turpentine worker leaving “old Virginny.” Stetson 
Kennedy, Palmetto Country. (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1942), 257-258; Florida 
Writers’ Project, “The Story of Naval Stores.. . ,” Florida Highways 2 (May 1943): 14.
19 Daniel, Shadow of Slavery. 24.
20 J. William Harris, “The Question of Peonage in the History of the New South,” in 
Plain Folk of the South Revisited, ed. Samuel C. Hyde, Jr. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1997), 104.
21 Ibid., 104,106, 111, 116-117.
22 Daniel, Shadow of Slavery. 24.
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explains that three general labor divisions emerged in the post-war South. Most southern 
workers were free and moved about selling their labor on a free market. Another group 
languished in debt peonage and was coerced to work to repay what they owed. Daniel identifies 
a third group which lived in a perplexing state somewhere between freedom and force labor. In 
this middle ground a laborer who ended the year indebted to his employer and who voluntarily 
agreed to stay on and work off his debt was technically free. But if the employer used coercion 
to force the worker to remain, the worker then entered a state o f peonage.23 Daniel explains that 
‘The line was that thin. No doubt many workers drifted from freedom to peonage often in their 
lifetimes, never realizing that they had crossed the line.”24 He further argues that because of this 
uncertain status, it is difficult to determine how many of the South’s laborers were caught 
between slavery and freedom, consequently, “the number of blacks, or whites for that matter, 
who were working involuntarily remains a part of the equation that has not been measured.”23 It 
is within this gray area between freedom and compulsion in which probably most naval stores 
workers labored.
Turpentine producers strongly resented others hiring their hands and swore out warrants 
against them if they discovered who was involved. Operators supported enticement legislation 
that prohibited others from hiring any o f their workers and there was a general, informal 
agreement among producers not to recruit each others’ labor. It was not only illegal but 
dangerous to be caught at the practice. Despite the consequences, however, operators did 
attempt to lure workers to their camps, usually relying on their most trusted black employees to 
perform the risky task. Itinerant preachers were often in the best position to move
23 Pete Daniel, “The Metamorphosis o f Slavery, 1865-1900,” Journal o f American 
History 66 (June 1979): 89.
24 Ibid., 89.
25 Ibid., 74.
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unsuspectingly in and out o f  neighboring camps on recruiting missions. They promised better 
pay and living conditions and commonly offered advances to encourage dissatisfied workers to 
leave their employers. Some recruiters received a commission for each man they attracted to 
their employer’s camp. By the 1890s it cost roughly $15 to $20 per worker to recruit labor for 
twelve months. Both the worker and the recruiter faced considerable danger. If  the recruiter 
allowed his cunning to slip as was discovered, he might face a  severe whipping or even death. 
His employer would usually deny any association and take no responsibility for his actions. On 
the occasions when a producer permitted his indebted employee to move to another operator, the 
new employer was required to pay the worker’s account.26
Once in an operator’s employment, turpentine laborers were not paid by the hour but for 
piece work, the actual amount o f labor they performed each day. It was a practice not unknown 
in agriculture, especially on sea-island cotton plantations. Such a wage system provided 
producers with more control over their workers than a pay system based on shares. The pay 
scale varied for different tasks and the pay for each task depended on how much work was 
actually completed. In the 1870s, unskilled turpentine workers in Georgia earned between $.60 
and $ 1.50 a day and skilled laborers from $ 1.50 to $2.00 a day. Box cutters earned $.0175 for 
each box cut and rakers earned $.0035 per tree. Dippers, who were paid by the amount o f gum 
collected, received 200 to 300 per barrel. Like farm wages, turpentine pay declined in the late 
nineteenth century. In the 1880s the amount paid for boxing declined nearly thirty percent from 
$.0175 per box to $.0125 per box. Pay rates apparently differed by place, as well. In most cases 
operators in Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas paid more than those in the East, probably 
because of a scarce labor supply. Whereas producers in the eastern areas paid between 450 and
26 Shelton, Pines and Pioneers. 202; Hickman, Mississippi Harvest. 125, 141-142; Albert 
Pridgen, “Turpentining in the South Atlantic Country,” in Naval Stores: History. Production. 
Distribution and Consumption, ed. Thomas Gamble (Savannah: Review Publishing and Printing 
Company, 1921), 103.
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550 per thousand faces chipped in 1896, operators in Mississippi paid from 550 to 600. Because 
of the practice of paying according to piece work, there could be considerable difference between 
individual laborers in the amount o f work performed and the pay they received. This pay 
variation is illustrated by two boxers who labored for Kittrell and Smith, turpentine producers in 
Georgia. Edward Gillam cut 313 boxes one week in November 1881 and 200 boxes the next 
week. For this work he received $5.48 and $3.50 respectively. However Joe Stevens, a 
obviously a faster worker, cut 500 boxes one week in January 1882 and 505 one week later. He 
was paid $8.75 and $8.84, forty-nine percent more than Gillam for working the same amount of 
time. Wages could also vary depending on the worker's sex. Women, who typically did little 
work in the forest after the war, received about eighty percent o f  men’s wages.27
The unique labor characteristics and challenges of the southern naval stores industry 
explain why a wage system based on piece work, not sharecropping, emerged following 
emancipation. Far fewer blacks were familiar with the techniques involved in turpentine 
production than were knowledgeable about farming. Thus turpentiners had a far smaller pool of 
experienced labor from which to draw compared to farmland owners. Also, in the piney woods 
of the deep South—into which the industry moved after the Civil War—the extremely small native 
black population offered virtually no hope of supplying adequate labor. Moreover, work in the 
naval stores industry was well known for a difficult and demanding schedule that did nothing to 
attract new workers. For turpentine producers the resulting labor scarcity necessitated the tight
27 Armstrong, “Georgia Lumber Laborers,” 443; Ralph Shlomowitz, “‘Bound’ or ‘Free’? 
Black Labor in Cotton and Sugarcane Farming, 1865-1880,” The Journal o f Southern History 50 
(November 1984): 584, 589; Ralph Shlomowitz, “The Origins o f  Southern Sharecropping,” 
Agricultural History 53 (1979): 562; Wetherington, New South Comes to Wiregrass Georgia.
121; Franklin B. Hough, Report Upon Forestry, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: Government Printing 
Office, 1878), 139. Wright, Old South. New South. 202; Matthew J. Mancini, One Dies. Get 
Another: Convict Leasing in the American South. 1866-1928 (Columbia: University of South 
Carolina Press, 1996), 54. Hickman, Mississippi Harvest. 125; Armstrong, “Transformation of 
Work,” 527; Sandra Jo Fomey, “The Importance of Sites Related to the Naval Stores Industry in 
Florida” (paper presented at the thirty-seventh annual meeting o f  the Florida Anthropological 
Society, Daytona Beach, Florida, 1985), 2.
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control of workers that a  wage system facilitated. Farmland owners, on the other hand, who did 
not need to worry so about securing labor to plant their fields, could afford to compromise with a 
sharecropping system that gave the workers more autonomy than a wage system, but not as much 
as cash renting. That a share cropping arrangement was possible in turpentine production is 
demonstrated by the practice in French gum harvesting in the late nineteenth century.28
Under the wage system some producers took measures to reduce pay either out of sheer 
greed or as punishment. Two partners in a Georgia turpentine operation docked workers’ pay as 
a penalty for not completing their task, for performing sloppy work, or for losing work time. The 
most unscrupulous producers practiced a deception called “loading the boxes.” They reduced 
their workers’ pay by adding boxes to the standard crop size o f ten thousand boxes, thus making 
their employees perform extra work without added compensation.29
The seasonal variation in the work schedule, combined with piece work pay scale and the 
occasional unscrupulous increase in crop size, presented special challenges. As before the war, 
producers tried to keep their workers busy throughout the year in an effort to prevent workers 
from leaving to find employment to carry them through the winter.30 A Florida producer advised 
to “keep all hands at work doing something. It never will do to let them start to scattering.”31 
However, operators found it virtually impossible to provide constant employment. Boom and 
bust economic cycles subjected workers to layoffs, pay reductions, and periods of only partial 
employment. The seasonal nature of production also worked against laborers who found 
employment opportunities scarce during the winter months when only boxing and raking were
29 Armstrong, “Georgia Lumber Laborers,” 443; Hickman, Mississippi Harvest 125.
30 Rupert B. Vance, Human Geography o f the South: A Study in Regional Resources and 
Human Adequacy (Chapel Hill: The University o f North Carolina Press, 1935), 122.
31 Hervey Evans to Susan Murphy Evans, 6 January 1900, Patterson Papers.
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performed. In fact, raking was done for only a brief period and paid little. It was not uncommon 
for producers to contract with workers for only the ten busiest months of labor.32 And bad 
weather could halt work even during the busiest period. In September 1889, for example, a 
series of storms and subsequent floods seriously hurt the industry in parts o f  Georgia. “Whatever 
dip was in the boxes was washed out,” one operator complained. “Nothing has been done for 
two weeks and the bad condition of the woods will prevent work of any consequence being done 
for a week or ten days.”33 During such times, workers received no wages, but had to continue 
buying supplies from the commissary.
Some turpentine workers attempted to stay busy by exercising considerable versatility 
and mobility within the turpentine labor force. One Georgia laborer, for example, worked in 
December 1889 as a teamster, but in January 1890 as a boxer. Another worker at the same 
operation labored at the still in early November but by the end of the month was hauling barrels. 
In early December he was back at the still but then moved to cutting boxes for the remainder of 
the month. Yet another turpentine hand’s activity varied among dipping, driving a wagon, 
performing general labor, dipping again, and, finally, cutting boxes—all within two months. For 
each task he was paid a different rate. One laborer went to work as a boxer for a South Carolina 
producer in February 1872. By June he was cornering and chipping. Other turpentine workers 
stayed busy by alternating between turpentine and agricultural labor. In the early 1880s a 
Georgia farmer who raised horses and grew com, cotton, cane, and potatoes, began turpentining. 
His hands alternated between work in the forest and work in the field as the needs demanded.34
32 Armstrong, “Georgia Lumber Laborers,” 438-439; Shelton, Pines and Pioneers. 200- 
201; Account book, 1872, Thomas H. Osteen Papers, South Caroliniana Library, University o f 
South Carolina.
33 John Avery Gere Carson to J.P. Williams, 15 September 1888, John Avery Gere 
Carson Papers, Manuscripts Collection, Georgia Historical Society.
34 Armstrong, “Georgia Lumber Laborers,” 411,444; Account book, 1872, Osteen
Papers.
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However, workers were somewhat limited in their ability to perform both agriculture and 
turpentine work. Because farming and turpentining shared the same seasonal production cycle 
and were both similarly affected by adverse weather conditions, it was rare that one job offered 
work opportunities when the other was at a slack time.
Along with job variation, turpentine workers with families sometimes enjoyed the 
addition of wages, earned by wives and children, to their household incomes. In December 1890 
two boys contributed to their family’s commissary account by working in the potato fields 
associated with the turpentine operation. Again in April 1891 they contributed $3.39 to the 
family account by raking leaves. In another case during the 1890s all members o f the Alton 
family at a Georgia operation contributed to the household income. Mr. Alton dipped and he, his 
wife, son, and daughter also raked around the pines.3s
Unlike agricultural workers, who commonly received a portion o f their compensation in 
kind, turpentine workers most often received only wages, with which they were expected to 
purchase everything they needed from the commissary. Most turpentine operators paid their 
employees in script—tokens, coupon books, and punch cards—redeemable only at the camp store. 
Coin-size tokens, with the producer’s name usually stamped on the face, were issued in values of 
five, ten, twenty-five, fifty cents, and one dollar. Operators occasionally issued one-cent pieces, 
but only rarely did they use tokens valued at two, five, or ten dollars. Coupon books and punch 
cards were more often used for issuing these larger denominations. Workers either signed the 
coupon book authorizing the amount to be deducted from their pay after spending it at the 
commissary or had the purchase amount punched out on the card. Because the commissary
35 Armstrong, “Transformation o f Work,” 527-528.
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played suck a pivotal role in the turpentine wage system, producers required that only the most 
trusted managers run i t  This often meant family members.36
The camps’ isolation and lack o f transportation to the nearest town ensured that most 
workers traded at the commissary. However, in some instances, workers had more choice. At 
camps located closer to a town, workers had the option of shopping at some private stores which 
accepted tokens at seventy percent o f  their face value. In other cases merchants would exchange 
the script for United States currency at the same discount Some operators opposed the use of 
their tokens at other stores and indicated on the tokens that they were for commissary trade only. 
Conflicts often erupted between town merchants and operators when the turpentiner refused to 
redeem the tokens at face value or in some cases would not buy them back at all.37
Although the introduction o f a wage system and commissary represented a significant 
break from the laborers’ pre-war years as slaves, other areas of their experience changed little. 
Very little about the actual work in the naval stores industry changed after the war. The work 
remained hard and the standard of living low. Typically turpentine workers awoke at around 
4:30, began work at sunlight, and continued until sundown with breaks for breakfast and lunch. 
The various jobs, the tools, and the ten thousand box-size task all remained virtually unchanged 
until the turn of the century.38 Boxing, cornering, chipping, dipping, scraping, and distilling all 
remained primitive processes, exposing workers to the same hazards as in the antebellum era.
36 Ibid., 529-530; Shelton, Pines and Pioneers. 199.
37 C.R. Clark, Florida Trade Tokens (St. Petersburg, FL: Great Outdoors Publishing Co., 
1980), 3-4, 6-8.
38 Thomas D. Clark, The Greening of the South: The Recovery of Land and Forest 
(Lexington: The University Press o f Kentucky, 1984), 22; Vance, Human Geography of the 
South. 122; Armstrong, “Georgia Lumber Laborers,” 443; Shlomowitz, ‘“ Bound” or ‘Free’?,” 
584, 589; Shlomowitz, “Origins of Southern Sharecropping,” 562; Hough, Report Upon Forestry.
139.
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Like work patterns, the characteristics o f camp life survived the Civil War intact. As 
during the antebellum period, post war turpentine camps tended to be isolated and temporary. As 
railroad trunk lines spread across the southeastern pine belt and branch lines opened up the most 
uninhabited areas to turpentine production, workers found themselves living and working many 
miles from any community. These camp sites served primarily to locate workers near the forests 
in which they worked. However they also served to keep the workers well away from other 
potential employers and free from the distractions offered by a more populated area. With the 
camp located far back in the unsettled forest, workers seldom traveled and visitors were rare.39
When a producer relocated from one remote area to another, he closed his existing camp 
in the fall and began construction of the new one. The turpentine labor force, which commonly 
followed the operator, did most o f the work building the new camp. They first erected fifteen to 
forty cabins, depending on the number of workers. They next constructed a building to serve as a 
store, office, and warehouse. In the area near the office, the owner built for himself a 
comfortable house and a  somewhat smaller dwelling for the woodsrider. Not far from this 
central area, the workers constructed a barn for the horses and mules. Once these essential 
buildings were complete, the workers moved from the old camp to the new and the new 
commissary was stocked with groceries and supplies. Once the move was completed the men 
began cutting boxes to begin production for the coming year. When all other buildings were 
completed and work in the woods begun, the still went up. Workers first built the furnace, a steel 
structure with a bricked exterior. Once they had completed the furnace, laborers placed the 
copper still on top and constructed a wooden platform around the still base. They then built yet 
another platform at the top of the still with a ramp connecting it to the lower platform.40
39 S.G. Thigpen, A Bov in Rural Mississippi and Other Stories (Picayune, MS: S.G. 
Thigpen, 1966), 177; Gene Burnett, “To Bum in a Turpentine Hell,” Florida Trend (October 
1976): 100.
40 Thigpen. Bov in Rural Mississippi. 176-179.
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With a still, cooperage shed, glue shed, pump house, spirit shed, stable, blacksmith shop, 
commissary, and workers’ quarters, many camps represented self-contained piney woods 
enterprises. Operators tried to locate their camps near clear running streams that could furnish 
water for the still’s cooling tank, for the mules and horses, and for washing clothes. A well in 
the middle of the quarters provided drinking water. The cabins sat about fifty feet apart and were 
arranged in rough rows, forming a grid pattern about one-fourth mile from the still. The owner’s 
house, and often the overseer’s as well, sat a moderate distance from the quarters. The workers’ 
cabins, intended to serve only as temporary structures, were crudely and cheaply constructed, 
often costing no more than $200 a piece to build. O f all workers in the postbelium South, 
turpentine laborers endured perhaps the poorest housing. The typical turpentine laborer lived in 
a two-room cabin with batten siding, wide pine boards nailed together either horizontally or 
perpendicularly across the side with laths covering the cracks. Few cabins had screened 
windows, but shutters were common. None had indoor plumbing. Many had dirt floors but it 
appears that, over time, more and more were built with wood floors. A stick and clay fireplace 
sat at one end of the cabin. For heating and cooking workers burned wood gathered from the 
neighboring forest and, sometimes, dross, the residue that collected in rosin strainers. Nollie 
Hickman finds that Mississippi turpentine workers lived in poorer quarters than the workers in 
other states. Many o f the Mississippi cabins represented nothing more than one-room huts 
constructed of pine poles and lacking floors, doors, and windows. When a family grew large, a 
second room, really nothing more than a lean-to, was added. More skilled workers tended to live 
in somewhat better housing. Dwellings for distillers, foremen, and woodsriders often had more 
room and were better constructed than those of the regular workers. In some cases they cost 
twice as much to build.41
41 Sandra Jo Forney, “Naval Stores Industry in North Florida Pine Flatwoods” (paper 
presented at the sixteenth annual meeting o f the Society for Historical Archaeology, Denver,
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Turpentine workers usually ate three meals a day, all usually prepared by their wives 
over the primitive cabin fireplaces. They ate breakfast in the woods between 8:00 and 9:00 after 
they had been at work for a few hours. In the early afternoon, when the day’s heat was at its 
greatest, they took a break for lunch. Supper, the heaviest meal of the day, was eaten after work. 
Molasses, bacon, and combread or maybe biscuits provided the bulk of the turpentiner laborer’s 
and his family’s diet. Workers supplemented these staples with coffee, mackerel, peas, beans, 
rice, sugar, and occasionally beef, mutton, and cheese. All these foods they obtained from the 
commissary. On occasion fresh fish or salted mullet arrived in the commissary or from peddlers 
who traveled as far as fifty to sixty miles inland from the coast.42
The commissary account ledgers o f turpentine laborer, Tom Lud, who was employed by 
South Carolina producer Thomas H. Osteen in 1872, provides insight into the purchasing 
patterns of naval stores workers. Lud contracted to work for ten months from February 1 to 
December 1. He was to work five days each week in both Osteen’s agricultural fields and 
turpentine forest. Soon after Lud began work, he made some grocery purchases: one peck of 
meal, one pound o f bacon, and a dozen eggs. He also brought a pair o f shoes for $2.25. On six 
occasions he drew cash against his account, all withdrawals totaling $2.05. From the end of 
March to mid June Lud’s pattern o f purchases remained relatively constant. He continued to buy 
com, bacon, and other groceries, but his most frequent purchase was tobacco, which cost $.30 a
Colorado, 1983), 4; Thigpen, Bov in Rural Mississippi. 174-177; Carswell, “Holmesteading.” 
143; Bond, “Development of the Naval Stores Industry,” 200; Dwight Wilson, interview, tape 
recording, Oral History Collection, Research Library, St. Augustine Historical Society, St. 
Augustine, FL; Wetherington, New South Comes to Wiregrass Georgia. 238; Hickman, “Black 
Labor in Forest Industries,” 88; Account Book, Osteen Papers; Hickman, Mississippi Harvest 
146-147; Armstrong, “Transformation of Work,” 531; Richard C. Davis, ed. Encyclopedia of 
American Forest and Conservation History (New York: Macmiliian Publishing Company, 1983), 
s.v. “naval stores;” Vance, Human Geography of the South. 122; Armstrong, “Georgia Lumber 
Laborers,” 445.
42 Thigpen, Bov in Rural Mississippi. 177; Hickman, Mississippi Harvest 150. Account 
book, 1872, Osteen Papers.
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plug. One o f his most important buys was a stove for which he paid $1.60. He also continued to 
debit his account periodically for cash. From mid-June to the end of December his grocery 
purchases became more frequent and varied. To his staple o f flour and bacon he added molasses, 
sugar, coffee, mackerel, beef, and mutton. The latter three items, however, appeared only 
occasionally on Lud’s account During September he appears to have quit chewing. On several 
occasions Lud’s account was deducted for missing work, at least once because he was sick. In 
the last half of the year he lost $12.24 for missed work. In October Lud’s account reached a 
credit of $ 16.21, but by the end of the year it had declined to only $ 1.89. Although Tom Lud 
appears not to have made seasonal purchases, workers in other camps bought special items for 
Christmas. In December 1882 Tom Sweath who worked for a Georgia turpentine operation 
earned an extra $4.80 for cutting boxes beyond his task and, with the earnings, purchased 
oranges, suspenders, four pounds of meat, candy, and cologne.43
Turpentine workers did not purchase all their food from the commissary, however. They 
supplemented their diets with squirrels, possums, raccoons, rabbits, turtles, and other wild game. 
They fished in local rivers and streams as well. Women and children not only tended gardens, 
which grew turnips and collards, but raised pigs and foraged in the woods for edible herbs and 
berries. Palmetto buds were reported to taste like cabbage and banban twigs resembled snap 
beans in flavor.44
Women did not usually work at turpentining, except maybe dipping gum, but they often 
supplemented their family’s income by cooking, cleaning, and washing for the producers’ and
43 Account book, 1872, Osteen Papers; Armstrong, “Georgia Lumber Laborers,” 443; 
Mart A. Stewart, “What Nature Suffers to Groe:” Life. Labor, and Landscape on the Georgia 
Coast 1680-1920 (Athens: The University o f Georgia Press, 1996), 216.
44 Forney, “Importance of Sites,” 2; Account book, 1872, Osteen Papers; Carswell, 
“Holmesteading”. 143; Shelton, Pines and Pioneers. 202; Hickman, Mississippi Harvest 150; 
Bond, Jr., “Development o f the Naval Stores Industry,” 198.
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overseers’ wives. Chloe Lud, Tom’s wife, labored for such wages and contributed to her 
household’s income. By working between four to twelve days each month at such jobs as 
spreading manure, planting potatoes, dipping gum, chopping cotton, and, most commonly, 
washing clothes, she was able to earn over $13.00. With these earnings she purchased bacon, 
flour, mackerel, sugar, potatoes, cheese, and tobacco. She also contributed cash to the family.
At year’s end her account contained a credit of $ 1.11.45
Despite the presence of families in camps, many turpentine workers were not legally 
married. Instead, a couple might ask the camp manager for living quarters to share, upon which 
he would ask them if they took each other as man and wife. Despite the informality of the 
arrangement, these unions were respected, considered binding, and could last for decades. To 
gain a divorce the couple also consulted with the boss who then assigned each to different 
quarters.46
Few camps offered much by way of diversions for the men and women living there. A 
reporter noted that “while traveling through those pine woods, and seeing nothing but the few 
huts and the turpentine still amid such a wilderness, I often wondered how man could thus 
content himself.”47 Some workers found fulfillment by attending church. If camps lacked a 
church, operators made arrangements for Sunday services to be led by one of the workers or an 
itinerant preacher. Gambling and drinking were, however, more popular camp pastimes.
Payday, when workers received the balance of their monthly wages after their commissary
45 The account book does not identify Chloe Lud as Tom’s wife but the fact that they 
share the same last name and Tom withdraws cash on her account makes it reasonable to assume 
their relationship. Account book, 1872, Osteen Papers; Bond, “Development of the Naval Stores 
Industry,” 198.
46 Hickman, Mississippi Harvest. 148-149; Hickman, “Black Labor in Forest Industries,”
89.
47 “The Pine Plantation,” New York Tribune. 17 March 1866.
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accounts were deducted, was the most lively time in the camps.4* In the 1890s a Florida producer 
complained that “I do not feel good one bit today. We paid off yesterday, and the negroes 
gambled, sang, danced and caroused all night long. Some o f them are lying around asleep now, 
while others are still gambling I guess from what I see. During the night the lucky ones would 
come and call me to keep their winnings lest they lost them and the unlucky to beg an advance of 
a quarter or so.”49 Producers often found it very difficult to get any work done in the few days 
following payday. However, they usually overlooked drinking and gambling and made no efforts 
to control their workers as long as they were able to perform their jobs at a minimal level. Some 
producers arranged for their workers’ transportation to the nearest town where goods unavailable 
at the commissary could be purchased. Here workers received a break from the monotony of 
camp life and could socialize with laborers from other turpentine operations.50
In most camps, located far from towns, the owner and overseer served all law 
enforcement functions. Producers preferred to run their camps as they saw fit and resented the 
intervention by outside authorities. The boss settled differences between the workers and 
decided guilt and punishment. Most used their authority with moderation, adopting policies that 
facilitated the camps smooth operation and maximum production. Justice ranked second in 
importance. In cases where one black worker killed another the incident was rarely reported to 
outside authorities and, if the murderer was a good worker, he was rarely punished. He would, 
though, have to face retribution from his victim’s friends and relatives. Other bosses, however, 
abused their near-absolute power in the isolated camps. One Hancock County, Mississippi camp
48 Bond, Jr., “Development o f the Naval Stores Industry,” 198; Hickman, Mississippi 
Harvest. 149; “Peculiar to the South,” Indianapolis. Indiana Sentinel. 15 November 1896, 
Turpentine newsclipping file, Forest History Society, Durham, North Carolina.
49 Hervey Evans to Mattie McNair Evans, 16 August 1899, Patterson Papers.
50 Hervey Evans to Mattie McNair Evans, 30 July 1899, Patterson Papers; Hickman, 
Mississippi Harvest. 149-150.
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had such a bad reputation for violence against workers that many laborers avoided it. Another 
camp in Harrison County was nicknamed “the graveyard” by area blacks because it was rumored 
that many of its workers disappeared, never to be heard from again.51
In many respects, life for turpentine workers changed little after the Civil War. Various 
laws and practices restricted laborers movement between employers and the work remained 
rooted in primitive technology. Turpentine workers occupied the lowest rung of black society. 
Their standard o f living, education, and work were lower than that o f most other blacks who 
worked in agriculture or at sawmills and viewed the turpentine laborers as backwards strangers 
with little world experience. Historian E. W. Carswell maintains that the poor and transient 
turpentine workers contrasted significantly with Florida’s established black families who entered 
the state with white settlers during and after its territorial period.52 And Noliie Hickman argues 
that “because o f his low income, his utter dependence on the white man, and his slave-like status 
in relation to his employer, the turpentine Negro was considered inferior by others of his own
_ n53race.
A comparison of turpentine laborers with logging and sawmill workers reveals that, 
despite similarities, those employed in the naval stores production endured harsher working and 
living conditions. During the 1880s and 1890s, logging and lumber work increasingly became a 
specialized, wage-earning occupation. The work, however, remained regular and reliable.
51 Dobson and Doyon suppose that black turpentine workers found camp life picturesque 
and communal. They maintain that the camp offered a simple, secure existence and that workers 
were attracted to the industry for its positive qualities. Dobson and Doyan, “Expansion of the 
Pine Oieoresin Industry,” 51; Hickman, Mississippi Harvest. 144-145, 152.
52 Michael D. Tegeder, “Prisoners o f the Pines: Debt Peonage in the Southern Turpentine 
Industry, 1900-1930” (Ph.D. diss., University o f Florida, 1996), 23, 25-26; Forney, “Importance 
of Sites,” 4; Hickman, “Black Labor in Forest Industries,” 88; Hickman, Mississippi Harvest. 
139-140. E.W. Carswell. Washington: Florida’s Twelfth County (Chiplev. FL: E.W. Carswell, 
1991), 255.
53 Hickman, Mississippi Harvest. 139-140.
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Wages were low, although relatively adequate and attractive considering the alternatives, but 
finances could become tight when the mill ran at reduced capacity, laid o ff  workers, or reduced 
hours. Poor market conditions or inclement weather, which prevented timber harvesting or its 
transportation to the mill, could cause a slowdown at any time with little warning, just as in the 
naval stores industry. However, even when the mills failed to run, the company continued to 
charge the workers for rent, board, utilities, and commissary charges. Blacks, who represented a 
significant portion of the timber industry work force, were attracted to lumber camps by the 
demand for unskilled manual labor and the relatively stable cash income the industry offered, 
which at least exceeded that in sharecropping. The constant competition for labor made workers 
reasonably assured that they could ultimately find employment with another company.54
Both black and white workers spent a large part of their day with each other, especially 
at logging camps. They rode to the logging site, worked, and spent much o f  their free time 
together. Both groups labored for the same hours at the same wage and even wore the same 
uniforms. However, as in the naval stores industry, blacks rarely received the highest-paying 
skilled jobs. Some companies, in fact, used only blacks in logging operations and just whites at 
their sawmills. At logging camps whites filled the managerial and skilled labor positions. The 
best opening blacks could receive was as log sawyer. At the mills whites and only select blacks 
held positions, there too blacks performed the jobs that required the least skill. Blacks who did
54 Clark, Greening of the South. 158-159; Jeffrey A. Drobney, “Company Towns and 
Social Transformation in the North Florida Timber Industry, 1880-1930,” The Florida Historical 
Quarterly 75 (Fall 1996): 122-124; Jeffrey A. Drobney, Lumbermen and Log Sawyers: Life- 
Labor. and Culture in the North Florida Timber Industry. 1830-1930 (Macon, GA: Mercer 
University Press, 1997), 112, 122, 124, 147, 180-181; Jerrell H. Shofner, “Negro Laborers and 
the Forest Industries in Reconstruction Florida,” Journal o f Forest History 19 (October 1975): 
183-184; Clark, Florida Trade Tokens. 3; Armstrong, “Georgia Lumber Laborers,” 447-449.
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labor in saw mills commonly enjoyed a standard o f living higher than that o f  other loggers and 
turpentine workers.55
As with turpentine camps, logging camps were transient, appearing in areas where 
lumber companies planned to begin logging and disappearing when the trees were gone. 
Buildings were consequently only temporary structures. The construction o f churches, schools, 
or recreational areas was unfeasible. Few families lived in the logging camps. Most often these 
camps worked twenty to forty men But as lumber companies began constructing their own 
railroad tracks, they replaced the shanty camps with “camp trains.” Boxcars served as 
dormitories, tool sheds, blacksmith shop, commissary, kitchen, segregated dinning halls and 
private quarters for the foreman. Dormitory cars measured about twelve feet by forty feet and 
were fitted with bunk beds. The kitchen car was normally in the middle of the camp train with 
segregated dinning cars for whites and blacks on either side. The segregated dormitory cars were 
attached to their appropriate dinning car. However some camps, instead of providing sleeping 
cars for black workers, set up portable shacks which could be taken down and moved when the 
camp train relocated. Meals, unlike sleeping and dining arrangements, were normally the same 
for black and white workers. Workers received grits and oatmeal for breakfast but the staples for 
other meals included pork or beef, combread or biscuit, peas or beans, and coffee. As with 
turpentine laborers, timber workers purchased their supplies from the commissary using a ticket 
system. At the end o f each month the commissary charges were deducted from wages and the 
employees received any remaining amount in cash. It was not uncommon for workers to receive 
nothing at month’s end. Many such camps had a juke joint where itinerant musicians, often hired 
by the boss, provided entertainment But as rail lines and roads improved transportation in the
55 Drobney. Lumbermen and Log Sawvers. 85-86, 184-185; Drobney, “Transformation of 
Work,” 106; Hickman, Mississippi Harvest 140; Edward L. Ayers, The Promise o f  the New 
South: Life After Reconstruction (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 126; Clark,
Florida Trade Tokens. 3.
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southern pine region, companies no longer found it necessary to keep the workers in isolated 
logging camps. Instead, they could live with their families in more permanent communities 
established by the company and transported to and be from the logging site for work during the 
day. These new communities resembled towns more than camps, housed several hundred people, 
including women and children and offered far more conveniences and comforts than the typical 
turpentine camp.56
Where virtually all turpentine workers endured living and working conditions worse than 
those later lumber towns, leased convicts, suffered conditions even harsher than that of most. 
During Reconstruction, first southern counties and then states began to lease their convicts as a 
solution to rising prison populations and empty treasuries. They sought the maximum amount of 
punishment at a minimum cost to the government. By 1880 all of the former Confederate states 
except Virginia leased their convicts and in 1890 over 27,000 convicts performed labor in the 
South.57
Georgia and Florida, the two principal naval stores-producing states during the late 
nineteenth century, quickly established the practice after the war. With nowhere to house its
56 Jeffrey A. Drobney, “The Transformation of Work in the North Florida Timber 
Industry, 1890-1910.” Gulf Coast Historical Review 10 (Fall 1994): 99, 105-109.
57 However, the lease system, like peonage, predated the Civil War. Most southern states 
had some system o f convict leasing—Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, North 
Carolina, and South Carolina. Convicted criminals, who were unable to afford their fines, could 
be hired out to anyone who paid it for them. If no one paid the fine, the sheriff would turn the 
convict over to whomever bid the highest for a certain period o f labor. Under this system 
laborers could find themselves forced back to work for employers who paid their fines. N. 
Gordon Carper, “The Convict-Lease System in Florida, 1866-1923” (Ph.D. diss., Florida State 
University, 1964), 3-5; Jonathan M. Wiener, “Class Structure and Economic Development in the 
American South, 1865-1955,” American Historical Review 84 (October 1979): 981; Jeffrey A. 
Drobney, “Where Palm and Pine are Blowing: Convict Labor in the North Florida Turpentine 
Industry, 1877-1923.” The Florida Historical Quarterly 72 (April 1984): 413,416; William 
Cohen, “Negro Involuntary Servitude,” 55; Edward L. Ayers, Vengeance and Justice: Crime and 
Punishment in the 19th-Century American South (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 
212 .
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prisoners once federal troops burned the state penitentiary, Georgia passed its first convict lease 
act in December 1866. But it was not until 1868, when a hundred black prisoners went to work 
constructing rail lines, that the provisional governor leased the first convicts under this new 
legislation. In 1897 the Georgia General Assembly passed a new convict lease law that made the 
system even more flexible. It prohibited the leasing o f convicts for longer than five years, 
permitted subleasing, and placed bidding on a per-convict basis instead of on the entire 
population regardless o f number. Because convicts could now be sublet, employers no longer 
had to pay for unneeded ones when business slowed. Also, because lessees paid for each 
convict, the state could boost its revenue by increasing its number of convicts. Thus between 
1870 and 1910, the number o f convicts in Georgia grew ten times faster than the general 
population. Most of the increase came from a sharp rise in the number of incarcerated young 
black men who served increasingly lengthy sentences. In 1882, for example, the state’s black 
convicts on average received sentences twice as long as whites for burglary and five times as 
long for larceny.58
Florida, like Georgia, lacked the facilities in which to house them. The state’s first 
solution was to incarcerate them at the old U.S. armory at Chattahoochee, which by 1869 held 
three hundred convicts. The next year, however, it began experimenting with leasing by 
contracting to lease fifteen convicts to cut and hew 200,000 feet o f lumber for a railroad trestle. 
Over the next ten years, instead of developing its penitentiary system, Florida gradually moved 
toward full-scale convict leasing. Under the Bourbons, the system received a boost from long­
term leases and especially the allowance of subleasing. White support for the institution
58 E. Merton Coulter, James Monroe Smith. Georgia Planter: Before and After Death 
(Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1961), 64; Alex Lichtenstein, Twice the Work o f Free 
Labor: The Political Economy o f Convict Labor in the New South (New York: Verso, 1996),
123; David M. Oshinsky, “Worse Than Slavery:" Parchman Farm and the Ordeal o f Jim Crow 
Justice (New York: The Free Press, 1996), 63.
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intensified with the discovery o f phosphate in the state in the 1880s, which spurred further 
demand for convict labor. It was during this decade that convicts probably began work in the 
naval stores industry.59
Like virtually all wage laborers in the naval stores industry, the great majority of convict 
workers were black. Whereas before the war most prisoners were white, after the war blacks 
made up ninety percent. Historian Edward Ayers points out that the transformation in the 
southern prison population resulted from the states’ assumption o f control over blacks after 
emancipation freed them from their masters’ control. The measure rested on southern whites’ 
belief that blacks were innately criminal, would never work unless compelled, and that the white 
south was entitled to cheap black labor for society’s good.60 To this end the white legal 
establishment targeted blacks. J.C. Powell, a former turpentine camp captain, observed that in 
the 1870s and 1880s “it was possible to send a negro to prison on almost any pretext, but difficult 
to get a white man there, unless he committed some very heinous crime.”61 He asserted that “the 
bulk of our convicts are negroes who could not by any possibility learn a trade, and how to 
employ them at anything save the simplest manual toil is a problem not yet solved.”62 Whites 
could and did become ensnared in the South’s lease system, but most camp captains, including 
Powell, preferred to work black convicts. Because it required a serious offense for whites to be 
sentenced to the penitentiary, white convicts tended to be more dangerous criminals than black 
prisoners. White convicts typically resented work in the turpentine industry, labor they, like the
59 Mancini, One Dies. Get Another. 184; Drobney, “Where Palm and Pine are Blowing,” 
415; Carper, “Convict Lease System in Florida,” 25-26, 36,45-46, 109; Powell, American 
Siberia, forward.
60 Ayers, Vengeance and Justice. 150,197, 199; Liechtenstein, Twice the Work of Free 
Labor. 25,29; Cohen, “Negro Involuntary Servitude,” 34; Cohen, At Freedom’s Edge. 227.
61 Powell, American Siberia. 332.
62 Ibid., 5.
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rest o f the white community, viewed as fit only for inferior blacks. Whites therefore had a 
reputation for working less, complaining more, and rebelling with greater frequency than black 
convicts. Their resistance took the form of assaulting guards, escaping, attempting suicide, 
performing low-quality work, and mutilating themselves in the hope o f receiving a hardship
pardon.63
Although a large percentage o f convicts labored in the turpentine production, especially 
in Florida, their number remained a  relatively small part o f the overall industry work force. In 
1890, when turpentining in Florida had only just begun and a mere five hundred Floridians 
worked in it, state convicts made up thirty-nine percent o f the labor force. Even then, fewer than 
ten percent o f producers worked state convicts. On average, between 1880 and 1910 only seven 
to eight percent o f  naval stores workers were state convicts. In 1898, 734 Florida convicts, 
seventy-one percent o f the state’s prison population, labored in the turpentine industry.64 Thus, 
whereas naval stores production played a large role in the world of convict leasing, the reverse 
cannot be claimed; prisoners represented only a small portion of workers.
An analysis o f the Florida state convicts who labored in the turpentine industry in 1898 
reveals a profile that changed little during the leasing program’s existence. The great majority of 
prisoners, over eighty percent, were black men. Fifteen percent were white men, four percent 
black women, and less than one percent white women. Over two-thirds o f the convicts sentenced 
in 1898 were between the ages o f sixteen and thirty. One was as young as eleven and the oldest 
was sixty-seven. More than half o f  Florida’s convicts were sentenced for some type o f theft or
63 Carper, “Convict Lease System in Florida,” 212-213; Oshinsky, “Worse Than 
Slavery.” 72, 165; Powell, American Siberia. 332.
64 Robert S. Blount, “Spirits in the Pines” (M A  thesis, Florida State University, 1992),
162-163: Report o f the Commissioner o f Agriculture o f the State o f Florida for the Period 
Beeinning January 1. 1897. and Ending December 31. 1898 (Tallahassee: Tallahasseean Book 
and Job Print, 1899), 93-99.
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breaking and entering and around twenty-two percent were serving time for either murder or 
attempted murder. Only one percent were committed for rape or attempted rape. Just over sixty 
percent were sentenced for less than three years, around fifty-seven percent for two years or less, 
and thirty-eight percent for one year or less. Nearly a quarter received sentences of ten years or 
more. O f the 734 convicts, fourteen were reported to have escaped, and two were killed by 
guards while attempting escape. Thirty-five, or nearly five percent o f the convicts, were reported 
to have died that year. It appears that Florida convicts leased to turpentine operators differed 
little from the overall state convict population. This profile also resembles that of twenty-nine 
Georgia convicts who labored at a Berrien County turpentine operation around the turn of the 
century. Of these convicts, all but one were between the ages of fourteen and thirty-seven and 
most were sentenced for gaming, larceny, carrying a concealed weapon, and attempting escape.65
Convict turpentine laborers performed the same tasks as free workers, almost always at 
separate camps, but usually at a quicker pace. Convicts rose at 4:30 AM and by 5:00 AM were 
on their way from the stockade to the forest work. They trotted to and from work on a squad 
chain, by which the men were attached together at the waist. Once in the woods, a few miles 
from the camp, they worked under the task system in three or four squads, each squad watched 
by one or two guards. Guards followed the convicts through the woods, keeping as much 
distance as would allow them to prevent a possible escape attempt. After resting for thirty 
minutes for lunch, convicts resumed work until completing their tasks, which often kept them 
busy until dusk. They then marched back to camp the same way they had left.66 Powell reported 
that “they kept this gait up all day long, from tree to tree, and as the labor is exhausting in the
65 Report of the Commissioner o f Agriculture o f the State of Florida. 1897-1898, 81-85, 
93-99; Lichtenstein, Twice the Work of Free Labor. 130.
66 As during the antebellum period, the task system was necessary in turpentining to 
gauge the amount of work performed. Drobney, “Where Palm and Pine are Blowing,” 419-421; 
Powell, American Siberia. 22,29; Lichtenstein, Twice the Work of Free labor. 128-130.
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extreme, I have frequently seen men on their way back to camp drop of fatigue, and their 
comrades on the squad-chain drag them a dozen yards through the dirt before the pace could be 
checked so as to enable them to regain their feet. There would be a prodigious clatter o f iron, a 
cloud of dust, a volley of imprecation, and the fallen man would stagger up, dash the dirt out of 
his eyes, and go reeling and running on.”67 It was not uncommon for convicts to endure this 
schedule six and even seven days a week.68
Not all convicts could withstand the intensity of such a demanding schedule.
Handicapped convicts presented special challenges to camp managers who were required to find 
some niche for them. At one camp a blind convict was given work at a pump to which he learned 
to find his way over time. An insane convict, described as an “idiot,” proved less useful. When 
put to work in the forest, he attempted to eat the raw turpentine and returned to the camp with it 
caked in his mouth. New convicts were ofren unable to keep up the prescribed pace and entered 
a period of depression and despondency. But within time, most reportedly developed the 
physical stamina to endure. Depression associated with loss of family contact, however, 
probably continued longer. According to one turpentine camp manager, convicts’ relatives and 
friends usually forgot about them after a short period of incarceration. Within the first year of 
their sentences convicts began receiving increasingly fewer letters and inside of two years 
correspondence usually ended completely. Many convicts lost their spouse as well. It was 
widely believed that because a felony conviction was grounds for divorce, a prison sentence 
automatically constituted one.69
67 Powell, American Siberia. 22.
68 Shelton, Pines and Pioneers. 202; Hickman, Mississippi Harvest. 141-142.420.
69 Powell, American Siberia. 17,122-123, 332-333.
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The chaplain who attended to Florida’s largely forgotten convicts faced the daunting task 
of single-handedly ministering to the dejected population of all the camps. Even he admitted that 
“'owing to their scattered condition under subleases, [I] cannot effect much good.”70 During the 
second half o f the 1890s, the chaplain visited fifteen o f the sixteen camps every nine weeks, 
requiring him to travel annually between 2250 and 2500 miles, and preached between eighty-five 
and ninety sermons. He went to the camp at Palatka in eastern Florida’s Putnam County only 
twice because it required a hundred miles of extra travel and contained only sixteen convicts.71 
From his rapid tour he concluded that “the health o f the camps . . .  was very good, and they 
seemed to be very well cared for.”72 He lamented, however, that the “morals of all the camps 
[were] as good as could be expected under the circumstances. We have one grand evil that exists 
on some of the camps, to-wit: gambling.”73
Despite the chaplain’s claim to good “health of the camps,” conditions at these scattered 
facilities, in fact, varied greatly. Like all turpentine operations, those employing convicts 
periodically moved to isolated areas in search of fresh pine stands. The initial camps at a new 
site tended to be the most primitive. At one such camp in the late 1870s, convicts slept in a 
twenty-foot by forty-foot log house on sloping platforms that ran one over the other down both 
sides of the structure. At night a long chain running the length of the bunk house was used to 
secure smaller chains running from the convicts’ leg irons. The spaces between the building’s
70 Report of the Commissioner of Agriculture of the State o f Florida for the Period 
Beginning January 1. 1889. and Ending December 31. 1890 (Jacksonville: DaCosta Printing and 
Publishing House, 1891), 141.
71 His effort, he reported, produced more than ten conversions a year. Report o f the 
Commissioner o f  Agriculture o f the State of Florida. 1897-1898,92; Report of the Commissioner 
of Agriculture o f the State o f Florida. 1895-96, 79.
72 Report of the Commissioner of Agriculture of the State o f Florida. 1897-1898,92.
73 Report o f the Commissioner o f Agriculture of the State o f Florida. 1895-96, 79.
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logs were not sealed, allowing wind, cold, and dampness to enter. However, during the summer 
heat, the cracks, no doubt, provided welcome ventilation. Pine knots which burned in the middle 
of the floor, provided light. At night an armed guard kept watch at the front Guards stayed in 
another primitive building constructed near the cell house. A simple lean-to served as the camp 
kitchen where cooks prepared food on a dirt bank and hung their pots and kettles from pieces of 
wire attached to its roof. Under these primitive conditions food preparation was hopelessly 
unsanitary, especially in the summer when a layer of gnats often covered meals as they cooked.74
Within a short time more substantial camp facilities were constructed. A high stockade 
typically surrounded turpentine convict camps. Inside the yard little vegetation grew. Most 
buildings were constructed o f rough pine boards and whitewashed. The bunk house resembled a 
warehouse and was the largest building in the camp. As much as one-hundred-feet long, both 
houses usually had uncovered rafters and boards and, except for barred windows and postings of 
the state prison authority’s rules, bare walls. Some even lacked floors, and in cold weather a fire 
was built on the ground and the smoke allowed to escape however it could.
At many camps the structure was divided into a dining hall and sleeping quarters. 
Bedding varied greatly; convicts at some camps had individual cots, but most slept on long 
platforms covered with hay and blankets, with no sheets. In some cases unchanged bedding grew 
disgustingly filthy. At one Florida camp bedding went unwashed for nearly a year. Sleeping 
convicts were chained by their waist chains to a chain that ran the length o f the bunkhouse. At 
night guards inspected each link to ensure its security. If a convict wished to change his sleeping 
position, he had to call to the night guard and get his permission. The dinning hall contained a 
heating stove, tables, and boxes and broken chairs for sitting. It appears that at some camps, 
however, convicts came directly from work to the bunk house, chained at their portion of the
74 Drobney, “Where Palm and Pine are Blowing,” 418; Powell, American Siberia. 17-21, 
275; Drobnev. Lumbermen and Log Sawyers. 157.
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bedding platform, and ate their supper there. Convicts ate their fare using dishes, pans, and 
spoons. Knives and forks were forbidden since they could be used as weapons. For bathing 
convicts used barrels o f water placed in the sleeping quarters. Twenty-five to thirty convicts 
used each barrel, which was commonly not emptied or cleaned, favoring the spread of disease 
and infection. In addition to the bunk house, camps contained a commissary, kitchen, pig pen, 
and garden plot.75
Segregation policies appear to have varied among camps, despite state legislation that 
forbade housing black and white convicts together. In the mid-I880s, Alabama forbade the 
chaining of black and white convicts together when not at work. The rule applied to both state 
and county convicts. The Georgia legislature, in 1891, went one step further and made it a crime 
for convict lessees to chain blacks and whites together, even at work. Compared to Georgia, 
Florida was slower and less radical in its requirement of separating prisoners. In 1905, it simply 
forbade chaining men o f the two races together and four years later required counties to house 
the races separately. Florida said nothing about work. Mississippi’s legislature in 1906 and in 
1908 prohibited housing or feeding convicts together and stated that the races should work 
separately when a separate arrangement was feasible. In his recollection o f experiences as a boss 
of convicts at a turpentine camp, J.C. Powell makes no mention of separating convicts by race at 
the camps he managed except in the case where a sublessee requested an all-black work unit. It 
also appears that if a camp contained female convicts, special quarters were reserved for them.76
75 Drobney, “Where Palm and Pine are Blowing,” 418-419; “Horrible Treatment o f 
Convicts,” Jacksonville. Florida Times-Union and Citizen. 20 May 1899; Tenth Biennial Report 
of the Commissioner o f Agriculture o f the State of Florida for the Period Beginning January 1. 
1907. and Ending December 31. 1908 (Tallahassee: Union Label, 1909), 383-384; Powell, 
American Siberia, forward, 18,21,39, 123-124, 289,338-339; Drobney, Lumbermen and Log 
Sawyers. 156-157; Carper, “Convict Lease System in Florida,” 130.
76 Franklin Johnson, The Development of State Legislation Concerning the Free Negro 
(New York: The Arbor Press, Inc., 1918), 64-65,93-94, 88,90, 135.
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As with housing arrangements, the quality of food in convict camps could vary from 
adequate to condemnable. Diets typically consisted of salt pork, pork fat or “white bacon,” 
combread, black-eyed peas, rice, beans, sweet potatoes, and occasionally beef and fish, but at 
one camp located twelve miles outside o f Palatka, Florida, convicts subsisted on meat and bread 
that was not fully cooked.77 According to one observer, the camp commissary keeper exercised 
considerable influence over provisions. He “is generally a very important individual in a convict 
camp, for he controls, to a large extent, the food given not only to the men, but to the guards, and 
to the captn., consequently the captn. and he are usually very good friends, each knowing that he 
is to a certain extent, dependent on the other, and it often happens that the commissary man is the 
real ruler of the camp, though nominally the captn. is responsible for what is done.”78 At some 
camps convicts took the initiative themselves to supplement their diet. Because fresh pork was 
rarely included as part o f  camp meals, convicts sometimes killed and ate hogs stolen from either 
the camp or neighboring farmers. They also foraged in the woods for wild game. One Florida 
convict died after attempting to dig a ground tortoise from his burrow using a turpentine dipper. 
When he crawled head-first into the hole to retrieve his prey, the ground caved in over him.79
Convicts leased to turpentine outfits usually at the mercy of incompetent guards. 
Guarding convicts was a difficult and low-paying job Guards did not have to perform physically 
exhausting labor, as did the convicts, but they did have to keep the same long hours guarding the 
prisoners both in the camp and in the woods. They also lived in the rustic and isolated camps. 
Because producers needed to keep costs low in order to make a profit in the frequently depressed 
industry, guards received little compensation for their long work and primitive living condition.
77 “Horrible Treatment o f Convicts.”
78 “White Slavery in Florida,” New York Evening Post. 12 February 1898.
79 Drobney, “Where Palm and Pine Are Blowing,” 419; Powell, American Siberia. 21, 
123-124, 338-339.
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The occupation, therefore, attracted generally unreliable workers. Most guards were young men 
who lacked better prospects in the area surrounding each camp. Many worked sloppily, caused 
trouble, and stayed at the job only a short time. There was, consequently, a  constant turnover in 
personnel. The inability to attract reliable white men as guards led some producers to use trusted 
convicts to oversee other prisoners. Known as the trustee system, the practice was relatively 
common but posed its own shortcoming. One camp manager found that trustees inspired 
confidence in themselves by preventing other convicts from escaping, only to later use that trust 
and the loosened restrictions it brought to run away themselves.80
Although convict camps provided employment for local men, many whites living in areas 
surrounding the facilities strongly opposed their introduction into the community. Local whites 
were especially averse to the trustee system. According to one report, frequent escapes did “not 
give the citizens in the vicinity of the convict camps much feeling of security.”81 After trustees 
reportedly committed a series of crimes in the early 1890s, concerned local citizens complained 
to the Florida Board o f Commissioners o f State Institutions and petitioned that the trustee system 
be abolished. In other localities citizens protested by more direct means. At one Taylor County, 
Florida, turpentine operation a black convict who became lost in the woods was marched back to 
camp at gun point by an angry white man. Another black convict from the same operation found 
himself fired upon as he approached a house to have an ax sharpened. Other local whites 
sabotaged turpentine operations that used convict labor by removing the gum from boxes, 
throwing it on the ground, and replacing it with dirt. More cunning protesters drove nails into 
the pines just above the last chip. The next swipe with the hack resulted in a broken blade. As a
80 Powell, American Siberia. 29, 41-42, 304-305; Mancini, One Dies. Get Another. 74; 
Carper, “Convict Lease System in Florida,” 116,230-231; Drobney, “Where Palm and Pine are 
Blowing,” 418.
81 Report of the Commissioner o f Agriculture of the State of Florida. 1889-1890, 141.
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result o f such action at one camp a dozen hack blades broke in one day, greatly interrupting 
work.82 In 1896 the neighbors o f an Alachua County, Florida, turpentine operation complained 
about the inhumane treatment of the convicts and threatened that “if the county or state officers 
do not do something to prevent it, they will rise en masse and release every convict in the
_ _ _ _ _  ii83camp.
Camp bosses and guards maintained order and an exhausting work pace through the use 
of brutal punishment, most commonly with beatings. It appears that, beginning in the 1870s, 
most convict camps replaced the whip with a strap of tough leather measuring one and a half feet 
by three inches and attached to a wooden handle. Until the turn of the century there was no legal 
restriction on the number o f blows a convict could receive or on the frequency they could be 
administered. Whippings could easily become uncontrolled, sadistic forms o f torture and even 
death. At their discretion, a warden could turn the event into a cruel game for his amusement. 
For example, when a Florida camp boss caught one of his convicts stealing dinner rations, he 
forced a woman with whom the prisoner collaborated to administer the first blows. She made 
gentle strokes with the strap until the boss threatened her.84 “At this stage,” he explained, “the 
negress fully believed that her life depended upon her vigor, and she beat a devil’s tattoo upon 
the prostrate trusty.”83 Once satisfied that the woman had exhausted her physical strength, the
82 The Board’s subsequent resolution that forbid the use of trustees outside the stockade 
without the presence o f armed guards met with opposition from lessees who complained that 
such action would bring an expensive hardship. Report o f the Commissioner of Agriculture o f 
the State of Florida for the Period Beginning January 1. 1893. and Ending December 31. 1894 
(Tallahassee: John G. Collins, State Printer, 1895), 62-63; Powell, American Siberia. 327-328, 
332-333.
83 “Trouble Threatened,” Jacksonville. Florida Times-Union. 9 February 1896.
84 Drobney, “Where Palm and Pine Are Blowing,” 429; Powell, American Siberia. 21, 
130-131; Mancini, One Dies. Get Another. 75-77; Clarissa Olds Keeler, The Crime o f Crimes or 
The Convict System Unmasked (Washington, DC: Clarissa Olds Keeler, 1907), 11.
85 Powell. American Siberia. 131.
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warden took the strap and continued beating the convict himself. The boss then forced the 
convict to beat his female accomplice. The warden described with amusement how “the scene of 
their late loves reechoed to the thuds of the strap and the screams, pleas, and protests o f  his 
quondam sweetheart.” Once the ordeal was complete, the boss pronounced the convict’s 
flogging “artfully performed.”*6 He believed that such punishment was neither harsh nor 
unjustifiable. “The life o f the convict was hard,” he explained, “and the punishments often 
severe, but they were not inhuman, and were invariably necessary, not only for our safety but for 
the safety of the peaceably disposed prisoners.”87 Moreover, the boss added, the rough nature of 
the convicts, whom he characterized as ‘“Cracker outlaws’ and cut-throat negroes,” necessitated 
harsh punishment.88 Powell also believed that severe punishment was required because 
discipline was more difficult to maintain when convicts spent most o f their days outside the 
camp. Other captains, however, apparently relied (ess on the strap. At one especially well run 
camp near Floral City, Florida, beatings occurred only six times a year.89
Beating was not the only method of discipline in turpentine convict camps. Some 
wardens devised more cruel and unusual forms of punishment. They had convicts strung up by 
their thumbs and left teetering on their toes for hours. At the largest turpentine business in 
Florida, a sick convict who failed to work was hung by handcuffs from a tree branch so that his 
feet dangled above the ground. When he screamed from the pain after twenty minutes, a guard
“ Ibid., 131-132.
87 Ibid., 118.
88 Ibid., 30
89 Matthew Mancini puts the late nineteenth century use o f the lash in the perspective of 
its time. Flogging, he explains, did not carry today’s connotation o f cruelty and was generally 
regarded by older Americans in the late 1800s as a common and acceptable form of discipline 
within the home, school, farm, and factory. Mancini, One Dies. Get Another. 77; “White Slavery
in Florida.”
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severely beat him with a  grape vine. Others endured the especially cruel “ordeal by water” in 
which guards strapped down a prisoner, forced a funnel into his mouth, and poured water down 
his throat. The victim’s expanded stomach caused great pain and sometimes death.90
Georgia records for 1895 and 1896 indicate that turpentine camps had a much lower rate 
of hospitalization, twelve percent, than did the overall convict population, thirty-nine percent. 
However, this statistic no doubt says more about the primitive and isolated nature of turpentine 
camps-which were notorious for lacking hospital facilities—than about the frequency of illness or 
injury.91 In fact the Georgia penitentiary physician complained that “under the present 
management the prisoners are frequently moved to places where there is no preparation to care 
for them, and on this account they suffer a great deal.”92 However, those turpentine camps that 
reported hospitalization indicated that convicts working in the naval stores industry suffered 
from the same illness and injuries as did those in other work camps. Respiratory diseases, 
bilious fever, intestinal ailments, and cuts were common in all camps. Some camps experienced 
attacks from contagious diseases. For example, one-half o f  the convicts hospitalized at Camp 
Magnolia in Clinch County, Georgia, in 1895-1896 had influenza. Prisoners suffered the greatest 
amount of illness and death during the summer months when the heat was most intense. The 
rainy months of July and August also adversely affected convicts who caught chills, fever, and 
pneumonia afrer working in water. Convicts also contended with diseases they brought with 
them into the camps, especially tuberculosis and venereal disease.93 In the late 1890s the
90 Carper, “Convict Lease System in Florida,” 115; Drobney, “Where Palm and Pine Are 
Blowing,” 429.
91 Annual Report o f the Principal Physician of the Georgia Penitentiary from October 1.
1895. to October 1. 1896 (Atlanta: George W. Harrison, State Printer, 1896), 117-142.
92 Ibid., 110.
93 Ibid., 109, 117-142; Drobney, “Where Palm and Pine Are Blowing,” 428-429; Blount, 
“Spirits in the Pines,” 164.
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managers of a Florida turpentine camp that employed convicts reported that “the main sickness 
we have to contend with is bilious attacks. We have to give quite a lot o f them blood medicines 
to keep their blood in condition, as they have old cases o f different kinds that return
occasionally.”94
Although it is difficult to know the exact rate of mortality for convict laborers in 
turpentine, it appears to have been twice as high as the overall prisoner population’s. In general, 
mortality among all leased convicts varied depending on their treatment and the business in 
which they worked. Convicts leased to plantations tended to have a better chance of surviving to 
the end o f their sentence than those who worked in coal mines, railroad camps, and turpentine 
operations. At their very worst, death rates could run as high as twenty-five percent. Historian 
Robert S. Blount, however, finds that official reports list prisoner death rates over the years of 
Florida’s leasing practice at between one and four percent. But at some camps the frequency was 
higher. In 1899 twelve out o f fifty-five convicts who labored at a Padgett, Florida, turpentine 
camp died. Located in a low palmetto flat, the camp was wet much of the year.95
Convicts who endured these terrible working and living conditions had little means of 
voicing complaint. State prison officials visited the isolated camps infrequently and, if a prisoner 
had the rare opportunity to speak to a state official, it was the convict’s word against the guards’ 
and warden’s. Except for the name of the lessee, Florida had no knowledge of exactly who was 
in charge o f the convicts, under what conditions they worked and lived, or how often or brutally
94 Report of the Commissioner of Agriculture of the State of Florida. 1897-1898, 88-89,
98.
95 As high as the mortality rate could climb in the worst turpentine camps, convicts in 
other states had an even lower chance of survival. In two years, 101 o f324 convicts who worked
for the Sloss Steel and Iron Company in Alabama died, half from tuberculosis. In 1895 and 1896 
tuberculosis and pneumonia killed another 265 convicts. Keeler, The Crime of Crimes. 7; 
Oshinsky, “Worse Than Slavery”. 67; Drobney, “Where Palm and Pine Are Blowing,” 428; 
Blount, “Spirits in the Pines,” 164; Mancini, One Dies. Get Another. 66; Carper, “Convict Lease 
System in Florida,” 130.
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they were punished.96 By the late 1890s, however, Florida began limited efforts to bring convict 
leasing under tighter state control. The Commissioner of Agriculture who had charge o f the 
Florida convict lease system, a state legislative committee, inspection agents who reported to the 
Commissioner o f Agriculture, and a prison chaplain all made periodic visits to the convict 
camps. Every twelve to fifteen months the Commissioner of Agriculture made a short visit to 
each camp and interviewed the convicts to see if they had any complaints. Only rarely though 
did prisoners report any problems, knowing that, although their discussions with the 
Commissioner were conducted in the warden's and guards' absence, the trustees would report the 
conversation. Convicts also understood all too well that the captain and guards would tell a 
different story and that they would more likely be believed. The same circumstances prevented 
convicts from discussing grievances with the legislative committee that visited camps every two 
years. In the days preceding the committee’s visit, which was announced in advance, camp 
conditions underwent a transformation. Living quarters and clothes were cleaned, the food got 
better, and whippings decreased.97 State inspectors made more frequent visits than the legislative 
committee, but the law seriously restricted their ability to thoroughly examine camp conditions.
In 1896 a frustrated agent asked the governor that “the law be amended so as to enlarge the 
duties of the Agent, authorizing him in his visits to inspect the quarters, and look after the 
management and treatment o f the convicts, and see that the contracts with the lessees are 
complied with. Under the present law, the Agent has no authority to look after these matters.”98
97 Carper, “Convict Lease System in Florida,” 116; Drobney, Lumbermen and Log 
Sawyers. 156: Tenth Biennial Report of the Commissioner of Agriculture of the State o f Florida. 
1907-1908, 384; “White Slavery in Florida.”
98 Report of the Commissioner of Agriculture o f the State of Florida for the Period 
Beginning January I. 1895. and Ending December 31. 1896 (Tallahassee: Florida Printing 
Company, 1897), 78-79.
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Inspections were typically superficial and uncritical. One agent, for example, found all 
camps in generally good condition but at one recommend that a new bunk house be built99 
Another reported that he made “a tour o f inspection of the several convict camps of the State, to 
correct certain abuses and improper use o f authority which had been reported. In every camp 
except one—of which due report was made—we found the convicts well cared for, well fed and 
clothed, and but little sickness among them.”100 The fact that at least one agent was a naval 
stores manufacturer himself calls into question the reliability of both the inspectors and the 
system reliability.101
Although they possessed severely limited ability to complain to officials, convicts in 
turpentine camps resisted harsh conditions in other ways. One convict feigned insanity to avoid 
work. He began speaking gibberish and cut down a tree which he was supposed to be boxing. In 
response he was whipped, the camp manager reported, “until he admitted the ruse and promised 
to drop it in the future. He had no more attacks after that, and made it a point to take new 
prisoners aside and warn them in a fatherly way against the insanity dodge.”102 In a more 
dramatic attempt to avoid the hard work, another convict, while cutting boxes, he drove his ax 
through his foot, cutting a severe gash. The wound, however, healed well enough for him to get 
about sufficiently to split wood. Still miserable, he again cut his foot, but this time the deep 
wound refused to heal and he died o f gangrene after suffering in agony. Other more desperate 
convicts attempted suicide. When a guard threatened to whip a convict for not working hard
99 W.J. Hillman to W.D. Bloxham, 25 July 1903, Convict Lease Program Subject Files, 
1889-1916, Board of Commissioners of State Institutions, Florida State Archives.
100 Report of the Commissioner of Agriculture of the State o f Florida. 1895-1896,78.
101 W.J. Hillman to W.D. Bloxham, 25 July 1903, Convict Lease Program Subject Files, 
1889-1916.
102 Ibid., 64.
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enough, the distraught prisoner, a black preacher sentenced for stealing cotton, used a boxing ax 
to slit his throat. Missing his jugular vein but severing his windpipe so severely that his tongue 
dropped through the gapping cut, he was capable of only making a faint whistling sound to get a 
guard’s attention. He recovered after receiving stitching for the wound. In yet another instance a 
poor white man sent to prison for murdering his brother-in-law refused in disgust to chip faces. 
When threatened with a whipping, he defiantly ordered a guard to shoot him, then attempted to 
break his skull with the weighted end of his hack. He, too, survived his self-inflicted wound.103
Escape, however, was the most common form of resistance. Escapees represented a 
double loss for the camp. Not only did the producer loose the labor for which he had already 
paid, but if the convict was not caught within two months, the operator had to pay a two- 
hundred-dollar fine. Some convicts appear to a have attempted escape spontaneously out of 
desperation. One Florida convict in the 1890s tried to escape after the entire camp received fifty 
lashes one night for not chipping their required task. When they were threatened with the same 
punishment the next day, he tried to get away. Another convict used more cunning in escaping 
from a Florida turpentine camp. One night he succeeded in cutting his chain and sneaked off his 
bunk and toward the cell house door. When the patrolling guard turned his back, the convict 
pushed the backdoor wide open, blocking the guard’s view o f him, slipped around the side of the 
building, and left the camp never to be seen again. In Georgia, where figures are relatively 
complete, 1,174 convicts escaped during the lease’s forty year existence. In the 1890s the typical 
escaped convict laborer in Florida was a black male who fled after serving less than one year for 
either robbery or murder.104
103 Ibid., 60-63.
104 Coulter, James Monroe Smith. 69; Carper, “Convict Lease System in Florida,” 118. 
Powell, American Siberia. 79. For five o f these forty years the number for escapes is unavailable. 
Mancini, One Dies. Get Another. 68; Report o f the Commissioner of Agriculture o f the State of 
Florida. 1897-1898, 90.
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Because recapturing convicts proved difficult once they made their way away from 
camp, if guards happened to see them on the run, they shot them. Apparently guards used little 
restraint with their aim, shooting to kill rather than merely to halt the fleeing prisoner. At one 
Florida turpentine camp three convicts out o f around fifty were killed in escape attempts. At 
another Florida camp a guard shot an escaping convict twice and, once he was down, shot him a 
third time. He lingered before dying. In Florida from 1874 to 1920, an average o f  seven state 
convicts died each year from gunshot wounds they received while trying to escape.10s
Once convicts successfully made it out o f the camp, four conditions aided them in 
alluding authorities. First, there existed no procedural method for capturing convicts. Camp 
bosses and guards coordinated the effort as best they could. If a convict successfully slipped 
away from a camp, guards used hounds to track him. Camp managers trained young hounds for 
this job by ordering trustees to run through the woods and putting the pups on his trail soon 
afterwards. Many convict camps used fox hounds for this task because their slower speed 
enabled the guards on horseback to keep up with them. However, if  the hounds failed to track an 
escapee within a few hours o f his departure, his likelihood of recapture dropped to less than 
thirty percent.106 Second, within the surrounding areas there was a great demand for black labor, 
especially workers who already possessed skills in turpentining. Escaped convicts found little 
difficulty in securing employment in out-of-the-way naval stores operations, which hid them 
from recapture. Third, the area’s white citizens, who tended to despise the black convicts but 
often hated the convict lease system even more, sometimes agreed to assist escapees in an effort 
to discredit the system. Fourth, the wild, inhospitable countryside surrounding camps offered a 
safe haven for runaways. Some parts o f the turpentine belt, especially the area closest to the
105 Carper, “Convict Lease System in Florida,” 118; Blount, “Spirits in the Pines,” 164; 
“Horrible Treatment of Convicts.”
106 Drobney, Lumbermen and Log Sawyers. 162; Powell, American Siberia. 24.
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Gulf, were vast swamps with virtually impenetrably thick vegetation and with very little 
settlement, even by the standards o f the sparsely-populated piney woods region. The escapees 
who lived in this coastal area survived off what the wilderness provided. Deer, black bear, 
caterouts, wild hogs, foxes, wolves, rabbits, raccoons, and panthers were plentiful in the dense 
woods. Escapees built log huts with dirt floors and animal skin bedding. They occasionally 
emerged from their hideouts only to purchase such supplies as powder and shot.107 Historian 
Matthew Mancini concludes that “literally thousands of escaped convicts must have inhabited 
the late-nineteenth-century Southern landscape.”108
A comparison of convicts involved in turpentine manufacture and those involved in other 
types of business reveals that prisoners who labored in naval stores production both experienced 
unique conditions and shared experiences with other convicts. Of the convicts leased to 
Florida’s railroad camps, phosphate mines, and turpentine operations, reportedly “none can 
suffer more than the convicts sub-let to work in turpentine forests.”109 The convicts at one 
turpentine camp dreaded the work so much, they rejoiced when the state leased them to a 
planter.110 “The fact was that the work at the pine woods, particularly the chipping, had broken 
down most of the long-time men,” J.C. Powell explained. “They were eager to exchange the 
hack and dipper for the plow and hoe.”1" The convicts who were fortunate enough to be spared
107 Powell, American Siberia. 31, 324-325,324-326.
108 Mancini, One Dies. Get Another. 68.
109 Keeler, Crime of Crimes. 13.
110 In Florida a division of the state convicts occurred every few years. When it 
occurred, the lessee and the sublessees often changed. All convicts were collected at a central 
point for redistribution, an ordeal that no doubt resulted in considerable stress from being 
uprooted from one area and sent into unknown conditions. Drobney, “Where Palm and Pine Are 
Blowing,” 427-428; Powell. American Siberia. 134, 138.
111 Powell, American Siberia. 341.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
335
turpentine work, had good reason to feel thankful. Powell reported that farm work proved “much 
more satisfactory to the convicts themselves than any other at which they have ever been 
engaged. In point of severity it is not to be compared to turpentine culture, and the facilities for 
obtaining fresh vegetables on the farm is a matter of the first importance.”112 But although work 
and punishment at turpentine convict camps were more difficult and harsh than those at other 
types of operations, in other ways conditions appear to have closely resembled camps for 
convicts engaged in other types of work, both industrial and agricultural. In the late 1880s and 
early 1890s, seventy-five percent o f  convicts who worked in Tennessee coal mines were black. 
Most lived in rough board structures and slept on planks covered by filthy ticking stuffed with 
straw. Their diet consisted o f combread, pork, black-eyed peas, beans, and coffee. Whipping 
was the most common form o f punishment. Convicts leased to agricultural operations 
experienced similar conditions. At one Georgia plantation convicts lived in a long bunk house 
and were chained in at night. The entire camp was surrounded by a stockade.113
Despite convict leasing’s characteristically brutal nature and distinction as a form o f 
forced labor, the practice, whether in industrial pursuits or agriculture, represented neither a form 
of slavery nor a functional replacement for it. Although both systems were forms of forced 
labor, they each operated quite differently. First, slaveholders carried the cost of sustaining the 
entire slave community which included such relatively unproductive members as the elderly, the 
sick, and young children. Convict employers concerned themselves mostly with productive men. 
A second difference is the low financial interest that the lessee had in the convict. Whereas each 
slave represented a considerable investment to his owner, lessees had little long-term financial 
stake in the individual convict. The latter’s death, release, or escape consequently did not
112 Ibid., 349.
113 Keeler, Crime o f Crimes. 4-5. Coulter, James Monroe Smith. 74-75, 79.
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represent a significant loss.114 As capital, slaves were important individually where as convicts 
were only collectively so. As one early twentieth century reformer found, “the lessee has no 
interest in the convict except to secure the largest amount o f labor in a given time. What matters 
it to him if the convict’s health is broken down? There are plenty o f more convicts.”115 This 
endless supply reinforced the cruel treatment of convicts who were important to their employer 
only as a group not as individuals. But despite the less individual value of convicts compared to 
slaves, financial cost o f convict leasing could present a greater problem than the experience of 
slave ownership when seasonal work cycles or economic downturns created periodic idleness 
during which time the maintenance cost for the entire convict work force continued. Whereas 
individual slaves could be sold or hired out, convicts were leased in lots and, until changes in 
state legislation, could not be subleased.116
Despite this economic drawback, analysis o f convict leasing in the turpentine industry 
largely supports recent scholarship that argues that convict leasing helped to modernize the 
southern economy by providing a cheap and reliable labor force for a region short o f investment 
capital. Edward Ayers contends that the convict lease system helped in the transition from an 
agricultural economy to one o f fuller capitalist development by providing a reliable labor at a 
fixed and predictable price and therefore helping produce quick profits.. Convicts could be 
driven to work at a more rapid pace and for longer hours than free workers would tolerate and at 
difficult jobs that free workers shunned.1'7 Charles K. Dutton, a New Yorker and head of a naval
1,4 Mancini, One Dies. Get Another. 20-24.
115 Keeler, Crime o f Crimes. 14.
116 Mancini, One Dies. Get Another. 24.
117 Carper, “Convict Lease System in Florida,” 49-50, 143-144; Drobney, Lumbermen 
and Log Sawyers. 151; Shofner, “Negro Laborers,” 183; Clark, Greening of the South. 22; 
Oshinsky, “Worse Than Slavery”. 70; Ayers, Vengeance and Justice. 4,185, 191-193.
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stores company, explained that he leased Florida convicts because “turpentine culture was 
exhausting work, and it was difficult to obtain enough labor for the proper cultivation o f any 
great number o f trees. Natives o f Florida’s piney woods would quickly abandon the work when 
any other type of livelihood became available.”118
Alex Lichtenstein agrees that convict leasing supplied a reliable and predictable labor 
force required of the South’s developing iron mines, railroad construction, brick yards, sawmills, 
and turpentine camps. Instead of repressing the region’s industrial economy, he argues, “convict 
labor was a central component in the South’s modernization.”119 The region was poor in capital 
and rich in natural resources and convict labor offered a solution for industrial growth. 
Lichtenstein finds that economic modernization is commonly tied to forced labor as producers 
attempt to control workers who resist entering wage labor relationships, a situation that was 
especially so among naval stores producers. Lichtenstein explains that “the combination of labor 
uncertainty, production on a narrow margin, destructive methods o f extraction, seasonality, 
geographic mobility, and isolation encouraged many turpentine operators to look to the county 
courts for their labor supply. Forced labor, he argues, is also often a necessary phase in the 
process of capital accumulation that enables capitalist development. Finding itself at an 
economic disadvantage with so little investment capital, the South used forced labor to spur its 
economic progress without upsetting the traditional racial order.120 Thus instead of repressing 
the region’s industrial economy, Lichtenstein argues, “convict labor was a central component in 
the South’s modernization.”121 He concludes that “progress is not necessarily progressive for all
118 Quoted in Ayers, Vengeance and Justice. 192.
119 Lichtenstein, Twice the Work of Free Labor, xvii.
120 Ibid., xv-xvi, 4-5,11-13, 19-20, 170-171, 187-188, 195.
121 Ibid., xvii.
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peoples, and that the bearers of modernity frequently carry with them its antithesis.”122 But 
whereas the manner in which producers employed convicts in the naval stores industry certainly 
fits this argument, the relatively small number o f such workers involved in turpentine 
manufacture, less than ten percent, calls into question the degree to which production owed its 
continuation to convict leasing.
When combined with similar findings by other scholars who examine the restricted 
freedom of wage laborers, the broader argument that varying forms and degrees o f forced labor 
helped the South develop economically appears valid with regard to the naval stores industry, 
which with slavery’s end, turned to two alternative means of forcing blacks to work, debt 
peonage and convict leasing. David L. Carlton maintains that although peonage was not unique 
to the South, the practice was more widespread in the region because of the undercapitalized 
economy that consisted primarily o f export agriculture and extractive industries that required 
routinized and relatively unskilled labor. It is, therefore, not surprising, Pete Daniel adds, that 
the cotton belt, especially the Mississippi Delta, the turpentine region, particularly south 
Georgia, North Florida, and southern Alabama and Mississippi, and railroad construction camps 
throughout the South produced the most peonage complaints.123 In his doctoral dissertation 
Michael Tegeder, like Lichtenstein, finds no contradiction between forced labor and economic 
development as well as no significant divide between planters and industrialists or antebellum 
and postbellum economics. He maintains that “continuities in the development of forced labor in 
southern turpentine production were not incompatible with the postbellum process of 
modernization.”124 Turpentiners, who commonly struggled under debt themselves and could
122 Ibid., 195.
123 David L. Carlton, “The Revolution from Above: The National Market and the 
Beginnings of Industrialization in North Carolina,” The Journal o f American History 77 
(September 1990): 447; Daniel, Shadow o f  Slavery. 21; Tegedar, “Prisoners o f the Pines,” 14-15.
124 Tegeder, “Prisoners of the Pines,” 21-22.
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expect low profit margins at best, sought financial relief by reducing their labor costs to barely 
more than subsistence wages. Labor expenses accounted for between fifty and sixty percent of 
production costs and, unlike expenses o f leases, tools, and supplies, which were fixed, the 
producer had some control over them. Forced labor offered the turpentiner the ability to pay low 
wages and still enjoy a relatively reliable labor supply.125
In the three decades following the Civil War, considerable continuity existed between 
the naval stores workers’ antebellum and postbellum experiences. Labor laws—enticement, 
emigrant agent, vagrancy, and contract legislation—and the movement o f  free labor that they 
restricted, combined with convict leasing, forced many southern blacks to toil at turpentine 
production against their will. Although most such workers received wages, often low and based 
on piece work, the legal system commonly left them little choice in terms o f their employment. 
Laborers continued to work at the same tasks as before the war and to lived in camps that 
remained isolated, primitive, and transient. For convicts, work requirements were greater, the 
living conditions more isolated and crude, and the brutality visited upon workers more intense 
than those of wage laborers. Although these conditions could also be found in other areas of 
southern business such as agriculture and especially the lumber industry, they were perhaps 
more broadly characteristic o f  the naval stores industry.
,25 Ibid., 13,49, 52.
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Chapter Eight 
Change at Last:
Government Involvement and Naval Stores Industry Innovation
During the first decades of the twentieth century, the naval stores industry, with 
considerable assistance from the newly formed federal Bureau of Forestry, at long last began 
successful efforts to adopt less destructive production methods than those employed since the 
business began in the American colonies centuries earlier. University-trained researchers 
pioneered practices that not only produced a higher-grade gum than the older practice o f boxing, 
but also caused less harm to the tree. Their successes then fostered a more receptive 
environment for scientific forestry among many producers, which allowed for further 
improvements. These innovations ultimately averted the impending forest depletion that had 
brought the industry to the brink of collapse. The naval stores industry not only benefited from 
federal forestry efforts, but also from research and experiments conducted by the Bureau o f 
Chemistry. Where the Bureau of Forestry focused on improving gum harvesting, the Bureau of 
Chemistry worked to advance distilling and marketing o f turpentine and rosin. Together, these 
government agencies introduced significant changes to the conservative industry.
Indeed, the likely threat of deforestation spurred many turpentine producers to consider 
at last alternative, less-destructive methods of harvesting gum. By the early twentieth century, 
the naval stores industry’s growth, its continued movement into the deep South’s dwindling 
virgin pine forests, and producers’ persistent use of destructive harvesting practices presented 
manufacturers with an impending crisis. Operators began to take note when their production 
costs rose in relation to returns and, more ominously, when their most conservative estimates 
predicted that, at the then current rate of boxing, virgin timber supplies would disappear before
340
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1920.1 The reduced timber acreage by the turn o f the century was not only reflected in higher 
prices, but was visually obvious as well. In 1901, one Georgia resident recalled that “in 1864 
when I first went over the railroad from Savannah to Thomasville there was an almost unbroken 
forest o f magnificent pines extending from Bryan to Thomas Co. through which the railroad cut 
its way like a ditch—but now one may go over the same rout [sic] and scarcely see a merchantable 
pine—From most o f the visible land the timber is entirely gone and the same state of things 
prevails in much o f the piney woods part of the state—If these lands were covered with well tilled 
farms it would be well enough but most of them are barren desolate wastes.”2 About the same 
time, a naval stores factor complained that “the people of Georgia are disposing of one of 
themost [sic] valuable assets o f the state without receiving adequate compensation therefor.” He 
argued that “if the law making power of Georgia had taken up actively the preservation o f the 
forests twenty years ago, the value o f real estate within the pine belt would have been many 
millions more than it is to-day.”3
Similar conditions existed in Florida. In 1902, a naval stores factor explained that during 
the short time the turpentine industry had existed in that state rapid tree loss “has brought about 
conditions which the people o f the South have too long ignored, and the time is fast approaching 
when the method employed by the native turpentine operators must be replaced by a more 
scientific and less extravagant mode of operation. Other nations and other people long since
1 Charles H. Herty, A New Method o f Turpentine Orcharding (Washington, DC: United 
States Department o f Agriculture, 1903), 9-10; A.W. Schorgerand H.S. Betts, The Naval Stores 
Industry (Washington, DC: United States Department o f Agriculture, 19 IS), 1-2; Thomas D. 
Clark, The Greening o f the South: The Recovery o f Land and Forest (Lexington: The University 
Press of Kentucky, 1984), 162; J.P. Williams to Charles H. Herty, 20 November 1900, Charles 
Holmes Herty Collection, Special Collections, The Robert W. Woodruff Library, Emory 
University.
2 Archibald Smith to Charles H. Herty, 7 June 1901, Herty Collection.
3 J.P. Williams to Charles H. Herty, 20 November 1900, Herty Collection.
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went the way we are so blindly pursuing and have perceived the error of that way, and have 
forced private greed to give way to the public good by a wise and efficient system o f forestry. 
And why may not the people o f the South profit by their dearly bought experience and take steps 
to profit and maintain the wealth still stored up in their forests? Such protection cannot come too 
soon.’'4 Others were concerned about the effect that the unsightly, denuded forests would have 
on Florida’s growing tourist industry.5
Despite the failure o f late-nineteenth-century efforts to develop a less destructive gum- 
harvesting technique to help avert the destruction of the forests, an inventor, in 1900 attempted to 
find a new way. Bom in Milledgeville, Georgia, in 1867 and educated at the University of 
Georgia and The Johns Hopkins University, Dr. Charles H. Herty sailed to Germany in 1899 to 
continue his chemistry studies. Although trained as a “pure” chemist in the United States, his 
experiences in Germany led him to believe that he could best use his education for practical ends. 
He was especially interested in advancing his native South’s economic condition by improving 
the region’s existing industries and helping it develop the technology to start new ones. His 
interests in the turpentine industry were stirred by his favorite lecturer in Charlottenburg, 
Germany, who described the American turpentine industry as “butchery” and insisted that, 
without change, it would disappear. Transforming the naval stores industry was just the crusade 
Herty sought.6
4 “Turpentine Industry,” New York Tribune. 26 January 1902, Turpentine news clipping 
file, Forest History Society, Durham, NC.
5 Winthrop Packard, Florida Trails: As Seen From Jacksonville to Key West and From 
November to April Inclusive (Boston: Small, Maynard and Company, Publishers, 1910), 279.
6 Gerry Reed, “Saving the Naval Stores Industry: Charles Holmes Herty’s Cup-and- 
Gutter Experiments, 1900-1905,” Journal o f  Forest History 26 (October 1982): 168; Germaine 
M. Reed, Crusading for Chemistry: The Professional Career of Charles Holmes Hertv (Athens: 
The University of Georgia Press, 1995), 12, 14. Until the early twentieth century, the United 
States relied on Germany, France, and Sweden to train foresters and advance research. Clark, 
Greening of the South. 37.
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Herty spent the academic year of 1900/1901 serving on the faculty at the University of 
Georgia and contemplating the problems of American turpentine production methods. He 
corresponded with producers and visited south Georgia to view first-hand the effects that 
traditional gum harvesting practices had on the pine trees. He learned how the destructive 
methods had driven the industry southward and closely examined the problems boxing caused. 
The box, he discovered, not only weakened the tree’s structure, left it open to infection and 
insect attack, and reduced its vitality by interfering with the circulation of sap between the root 
and the needles, but it also reduced the pine gum yield. Weaker trees produced less gum than 
those not stressed by having a cavity cut into their bases. And because the box received the gum 
at a fixed point, no matter how high the face climbed, in all but the first years of harvesting the 
traditional system delivered resin that had deteriorated from ever-increasing exposure to light and 
air.7 Herty found the naval stores industry wasteful in several other ways. First, the persistent 
deterioration of the forest and the utter absence of any effort to encourage new growth doomed 
the industry’s future. Next, the gum collection method was inefficient, leaving portions o f each 
year’s harvest wasted on the ground. “We are not only killing the goose that lays the golden 
eggs,” Herty lamented, “but we are actually failing to pick up all o f  the wealth during the dying 
process.” Third, he faulted the antiquated distilling method that continued to rest entirely on 
distillers’ experience and most often failed to produce rosin that reached its full quality 
potential.8 Along with field observations, Herty studied literature that fully explained the French 
system of gum collection and reviewed the U.S. Patent Office records to determine what had 
already been tried. He was fully aware that French turpentine producers had used the cup and 
gutter system for decades and that American inventors had attempted similar methods in this
7 Charles H. Herty, “The Turpentine Industry in the Southern States,” Journal o f  the 
Franklin Institute 181 (March 1916): 346-347; Hertv. New Method o f  Turpentine Oracharding. 
12-13; Reed, Crusading for Chemistry. 16-18.
8 Charles H. Herty to John M. Egan, 18 January 1901, Herty Collection.
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country. What was needed, he believed, was an economical system that allowed the harvesting 
practices to remain as little changed as possible.9
Despite his enthusiasm for the project, Herty doubted his efforts would succeed. He 
feared “that the end o f the turpentine industry is so rapidly approaching in our state it is possible 
that even should I succeed in the work I may be too late to be of any real service to this sector of 
the South.”10 He also worried about the “question of negroe labor,” whether black workers 
would be able to learn the new and somewhat more tedious method. “As to whether this labor 
can perform the work under another system,” he concluded, “experiment only can tell.”11 Along 
with timing and labor concerns, Herty worried that even his best effort might meet the same fate 
as earlier attempts to introduce new methods. On his trips to operations in the Valdosta and 
Fargo, Georgia, area, he was “amazed to find in each case that the turpentine people showed so 
little regard to the future of the industry in that they ‘box’ not only the good sized trees but also 
trees almost small enough to be called saplings.”12 Herty believed that turpentine producers’ 
traditional conventions had prevented the naval stores industry from adopting innovation. 
Although Herty believed them to be robust and hard-working—especially noble characteristics in 
the Progressive era—he thought producers resisted change because they lived “on the outer edge 
of developing civilization, with few of the comforts and conveniences o f  life, indifferent to the 
utter lack o f efficient business methods in their operations, and strongly wedded to work
9 Herty, “Turpentine Industry in the Southern States, 346-347; Herty, New Method of 
Turpentine Orcharding. 12-13: Reed. Crusading for Chemistry. 16-18.
10 Charles H. Herty to John M. Egan, 18 January 1901, Herty Collection.
11 Ibid.
12 Charles H. Herty to Byron B. Brower, 24 April 1901, Herty Collection.
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practices which have been handed down from generation to generation as they steadily moved 
from North Carolina toward Texas.”13
With deep questions about his acceptance by producers, in the spring of 1901 Herty 
began to lay the ground work for his initial experiment. He first contacted the leading naval 
stores factors in Savannah for permission to experiment on their land. Not all were encouraging. 
One part-owner of a Savannah factorage house responded that he “had no confidence in the 
project, that I had already made some experiments myself and do not believe any new method 
could be invented to take the place o f the old way.”14 JJ*. Williams, a cotton and naval stores 
factor, believed differently, however, and granted his permission to conduct experiments on his 
company’s forest near Statesboro, in southeastern Georgia. With a test area secured, Herty next 
visited Gifford Pinchot, the head of the recently created Bureau of Forestry, in his Washington, 
D.C. office. After listening to Herty’s plan, Pinchot agreed to lend assistance, beginning a 
pattern of cooperation between federal agencies and the naval stores industry that would last for 
over half a century. He offered Herty a position as collaborator with the Bureau, an appointment 
that only paid three hundred dollars a year, but came with invaluable fringe benefits: access to 
scientific instruments, a travel allowance, Bureau stationary—which lent greater prestige to 
Herty’s efforts—and a chance to publish his results. Another $150 raised by the Savannah factors 
also helped pay for equipment. Herty also sought broad support from producers through a 
presentation on his plan before the actual work began. To reach an even wider audience, he ran a 
description of his proposal in the Atlanta Constitution.15 Bewildered by his need to act as a
13 Herty, “Turpentine Industry in the Southern States,” 339.
14 J.B. Chestnett to Charles H. Herty, 5 September 1901, Herty Collection.
15 Reed, Crusading for Chemistry. 19,21; Herty, “Turpentine Industry in the Southern 
States,” 348; Maxwell Taylor Courson, “Here Began a Revolution,” Southerner 1 (Fall 1979):
33.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
346
public relations man, he complained that “in Germany the practical man seeks the help of the 
scientific man, with us the scientific man seeks the help of the practical man.”16
Herty knew that his system had to incorporate eight important features in order to be 
accepted by both American producers and workers. First, turpentine operators needed to be 
assured of greater profits; otherwise, they would have no direct interest in adopting the system. 
Second, the equipment should cause the tree as little injury as possible. Next, the system had to 
allow the task o f chipping to remain unchanged, otherwise labor difficulties could develop and 
threaten the system’s acceptance. Fourth, the placement o f the equipment must require no 
special skill not already possessed by the average turpentine worker. Fifth, equipment 
construction should be as simple as possible and unaffected by the hardening o f resin. Next, the 
equipment had to be adaptable to the widely varying sizes o f trees used in turpentining. Seventh, 
it needed to hold so tightly to the tree that it could not accidentally fall off, but also had to be 
easily and cheaply removed to allow it to be installed at the beginning of each season. Lastly, for 
the resin to be scraped out of the cup most efficiently, workers needed to be able to remove the 
cup without difficulty from the tree, but it had to hang securely enough that grazing canle could 
not knock it off. Although the French method provided many of these characteristics, its use in 
the United States, Herty believed, would require the workers’ complete retraining. The French 
method employed a one-streak chip, that created a flat face, where Americans used two-streak 
chipping which created a V-shaped pattern. Any system used in America needed to 
accommodate that style o f chipping.17
Although similar to the French system, the method of collecting gum that Herty 
discovered did not require unfamiliar tools, new techniques, or expensive retraining of workers.
16 Charles H. Herty to John M. Egan, 18 January 1901, Herty Collection.
17 Herty, New Method of Turpentine Orcharding. 14, 16.
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It permitted chipping to continue as usual. The only change in turpentining came when instead 
of boxing, workers hung cups and gutters, and, rather than dip gum from boxes with spade­
shaped dippers, laborers scraped gum out of cups with trowels. To install the system, two 
workers used cornering axes, just as they would in cornering a box, to create a smooth face by 
removing the bark. Then, swinging the ax sideways, the laborers removed just enough bark and 
sapwood to create a flat surface half the width o f the smooth face. Next, they used broad axes to 
cut incisions about one-fourth inch deep at the top of the flat surface. Both incisions inclined 
toward the center, but they did not meet One extended an inch beyond the end o f the other. Into 
these incisions the workers inserted the gutters—galvanized iron strips about two inches wide and 
from six to twelve inches long. The upper gutter declined to the center o f  the face and the lower 
gutter extended a little beyond, forming a spigot that channeled gum into the cup hung by a nail 
below.18
On July 20, 1901, Herty and his team hung the first cup and gutters. Because he could 
not find a pottery manufacturer to make his small order of earthen cups, Herty used galvanized 
iron cups instead. Under the eye of a local woodsrider hired by Herty, baffled and amused 
workers hung the equipment in four groups, representing first, second, third, and fourth year 
boxes. Each group contained one hundred trees, half from which gum was harvested employing 
the box method and the other half using cups and gutters. Herty kept records of the quantity and 
quality of gum collected using the two different systems. He also noted the effect that 
temperature and rain had or resin flow.19 Within days of the experiment’s start, southern 
newspapers reported “that no more important public work than this has been undertaken in
18 Reed, Crusading for Chemistry. 19-21.
19 In spring 1979 a historical marker was erected at the site o f Herty’s Statesboro 
experiments, now a part of the Georgia Southern University campus. Courson, “Here Began a 
Revolution,” 10, 12; Hertv. New Method of Turpentine Orcharding. 16.
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Georgia in many years, and that if Prof. Herty accomplishes the task he has set for himself the 
state will be Mncaluably benefited.’”20 By the fall, Herty’s data indicated that his method held 
great promise. The cupped trees produced 186.06 barrels of gum while the boxed ones yielded 
only 86.06 barrels. However, scrape from the boxed trees brought their total yield to 177.06 
barrels. Although the cupped trees thus provided only ten pounds more in resin, the benefits of 
the cup remained significant Because the cups yielded far more spirit-rich soft gum than boxes, 
their use resulted in more turpentine produced at the still. Not only that, but the rosin was of a 
higher quality. Furthermore, cupped trees proved to withstand the wind better than boxed ones.21
Most informed observers expressed great faith in Herty once his results indicated initial 
success. Pinchot, in fact, offered him a full-time position at the Bureau o f Forestry, which Herty 
joined at the beginning of 1902 after resigning from the University o f Georgia.22 Many 
turpentiners also supported Herty’s efforts, as did The American Forestry Association, which 
endorsed Herty’s project stating that “his work, in line with the movement for practical forestry 
in the United States, promises to preserve a source o f great wealth for the South. That he has the 
support of the national bureau of forestry (sic) is a source of encouragement.”23 In 1902, one 
industry official reported that turpentine men “now all see the necessity o f preserving the timber, 
and getting as much o f the gum as possible, or in other words preventing the great waste that has 
in the past robbed the producer o f much o f his profits.”24 But given the history of failed efforts at
20 “Destroying Pine Trees,” Tampa. Florida Tribune. 26 July 1901, Turpentine 
newsclipping file, Forest History Society, Durham, NC.
21 Courson, “Here Began a Revolution,” 12.
22 Herty, New Method o f Turpentine Orcharding. 17; Herty, “Turpentine Industry in the 
Southern States,” 348; Reed, Crusading for Chemistry. 21.
23 “Guarding the Forests,” Macon. Georgia News. 28 October 1901, Turpentine 
newsclipping file, Forest History Society, Durham, NC.
24 D.H. Ketchum to Charles H. Herty, 13 September 1902, Herty Collection.
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innovation, not all were convinced Herty could succeed in saving the industry. In October, 
Georgia’s Assistant Commissioner of Agriculture argued that the pine forest was certain to 
disappear. “There is no help for i t  The trees cannot live longer than four years after they have 
been tapped. If we could preserve the forest it would accomplish a great deal, but the demand for 
naval stores calls for wholesale and almost indiscriminate destruction o f the pines.”25 The 
Atlanta Journal defiantly responded to the commissioner’s doubt by explaining that boxing, not 
the tapping itself, killed trees and that otherwise stands could potentially be worked for 
decades.26
With growing industry support and the resources o f the Bureau of Forestry behind him, 
Herty began a larger-scale experiment in 1902. The Bureau financed the needed equipment and a 
large turpentine-producing outfit, Powell, Bullard and Company, allowed the use of their timber, 
located near the town o f Ocilla in southeastern Georgia. Using the producer’s labor to determine 
how easily the transition to cups could be made, Herty outfitted one-, two-, and three-year old 
crops (10,000 faces), half with his cups and gutters and the other half with boxes. Workers were 
instructed to chip, dip, and scrape normally. The gum collected using the two different systems 
was distilled separately. To render accurate dipping results, measurements were made of 
distilled products, not dip, which contained trash and water. The company sent the rosin to the 
Southern Naval Stores Company in Savannah for grading. The land-owning company kept the 
yield and profit records, which they later furnished to the Bureau.27
25 “Can Forests be Saved?” Augusta. Georgia Herald. 20 October 1901, Turpentine 
newsclipping file, Forest History Society, Durham, NC.
26 Turpentine Operating in Georgia Forests, Atlanta Journal. 31 October 1901, 
Turpentine newsclipping file, Forest History Society, Durham, NC.
27 Herty, “Turpentine Industry in the Southern States,” 348,350-351; Herty, New 
Method of Turpentine Orcharding. 18; Reed, Crusading for Chemistry. 21-22.
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Problems plagued the experiment from the beginning. The cup manufacturer was slow 
to deliver. Herty had placed an order for 31,500 clay cups with the Chattanooga Pottery Co. of 
Downing, Tennessee. However the cups arrived a week late and with freight costs that nearly 
doubled their expected price. They were also not o f the design Herty had specified; he requested 
oval bottoms, but instead received cups with flat ones. Labor problems also troubled the 
experiment’s launch, a difficulty that was anticipated but not for the particular reason it occurred. 
Producers, and Herty himself, suspected that the industry’s all-black Iabor-force “could not be 
taught to work in any but the orthodox way.” However with proper instruction, Herty found 
early on that workers could learn the new tasks well in only a few hours. Difficulties arose 
because the laborers had little faith in the strange new system that they were asked to install and 
felt it was beneath the dignity o f good turpentine workers. As relatively light work, they 
believed it was more suitable for women and children. Those who reluctantly performed the task 
condescendingly termed themselves “cup niggers.” Herty, in exasperation, found that ‘"the Negro 
laborers proved even more conservative than the white operators.” Eventually the workers were 
convinced to cooperate, squads were organized, and the work proceeded smoothly.28 Once the 
experiment was underway, there were early doubts that the new system was performing as hoped 
when the boxes showed greater output that the cups early in the season.
By the end of the season, however, records indicated that the cup system performed far 
better than the box. The virgin cups yielded sixteen percent more gum than virgin boxes, and the 
cup-collected gum produced eighteen percent more spirits than that harvested from boxes. When 
amounts of spirits derived from scrape were also considered, the difference was even greater— 
23.43 percent more spirits derived from gum collected in a cup. Although the second-year 
cupped faces collected gum that produced only 5.51 percent more spirits than boxes, the third
28 Herty, “Turpentine Industry in the Southern States,” 349-351; Herty, New Method of 
Turpentine Orcharding. 18-19; Reed, Crusading for Chemistry. 24-26.
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year yield was a substantial 58.58 percent greater and the fourth an impressive 66.29 percent 
more. The yield, combined with the superior quality o f  the gum, made profit percentage rise 
above yield percentage increases. Based on Herty’s Ocilla experiments, producers could expect 
to net $412.54 more from their crop o f first year faces, $341.54 from second year, $513.38 from 
third year, and $516.48 from fourth year. The increase in the third- and fourth-year faces was 
largely explained by reductions in the distance the gum had to travel to reach the receptacle, 
since cups, unlike boxes, could be raised. New faces showed increased yield because of the 
cupped trees’ greater vitality over boxed ones and because less gum was lost in dipping cups than 
boxes. When removing the gum from a box, workers separated out the contents and transferred 
them to a bucket sitting several feet away. With cups, however, laborers removed the cup, held it 
directly over the bucket and scraped the gum out. The experiment also demonstrated that 
cupping proved less fatal to pines than boxes. Less than half the number o f trees cupped blew 
down or died compared with boxed ones. Because it cost around $350 per crop to purchase and 
install cups and gutters, the expense could be made back in the first year of use. Although none 
of the tools except the gutter benders were specialized, all tools—cutting shears, broad axes, and 
claw hatchets—could be purchased from Chattanooga Pottery Company and shipped with the first 
shipment of cups.29
Despite the praise heaped on him by the press as the Ocilla study concluded, Herty made 
clear that he did not invent the concept o f the cup and gutter system. He had merely devised a 
method whereby the lateral placement o f the gutters, one about an inch higher than the other, 
facilitated the American style of chipping, thus making it adaptable to the American method of 
production. In fact, by the time Herty received his patent in 1903, at least fourteen other cup-
29 Herty, “Turpentine Industry in the Southern States,” 353,356; Herty, New Method of 
Turpentine Orcharding. 20,24-25,31-32. Charles H. Herty to Vickers and McKenzie, 30 
December 1903 and Charles H. Herty to J.E. North Lumber Co., 31 December 1903, Herty 
Papers.
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type devices for collecting raw turpentine were already registered. He openly acknowledged 
having read bulletins on the French method, especially a publication prepared for a  recent Paris 
Exposition.30 “I have gained the confidence of the turpentine people by being absolutely fair and 
truthful in every statement I have ever made them,” he proclaimed, “and I would not have this 
record sullied by a silent assertion of credit to which I do not believe I am entitled.31
Herty did not wait for the season to end before proclaiming the Ocilla experiment a 
success. He used both newspapers and trade journals to publish his efforts. Most importantly, 
he delivered the keynote address at the newly-chartered Turpentine Operators Association 
meeting in Jacksonville on the night o f September 10,1902. After listening to the Florida 
governor, the leading turpentiners in the South, many no doubt anxious over approaching timber 
depletion, eagerly listened to Herty explain his system that promised larger yields, less tree 
damage, and would pay for itself in the first year.32 Despite the interest o f his Jacksonville
30 E. Moulie to Charles H. Herty, 15 September 1902, Charles H. Herty to E. Moulie, 22 
September 1902, and Charles H. Herty to George W. Wilson, 29 September 1902, Herty 
Collection.
31 From early in Herty’s experiment, J.C. Schuler, who had developed his own cup 
system in the late nineteenth century, regularly contacted him, offering his assistance and 
reminding Herty of his own patented device. Despite Schuler’s apparent belief that Herty was 
merely copying his earlier design, the two inventions were indeed different Schuler’s device 
consisted of one piece and gutters, and when raised could only be reinstalled on the barked tree 
surface, thus reducing the potential area of a tree’s face. Schuler’s method also required that 
deep incisions be cut in the tree to support his apparatus. The cut weakened the tree’s structure 
and vitality. J.C. Schuler to Charles H. Herty, 25 July 1901, J.C. Schuler to Charles H. Herty, 5 
September 1902, D.W. Ketchum to Charles H. Herty, 13 September 1902, Charles H. Herty to 
John C. Powell, 21 October 1902, Charles H. Herty to Commissioner of Patents, 16 December 
1902, Charles H. Herty to John R. Young, 11 October 1903, and Charles H. Herty to George W. 
Wilson, 29 September 1902, Herty Collection.
32 In 1905 Herty estimated the cost at around $370, $260 for 10,000 cups and 1800 
pounds of galvanized iron, $45 for freight, $4 for cutting and bending gutters, $ 1.50 for nails, and 
$60 for labor. This did not include the cost o f tools. Chattanooga Pottery Company sold broad 
axes for $12 per dozen, claw hatchets for $6 per dozen, tin snips for $ 1.50 for two, gutter benders 
for 750 each, gutter boxes for $50 each, gutter pullers for $ 1.50 each, and dipping knives for $6 
per dozen. Hertv C ud Hand Book. 1905, Herty Collection; Reed, Crusading for Chemistry. 23; 
“To Save Forests,” New York Evening Sun. 10 September 1902, Turpentine newsclipping file, 
Forest History Society, Durham, NC.
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audience, Herty continued to find many producers cautious o f change. He took hope, however, 
that their disposition would actually work toward the industry’s advantage: “Our Southern 
people are conservative, they are not prone to run after novelties, but where conviction is based 
on careful thought success is assured by reason of the same elements o f strength which are the 
basis of that conservatism.” He felt confident that the entire industry would eventually be won 
over to the new system.33
Also excited by the results, Pinchot encouraged Herty to prepare a report on his success. 
Herty eagerly complied, desiring to put his beneficial information in as many producers’ hands as 
possible. The Bureau, however, was slower to publish his report than he hoped. By late January 
1903, Herty detected that interest in his system was decreasing as producers began preparations 
for the upcoming turpentine season and still no bulletin appeared answering questions and 
addressing concerns. To stimulate the use of cups, Herty, by that winter, began a tour o f Georgia 
and Florida, explaining the benefits of his system and helping pioneering producers install their 
new cups and gutters. If Herty could not travel to an individual producer, he sent one of his 
assistants who had worked with him at Ocilla. Finally in May 1903, A New Method of 
Turpentine Orcharding was published. A forty-three-page Department o f Agriculture bulletin 
with illustrative plates and drawings, it guided producers through the basic principals of the cup 
and gutter method. In it, Herty described the current boxing method and carefully identified its 
faults. He then gave an overview of his own experiments before detailing the directions and cost 
for installing, using, and raising cups and gutters.34
33 Charles H. Herty to Thomas Gamble, Jr., 12 July 1904, Herty Collection.
34 Reed, Crusading for Chemistry. 22,27-28; A. Sessoms to Charles H. Herty, 4 October 
1902; A.G. Paul to Charles H. Herty, 26 September 1902, Denton Brothers and Company to 
Charles H. Herty, 16 March 1903, A.G. Paul to Charles H. Herty, 8 October 1904, Charles H. 
Herty to John C. Powell, 21 October 1902, Charles H. Herty to A.G. Paul, 15 October 1902, 
Charles H. Herty to A.G. Paul, 20 January 1903, Mixon Lucas to Charles H. Herty, 26 February
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A New Method of Turpentine Orcharding outlined a procedure that differed little from 
the original method Herty first developed in 1901. Before work in the woods began, thirty-inch 
galvanized strips were cut into lengths o f between six and twelve inches and placed in a special 
device that bent them. This preparation was usually performed in the cooper shop. Around mid- 
February the various sized gutters were separated and loaded onto a wagon along with cups for 
distribution in the woods. Once the equipment was placed in the forest, two ax men worked as a 
team to prepare each tree. Using broad axes, they created two flat subsurfaces about eight to 
twelve inches high by six to ten inches wide, beginning about one inch above the ground. The 
flat surfaces met at a wide angle just below where the season’s chipping would begin, each half 
the width of the face. At the top o f this flat surface, the ax men made two incisions, one on each 
side of the face, declining downward, with one side about an inch above the other. Once the 
incisions were made, workers inserted the gutters into the slits, the bottom one first. In time the 
green wood tried to return to its former position and created the tension needed to hold the 
gutters in place. After the gutter was secured, a claw hatchet was used to even off the trunk 
where the cup would rest Then another worker drove a nail two-thirds o f the way into the tree 
just below the end of the lower gutter from which he suspend a cup. Usually two ax men and a 
cup man worked as a team.35 When dipping, workers slipped the cup from its nail and, using a
1903, A.H. Norwell to Charles H. Herty, 1 September 1903, A.G. Paul to Charles H. Herty, 15 
September 1904, and Charles H. Herty to C.A. Howell, 10 January 1905, Herty Collection.
35 An alternative method was, however, soon available in a cup and apron system. The 
apron installed much like the gutters and also served to guide the resin into the cup. But unlike 
the gutters, the apron consisted o f one piece of curved galvanized iron and it also served to hold 
the cup which inserted into a specially-designed grove. The apron was curved on one side to fit 
the tree’s round face and bent to prevent the gum from running over the edge, but guided it 
toward its slopping center where the gum then spilled into a cup. Asa L. Brower and John O. La 
Fontisee, “Report o f  the Investigation on the Naval Stores Industry and Statistics on the 
Production of Turpentine and Rosin for the Seasons of 1907-8 and 1908-9,” 15 March 1909, 
Austin Cary Memorial Forestry Collection, Department o f Special Collections, George A. 
Smathers Libraries, University o f Florida, 12-13, 15; James Berthold Berry, Farm Woodlands 
(Yonkers-on Hudson, NY: World Book Company, 1923), 339-340; Hertv C ud Handbook: Herty, 
New Method o f Turpentine Orcharding. 32.
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metal knife, scraped the gum from the bottom and sides o f the cup into a ten-gallon bucket placed 
directly below. Once filled, workers emptied the bucket into barrels placed intermittently 
throughout the woods. Dippers occasionally had more than a single cup to empty at each tree. 
Chippers sometimes removed full cups and replaced them with empty ones, especially during 
July and August when gum flow was the heaviest. The full ones were hung on nails about the 
trees’ base and emptied by dippers on their next pass through the forest.36 Before scraping, 
which continued despite the reduced build-up o f dry gum, workers removed the cups and gutters, 
dipping the former and cleaning the latter, and inverted the cups on the ground. After scraping 
the face, gutters were raised, allowing the entire winter for the wood to grip them.37
Just as producers began studying Herty’s publication, he resumed his naval stores 
research with a European tour sponsored by the Bureau. He visited Austria, Holland, Belgium, 
and England, but his most fruitful study came during visits to France and Switzerland. In France 
he observed how naval stores production was carried on in cooperation with lumbering and 
attentive reseeding. Although the French system was admirable in its conservation, Herty 
concluded that it was too expensive for practical adaptation in the United States. In Bern he 
visited a Swiss scientist who worked on discovering how resin formed in conifers. Here Herty 
learned of the surprising discovery that the number of resin ducts increased in the new wood of 
wounded trees.38
Most o f Herty’s time in the years following his return from Europe was consumed with 
efforts to manage the company he co-founded to manufacture cups. Unable to find a producer of
36 Brower and La Fontisee, “Report of the Investigation on the Naval Stores Industry,” 
12, 15-17; Berrv. Farm Woodlands. 341-342.
37 Hertv C u p  Handbook: Herty, New Method of Turpentine Orcharding. 38.
38 Reed, Crusading for Chemistry. 30,32.
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clay cups for his 1901 experiment and unsatisfied with the design, cost and late delivery o f the 
cups used in the 1902 study, Herty faced even more trouble in securing a manufacturer for cups 
to manufacture producers for the 1903 season. He failed to locate a company that would agree to 
produce enough cups of the correct design at the right price. He requested that the cups have 
oval bottoms, which the Chattanooga Pottery Company failed to provide in 1902, and he wanted 
the cups bigger to prevent a run-over of gum from especially productive trees. C.L. Kreger, the 
manager o f Chattanooga Pottery, suggested the construction o f a plant in the heart of the pine 
belt to specialize in turpentine cup production. After careful consideration, Herty, John H. 
Powell—manager of the firm on whose land Herty conducted his 1902 experiment—and other 
naval stores interests in Savannah and Jacksonville, principally Consolidated Naval Stores 
Company, put up the money for a plant. Because Herty, a modestly paid Bureau of Forestry 
researcher, lacked investment capital, Powell loaned him $1,000. In the end, the group did not 
build a new plant, however. Instead they bought Chattanooga Pottery. Powell served as the 
company’s president and Kreger remained as general manager.39
Herty continued as a researcher with the Bureau, which showed a continued interest in 
improving the naval stores industry, but persistent problems with the new company and conflicts 
with Pinchot strained Herty’s position there. Herty made it no secret that he intended to profit 
from his invention, at a rate of twenty-five cents per one thousand cups. Under the assumption 
that the Bureau knew o f his plans, he began application for a patent which he received in early 
February 1903. But once Pinchot heard o f these activities, he telegraphed Herty explaining that, 
as a Bureau employee, Herty could not charge for the use o f the system. Herty reluctantly agreed 
to stop receipt of royalties. But activity with the company grew complicated. In order to move 
their supply, Chattanooga Pottery was selling cups at too low a price to profit and, by 1904, it
39 Ibid., 23-24,26, 29.
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still operated in the red. Now neither Herty1 nor his company was benefiting financially from the 
sale of cups. With Pinchot unwilling to budge on the royalty question and the company in need 
of his expertise, Herty respectfully resigned from the Bureau in March 1904.40
Pinchot offered Herty a considerable raise to stay at the Bureau, but Chattanooga Pottery 
offered a far greater return and became the company’s director. As an employee of Chattanooga 
Pottery, not only did Herty enjoy a far more lucrative position than he had held at the Bureau o f 
Forestry, he could work at the same project as he had under Pinchot. In return for exclusive right 
to manufacture and sell Herty’s patented cups and gutters through the end of 1910, the company 
agreed to pay Herty S20 for each set of ten thousand. Herty would also work full time for the 
company from April 1, 1901 to April 1, 1908 at an annual salary o f $2,400. His duties included 
promoting the cups, stressing the importance of early ordering, assisting producers with 
installation, and instructing workers in how to use the system. He was also required to defend 
the patent and protect it from infringement at his own expense. At the end of 1910 Herty was 
promised the opportunity to purchase the plant at a fair price.41
As director Herty saw the company through several crises involving the cups. First, in 
January 1905, a bitter freeze hit the southern naval stores belt causing the water in hanging cups 
to turn to ice, cracking them. Damage varied considerably among producers. One in 
Apalachicola, Florida, lost twenty-five percent of two crops, around five thousand cups. In other 
areas damage was heavier. A Shellman, Georgia, producer lost ninety percent of his cups, a total 
of 15,000. Some very large producers lost as many as 80,000 to 90,000 cups. The producers hit 
hardest by the freeze unfortunately were the first ones to show confidence in the system. After 
investigation, Chattanooga managers realized that fifty percent of cups at least half full of water,
40 Ibid., 28-29, 34-37.
41 Ibid., 41-43; Charles H. Herty to C.A. Howell, 10 January 1905, Herty Collection.
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broke in freezing temperatures. Luckily for Chattanooga Pottery Company, few producers 
demanded that the company replace the broken cups at its own expense. However, the company 
did face a problem filling the sudden flood o f  orders from turpentiners hoping to replace their 
broken cups before the next season. Lacking the capacity to fill the orders, Chattanooga had to 
turn to other potteries for help. After the 1905 freeze, Chattanooga recommended that producers 
remove the cups and set them inverted on the ground during the winter months. Second, 
following the 1905 freeze, the American Can Company began marketing galvanized metal cups 
as winter-proof substitutes for clay ones. Chattanooga reached an agreement with American 
Can, which claimed to know nothing o f the patent, whereby American Can sold metal cups 
through Chattanooga to operators who preferred them over earthen cups.42
Each type of cup possessed both benefits and disadvantages. Clay cups cost half as 
much as metal cups, but clay cups were more likely to break. If  they remained on the tree all 
winter, they could break during freezes. During summer fires, water standing in the clay cups 
caused the same result by cooling the cup’s interior so that it expanded less than the hot exterior, 
causing breakage. Clay cups were also heavier and therefore more expensive to ship from the 
factory to the producer. Although metal cups were cheaper to ship and did not break as easily, 
they tended not to perform as well as clay ones. Because the gum clung more stubbornly to their 
sides, workers used a metal knife to scrape the cups which wore away the galvanizing, allowed 
rusting, and shortened the cups’ lives. The rust also, no doubt, colored the gum, lowering its
42 John Henderson to Charles H. Herty, 19 January 1905, Herty to Brower, January 23, 
1905, John Henderson to Charles H. Herty, 18 January 1905, J.F. Dusurberry to Charles H. 
Herty, 30 January 1905, D.R. Stewart to Chattanooga Pottery Company, 3 February 1905, 
Charles H. Herty to D.R. Stewart, 10 February 1905, and Charles H. Herty to East Coast Lumber 
Company, 2 March 1905, Herty Collection; Reed, Crusading for Chemistry. 41-43.
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grade. Producers also complained that the metal cups heated more on sunny days, causing the 
evaporation of some o f the spirits.43
With either type o f cup, however, Herty’s system possessed all the benefits he intended 
and at an affordable price. The expense o f beginning the new method was more than offset by 
the higher quality and greater quantity o f gum as well as through the preservation o f the timber 
that boxes damaged. The cup reduced the mortality of turpentined trees by reducing the 
interruption in sap flow and structural weakening of the tree. The cup also lowered the 
turpentine forests’ susceptibility to fire by eliminating the box—which allowed the damaging heat 
from fire to penetrate deep into the trees’ base—and by reducing the amount o f hardened gum 
collected on the face at any given time of the year. Also, the ability of producers to move cups 
up the side of the face each spring facilitated a more efficient gathering of soft, high-grade gum 
throughout each harvest season. The improved method permitted turpentiners to manufacture 
rosin of a high quality that could not have been imagined before the twentieth century. Where 
No. 1 rosin was the very best for which producers could have hoped before, by the 1910s there 
were at least five grades above that. The best quality, Window White, sold for around twenty- 
five percent more than No. 1. And because the cups could be removed and emptied directly over 
the dip buckets, workers could more efficiently harvest the gum. Moreover, the ability of 
chippers to replace full cups with empty ones between dippings enabled better collection from 
particularly productive trees. Around 1910, this improved grade raised returns by one to two 
dollars per barrel. In years when depressed markets drove profit margins down, the use of cups 
could make the difference between a net profit and a loss for the year. The use o f cups also made 
the formation of scrape consistent from year to year, ranging between fifty and seventy barrels
43 Brower and La Fontisee, “Report o f the Investigation on the Naval Stores Industry,”
13-14.
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per crop.44 As early as 1903 Progressive Fanner extolled the virtues o f Herty’s system. “The 
cup-and-gutter system,” it reported, “works to great advantage both for the turpentine operator 
and the owner o f timber lands. It assure [sic] the former an immediate profit at very little 
additional expense, and the latter by inflicting the least possible damage to his timber.”45
Some producers, however, negated the benefits of the cup by putting too many faces on 
their trees. Twice as many faces did not yield twice as much gum per tree. On pines eleven to 
thirteen inches in diameter two feet from the ground, two faces yielded only fifty percent more 
gum than one face. In one crop this reduced the yield per cup by ten to fifteen barrels. The trees 
also suffered from the extra chipping which reduced the amount o f cambium tissue. At best the 
tree’s growth was severely reduced. At worst the pine was essentially girdled and died. The 
larger surface of the wounded trunk left weakened trees more vulnerable to insects and disease. 
Weakened trees were also more susceptible to wind.46 Only pines sixteen-inches in diameter or 
larger could yield enough gum to justify the cutting of two faces.
The worst abuse of the cup system, however, was the effort to harvest gum from trees 
under six inches in diameter. As the amount of virgin timber declined and second-growth 
appeared in some areas, desperate producers fitted saplings, that would have been far too small to 
box, with cups and gutters. Not only did the yield from such small trees rarely cover the expense 
of their operation, but the shock halted their growth and weakened many to the point of death. 
Moreover, in cupping small pines, producers were ensuring that second-growth stands of
44 Berry, Farm Woodlands. 336-337,343; Brower and La Fontisee, “Report o f the 
Investigation on the Naval Stores Industry,” 22-24.
45 “Larger Profits in Turpentine,” The Progressive Farmer (15 June 1903), Turpentine 
newsciipping file, Forest History Society, Durham, NC.
46 Brower and La Fontisee, “Report o f the Investigation on the Naval Stores Industry,” 
24-25; “Good Naval Stores Practice” (Washington, DC: United States Department of 
Agriculture, 1927), Cary Collection, 3; Charles H. Herty to Thomas Gamble, Jr., 12 July 1904, 
Herty Collection.
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sufficient size would never permit the industry’s continuation. Even by the late 1920s this abuse 
remained a persistent problem.47
Despite occasional misuse, producers generally recognized the cup and gutter system’s 
benefits and, after a slow initial start, began a steady adoption of the method. In the first year, 
only a few producers had access to the limited supply o f equipment but, by 1904, cups and 
gutters were more readily available. Several events in the first decade of the twentieth century 
helped the situation. The endorsement of several forestry organizations and support o f the 
factors, who agreed to lend the capital for investment in cups and gutters, aided sales.48 The 
Executive Committee o f the Consolidated Naval Stores Company, for example, pledged “to use 
every influence to our respective commands toward bringing about as near as possible the 
universal use of cups as against boxes in the production of naval stores.”49 Then in September 
1905, a hurricane crossed southern and western Florida, blowing down ten percent of the boxed 
trees and none of the cupped ones. After this natural demonstration orders rose.50 However, a 
rise in naval stores prices at the same time prevented sales from reaching their potential and the 
pottery facility’s capacity went untested.
By around 1910, the use of cups showed promising expansion in first-year crops, 
especially among large producers whose substantially-sized operations were the most threatened 
by the reduction in large timber tracts. Where only fourteen percent o f all spirits produced in
47 Schorger and Betts, The Naval Stores Industry. 40; Herty, “Turpentine Industry in the 
Southern States,” 364; Richard C. Davis, ed. Encyclopedia o f American Forest and Conservation 
History (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1983), s.v. “naval stores.”
48 Brower and La Fontisee, “Report of the Investigation on the Naval Stores Industry,”
17, 55.
49 “Turpentine Makers Advocating Conservative Methods,” Turpentine newsclipping 
file, Forest History Society, Durham, NC, I.
50 Charles H. Herty to Dixie editor, 1 August 1904, Herty Collection.
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1908 and 1909 came from cupped trees, about a  quarter of the spirits from virgin crops did.SI In 
his 1910 travel account o f  Florida, Winthrop Packard expressed relief that “the old crude method 
of boxing the trees is fortunately, rapidly passing and in the place o f the great hole cut in the base 
of the trunk one often passes through miles o f trees that have flower-pot like receptacles hung 
beneath them to catch the pitch.”52 Five years later, two industry experts found that “the damage 
to standing timber due to turpentine operations has been considerably reduced.”53
However for total gum production, including both old and new crops, cup use was much 
higher in the western areas o f the longleaf pine belt (fig. 8.1). In Mississippi and especially 
Louisiana and Texas a few large and well-financed corporations owned large areas of the 
remaining virgin forests and either adopted the cups, if they worked the timber for turpentine 
themselves, or insisted that their lessees adopt the system. In 1909 34.S percent o f the total 
southern turpentine yield was collected in cups. In some states the percentages were much 
higher, 44.7 in Louisiana and 43.5 in Texas. By contrast, Herty’s system was responsible for 
collecting only one percent o f all gum in Georgia, 16 percent in Florida, and 8 percent in 
Alabama. There was an equally great divide between the East and West in terms o f first-year 
crop use of cups. In Georgia, where turpentine had been produced longer and smaller and mid­
sized operations were common, only 10.5 percent of gum came from cupped trees where in 
Texas and Louisiana, the newest producing states with the greatest concentration o f larger 
producers, 59.5 percent came from cups. Regional difference in cup use was a major 
contributing factor, along with better quality timber, in the larger yields produced in the more
51 Brower and La Fontisee, “Report o f the Investigation on the Naval Stores Industry,” 
54-55; Schorger and Betts, The Naval Stores Industry. 43.
52 Packard, Florida Trails. 281-282.
53 Schorger and Betts, The Naval Stores Industry. 40; For figures related to the number o f 
crops employing boxes and cups see Appendix A.
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Figure 8.1. Percentage of Crops Worked by Cup System by State, 1909, 1914, 1919 
Donald Fraser Martin, Jr., “An Historical and Analytical Approach to the Current Problems of 
the American Gum Naval Stores Industry” (Ph.D. diss., University o f North Carolina, 1942), 
318.
western areas (fig. 8.2). In 1919 Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi had a combined average yield 
of forty-three barrels of turpentine per crop, compared to Georgia and Florida’s yields of slightly 
less than twenty-six barrels. Although this regional disparity persisted, cup use continued to 
grow in all areas. Across the South from 1909 to 1914 its use increased 39S.7 percent and the 
number of crops using the box system declined by 64.3 percent. By 1916 an estimated 75 
percent of crops used the cup and gutter method and in 1919 over 80 percent (fig. 8 J ) .54
54 Donald Fraser Martin, Jr., “An Historical and Analytical Approach to the Current 
Problems of the American Gum Naval Stores Industry” (Ph.D. diss., University o f North 
Carolina, 1942), 116-117; Carl F. Speh, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Western Territory,” in 
Naval Stores: History. Production. Distribution and Consumption, ed. Thomas Gamble 
(Savannah: Review Publishing and Printing Company, 1921), 112; Brower and La Fontisee, 
“Report of the Investigation on the Naval Stores Industry,” 55-58; Schorger and Betts, The Naval 
Stores Industry. 43; C. Dorsey Dyer, “History of the Gum Naval Stores Industry,” The AT-FA 
Journal 25 (January 1963): 7; Carroll B. Butler, Treasures o f the Loneleaf Pines. Naval Stores 
(Shaiimar, FL: Tarkel Publishing, 1998), 46.
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Figure 8.2. Turpentine Yield Per Crop, 1909 and 1919
Donald Fraser Martin, Jr., “An Historical and Analytical Approach to the Current Problems of 
the American Gum Naval Stores Industry” (Ph.D. diss., University of North Carolina, 1942), 
318.
Total Number of Crops Worked by Cap and Boxing Systems 
1909,1914, and 1919
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Figure 8.3. Total Number of Crops Worked by Cup and Boxing Systems, 1919, 1914, 1919 
Donald Fraser Martin, Jr., “An Historical and Analytical Approach to the Current Problems of 
the American Gum Naval Stores Industry” (Ph.D. diss., University of North Carolina, 1942), 
318.
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For a variety o f  reasons some producers refused to adopt the cup and gutter system. 
Despite ample evidence that the system would quickly pay for itself, in the first years after its 
development there remained uncertainty. Even if the equipment would pay for itself within a 
year, its adoption required a large initial capital outlay that some financially-strapped producers 
could not afford. Although Herty developed his system to deviate as little as possible from the 
traditional turpentining method, other producers objected to the training their workers required to 
use the cups. These operators believed cupping represented too great a  departure and, realized 
that if inadequately trained, laborers could cause the near complete loss o f gum by improperly 
installing the system. Also, many workers complained about the new extra work of hanging and 
removing cups. Chippers did not like the added burden, required by some producers, of 
performing their job at each face after placing a shield over each cup to prevent pieces o f bark 
and wood from falling in. There were also problems with the cups themselves. Careless workers 
broke them accidentally and, despite manufacturer’s suggestions to prevent it, freezing 
temperatures caused many to crack. One Georgia producer had to remove his clay cups from 
roadside trees after passing travelers shot at them.ss In response to that percentage of producers 
who continued to use boxes, Weekly Naval Stores Review editor Thomas Gamble complained 
that “the method of exploitation commonly followed during the last hundred years is crude, 
wasteful, destructive, and sadly shortsighted.” He blamed “inertia, not financial obstacles” as 
“the chief reason why these conservative methods have not been more generally employed.”56
55 Carl E. Ostrom, “History o f Gum Naval Stores Industry,” The Chemureic Digest 4(15 
July 1945): 221; Brower and La Fontisee, “Report of the Investigation on the Naval Stores 
Industry,” 15-16, 24.
56 “The Life o f the Naval Stores Industry as at Present Carried on in the South,” in Naval 
Stores: History. Production. Distribution and Consumption, ed. Thomas Gamble (Savannah: 
Review Publishing and Printing Company, 1921), 90.
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The conservation efforts that began to spread across the South in the early 1900s and of 
which Herty was a part, had their origin outside the region where they began three decades 
earlier. In the mid 1870s, concerned Americans, many o f  them from the North who had watched 
their own disappear into sawmills, began efforts to conserve the nation’s forests. George Perkins 
Marsh advocated the preservation o f large timbered areas in a “natural” or “primitive” condition. 
At the same time the American Association for the Advancement of Science established a 
committee to promote federal and state legislation to protect forests and encourage timber 
cultivation. Partly as a result of its efforts, Congress in 1876 appropriated funds for a forestry 
agent at the Department o f Agriculture. By 1890, conservation was becoming popular in the 
South. Albert Cowdrey identifies three late-nineteenth century developments that pushed the 
region toward support o f  conservation: depletion of resources, growth o f organization, and the 
development of science. The South by 1900 could find much about the conservation movement 
to support. It offered the region improvements in agriculture, forestry, river basin planning, and 
public health. These improvements fit well with the New South Creed, which sought efficient 
resource use and development and was not shy about accepting outside help or leadership to 
accomplish these ends. Pinchot, as director of the Division of Forestry, won the region’s timber 
product industries over to scientific forestry by offering considerable assistance to their resource 
management efforts, help they readily accepted.57
Southerners grew even more interested in forestry and government research assistance as 
Herty’s argument that the cup and gutter system alone could not save the naval stores industry 
proved accurate. He maintained that “so long as the system of leasing turpentine privileges from 
timber owners continues, whereby the turpentine operator has but slight direct interest in the
57 Michael Williams. Americans and Their Forests: A Historical Geography (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989), 18-19; Albert E. Cowdrey, This Land. This South: An 
Environmental History (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1996),103, 119-120, 135-136.
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future of the timber, and so long as the saw mills continue active in cutting small trees along with 
large ones, while the native follows with burning the woods each spring for his cattle thus 
preventing reproduction there can be but little hope of permanency. The rich harvest provided by 
past centuries is limited. It is being rapidly garnered. Unless something be done for 
reproduction in the waste places the end will be reached before very many years pass by.”58 
With the increasing timber scarcity, forest products manufacturers attempted to make the best use 
of what little remained. Turpentiners and especially large lumber companies invested in 
remaining virgin forests in excess of the near-term needs.59 In June 1901, the Atlanta 
Constitution reported that “Savannah naval stores factors and shippers have long realized the 
condition of affairs in Georgia and it is only within the year that several firms there have 
purchased in the aggregate hundreds of thousands of acres o f  turpentine land for the purpose of 
keeping their business going. They went to Florida because there they could get the virgin 
forest.”60
The lumber industry was responsible for a large portion of the forest’s rapid loss. In 
1909, lumber production peaked at twenty-one billion board feet, nearly half of the country’s 
total. Although it declined after that, southern sawmills remained busy for the next two decades. 
Turpentining, however, also took its toll on timber stands. By 1909, the turpentine industry was 
responsible for the lose o f an estimated thirty-seven billion board feet of southern timber.
Georgia lost more than any other turpentine-producing state, ten billion board feet. Thirteen
58 Charles H. Herty to Dixie editor. August 1, 1904, Herty Collection.
59 Martin, “An Historical and Analytical Approach,” 104-106.
60 Over a month later, W. D. Wood of Darlington, South Carolina, complained in a letter 
to the editor of the Charleston News and Courier that the region’s rapid deforestation was certain 
to result in soil erosion and flooded streams. “Plea for Long Leaf Pine,” Charleston New 
Courier. 25 July 1901, “Would Preserve Pine Forests.” Atlanta Constitution. 2 June 1901, 
Turpentine newsclipping file, Forest History Society, Durham, NC.
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billion disappeared from the Carolinas. Florida, where the industry had only recently expanded, 
lost five billion; Alabama, where the industry had continued steadily since the Civil War, saw a 
reduction of six billion; and Mississippi fell by three billion. By 1915, the supply o f longleaf 
was growing acutely short in North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia and, although 
considerable stands remained in Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas, most were 
controlled by large syndicates who refused to permit turpentining. Florida offered the best 
turpentining opportunities, because a large portion o f the timber was owned by small investors.61 
But, by the 1920s, Florida too suffered from timber depletion. After 1923, the state lost its status 
as the leading naval stores-producing state, its timber worked out, cut out, and consumed by 
widespread forest fires. In 1920 the United States Secretary of Agriculture reported to the Senate 
that “so pronounced is depletion o f the timber upon which our naval stores industry depends for 
its supplies that it is commonly regarded as a dying industry in the United States.”62 By 1923, 
only between one-fifth and one-sixth of the original pine forest in the South remained. O f the 
roughly one hundred million acres that had been cut over, one-third lay wholly empty o f new 
growth. In a few areas of the South, sizable tracts o f  virgin pine remained, but many counties 
had lost their forests entirely.63
61 “The First Forest,” Southern Forest Institute Papers, Special Collections Division, The 
University of Georgia Libraries, University of Georgia, 1; Brower and La Fontisee, “Report of 
the Investigation on the Naval Stores Industry,” 28-29; Schorger and Betts, The Naval Stores 
Industry. 40-41,
62 Thomas Gamble, “Mining for Rosin in the Old North State,” in Naval Stores: History. 
Production. Distribution and Consumption, ed. Thomas Gamble (Savannah: Review Publishing 
and Printing Company, 1921), 37.
63 R.D. Forbes, “The Passing of the Piney Woods,” American Forestry 29 (March 1923): 
184-185; A. Stuart Campbell, Robert C. Unkrich, and Albert C. Blachard, The Naval Stores 
Industry (Gainseville, FL: Bureau o f Economic and Business Research, College of Business 
Administration, The University o f Florida, 1934): 10. E.A. Ziegler, A.R. Spillers, and C.H. 
Coulter, Financial Aspects o f Growing Southern Pine. Washington County Florida (Tallahassee: 
Florida Forest Service, 1931), 37.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
369
By encouraging reseeding, the development o f  the southern pulpwood industry helped as 
well make forestry appear more attractive. The industry first emerged in the South in Hartsville, 
South Carolina in 1891, and by 1930, two dozen small mills had opened. Pulpwood processing 
became a significant factor in the southern economy by providing a steady market for small trees. 
Owners of clear-cut land could replant and wait but a few decades, if they so desired, before 
selling the immature trees for pulpwood. When stands were now thinned, the small trees 
selected for cutting provided an early, although small, return from forest land. Thus forest 
owners did not have to wait for the trees to reach full maturity to realize a return.64
Along with the continued loss of timber and the pulpwood industry’s encouragement of 
reseeding, Herty helped promote conservation in the South. His success inspired continued 
applied research at the Forest Products Laboratory in Madison, Wisconsin, established in 1910, 
and at government experiment stations set up in Florida and Mississippi. And because Herty had 
developed such a useful system with which the producers’ needs were made central and since he 
had proved so genuinely eager to work with them in improving the industry, more naval stores 
men were afterward willing to consider other conservative methods developed by foresters.65 
Herty’s work began when the South’s conservation movement was in its infancy. As early as the 
late nineteenth century a few state efforts had begun. In 1894, North Carolina produced a report 
on the condition o f the timber lands in the eastern portion of the state and two years later 
Alabama began a similar study. The most important and sustained effects originated in the early
64 “The First Forest,” 3.
65 Herty’s greatest achievement in southern forest use, however, came nearly three 
decades later when as the director of the Savannah Pulp and Papers Laboratory, funded by the 
City of Savannah and the Chemical Foundation, he demonstrated that with the proper treatment, 
southern pines could be used in newsprint manufacture. Before Herty’s later efforts, newsprint 
producers avoided southern pines because the excessively-pitchy southern pine pulp gummed up 
paper-making machines and the sheets that did make it through were too dark in color to use. 
Reed, Crusading for Chemistry. 47; Courson, “Here Began a Revolution,” 12-13.
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twentieth century. In 1904, progressive Louisiana lumberman Henry E. Hardtner, who in the late 
nineteenth century began purchasing cut-over land and reseeding it, convinced the Louisiana 
state legislature to create a Department o f Forestry. However, the state never funded the project. 
By the 1910s the pace of southern forestry development quickened. Virginia, Texas, North 
Carolina, and Louisiana organized divisions of forestry and some southern colleges began 
offering courses in forestry. In 1914 Georgia established the region’s first forestry school. Later 
that same year, the Southern Pine Association was organized, and in 1916 the Southern Forestry 
Congress held its first meeting. Organized by the North Carolina state geologist Joseph Hyde 
Pratt, forester John S. Holmer, and Hardtner, the Congress sought to address the region’s forest 
problems. Meeting into the 1920s, it campaigned for additional national forests, reforestation, 
more scientific methods of naval stores production, creation of a research organization, the 
passage of the Clarke-McNary Act o f 1924—which provided for state and federal cooperation in 
forest management—and the development of state forestry departments. In an effort to encourage 
the regrowth of forests, between 1924 and 1927 all the naval stores producing states established 
forest extension services.66
With all these efforts in place by the mid 1920s, optimism settled over the South.67 In 
1923, the American Forestry Association magazine reported that “provided that forestry is 
practical in the piney woods of the South, southern pine can maintain and even increase its 
ascendancy in the lumber markets o f America and the world.”68 One year later, Thomas Gamble, 
editor of the Savannah Weekly Naval Stores Review, expressed relief that “a new sentiment has
66 Frank Bedingfieid Vinson, “Conservation and the South, 1890-1920,” (Ph.D. diss. 
University of Georgia, 1971), 124-125; Cowdrey, This Land. This South. 137; Davis, 
Encyclopedia of Forest and Conservation History. 476; Martin, “An Historical and Analytical 
Approach,” 139-140.
67 Martin, “An historical and Analytical Approach,” 138.
68 Forbes, “Passing of the Piney Woods,” 136.
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sprung up in the last few years through education and the spreading o f more exact knowledge as 
to actual conditions, and there is apparent today in every state a group working for the protection 
of the young pine.”69
Despite the considerable attention focused on forest conservation, the naval stores 
industry itself failed to create any association strong enough to address effectively its specific 
problems. Charles Herty found it “strange that an industry as large as this one has no 
organization of any kind, no meetings for the discussion of subjects pertaining to its welfare.”70 
This situation did not result from a dearth of organizing initiatives, but from the failure o f 
producers to maintain interest in such organizations once formed. Since the late-nineteenth 
century efforts to establish regional associations had produced only short-lived groups. Another 
attempt was made in 1901 with the formation of the Turpentine Operators Association, which 
hoped to respond to the diminishing supply of virgin timber, overproduction, and soaring labor 
expense. The association met with very limited success in its short life, however. There was a 
small decrease in production in the following years, but it was probably a result of declining 
timber availability. Other efforts at organization met similarly short-lived and disappointing 
results. In 1909, Texas and Louisiana producers created the Western Naval Stores Association 
headquartered in Beaumont, Texas. Producers, factors, and dealers in 1914 created the 
Turpentine Farmers Association, headquartered in Savannah. In the late 1910s the Turpentine 
and Rosin Producers Association of New Orleans formed. All of these groups lasted for short 
periods and suffered from the turpentiners’ inability or unwillingness to cooperate in lower
69 Thomas Gamble, “The Naval Stores Industry of the South,” in The South’s 
Development: A Glimpse of the Past, the Facts of the Present a Forecast of the Future 86 (11 
December 1924): 325.
70 Charles H. Herty to John M. Eagan, 18 January 1901, Herty Collection; George B. 
Tindall, The Emergence of the New South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1967), 130-134.
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production. When naval stores prices declined, producers were more likely to increase 
production, the greater output seeming the best way to preserve cash flow. Because o f 
paternalistic labor policies and multi-year timber leases, even financially independent operators 
faced difficulty curtailing production. Few operators who owned their own land increased their 
production during periods of low prices.71
In the 1920s, turpentiners experienced somewhat more success in addressing their own 
concerns. Founded in 1925 and based in New Orleans, the Pine Institute of America conducted 
experiments to discover the chemical properties o f turpentine and rosin and to develop new uses 
for these products. It also sought improved marketing, encouraged scientific forestry, and 
lobbied for government experiment stations. But it closed within a decade because of 
insufficient financial support. Turpentiners also benefited from such groups as the Georgia 
Forestry Association, which focused a portion of its attention on naval stores production. 
Organized in 1921, the Association included among its aims preserving the naval stores industry 
and perpetuating of the new pulp and paper industries from what appeared as a certain 
devastation of the state’s forests and then the eventual loss of these businesses. The Association 
worked to encourage cup use and limit the size of trees worked. It also advocated fire 
protection.72
71 Turpentine Operators Association members agreed to pay 1.250 for each box cut, $22 
for chipping each crop, 33 1/30 per barrel dipped, 200 to 250 per one hundred trees racked, $16 
for driving a two-horse buggy a month, and $20 for driving a four-horse one. Butler, Treasures 
o f the Loneleaf Pines. 247; A. Vizard to Charles H. Herty, 19 December 1900; Herty Collection; 
Herty, New Method o f Turpentine Orcharding. 9; Martin, “An Historical and Analytical 
Approach,” 14-15, 107; Brower and La Fontisee, “A Report of the Investigation on the Naval 
Stores Industry,” 50.
72 Butler, Treasures of the Loneleaf Pines. 247-248; George H. Priest, Jr., Naval Stores: 
Production. Consumption and Distribution (Washington, DC: United States Department of 
Commerce, 1927), 3; Thomas F. Armstrong, “Georgia Lumber Laborers, 1880-1917: The Social 
Implications of Work,” The Georgia Historical Quarterly 67 (Winter 1983): 438; Brower and La 
Fontisee, “Report o f the Investigation on the Naval Stores Industry,” 1,70; Campbell, et. al., 
Naval Stores Industry. 77; Martin, “An Historical and Analytical Approach,” 112, 140; L.F. 
Hawley, “Forest Service Investigations of Interest to the Naval Stores Industry,” in Naval Stores:
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In the absence of a  strong organization to focus on improving the naval stores industry, 
most efforts were initiated by the federal government. The government-supported conservation 
agenda represented a new cooperation between business, state, and federal agencies in the South, 
an alliance also seen in the first decades o f the twentieth century with efforts to fight the boll 
weevil and improve public health. At the federal level, one means used to encourage improved 
practices was by placing leasing conditions on public pine land used for turpentining. Beginning 
around 1910, for example, turpentining was permitted in the Florida National Forest as a means 
to add income to the site’s management. When the Forest Service leased boxes it demanded the 
strictest adherence to the improved methods. Only timber in an area designated by a forestry 
officer could be worked. Pines smaller than ten inches in diameter at breast height were off 
limits. Trees sixteen to twenty-five inches in diameter were allowed two cups and pines larger 
than twenty-five inches in diameter were permitted three cups. Cups and aprons had to be placed 
as near to the ground as possible. No nails could be used to attach the cups or aprons to the tree 
and, when the aprons were removed, it had to be done by pulling, not chopping. Chipping 
streaks were not to exceed one-half inch in height and the face was not to rise more than fourteen 
to sixteen inches each year. And the hack or puller used had to satisfy the Forestry Service 
officer. During July and August, the most productive months, two streaks could be made on a 
face in a week but the height could still not increase more then one-half inch. If the forester 
discovered the chipping process was in violation of regulations, he could remove cups.
Producers had to pay for any badly damaged trees. Each tree was worked fourteen out of fifteen 
years. Front faces were worked for seven years. Following a year o f rest, back faces were 
worked for another seven. Producers had to agree to expend all possible means to suppress
History. Production. Distribution and Consumption, ed. Thomas Gamble (Savannah: Review 
Publishing and Printing Company, 1921), 139; “Welcome to Annual Meeting Georgia Forestry 
Association, at Savannah,” 8 May 1942, Georgia Forestry Association Papers, Special 
Collections Division, The University o f Georgia Libraries, University o f Georgia.
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forest fires, even placing their workers at the disposal o f Service officers to fight the blazes. If 
laborers were impressed to fight fires more than one mile from the lessees timber the producer 
would be compensated for their service. As a precaution against fire, a space o f three feet was to 
be raked around each tree. Finally, Forestry Service officers had unlimited access to records of 
production, cost, and yield to ensure that all requirements were met.73
Then, in 1908, an Agricultural Appropriations Bill allotted ten thousand dollars for a 
study of how the turpentine industry contributed to the death of the southern forest. By 1917, the 
United States Forest Service had published seventeen bulletins on naval stores production, 
Herty’s 1903 booklet on his new harvesting method being one of the most important. Within a 
few years, the Forest Service operated two experiment stations in the South, one in Asheville, 
North Carolina, and another in New Orleans. Both worked on efforts to reduce forest destruction 
caused by turpentining. In 1923, tests began at a branch station at Starke, Florida, on private 
second-growth tracts granted for the Service’s use. Here foresters experimented with methods 
that would result in profitable turpentining, high gum yield, and conservation of the harvested 
pines. The men who worked for the Service at this time received pay from the government, but 
large naval stores companies and factors had to cover the cost of their travel and accommodation 
when they worked in the field. At times foresters found themselves staying in private homes.74
73 Cowdrey, This Land. This South. 127-135; Dereland Turpentine Company, C.B. 
Ferden, and Doe and Roe naval stores lease agreements, and sample crop inspection report, Cary 
Collection; United States Forest Service, “U.S. Government’s Turpentine Experience in the 
Florida National Forest,” in Naval Stores: History. Production. Distribution and Consumption. 
ed. Thomas Gamble (Savannah: Review Publishing and Printing Company, 1921), 227.
74 In 1911 and 1912, the Forest Service conducted experiments on different pine species 
in Arizona, California, and Oregon to determine their feasibility for producing turpentine. 
Although the pines o f the West yielded sufficient gum, the cold weather in Arizona, which began 
earlier than in the Southeast, shortened the production season there. There was also a dearth of 
skilled labor. AH potential workers, whites, Indians, and Mexicans would have required 
extensive training and the cost of importing experienced black workers from the South was 
deemed too expensive. Schorger and Betts, The Naval Stores Industry. 44-46; Vinson, 
“Conservation and the South,” 154; “First Forest,” 2; Lenthall Wyman, Experiments in Naval 
Stores Practice (Washington, EX2: United States Department o f Agriculture, 1932), 5; G.P.
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Austin Cary was arguably the most influential federal forester to bring improved 
scientific management to the turpentine industry during this new era o f government involvement. 
Bom in Massachusetts in 1865, he studied biology at Bowdoin College where he received his 
undergraduate and graduate degrees. He also attended The Johns Hopkins University and Yale 
University. Cary entered the new field o f forestry after a 1892 chance meeting with Bernard 
Femow, the head of the U.S. Division of Forestry, who hired Cary as a forestry surveyor and 
investigator. With practical knowledge of forestry and an academic mastery of natural sciences, 
Cary went on to teach at Yale in 1904 and the next year at Harvard. He also authored a Manual 
For Northern Woodsmen, a well-known, straight-forward guide to land surveying, forest 
mapping, timber estimating, and log and wood measurement. As an advocate of private 
enterprise and believer that economic motivation was the best road to conservation, Cary drew 
strong opposition from Pinchot, who promoted govemment-ownership and control o f  forest 
resources. But with Pinchot removed from office in 1910, Cary’s forestry career advanced; Cary 
would remain with the Service for twenty-five years, until his retirement. His first assignment 
was on the West Coast, but his graceless and unsociable behavior, combined with his resentment 
of government over-regulation, caused him to clash with his supervisors and eventually led to a 
transfer. From several options he chose the South, where he began work the next year.75
Shigler, interview by R. White, 30 June 1959, Oral History Interview, Forest History Society, 
Durham, NC, 4.
75 “List o f Materials in the Austin Cary Memorial Forestry Collection,” Department of 
Special Collection, George A. Smathers Libraries, University o f Florida, i; Gloria Hutchinson, 
“Pioneer Maine Forester, Austin Cary: A Diamond in the Rough from East Machias, He Wrote 
the Book on Modem Forestry,” Austin Cary file, Forest History Society, Durham, NC, 51-53, 68, 
71-72; Vinson, “Conservation and the South,” 159-160; Cowdrey, This Land. This South. 137- 
138; Shingler interview, 6; Peter Koch, Utilization o f the Southern Pines (Washington, DC: 
United States Department of Agriculture, 1972), 1478; “Austin Cary,” Austin Cary File, Forest 
History Society, Durham, NC, 28-29; Berry, Farm Woodlands. 345.
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Headquartered in Florida, Cary was left to operate on his own as the Forest Service 
concentrated most of its efforts in the West. Here he set about achieving his goal o f  stabilizing 
the southern forestry industry. His straight-forward manner (which had caused problems in the 
West), his support for private property rights, and his opposition to government regulation helped 
him win southerners over to forestry, his greatest career achievement. Cary understood how to 
approach the individual producers and gradually convince them to accept his scientific ideas. 
First he asked producers if they had any problem with their operation, then walked into the 
woods with them, evaluated the situation with the producer, and suggested solutions. Through 
his efforts, turpentine operators learned the best size of steaks, the most productive chipping 
frequency, the optimal diameter tree for gum production, the appropriate number o f faces per 
tree, the effects o f turpentining on tree growth, and the benefits o f the cup and gutter system.
They so trusted Cary and his recommendations that, at their request, the Forest Service sent him 
on a trip to France in 1924 to observe the conservative management of the maritine forests there. 
Cary continued his work in the South even after his retirement in 1935. By this time many in the 
region considered him the father of southern forestry. He was visiting forestiy students at the 
University o f Florida when he died of a heart attack in 1936.76
Whereas Austin Cary is perhaps most notable for his successful efforts to advance 
applied conservative methods, another federal forester made the most numerous research
76 Cary conceived a plan, apparently based on the French method, whereby, he believed, 
the turpentine industry could make the maximum use of timber. According to his proposal, trees 
should be bled for the first time at twenty to twenty-five years o f age and worked for three years 
before allowing them to rest for another ten. After this period they could be cupped again and 
trees larger than fifteen inches could be fitted with two cups. After three years o f work and 
another ten years of rest, the process would be repeated. “List o f Materials in the Austin Cary 
Memorial Forestry Collection,” i; Hutchinson, “Pioneer Maine Forester,” 51-53,68, 71-72; 
Vinson, “Conservation and the South,” 159-160; Cowdrey, This Land. This South. 137-138; 
Shingler interview, 6; Koch, Utilization of the Southern Pines. 1478; “Austin Cary,” 28-29; 
Berry, Farm Woodlands. 345; Richard C. Davis, Encyclopedia o f American Forest and 
Conservation History (New York: Macmillian Publishing Compnay, 1983), s.v. “Austin Cary.”
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contributions. Eloise Gerry, who sometimes worked with Cary, pioneered studies into a problem 
that continued to plague turpentine producers after the development o f the cup system. Although 
the cup reduced the damaging effects o f turpentining a tree, the wound created by chipping 
continued to harm the pine. Herty himself recognized that “if the tree is not wounded, turpentine 
is not produced; if it is girdled, the tree dies. Somewhere between these extremes lies the most 
efficient operation.”77
Gerry, who held a  Ph.D. from the University o f Wisconsin, undertook research to 
discover this balance. Trained as a wood anatomist and specializing in the study of wood 
formation and development, she focused on discovering what caused gum to flow from 
turpentined trees. Working at the Forest Service’s Forest Production Laboratory in Madison, 
Wisconsin, Gerry discovered that resin ducts were much more numerous in the trunk just above 
the most recent streak.78 Geriy examined the development of resin duct tissue, refining the data 
produced from earlier studies. Her work led to the recommendation that producers follow the 
installation of cups and gutters with an immediate chipping and allow the tree to stand for about 
a month before regular chipping began.79
77 Herty, “Turpentine Industry in the Southern States,” 363.
78 Dryer, “History o f the Gum Naval Stores Industry,” 7; Ostrom, “History of the Gum 
Naval Stores Industry,” 221; Elwood R. Maunder, Voices From The South: Recollections of 
Four Foresters (Santa Cruz, CA: Forest History Society, 1977), 124.
79 Her work continued studies that had begun in the first decade of the 1900s. While in 
Europe in 1903, Herty learned that extra resin ducts formed in trees above and below the worked 
face after two to four weeks. This explained why the boxes had yielded greater amounts o f gum 
with the first dipping than had the cups in the 1902 experiment. With boxing, the practice o f 
cornering caused the extra ducts to form early, before the first chipping. In using the cup system, 
resin ducts did not begin to increase until after the first chip o f the season, meaning the increased 
resin flow did not come until later. Herty, “Turpentine Industry in the Southern States,” 360-362; 
Schorger and Betts, Naval Stores Industry. 10.
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Gerry’s work also provided a scientific basis to explain the benefits of lighter chipping, a 
justification many operators required before altering their practices.10 One of the greatest 
obstacles to light chipping was a persistent belief that originated with the naval stores industry’s 
introduction into America, that gum was tree sap. By the first year o f the twentieth century, 
American scientists understood from Gerry’s work that unlike sap, which was water-based and 
circulated between the roots and the needles, gum was manufactured by the resin ducts in the 
layers o f new wood just below the bark. At the time a tree was chipped, it contained no gum. 
Rather, the trees’ exterior wood cells manufactured gum following the wound as a way to protect 
the exposed wood from insects, disease, and evaporation. Although many producers accepted 
the finding, the older idea persisted among some into the 1920s. One forester now found that “it 
seems difficult to get away from the notion that by tapping gum is drained from a reservoir in the
Gerry further discovered that the extra resin passages that formed as a result of wounding 
were most numerous in the rings nearest the bark and extended up the trunk from two to three 
feet from the point that chipping began each year. Narrow streaks kept the face in the maximum 
area o f production throughout the year. If producers chipped three-fourths to one inch each time, 
the face would rise out of the region with the largest number of resin ducts. Narrow streaks also
*° Before 1910, Forest Service experiments at Walkill, Florida, demonstrated that 
chipping only one-half inch wide and deep would provide the same gum yield as broader and 
deeper chips while a the same time doubling the working life of the tree and reducing mortality. 
Beginning in 1910 government turpentine leases in the Choctauhutchee National Forest in 
Florida required lessees to chip no more than one-half inch each week at a time when chippers 
commonly removed three-quarters to one inch of bark. Over the next decade some producers 
switched to lighter chipping. Eloise Gerry, Improvement in the Production of Oleoresin Through 
Lower Chipping (Washington, DC: United States Department of Agriculture, 1931), 3; Dyer, 
“History o f the Gum Naval Stores Industry,” 7; T. F.P. Veitch and V.E. Grotlisch, “What Uncle 
Sam Does for the Naval Stores Industry,” in Naval Stores: History. Production. Distribution and 
Consumption, ed. Thomas Gamble (Savannah: Review Publishing and Printing Company, 1921), 
136.
81 Hawley “Forest Service Investigations of Interest to the Naval Stores Industry,” 140.
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protected a layer o f sapwood behind the face, which kept the tree vibrant by severing only a few 
of the passages used to carry sap between the roots and the needles. They also helped protect the 
resin-producing cells from the damaging effects of drought. If  chips were cut too deeply or the 
gutter or apron driven too far into the trunk, the sap wood could be cut through. Very large trees 
were especially susceptible to this threat because the sapwood tended to be thinner. If  the sap 
became severed the tree would begin to dryface.82 It was important to keep the tree healthy to 
ensure that it achieved optimal annual ring growth. Gerry researched the O hack, whose .75-inch 
blade was designed to make a smaller streak. However, the O hack required more effort to make 
a chip and workers complained that they could not make their tasks as quickly as with the No. 1 
hack. Workers also had difficulty beginning light chipping on a virgin year because o f the 
difficulty involved in stooping to reach such a low point on the truck. Workers were perplexed 
when they received instructions to chip lightly. For all the previous years they had worked in 
turpentine, they were taught that “The deeper you go into the meat, the more blood you get.”83
By 1931 Gerry’s continued experiments showed that one-fourth inch chips yielded the 
best results. Although wider chips could yield more gum initially, the shorter chips allowed 
longer production from some of the short resin ducts that Gerry discovered. One-fourth inch 
chipping provided for better wood development and greater growth of oleoresin-yielding tissues. 
There was no need, she believed, for faces to exceed eight to twelve inches per season. The low 
chipping exposed less wood to pitch soaking and insect attack. It also helped maintain the tree’s 
vigor and wood formation, which later made trees more valuable for timber.84 Gerry forthrightly
82 Eloise Gerry, “The Goose and the Golden Eggs or Naval Stores Production a la 
Aesop.” Southern Lumberman (25 August 1923), 1-3; L.A. Ivanov, “Scientific Principles 
Underlying the Technique o f  Streaking Pines,” Cary Collection, 49; “Good Naval Stores 
Practice,” Cary Collection, 2; Butler, Treasures of the Longleaf Pines. 23.
83 Maunder, Voices from the South. 36.
84 Such narrow chipping required the O hack or even the newly invented OO hack with a 
.625-inch wide blade. Low-faced trees continued to produce new wood growth, even during the
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conceded that if  producers were harvesting for the short-term before logging their timber, they 
could indeed collect more gum through moderately high chipping. Lessees too might opt for 
more intensive chipping since their short-term interests might be best served in this manner. 
Ultimately, however, producers could gain more gum in the long run from a forest worked using 
lower chipping.85
Although working in a field almost completely dominated by men, Gerry was highly 
respected by both the foresters and producers with whom she worked. Her research and 
publications were taken seriously and her recommendations adopted.86 Her presence in the field, 
however, caught the foresters o f  the 1910s and 1920s, who politely referred to her as “Miss 
Gerry,” off guard. One, for example, described her as “a very bright able woman.” He also 
found her “very attractive. She had a good figure, a pretty face, a good complexion, but she 
couldn’t talk about anything but her job. She was just as sexless as old Doc Caiy.”87 The 
southern racial climate demanded that special arrangements be made when Gerry journeyed to 
the region for her research. On one trip, her studies required that she collect fresh wood chips by 
following a black chipper through the woods for a day. The forestry supervisor, however, 
“couldn’t hear to that. A girl would have been in great danger right off the bat.” So, for several
later years of harvesting. The pines apparently adjusted to the continued production of oleoresin. 
Where severely chipped trees slowed their growth by one-third to one-half, low-chipped trees 
reduced their growth only a little, even above the face where the growth was most affected. In 
the healthier, low-chipped pines the face healed over quicker with new wood growing at the
sides.
85 Eloise Gerry, “More Turpentine, Less Scar, Better Pine,” leaflet 83 (Washington, DC: 
United States Department o f Agriculture, 1931), 1-4; Butler, Treasures of the Longleaf Pines. 23; 
Gerry, “Improvement in the Production of Oleoresin,” 3,17-23.
86 Shingler interview, 6.
87 Inman F. Eldredge, interview by Roy R. White, 9 July 1959, Oral History Interview, 
Austin Cary File, Forest History Society, Durham, NC, 8.
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days, Gerry followed the black worker under the watchful eye of a white ranger who 
accompanied her to ensure her safety.88
Along with Herty, Cary, and Gerry, other government-supported researchers made many 
new discoveries during the 1910s and 1920s that helped the industry. For one, their studies 
showed that lighter methods of chipping could reduce the frequency of dryface and the fungi that 
often accompanied the ailment. To have the safest assurance against dryface, trees were not to 
be worked beyond three years. Researchers also found that older trees with crown lengths less 
than one-third the total tree height were deemed to be the most susceptible to dryface and 
producers were advised to avoid them. If dryface did occur, producers could let the pine rest for 
a few weeks and thereby enable it to better resist the condition. After the period, producers 
could either double chip the face each week to rapidly raise the face above the affected area 
before it expanded further, or they could ignore the dryfaced area and begin the next streak above 
it. Researchers recommended that infested trees be removed after turpentining to prevent the 
fungi’s spread and any additional turpentining should be continued with great caution.89
Foresters also explored the problems associated with fire. Fire damage to pines 
remained a widespread problem in the first decades of the twentieth century. Although damage 
done by fire was less per average acre in the southern piney woods than in forests of other areas 
of the country, such a large percentage o f the southern pine forest was burned that overall 
damage in the region was much more extensive.90 Work by foresters in the 1920s demonstrated
88 Ibid., 6-8.
89 C.S. Schopmeyer and Otis C. Maley, “Dry Face of Naval Stores Pines,” Forest Pest 
Leaflet 51 (Washington, DC: United States Department of Agriculture, 1960), 1, 5, 7; R.P. True, 
“Dry Face of Turpentine Pines,” The Forest Farmer 8 (August 1949): 11,14.
90 R.D. Forbes and R.Y. Stuart, Timber Growing and Logging and Turpentining Practices 
in the Southern Pine Region (Washington, DC: United States Department o f Agriculture, 1930), 
3,6,14.
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that persistent burning practices seriously damaged the pines and hurt their gum yield. They 
conceded that the practice of yearly raking and burning of the pine straw, chips, and spilled gum 
reduced the amount o f flammable material on the forest floor and, in turn, the later likelihood 
that accidental fire would rage out o f control. The practice, however, in no way rendered the 
forest fireproof. Producers often finished their raking and burning before needles had completed 
their fall in late winter, and occasionally the fire encouraged a subsequent needle release that 
could easily feed another fire. Also, longleaf seedlings and saplings, although more fire resistant 
than other species, often succumbed to the burning, reducing the chances o f reforestation. 
Foresters also discovered what producers had been unable to realize from casual observation, 
burning slowed the growth o f trees not directly affected by the fire. Not only did burning 
consume the debris, it also damaged the humus layer which otherwise provided nutrients to the 
trees. Studies showed that Iongleafs grew eighty percent faster on unbumed land than on burned. 
On unbumed land gum production rose between twenty-five and one hundred percent. Thus, in 
the most conservative estimates, producers could increase profits by twenty-five percent by 
keeping fire out. For some producers, the twenty-five percent loss of potential profits was an 
acceptable sacrifice for greater insurance that a conflagration would not consume their entire 
stand. With the great threat of fire from lightning and especially herdsmen, producers opted to 
bum the forests under conditions over which they had relative control. Eloise Gerry discovered 
that in cases where controlled annual burning accidentally spread into the tops of trees, the 
consequences could be devastating for turpentiners. If turpentining continued in such stands, 
half of such trees could be expected to stop producing or die, and although surviving trees 
appeared to recuperate fully after several years, they actually experienced retarded wood-cell and 
resin-tissue growth.91
91 Forbes and Stuart, Timber Growing and Logging and Turpentining Practices. 14,26; 
O.H.L. Wernicke, “Piney Wood Sense,” Pine Institute o f America General Bulletin, 1926, Forest 
Service newsclipping file, Forest History Society, Durham, NC, 2-3; Harry Lee Baker, “Fire in
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Foresters discovered that the damaging effects of fire caused long-term harm to the 
industry. Fire killed up to two-thirds of the round trees which left timber tracts sparsely stocked. 
Some operators by the 1920s worked tracts containing between fifteen and thirty trees per acre 
when, if fire had been repressed, they might have been working forty-five to ninety per acre. 
Denser stands lowered operating costs by reducing the time laborers spent walking between trees 
and raising the number o f faces each could attend.92 Another problem that persisted was the lack 
of care for formerly turpentined tracts. Although the adoption o f  the cup system made them have 
less flammable, pitchy faces, trees could still easily ignite, especially if debris accumulated at the 
their base. Because many producers began harvesting from very young trees, the neglect of these 
formally turpentined stands ensured that many would never mature.93
With these findings foresters recommended that producers replace their raking and 
burning practices with organized fire prevention methods. According to their strategy, rather 
than reduce the risk o f  large fires by burning away the small deposits of flammable debris each 
year, turpentiners would contain fires and suppress them before they grew too large. The 
recommended proposal called for continuing the practice o f raking around the trees as a 
precaution. Instead o f setting fires, however, producers were to construct a network of fire lanes 
and breaks which foresters assured producers would cost less to construct than their expenditure 
for annual raking. Where raking cost between seven cents and fifteen cents per acre, fire 
prevention cost just four cents to six cents per acre. Although a risk of a large, disastrous forest
the Turpentine Orchard” (paper presented at the Get-Together Conference of the Pine Institute of 
America, Pensacola, FL, February 1929), Cary Collection, 1-2; Lenthal Wyman, Florida Naval 
Stores (Tallahassee: Florida Forest Service, 1936), 36; Eloise Gerry, “Oleoresin Production from 
Longleaf Pine Defoliated by Fire.” Journal of Agricultural Research 43 (1 November 1931): 827, 
830-833.
92 Baker, “Fire in the Turpentine Orchard,” 1-2; Wyman, “Florida Naval Stores,” 36.
93 Wyman, Experiments in Naval Stores Practice. 4; Forbes and Stuart, Timber Growing 
and Logging and Turpentining Practices.
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fire was present even with the new protective methods, foresters promised producers that the 
increased profits from not burning offset it.94
But the turpentiners were at the mercy of local tradition that demanded periodic burning. 
Cattlemen—invoking traditional custom—believed grass growing on the forest floor was rightfully 
theirs to use. They demanded burning to keep down undergrowth and encourage grass for their 
livestock. Even if  the forest’s owners did not want their property burned over, they raked their 
trees in anticipation o f the cattlemen setting fire to it anyway. “The cattleman was your friendly 
enemy,” explained the son o f one Florida turpentiner of the period.95 Some farmers contributed 
to the problem; believing that the boll weevil thrived in wooded areas surrounding their cotton 
fields, they demanded eradication o f the pests through fire. A 1926 Pine Institute of America 
bulletin explained that “the turpentine farmer, where fires are allowed to run wild, is really in a 
vicious predicament, for when he does bum the woods others may do so at the wrong time with 
great damage to him, Yet any burning at any time costs him heavily.”96
As a means o f controlling fire and other resulting forms of tree damage, foresters 
advocated an end to the practice o f free-ranging livestock. Timber land owners possessed the 
right to use the stands and had the obligation o f paying taxes on the property, but beyond these 
legal rights and obligations they had little control over the acreage. The way piney woods 
southerners saw it, an investor bought land for the timber and until he harvested it and put the 
cut-over to some other productive use, they had a right to the range. Because there were no 
fences, livestock was permitted to roam over the countryside, grazing on the native grasses. The
94 Forbes and Stuart, Timber Growing and Logging and Turpentining Practices. 36;
Baker, “Fire in the Turpentine Orchard,” 2-3 36.
95 Herbert L. Kayton, interview by Roy R. White, 7 October 1959, Oral History 
Interview, Forest History Society, Durham, NC, I; Elliott Maguire, interview by author, tape 
recording, St. Augustine, FL, 5 June 1996.
96 Wernicke, “Piney Woods Sense,” 3.
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number o f animals involved was considerable. In Washington County, Florida, for example, the 
forest provided grazing for around ten thousand head o f cattle and twenty thousand hogs. Sheep 
and goats also browsed the forest, especially during the spring and summer months when the 
grasses’ lushness peaked. Goats and pigs damaged stands considerably. Goats were fond o f the 
tender tips of young pine stems and branches. Although hogs obtained most of their forage from 
acoms and low-growing plants, they did not hesitate to dig up and devour the starchy roots of 
iongieaf pine seedlings. Sometimes they even dined on large saplings. In sufficient numbers 
hogs could destroy Iongieaf reproduction over a sizable area. By 1930, foresters concluded that, 
in many areas of Georgia and Florida, hogs had killed between five and seven percent o f the 
young Iongieaf pines under three inches in diameter and in a period o f several months could 
seriously injure between forty-six and eighty-five percent. Except for the danger of fire, cattle 
and sheep grazing caused little damage to the pine forest. Although cattle might trample pine 
seedlings, they actually benefited the younger trees by consuming much o f the flammable debris. 
However cattlemen’s insistence on setting fire to the forest floor ran afoul o f the growing 
conservation movement’s stand against controlled burning.97
At one Southern Forest Congress meeting the cattlemen were attacked for their stubborn 
persistence in burning. Foresters and land owners wanted to fence in the range and protect it 
from fire to encourage regrowth. According to the law at the time, it was the landowners’ 
responsibility to fence in the forest, not the herders’ duty to fence in their livestock. Controlling 
access to the forest was in the land owners’ best long-term interest. Cattlemen, the foresters 
complained, had no future stake in the property they harmed each year. Cattlemen consequently 
disliked the foresters and their efforts at reforestation, which they viewed as the forerunner of a
97 Maunder, Voices from the South. 76; Ziegler, Spillers, and Coulter, Financial Aspects 
of Growing Southern Pine. 60; Rupert B. Vance, Human Geography of the South: A Study in 
Regional Resources and Human Adequacy (Chapel Hill: The University o f  North Carolina Press, 
1935), 140; “Annual Report of the Starke Branch for the Year 1929-1930,” Cary Collection, 6.
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stock law. Given that angry free range herders were known to destroy fences in protest, one 
ingenious company which owned large tracts o f  timber in Georgia enclosed forty-four thousand 
acres only after putting their own recently-purchased cattle out to graze on their property. 
Because the company had a legitimate purpose for fencing in their property, local residents 
accepted the change. It thus appears that piney woods herders o f the early twentieth century 
closely resembled similar men in the Georgia upcountry in the second half of the nineteenth 
century as described by historian Steven Hahn, in that they did not reject efforts toward property 
improvement, but at the same time viewed stock laws as an unjust attack on their economic 
welfare.98
Foresters also made efforts to understand other factors associated with yield variation 
that were not as obvious as deep chipping, burning, and free-ranging livestock. By the late 
1920s, they made significant strides in understanding the variation in gum yields between 
different timber stands and individual trees within those stands. In general, researchers found 
that all factors that favored the trees’ health favored resin production but that moisture was the 
most important factor in gum secretion. The greater the amount o f water in a tree, the greater 
absorption by the cells, which created abundant pressure necessary to encourage the open resin 
ducts to exude gum. This finding explained the drop in gum yields during drought. Also, 
moisture in both the ground and air affected gum yield, which rose appreciably after rains in 
warm humid weather. Temperature also influenced resin production. High temperatures 
encouraged gum yield and low temperatures, below 10° C., severely retarded it. However, to
98 Vance, Human Geography of the South. 140; Harley Langdale, Jr., interview by 
Harold K. Steen, 1991, Forest History Society, Durham, NC, 38. The company also took control 
of hunting on its property, allowing permits only on the condition that hunters exercise care with 
fire and report any that they saw and regulating trapping by leasing rights. Maunder, Voices from 
the South. 76-77. Steven Hahn, The Roots o f  Southern Populism: Yeoman Farmers and the 
Transformation of the Georgia Uocountrv. 1850-1890 (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1983), 247.
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affect yields, temperatures bad to remain low for twenty-four hours, meaning that cool evenings 
did not necessarily hurt turpentining provided daytime temperatures rose sufficiently. Increased 
daylight generally helped gum production, but it also possessed negative effects. By stimulating 
photosynthesis in the crown, thus increasing nutrients available to the tree, and heating the trunk, 
which favored resin production, the increasing number of sunny hours in summer aided 
operators. However, light also increased transpiration from the crown, reducing water pressure 
and emission o f spirits. These discoveries explained why spring yields were smaller and 
production during July and August rose. In mid-summer, eighty percent of weekly gum flow 
occurred within twenty-four hours of chipping, but in the cooler days o f the spring and fall the 
same percentage of flow required five days.99
Even under similar growing conditions, researchers discovered, trees in different areas 
could have yields that varied as much as three hundred percent. Pine trees growing in sandhills 
produced less gum than pines growing in slightly more fertile soil. In the former, trees tended to 
grow more slowly, failed to achieve great height, and consequently produced less resin. Thus the 
trees in the Carolinas and south Florida, which grew in sandy hardpan land, yielded less than 
stands in Georgia, north Florida and across the Gulf coast. Large trees with full crowns tended to 
produce more as a result o f their greater strength. Within the same stand, however, certain trees 
tended to outperform other seemingly identical trees growing close by. Gerry discovered that 
such trees usually grew in more open spaces than the others, possessed broad, large crowns, 
straight, not forked tops, long and very green needles, rough, thick bark, and if  examined, usually 
had wide annual rings. Even with this characterization to go by, woodsmen had difficulty 
identifying the most productive trees because the root system of individual trees and deep soil
99 Ivanov, “Scientific Principles Underlying the Technique of Streaking Pines,” 28,43- 
46; Wyman, Experiments in Naval Stores Practice. 8; Karl Petraschek, “The Further 
Development of the Technique o f Turpentining Pines,” Cary Collection, 16-17.
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conditions, neither o f which was easily detectable, also greatly influenced yield. To confuse 
matters more, some trees possessed a genetic orientation toward greater wood growth at the 
expense of resin production while others tended to grow less wood, but yield great quantities of 
gum once wounded.100
As researchers began to acquire better a understanding of the dynamics of gum 
production, they began campaigning for careful resource use to render the industry sustainable. 
Scientific study confirmed what informed observers suspected—the pervasive practice of cupping 
small trees not only harmed the pines, but produced an unprofitable yield. It was estimated that 
seventy-five percent of the second-growth pines in Georgia and South Carolina that measured 
more than eight inches in diameter had already been bled and that many trees even smaller were 
in production. Many of these stands were but fifteen years old. Even the trees growing on the 
best quality land could not withstand chipping until they were, at the earliest, around twenty 
years old. And if  young pines survived the drain on vitality caused by turpentining, their growth 
was either greatly slowed or stopped. In some cases, producers worked small trees at a loss 
because they were mixed in with larger ones, and the workers insisted on working all to make 
their crop. Gerry estimated that a very vigorous tree 5.4 inches at breast height yielded only half 
as much as 8-inch trees. Pines of the latter size yielded only about half as much as 11- or 12-inch 
diameter trees. Gerry recommended that producers ignore trees less than ten inches in diameter 
because the small trees yielded so little and their future use was seriously jeopardized by 
turpentining. One forester equated the turpentining o f small trees with cutting them down, so 
great was the harmful effect on them. In fact, a large portion of the undersized trees did either 
stop growing, blow down, bum up, or fall victim to dry face or pests. By exploiting the young,
100 Wyman, Experiments in Naval Stores Practice. 9, 33,36; Eloise Gerry, “A Study of 
Externally Matched Southern Pines Which Produce Widely Different Yields of Oleoresin,”
Carry Collection, 2-4.
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second-growth stands, producers were ensuring that the southern pine forest would never
return.101
Not only did foresters encourage the conservation of young pines, they addressed the 
problem of the growing number of acres o f cut-over wasteland in the South. Much of the land 
fell into the hands of the states and county governments, seized for delinquent taxes. Some states 
attempted to sell the cut-over acres as potential farmland. In 1901, for example, the Georgia 
Department of Agriculture made the erroneous claim that “where the trees have been removed 
there remains a cleared field well-suited to agricultural purposes, in some instances adopted to 
the raising of the highest priced cotton, the long style or sea-island variety, or other staple crops.” 
The same tracts, it claimed were suitable for commercial fruit and vegetable production.102 In 
fact the cut-over pine forest land tended to be relatively infertile, which is why settlers had 
avoided it in the first place. The application of commercial fertilizers could increase cotton, 
com, and wheat yields on it but with the low crop prices o f the time, the added expense of 
fertilizer made the land only marginally profitable at best. Some producers searched for 
innovative ways to market their used up acreage. In 1906 John D. Robertson purchased land in 
Lake County, Florida, and set up a still which he operated for seven years. Over this period he 
accumulated over 12,000 acres. When he had finished in the area, he sold the property in 1913 
to the Lake County Land Owners’ Association which developed it as a residential area called
101 Forbes “Passing of the Piney Woods,” 136; Harley Langdale, Jr. interview, 2; Eloise 
Gerry, “Recent Observations on the Effects of Turpentining on the Structure o f Second-Growth 
Slash and Longleaf Pines,” Journal of Forestry 21 (March 1923): 2-3; “Good Naval Stores 
Practice,” 2; Gerry, “Goose and the Golden Eggs,” 2; Brower and La Fontisee “Report of the 
Investigation on the Naval Stores Industry,” 29-30; Wernicke, “Piney Woods Sense,” 60; Baker, 
“Fire in the Turpentine Orchard,” 1; V.L. Harper, “Progress Report on Influence of Turpentining 
on the Growth of Slash and Longleaf Pine,” 1930, American Turpentine-Farmers Association 
Papers, Georgia Agrirama, Tifton, GA, 1.
102 Georgia Department of Agriculture, Georgia Historical and Industrial (Atlanta:
George W. Harrison, State Printer, 1901), 355.
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Fruitland Park, a community that remains in existence. Another turpentine operation eventually 
sold out to a lumber mill in the 1910s. The mill, in turn sold their one thousand cut-over acres to 
the Lake County Groves Corporation which succeeded in cultivating orange groves on the barren 
plot. Such successful cases were rare. To address the land use issue, the Southern Cutover Land 
Conference was organized in New Orleans in 1917. Although conference goers considered the 
option of reforestation, they ultimately settled on the unfeasible plan to turn the land into pasture 
and crop fields.103
Factors pushed to reforest denuded timber tracts through reseeding. The more easily 
cultivated slash pine, however, and not the once dominate iongieaf, was the foresters’ chosen 
favorite. Without periodic burnings, which the forestry establishment then shunned, the longleaf 
would be quickly shaded out by faster-growing species. And its long tap root, which even very 
young longleafs sent down, made it difficult to grow in nurseries. Although less hearty at a 
young age, the slash pine grew faster than the longleaf, making it marketable at an earlier age.
And best o f all, studies showed it could actually yield more gum than the longleaf. Only in the 
poorest soils, where no other species could thrive and where vegetation cover was much needed 
to curb erosion, did most foresters believe the iongieaf had a place.104
The combination of the improved methods and the conservation efforts made between 
1900 and 1920, both facilitated by federal intervention, averted the depletion that forestry experts 
had been forecasting. Tum-of-the-century technical changes also helped by reducing the nation’s 
over-dependence on wood. Treated railroad ties lasted thirty-five to fifty years instead o f the
103 Vance, Human Geography of the South. 135; Clark, Greening of the South. 29-30. 
William T. Kennedy, History o f Lake Countv. Florida. Lake County Historical Society, Tavares, 
FL, 43, 74.
104 “Good Naval Stores Practice,” 3. Gerry, Improvement in the Production o f Oleoresin. 
2; Forbes and Stuart, Timber Growing and Logging and Turpentining Practices. 8; P.L. Buttrick, 
“Commercial Uses of Longleaf Pine.” American Forestry 21 (September 1915): 908.
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previous five to ten. Building materials such as brick, stone, cement, iron, and steel replaced 
wood in the construction of buildings, ships, bridges, freight cars, and farm implements. 
American wood consumption consequently declined rapidly after 190S and timber supply 
estimates became more optimistic. Greater confidence in the forests’ regrowth resulted as well 
from improved understanding of the growth rates for different trees, climate, and topography.105 
One naval stores industry observer found as early as 1910 that “young trees grow where the old 
ones have been taken out and in many a once-plowed field stands to-day a young growth that will 
soon be big enough to yield a ‘crop of boxes.’”106 In 1923, Eloise Gerry observed that second- 
growth trees had a remarkably rapid rate of growth which offered much hope for the industry’s 
future. In the mid 1920s, Georgia, for example, possessed only one million acres of virgin pine 
growth, but had nine million acres of second-growth timber.107 In 1924, Thomas Gamble 
explained that “the return of Georgia to first rank this season as a naval-stores state is due to the 
working o f trees which have come up since 1900 and, almost without protection, have recovered 
the land held for centuries by their forebears. Great sections o f the state possess today a vigorous 
growth of young pines that, with moderate care, will develop in a comparatively few years into 
prolific yields of the oleo-resin from which spirits turpentine and rosin are made.”108 Another 
observer jeeringly explained that “people who regret the turpentine camps set the day not far 
ahead, in three years or in five, when the smoke o f the last still will have vanished and the 
ruthless ax of the woodsman following will have cut the last tree for the second-quality lumber
105 Donald J. Pisani, “Forests and Conservation, 1865-1890,” in American Forests:
Nature. Culture, and Politics, ed. Char Miller (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1997): 25, 
27; Clark, Greening o f the South. 129.
106 Packard, Florida Trails. 277.
107 Gerry, “Goose and the Golden Eggs,” 3; I. James Pikl, A History o f Georgia Forestry 
(Athens: Bureau o f Business and Economic Research, University of Georgia, 1966), 20.
108 Gamble, “The Naval Stores Industry of the South,” 325.
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which the turpentine-bleeding process leaves behind. Others say the end of the trees is 
something like the end o f the world. It has been prophesied almost since the beginning and has 
never yet happened.”109
The passing of the timber supply crisis won many producers over to the federally funded 
forestry efforts. A 1927 U.S. Department o f Commerce bulletin accurately summarized the 
impact of conservation methods on the industry, stating that “the lumber and Naval Stores 
industries are now fully awakened to the fact that their natural resources are being depleted, and 
they realize that their continued existence is dependent upon scientific measures o f conservation 
and reforestation.”110 But despite the obvious successes o f government and business cooperation
109 Packard, Florida Trails. 277.
110 Priest, Naval Stores Industry. 2. The development o f the American naval stores 
industry bears a remarkable resemblance to the kauri trade in New Zealand. In the early 
nineteenth century Europeans discovered large tracts if virgin kauri trees, some more than sixty 
feet in girth. Where these trees had grown for thousands o f years, Europeans found deep resin 
deposits, which they soon began mining. Kauri, used in the manufacture of varnishes, linoleum, 
glue, and ceiling wax, grew in demand and its production grew into a major industry that lasted 
into the twentieth century. At the industry’s peak in 1899, eleven thousand tons o f kauri were 
exported. At first producers gathered gum from near the surface, but as these easily-accessible 
supplies dwindled, it became necessary to dig for it, sometimes as deep as ten meters. Gum 
could also be collected from living kauri trees. Climbers or “tree bleeders” scaled the trucks, 
harvested gum in the forks of branches and on their decent cut incisions in the trucks at two-foot 
intervals. Within a few months the climbers returned, gathered the gum which had collected on 
the wound, and cut more scars to continue the process. While some entrepreneurs tapped the 
trees for gum, others cut them for lumber. Settlers cleared the cutover land of stumps to begin 
agriculture. Because of the damage resin producers caused the increasingly scarce trees, the 
bleeding process was outlawed in 1905. For a short while attempts were made to extract gum 
from kauri wood chips using solvents. The number o f kauri dwindled to the point that, by 1925, 
only five thousand tons of resin was exported and by 1952 just twenty-one tons. As the kauri 
forests disappeared, foresters sought efforts to restore New Zealand’s woodland. Because it 
required a century for a kauri seedling to reach marketable maturity, foresters chose to plant 
imported radista pine. With its rapid growth, prolific seed production, and adaptability to New 
Zealand’s geography and climatic conditions, radista pine was ideal to reclaim forest land. In the 
1930s, as part of a conservation program much like the United State’s Civilian Conservation 
Corps, New Zealand pine forests were replanted. By the late twentieth century over one million 
acres of natural and planted radista pine forests covered New Zealand and provided the raw 
material for an overseas market in lumber, plywood, turpentine, and tall oil. John Drew, “Let’s 
Face It,” Naval Stores Review 92 (May-June, 1982): 4.
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and the large operators’ general acceptance of federal and state involvement, in the late 1920s 
other producers, especially smaller ones, continued to look on forestry as a meddlesome and 
intrusive movement and persisted in their employment o f practices little changed from one 
hundred years earlier.
Where federal forestry efforts led to great advances in gum harvesting, another federal 
agency, the Bureau of Chemistry worked as well to improve the quality o f the turpentiners’ 
product and develop more reliable marketing standards. Beginning in 1915, the Bureau 
conducted demonstrations on improved distilling methods, developed both privately and by the 
Bureau, which would give better yields. Distillers had relied on their observations o f the water 
and turpentine consistency exiting the worm and the sound of the resin in the still to regulate the 
temperature. Interruptions or noise from thunderstorms could sometimes make the still 
impossible to regulate. Even for the most experienced and astute distiller, the challenges of such 
primitive operating methods produced widely varying results. In an effort to improve the 
distilling process, a physician and turpentine producer from Cordele, Georgia in 1908 developed 
a still thermometer which allowed for better regulation o f heat. He also calculated out the 
optimal temperatures for various grades o f gum, 250° F. for virgin, 260° F. for average, and 270° 
F. for old gum. Both the thermometer and temperature recommendations enabled distillers to 
produce more uniform results and the greatest quality and quantity. In 1916, another inventor 
developed a recording thermometer that gave a charge’s temperature history. Because it showed 
the speed and direction of temperature changes, it allowed for even better still regulation. The 
Bureau also sent agents into such important naval stores centers as Savannah to work with 
factors as well as individual producers on distilling problems. G.P. Shingler, who worked for the 
Chemical Bureau in the 1920s, invented a  ten-ounce “nursing bottle” marked to indicate when 
water should be added, the temperature raised or lowered, or the rosin discharged, by measuring
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the water and spirit consistency o f the fluid exiting from the condensing tube. Because many 
distillers could not read, these gauging devices were designed to be used by the illiterate. 
Shingler joined Austin Cary and Eloise Gerry in the field, visiting producers and demonstrating 
better ways of managing forests, chipping, and distilling. They also printed and distributed 
posters and circular letters warning o f wasteful losses through careless handling o f gum, 
distilling, and treatment o f the spirits and rosin.111
Perhaps the Bureau’s greatest contribution to production came in the late 1920s with the 
introduction of a new kind of refining process, steam distillation. Although first performed in a 
crude fashion in 1868 in Georgetown, South Carolina, and improved by the French eight years 
later, steam distillation in the United States did not mature until researchers with the Bureau’s 
Naval Stores Research Division worked out an acceptable design. Early problems with the 
original process involved the discoloration of rosin, by that time the most valuable o f  the naval 
stores products. Wood chips, one o f the most common foreign particles in raw gum, lodged on 
the steam coils, where they charred between still runs and discolored the rosin from successive 
charges. The presence o f water vapor in the still also tended to give the rosin a cloudy 
appearance. Naval stores researchers solved the problem by developing a method o f cleaning the 
gum before it entered the still. By this process, gum was melted to make it more fluid, diluted 
with spirits of turpentine to make it more liquefied, then filtered and finally sprayed into water 
where it settled. The improvement led to the rapid proliferation of steam distilleries (fig. 8.4).112
111 Robson Dunwody, “Proper Methods of Distillation and Handling in the Production of 
Turpentine and Rosin,” in Naval Stores: History. Production. Distribution and Consumption, ed. 
Thomas Gamble (Savannah: Review Publishing and Printing Company, 1921), 132-133; Shingler 
interview, 1-3; Butler, Treasures of the Longleaf Pines. 81; Veitch and Grotlisch, “What Uncle 
Sam Does for the Naval Stores Industry,” 138.
112 Ostrom, “History of the Gum Naval Stores Industry,” 222.
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Figure 8.4. Percentage of Gum, Steam, and Destructively Distilled Turpentine, 1900-1930 
Naval Stores Statistics. 1900-1954 (Washington, DC: United States Department of Agriculture, 
1956), 7-8.
The Bureau o f Chemistry was also instrumental in establishing improved naval stores 
production standards. By the turn o f the twentieth century, no uniform industry standards of 
purity and grade existed and individual ports tended to follow different requirements. In 1869, 
the New York Port Authority created standards for rosin, but these did not apply to southern 
ports. In 1894, the Savannah Board of Trade established its own naval stores grades, but its 
authority did not extend to other ports. In an effort to remedy the lack of uniformity and the 
increasing problem o f  adulterated spirits, Georgia and Florida, the two most important naval 
stores-producing states, each passed legislation requiring purity of spirits shipped from their 
ports and providing for inspectors to enforce i t  Although the export o f adulterated spirits slowed 
to a trickle following these acts, no safeguard was provided for the quality o f rosin and standards 
continued to vary so much between ports that in 1910 there existed sixty different grades. In 
some cases, the confusion caused rosin o f presumably the same grade to be, in fact, as much as 
two grades different. Finally, in 1912, the Bureau o f Chemistry established uniform standards 
for both rosin and turpentine based on color. W.W. (Water White) and W.G. (Window Glass)
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represented the two palest and thus most valuable grades. Lower grades included N. (Extra 
Pale), M. (Pale), K. (Low Grade), I (Good No. 1), H. (No. 1), F. (Good No. 2), E. (No. 2), D 
(Good Strain), C. (Strain), B. (Common Strain), and A (Black). The Bureau o f Chemistry issued 
sets of glass standards by which inspectors could grade rosin. The original set was kept at the 
Bureau office in Washington and matching sets were kept at the major naval stores ports. Once 
the standards were in place, prices varied widely between grades. The lower ones sold for 
roughly half the price o f the higher ones. The older naval stores region tended to make a larger 
percentage of the lower grades while states where the industry was new, especially Louisiana and 
Texas, manufacture more better-quality products, which came from gum harvested from virgin 
faces and from using improved methods.113
Although the plan helped the industry by providing added assurance to consumers that 
the products they purchased were in fact of the standard they expected, some in the business 
viewed the government’s increased role with suspicion. The head of one factorage house 
believed that “when the Government takes hold of the naval stores business at all it will take hold 
of it effectively, and we will have Governmental inspection and supervision from the tree to the
trade [S]uch work will require a very large number of petty Government officials, whose
stamp will be necessary before a barrel of rosin or turpentine can be marketed or shipped. Of 
course the turpentine operator will have to foot the bill.”114 The government’s involvement did
113 Davis, Encyclopedia of Forest and Conservation History. 476,479; John E. Register, 
“The Naval Stores Inspector—His Work and How He Does It,” in Naval Stores: History. 
Production. Distribution and Consumption, ed. Thomas Gamble (Savannah: Review Publishing 
and Printing Company, 1921), 69; Martin, “Historical and Analytical Approach,” 108-109;
Veitch and Grotlisch, “What Uncle Sam Does for the Naval Stores Industry,” 137-138; A. 
Sessoms, “To Factors and Operators,” Carry Collection, 1-2; Campbell, et al., Naval Stores 
Industry. 49; Brower and La Fontisee, “Report of the Investigation on the Naval Stores Industry,” 
10,47-48.
114 C. Downing to W.C. Powell, 13 February 1914, William C. Powell Papers, Special 
Collections Library, Duke University.
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not prove to be at all as intrusive as suspected. By around 1920, Savannah had four naval stores 
inspectors who each examined 1,200 barrels o f rosin and 300 barrels o f  turpentine each day at 
the season’s height Producers, however, paid for the service. Inspectors fees cost nine cents per 
barrel o f rosin and twelve cents per banel o f turpentine. The factor paid the fee which then 
charged to the producers’ accounts. At the urging of both consumers and producers, the Bureau 
in 1918 began collecting and publishing statistics on production, stocks on hand at stills, ports, 
dealers, and principal consuming industries.113
The system of turpentine and rosin standards and inspections reached maturity in the 
federal Naval Stores Act o f 1923. Designed with consumer interests in mind, it prohibited 
interstate commerce or foreign export o f adulterated or mislabeled naval stores. It reaffirmed the 
standard grades for turpentine and rosin, but authorized the Secretary o f Agriculture, who 
oversaw the Bureau o f Chemistry, to establish new ones and modify the existing standards if 
needed. Enforcement o f the act was the duty of the Food, Drug, and Insecticide Administration 
and violations were to be reported to the Department o f Justice. The act also provided for 
inspectors to check products ready for shipment.116
The naval stores industry’s successful efforts to alter production methods represented the 
convergence of two significant developments, the near-total loss o f the southern pine forest and 
the emergence of federally-backed scientific forestry in the United States. Whereas others had 
tried and failed at developing a cup-type system in the nineteenth century, Herty’s success was 
owed in large part to producers of whose mind’s the seemingly impending timber depletion made
115 Register, “Naval Stores Inspector,” 69; Veitch and Grotlisch, “What Uncle Sam Does 
for the Naval Stores Industry,” 138; Shingler interview, I.
116 Campbell, et al., Naval Stores Industry. 81-82; Kenneth H. Thomas, McCranie’s 
Turpentine Still. Atkinson Countv. Georgia: A Historical Analysis o f  the Site. With Some 
Information on the Naval Stores Industry in Georgia and Elsewhere (Atlanta: Georgia 
Department of Natural Resources, 1975), 7-8; Robert S. Blount, Spirits o f Turpentine: A History 
of Florida Naval Stores. 1528 to 1950 (Tallahassee: Florida Agricultural Museum, 1993), 28.
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more receptive to alternative practices. His efforts also benefited from his formal training in 
forestry and the support o f  the nation’s newly-formed forestry establishment. These advantages 
permitted Heity to develop a practical and affordable method, qualities that did not necessarily 
guarantee its adoption. But the endorsement o f the Bureau o f  Forestry helped convince 
producers o f its merits. Herty’s demonstrated desire to work in cooperation with producers 
ushered in, by the 1910s, an era of forestry experimentation and study unlike anything seen 
before in the industry. Although Herty shifted his attention to other areas of southern economic 
improvement, Austin Cary, Eloise Geny, and other foresters continued research and close work 
with turpentiners. Their efforts led to far greater understanding of the influences of deep 
chipping, burning, and free-range grazing on turpentine yield. Federal assistance through Bureau 
of Chemistry research also helped naval stores producers by developing distillery improvements 
and uniform marketing standards. For the time being, their efforts rescued the turpentine 
industry from certain doom.
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Chapter Nine
Fresh Challenges:
The Naval Stores Industry Faces New Problems
During the first decades of the twentieth century the naval stores industry faced 
challenges on several fronts. Although improved methods o f production did retard depletion of 
pine timber, overall stands remained scarce, and the industry, with no more fresh pine territory to 
exploit, could not solve its resource problem by moving as it once had. As timber grew 
increasingly scarce and, consequently more expensive, labor and supply costs also rose, reducing 
the industry’s profitability, especially during the First World War. At the same time, producers 
had to adjust to a change in market demand that caused rosin prices to rise above those for 
spirits. During these difficult years the gum naval stores operators faced growing competition 
from foreign producers, most notably the French, whose superior methods were the envy of 
American producers. The development o f a revolutionary new way o f manufacturing turpentine 
by well-capitalized, heavy industry at home intruded on their market as well. On top of 
profitability declines, a change in market emphasis, and new challenges for market share, the 
factorage system, which by the late-nineteenth century had virtually disappeared in cotton 
production, developed an even firmer grip over the naval stores trade and producers than ever 
before. All of these developments created a difficult business environment for naval stores 
producers during the first three decades o f the twentieth century.
As southern timber began supplying a growing percentage of national lumber production, 
a problem developed as lumber companies grew ever more hostile to the practice of leasing their 
pines to naval stores men before chopping the trees or “turpentining ahead of the cu t” From 
1880 to 1920 lumber production in the South increased nearly ten times from 1.6 billion board
399
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feet to 15.4 billion board feet. The first World War created an immense demand for lumber. The 
government needed wood for factories, warehouses, offices, military training camps, and most 
importantly, ships. Because pine lumber, especially that cut from longleaf logs, was water 
resistant and thus did not require seasoning, it was heavily used in ship construction. By 1917, 
the South provided thirty-seven percent o f U. S. lumber. Some lumber companies experimented 
with leasing but found turpentining too troublesome and suspended the practice. Despite 
requirements to the contrary, some turpentine producers left nails and gutters in trees because 
their removal was too expensive and burdensome, especially when nail heads broke off in the 
process. Turpentined trees sometimes dryfaced, even with the use of cups, and the fire hazard 
associated with turpentining remained a perpetual danger. A growing demand for pine lumber 
meant some stands were cut before turpentining could begin.1 When large timber holdings were 
worked for turpentine, it was typically done by the lumber concerns themselves or very large 
naval stores outfits, not smaller individual producers. Around 1910, the majority of new Georgia 
turpentine orchards were operated by timber owners who harvested gum before cutting. And by 
1919 corporations employed forty-one percent of the industry’s wage earners, operated forty- 
seven percent of the distillery operations, and were responsible for the same portion of product 
output.2
1 Michael Williams, Americans and Their Forests: A Historical Geography (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989), 238; Thomas D. Clark, The Greening o f the South: The 
Recovery of Land and Forest (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1984), 26; George
B. Tindall, The Emergence of the New South. 1913-1945 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1967), 55-56; P.L. Buttrick, “Commercial Uses of Longleaf Pine,” American 
Forestry 21 (Spring 1915): 904; James H. Jones, interview by Roy R. White, 9 July 1959, Oral 
History Interview, Forest History Society, Durham, NC, 1, 3-4; Elliott Maguire, interview by 
author, tape recording, St. Augustine, FL, 5 June 1996.
2 Asa L. Brower and John O. La Fontisee, “Report o f the Investigation on the Naval 
Stores Industry and Statistics on the Production of Turpentine and Rosin for the Seasons of 1907- 
8 and 1908-9” 15 March 1909, Austin Cary Memorial Forestry Collection, Department of 
Special Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries, University of Florida, 27-28.
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Foresters complained about the timber industry’s increased reluctance to capitalize on 
such a potentially valuable resource as turpentine and the hardship it placed on turpentine 
producers. In the South forester, Asa L. Brower, complained in 1909, “there are large areas o f 
round timber present, yet, as far as the small [turpentine] operator is concerned, a scarcity, 
artificially induced, prevails, and is beginning to make itself felt as keenly as that in the East. 
The ‘round’ timber is held by the large lumber companies, which are usually antagonistic to 
turpentine operations. Some few are beginning to permit turpentining, either performing the 
operations themselves or else leasing the privilege to large naval stores companies. Generally, it 
can be said that the future o f the naval stores industry in these parts is still problematic.”3 The 
situation remained the same over a decade later. In 1923, Eloise Gerry admitted that the 
increased use of the less-harmful cup and gutter method had prompted some lumber companies 
to allow turpentining in their stands. “The additional profits which come from turpentining 
longleaf and slash pines before they are cut for lumber,” she explained, “may be likened to the 
golden eggs of Aesop’s famous goose. Treat the goose well and the valuable product continues 
without unduly injuring the producer.” However, she complained, “there are still conservative 
timber owners, whose interests are centered in the products o f the sawmill, who are inclined to 
shake their heads dubiously when asked why they do not turpentine their timber before it is 
logged. They remain skeptical even when they are reminded that when they do not turpentine 
their timber, or when they work it for two years only, they are throwing away or wasting all or at 
least a considerable part o f an important and valuable natural resource.”4
3 Brower and La Fontisee, “Report o f  the Investigation on the Naval Stores Industry,” 30-
31.
4 Eloise Gerry, “The Goose and the Golden Eggs or Naval Stores Production a la Aesop,” 
Southern Lumberman (25 August 1923), 1.
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Independent producers suffered from the serious reduction in pine acreage that had 
already resulted from both their exploitative practices and lumber companies growing reluctance 
to lease stands. By the first decade of the twentieth century both North Carolina and South 
Carolina each had about forty naval stores establishments, but the output of their operations was 
extremely small. The great turpentine-producing days in these states had passed (fig. 9.1). At
Percentage of Naval Stores Production by State 
Selected Years from 1905-1944
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Figure 9.1. Percentage ofNaval Stores Production by State, Selected Years from 1905-1944 
Joseph B. Hosmer. Economic Aspects of the Naval Stores Industry (Atlanta: Georgia School of 
Technology, State Engineering Experiment Station, 1948), 4.
this time, Georgia lead in the number of naval-stores-producing establishments with over 650. 
However, the industry in many areas of the Peach Tree State was aging, having existed there 
since the 1850s. Moreover, independent producers experienced increasing difficulty locating 
acceptable tracts since the majority of new turpentine establishments in Georgia at the turn of the
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century were owned by lumber companies that were themselves turpentining before logging. As 
a result of the declining number o f available virgin stands, many producers in the state had begun 
to back-box, a practice which produced less gum than front-boxing. Despite labor and weather 
conditions very similar to Florida’s, Georgia’s turpentine forests yielded less turpentine. Where 
Georgia made an average of 26.5 casks of turpentine per crop in 1909, Florida produced 29.8.s
In Florida, where turpentine production increased very gradually following the Civil 
War, turpentiners discovered more available timber than in Georgia. Florida’s rail network, 
which expanded more slowly than Georgia’s in the late nineteenth century, made up for its 
retarded development during the first two decades o f the twentieth century. New lines improved 
access to the previously isolated, and thus relatively protected, pine stands. Producers also 
continued to rely on river transportation to move their naval stores to port. At Picalota, a small 
St. Johns County community by the river of the same name just below Jacksonville, one large 
producer had his own dock from which steam boats could service his operation. Hard surface 
roads, however, provided the best access to remote forests during this period. For example, 
producers in Walton County, located in the west-central panhandle, claimed in the late 1920s that 
it was cheaper to haul their naval stores 135 miles by truck to Pensacola than to transport them to 
the nearest railroad depot, load them on the cars, ship them to the factor in Pensacola, and finally 
unload them there. Roads also helped producers move their operations. In the 1920s one 
producer used Model T trucks to relocate twenty-one families, horses, mules, chickens, and at
5 Ibid., 3, 51, 54, 58-59. As a boy growing up in North Carolina around 1910, Erwin 
Stephens discovered such long forgotten relics as a  single-loaded musket, powder horn, loom, 
and old turpentine hacks and dippers, all stored in an attic. “The Place,” 14 December 1955, 
Edwin Duke Stephens Papers, Special Collections Library, Duke University, 1-2; For both 
combined and separated figures related to turpentine and rosin production see Appendix A.
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least one cow from a Manatee County camp to a new location in S t Johns County 225 miles
away.6
The rapid movement o f operations into the state in the 1890s made Florida the largest 
turpentine-producing state soon after the turn o f the century, despite having slightly fewer 
establishments than Georgia. By the early 1910s naval stores production was the most important 
industry in Florida with 529 establishments representing a combined capital investment of 
$ 14,376,088. The 21,262 laborers it employed earned a total o f $6,047,048/ Because of 
Florida’s increased naval stores production, in 1905 Jacksonville surpassed Savannah as the 
predominant naval stores exporting port (fig. 9.2). (The title reverted back to Savannah in 1923.) 
Jacksonville actually might have overtaken Savannah several years earlier if not for a disastrous 
fire in May 1901 which destroyed a large portion o f the city. By 1920, seven naval stores 
factorage houses were headquartered in Jacksonville and two others maintained branch offices 
there. The Commanders Point Terminal Company operated the largest naval stores yard in the 
world on the city’s waterfront. It handled the entire naval stores storage business in Jacksonville,
6 During the first decades of the twentieth century, counties funded most southern road 
improvements. Between 1906 and 1917 the southern states created highway commissions. From 
1920 to 1929 southern highway expenditure rose 157 percent and over roughly the same time the 
miles of paved road rose from 121,164 to 209,880. Draft of agreement with railroad builders, 
1913, William C. Powell Papers, Special Collections Library, Duke University; Elliott Maguire, 
interview, Oral History Collection, Research Library, St. Augustine Historical Society, St. 
Augustine, FL; Tindall, Emergence of the New South. 256-257; E.A. Ziegler, A.R. Spillers, and
C.H. Coulter, Financial Aspects of Growing Southern Pine. Washington Countv Florida 
(Tallahassee: Florida Forest Service, 1931), 18. Karen Harvey, “Maguire Bom Into Turpentine 
Family: Industry Once Had Major Impact on County,” The Compass. 26 April 1990, copy on file 
at Research Library, St. Augustine Historical Society, St. Augustine, FL, 9.
7 In comparison, there were 528 sawmills in Florida, representing $13,271,658 of 
investment capital. Their 13,083 wage earners made a total o f $5,098,568. The only other areas 
of manufacturing that approached naval stores and sawmills were phosphate, kaolin, and Fuller 
Earth mining and cigar manufacturing. Twelfth Biennial Report o f the Department o f Agriculture 
of the State o f Florida from the Years 1911 to 1912 (Tallahassee: T J. Appleyard, State Printer), 
428-429.
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thus saving buyers and sellers from having to collect supplies from different yards around the 
port to fill an order. The yard possessed storage space for 200,000 barrels of rosin, covered
Receipt o f Naval Stores at Savannah, Jacksonville, 
and Pensacola 
1914-1930
Savannah
Jacksonville
Pensacola
1914 1916 1918 1920 1922 1924 1926 1928 1930
Figure 9.2. Receipt of Naval Stores at Savannah, Jacksonville, and Pensacola, 1914-1930 
A. Stuart Campbell, Robert C. Unkrich, and Albert C. Blachard, “The Naval Stores Industry,” 
Studies in Forestry Resources in Florida 1 (May 1934): 53.
space for 12,000 barrels of turpentine, and tank storage capacity for another 33,000 barrels of 
turpentine.8
8 Pensacola also exported a substantial amount of naval stores. Brunswick, Georgia, 
Tampa, Florida, and New Orleans exported these products as well. A. Stuart Campbell, Robert C. 
Unkrich, and Albert C. Blachard, The Naval Stores Industry (Gainseville, FL: Bureau o f 
Economic and Business Research, College of Business Administration, The University o f 
Florida, 1934, 14; William Thomas Cash, The Storv of Florida (New York: The American 
Historical Society, 1938), 798; “Would Preserve Pine Forests,” Atlanta Constitution. 2 June 
1901, Turpentine newsclipping file, Forest History Society, Durham, NC; Brower and La 
Fontisee, “Report o f the Investigation on the Naval Stores Industry,” 64,67; George H. Baldwin, 
“Jacksonville as a Naval Stores Port and Market,” in Naval Stores: History. Production. 
Distribution and Consumption, ed. Thomas Gamble (Savannah: Review Publishing and Printing 
Company, 1921), 107-108.
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In the first two decades o f the twentieth century, Florida offered good opportunities for 
turpentining. The state’s central Gulf coast region, protected up to 1910 by its isolation and the 
state’s ownership o f the tracts, contained a considerable quantity of virgin pines. Improved 
transportation and the purchase o f timber land by private companies opened the region up to 
production. In parts o f south Florida a  large percentage o f the original pines remained by 1910, 
but much of these stands consisted of small trees growing far apart, and the even these acres were 
widely scattered. In the panhandle, west o f the Appaiachicola River lumber stands were more 
readily available. Lumber companies held the majority o f the timber there and seldom permitted 
turpentining of their trees. But in the other areas o f plentiful pines, the industry’s vigor led to 
rapidly diminishing resources in parts o f Florida just as it had in the Carolinas and Georgia. 
Turpentining in such places as Washington County reached its peak around 1905, but within five 
years the lumber companies began to remove the timber. By the late 1920s, the county’s naval 
stores production came from remnant longleaf and slash pine. At this time the relative 
importance of the naval stores industry in Florida declined, dropping behind lumber in the 
number of employees and behind both lumber and cigar and cigarette making in amount o f wages 
paid.9
In neighboring Alabama, turpentining continued at a steady but less rapid pace than in 
Florida. Although areas around Mobile had produced turpentine since before the Civil War, 
much of the longleaf pine in the southern portion o f the state had been left untouched until the 
turn of the century. Railroad development made these formerly isolated tracts more accessible.
In 1902, for example, the completion of a rail line from Georgiana, Alabama, in the south-central 
heart o f the state, to Graceville, Florida, in northern Holmes County—a distance of nearly one
9 Brower and La Fontisee, “Report of the Investigation on the Naval Stores Industry,” 4, 
34-36, 49, 54, 59; Ziegler, et al., Financial Aspects o f  Growing Southern Pine. 40; Campbell, et 
al., Naval Stores Industry. 21.
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hundred miles—provided convenient transportation to the pine region that possessed no water 
access. Lumber and turpentine camps quickly developed along the route. Although Alabama 
production had long fluctuated, by 1908-1909, the state ranked as the third largest naval stores 
producer. With its vast supply of virgin pine, producers enjoyed an average yield o f  35.6 casks 
of turpentine per crop, nearly nine casks more than crops in Georgia and six more than those in 
Florida. But large corporations controlled much of the round timber in Alabama so small 
producers found little opportunity to move into the state. With only around 190 operations, 
however, Alabama had fewer than half as many operations as Florida and Georgia had. And with 
the introduction o f such robust naval stores and timber activity, it was estimated that available 
round timber in south-central Alabama would be depleted by the mid 1910s. Longleaf pine 
stands in northeastern Alabama were largely ignored because they grew too sparsely for 
profitable turpentining.10
In Mississippi, where naval stores had been produced since the late antebellum era, 
manufacture remained erratic until the late-nineteenth century when declining timber stands in 
older producing states drove turpentiners there. Railroad expansion through the southern part of 
the state opened fresh areas of virgin pine and linked them with the port at Mobile. As the 
inevitable destruction took its toll, small independent producers found little room to expand as 
the lumber companies became increasingly reluctant to lease their stands. When they did lease, 
it was usually to large turpentine corporations that practiced conservation methods. Declining 
longleaf timber stands caused a rapid reduction in Mississippi naval stores activity after 1910.
At the turn of the century, Mississippi had 145 production establishments which were, on 
average, larger than those in the older producing areas of Georgia and still growing. In 1904 the
10 Brower and La Fontisee, “Report o f the Investigation on the Naval Stores Industry,”
54, 59,33, 36-37, 51,4; E.W. Carswell, Holmcsteadine: The History of Holmes County. Florida 
(Tallahassee: Rose Printing Company, 1986), 105.
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number o f producers dropped by fourteen percent but the number o f workers they employed rose, 
indicating the increasing size o f  the average turpentine business. By 1908 the ninety-four 
remaining establishments represented the largest manufacturers who had possessed the capital 
resources to weather the decreasing number of stands. At that time Mississippi was the fourth 
largest naval stores producer. Its yield of 34.5 casks of turpentine per crop, slightly less than 
Alabama, indicates that, although the timber resources may have been declining, enough virgin 
tracts remained to enable a substantial harvest. By 1909, however, nearly half o f the Mississippi 
pines had been bleed and, although the pines in the extreme western and northwestern edge of 
the Iongieaf belt remained less affected, their scattered growth mixed with shortleaf pines 
discouraged extensive turpentining. By the beginning of the First World War, the Mississippi 
industry was in rapid decline. The interruption in international export trade caused by the war 
resulted in a drop in production by approximately fifty percent. Like cotton, turpentine was 
included on the British list o f contraband. Even with the war’s end, the depletion of timber 
brought further declines to the naval stores business. By the late 1920s, the little Mississippi 
turpentine production that remained could be found only on small, usually scattered tracts.11
In eastern Louisiana, where the naval stores industry was essentially an extension of that 
in Mississippi, the longleaf forest and industry suffered the same fate.12 However, the 
southwestern Louisiana pine forest, separated from the east by the lowlands of the Mississippi 
valley, experienced surprising success. In this area, as in eastern Texas, pine forests remained
11 Turpentiners were also badly affected by a hurricane in 1906. Nollie Hickman, 
Mississippi Harvest: Lumbering in the Longleaf Pine Belt 1840-1915 (University: The 
University o f  Mississippi, 1962), 133, 135-137; Brower and La Fontisee, “Report of the 
Investigation on the Naval Stores Industry,” 54, 59,4,36-37, 52; James L. McCorkle, Jr., 
“Mississippi from Neutrality to War (1914-1917),” The Journal o f  Mississippi History 43 (May 
1981): 92-94.
12 Brower and La Fontisee, “Report o f the Investigation on the Naval Stores Industry,” 5,
37.
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largely untouched until the first years o f the twentieth centuiy. The timber was consequently of 
exceptional quality and jealously guarded by the few large concerns who owned it. Most land 
companies frowned on the often destructive and wasteful turpentining practices. By 1909, only 
twenty-five producers operated in Louisiana, most in the eastern pine forest, and but eight 
worked in Texas. In 1903, the Houston Texas Post complained that because lumber men were 
producing millions o f board feet o f lumber without first turpentining the timber, “millions of 
dollars are being lost annually as a result of neglect on the part of those interested.” Those 
companies that did work their timber for turpentine did so themselves, employing only the most 
conservative methods. Because they insisted on improved methods, these producers enjoyed 
substantially higher yields and less destruction o f  the timber than in any other state. Texas 
operations yielded 43.5 casks o f turpentine per crop and Louisiana, principally the western area 
of the state, collected 44.7 casks, forty percent more than Georgia producers.13 Producers in 
western Louisiana and east Texas did face a special problem, however; certain insects indigenous 
to the region hampered the regrowth of pine forests once turpentined and harvested. Pine sawfly 
larvae, which hatched from eggs laid in slits in the needles, fed on both new and old needles and 
could defoliate young seedlings. Although attacks by this insect only rarely killed the trees, they 
could severely stunt their growth. The leaf-cutting ant could also greatly weaken young pines. 
During the early winter or in the hot summer, whenever other green vegetation became scarce, 
these ants harvested needles on which they cultivated a fungus that they used for food.14
13 Ibid., 5,38-41, 53,48-49, 54, 59; “Turpentine in Texas,” Houston. T ex as P o st. 16 
September 1903, Turpentine newsclipping file, Forest Histoiy Society, Durham, NC.
14 The naval stores industry failed to establish itself west of Texas. During the Civil War 
efforts were made to supply the northern state’s naval stores needs from the Pacific coast forests, 
but production there suddenly collapsed with the resumption of southern manufacturing in the
1870s. Although west coast trees could yield substantial gum, their tough, rough bark had to be 
removed before chipping could begin, adding a prohibitably expensive procedure to the harvest. 
Howard E. Weaver and David A. Anderson, Manual o f Southern Forestry: With Special 
Adaptations for Students of Vocational Agriculture (Danville, IL: The Interstate Printers and
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The rapid decline o f the virgin pine forest, the lumber industry’s tight control of 
remaining stands, and these companies’ expansion into naval stores production challenged 
producers by creating a timber scarcity that drove up both purchasing and leasing prices 
throughout the South. By the early 1900s, Georgia pine lands, which could have been purchased 
for from 500 to $ 1.50 several decades before, sold for between $4 and $8. By the 1920s an acre 
sold for between $50 and $100 or more. Prices rose in Florida as well. In 1917, a large Florida 
timber owner offered 38,000 acres of timber land for $7.60 per acre. Even his open “prairieland” 
was expected to bring $4.75 per acre. Two years later another 28,000 acres were anticipated to 
sell for between $5 and $5.50 per acre. At these high prices it was easier for producers to lease 
than purchase pine timber tracts; the number o f acres owned by producers dropped as the number 
of leased acres grew. Where turpentine makers harvested gum from 3,249,577 acres of land that 
they owned in 1909, by 1914 that amount dropped twenty percent to 2,594,331 acres. Over the 
same period the number o f  leased acres grew nearly eighteen percent from 4,807,338 to 
5,833,757.15
Publishers, Inc., 1954), 276-277; A.W. Schorger and H.S. Betts, The Naval Stores Industry 
(Washington, DC: United States Department o f Agriculture, 1915), 46.
15 Donald Fraser Martin, Jr., “An Historical and Analytical Approach to the Current 
Problems of the American Gum Naval Stores Industry” (Ph.D. diss., University o f North 
Carolina, 1942), 107, 143; I. James Pikl. A History of Georgia Forestry (Athens: Bureau of 
Business and Economic Research, University o f Georgia, 1966), 10; Michael D. Tegeder, 
“Prisoners o f the Pines: Debt Peonage in the Southern Turpentine Industry, 1900-1930” (Ph.D. 
diss., University of Florida, 1996), 61; Hickman, Mississippi Harvest. 125; J. Arthur Johnston to 
W.C. Powell, 13 December 1817 and letter to The Germain Company, 17 May 1919, William C. 
Powell Papers, Special Collections Library, Duke University; R.D. Forbes and R.Y. Stuart, 
Timber Growing and Logging and Turpentining Practices in the Southern Pine Region 
(Washington, DC: United States Department o f Agriculture, 1930), 69; Turpentine rent 
agreements between L.N. Dantzler Lumber Company and Union Naval Stores Company, 5 
February 1901, 5 August 1901, and 11 July 1905, Dantzler Lumber Company Papers, Special 
Collections, Mitchell Memorial Library, Mississippi State University; Turpentine rent receipt to 
B.D. Clark, 16 March 1906, Belton Decatur Clark Papers, South Caroliniana Library, University 
of South Carolina; J.A.G. Carson, “The Increased Cost of Naval Stores Production,” in Naval 
Stores: History. Production. Distribution and Consumption, ed. Thomas Gamble (Savannah: 
Review Publishing and Printing Company, 1921), 73; Lenthal Wyman, Florida Naval Stores 
(Tallahassee: Florida Forest Service, 1936), 9.
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The cost o f  leasing, like that of purchasing timber, rose as supplies grew more scarce. 
Leases that cost from $100 to $200 per crop in 1896 rose to as much as $500 by 1899. Leasing 
costs continued to rise slightly from the turn of the century into the 1920s. In 1906 one producer 
paid $21 to rent three hundred turpentine boxes near Lexington, South Carolina, and another 
$120.47 to rent 1721, or about $700 per crop. By 1920, however, prices had risen considerably 
to between $ 1,000 and $2,000 per crop for a three year lease. By the mid 1920s lease costs 
increased to $2,000 and even $2,500, and some crops in Georgia reportedly reached as high as 
$3,000 to $3,500. By the late 1920s, however, leasing prices appear to have declined to around 
$1,200 of a four year lease as second-growth stands reached sufficient maturity.16
Because lumber companies, which tended to frown on the turpentining of their trees, 
now owned most o f the pine land, the lease agreements required practices that would ensure 
preservation of the timber quality. In the first years o f the twentieth century, lease agreements 
such as the one between Mississippi-based Dantzler Lumber Company and Union Naval Stores 
Company allowed for traditional boxing methods to be used provided they were worked in a 
“skillful and workable manner, according to the prevailing methods in the naval stores 
production trade.” In virgin timber, owners permitted as many as three boxes to be cut in one 
tree, as long as 3.5-inch-wide bands were left between each face. However, no trees less than 
eleven inches in diameter one foot from the ground could be boxed. Occasionally producers 
worked timber on a percentage basis, paying the owner fifteen to thirty percent o f the gross value
16 Martin, “Historical and Analytical Approach,” 107, 143; PikI, History o f Georgia 
Forestry. 10; Tegeder, “Prisoners o f the Pines,” 61; Hickman, Mississippi Harvest. 125; J. Arthur 
Johnston to W.C. Powell, 13 December 1917 and letter to The Germain Company, 17 May 1919, 
Powell Papers; Forbes and Stuart, Timber Growing and Logging and Turpentining Practices. 69; 
Turpentine rent agreements between L.N. Dantzler Lumber Company and Union Naval Stores 
Company, 5 February 1901, 5 August 1901, and 11 July 1905, Dantzler Lumber Company 
Papers; Turpentine rent receipt to B.D. Clark, 16 March 1906, Clark Papers; Carson, “Increased 
Cost of Naval Stores Production,” 73; Wyman, Florida Naval Stores. 9.
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of turpentine and rosin produced, depending on the timber’s quality. As the cup and gutter 
system became more widely used and its benefits increasingly recognized, landowners required 
producers who leased their timber to employ these new methods. Some owners offered reduced 
prices to encourage early adoption o f cups and gutters. New agreements insisted that cups were 
to be hung at the appropriate time on only trees o f  a designated size, usually nine inches in 
diameter or larger at breast-height. No more than one face was allowed on trees smaller than 
fourteen inches in diameter and no more than two faces were permitted on larger trees. Chipping 
was also to be practiced judiciously and fire kept out o f  the forest. But in the event a blaze 
accidentally started, producers were to rake around the tree. Finally, all o f the equipment, 
especially nails, was to be removed from the trees.17
Although naval stores prices—particularly rosin prices-rose in the first part of the 
twentieth century, production cost increases made the business less profitable. Until 1913 
profitability declines resulted from overproduction, a condition that worsened in 1914 due to 
disruption of foreign trade caused by the First World War (fig. 9.3). Although demand improved 
with the beginning of American war preparations, persistent low prices combined with high next 
year costs rose nearly fourteen percent, another twenty percent the next, and an amazing 
production costs drove many producers out of the business. Between 1914 and 1915, overall 
costs for a twenty-crop operation increased only slightly, from $25,046 to $25,233. The twenty-
17 Turpentine rent agreements between L.N. Dantzler Lumber Company and Union Naval 
Stores Company, 5 February 1901, 5 August 1901, and 11 July 1905, Dantzler Lumber Company 
Papers; Wyman, Florida Naval Stores. 9-11; Deed, Bill of Sale and Assignment o f Leases, A.L. 
Marsh and Ruby Marsh to E.E. Edge and Leo Maguire, 16 July 1928, in possession o f Maguire 
Land Corporation, St. Augustine, FL; Charles H. Herty, “The Turpentine Industry in the 
Southern States,” Journal o f the Franklin Institute 181 (March 1916): 356; Sample mortgage 
agreement, 1929, Cary Collection.
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Figure 9.3. Turpentine and Rosin Exports from the United States, 1901-1930
A. Stuart Campbell, Robert C. Unkrich, and Albert C. Blachard, “The Naval Stores Industry,”
Studies in Forestry Resources in Florida 1 (May 1934): 53.
nine percent from 1917 to 1918. In 1919 they rose a relatively modest 6.6 percent to $55,333. 
Over the five years from 1914 to 1918 costs increased a total of fifty-five percent.1®
The prices of certain supplies like livestock feed and barrels nearly tripled. Other items, 
like clay cups, rose in price only slightly. The greatest area of increase, however, came from 
labor, an expense that represented between fifty and sixty percent of production costs (fig. 9.4 
and 9.5). During the First World War, the cost of hiring skilled workers like chippers, cup 
raisers, and distillers more than doubled, and in some cases tripled, while less skilled workers
18 Martin, “Historical and Analytical Approach,” 107, 126, 128; Campbell, et al., Naval 
Stores Industry. 88; “Production of Naval Stores;” For figures related to early twentieth-century 
naval stores production, prices, and exports see Appendix A.
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Figure 9.4. Average Weekly Gum Naval Stores Wages Per Wage Earner, 1899-1930 
Donald Fraser Martin, Jr., “An Historical and Analytical Approach to the Current Problems of 
the American Gum Naval Stores Industry” (PhD. diss., University of North Carolina, 1942), 
339; For figures related to chart see Appendix B.
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Figure 9.S. Ration of Estimated Wage Cost to Gum Unit Prices, 1899-1930
Donald Fraser Martin, Jr., “An Historical and Analytical Approach to the Current Problems of
the American Gum Naval Stores Industry” (Ph.D. diss., University of North Carolina, 1942),
339.
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saw their wages rise from fifty percent to one hundred percent. At one operation in the Florida 
panhandle, the wages for chipping one thousand faces rose from 750 to 800 in 1916, to $1.40 by 
1919, and to $2.50 one year later. One worker who typically earned $6.83 per week in 1916, by 
1920 made S19.88.19 In 1921 a  naval stores man recalled that before these wage increases “labor 
was abundant, cheap, healthy, and efficient Every fall and winter trainload after trainload of 
expert turpentine negroes were brought into Georgia, Florida, and Alabama from North Carolina 
and South Carolina (the turpentine industry declining in the latter states and undergoing 
development in the former). Labor was so abundant that Sambo was willing to work efficiently 
for six days in the week and give good value for the wages paid him. Times have changed and 
Sambo with them. The competition between the employers of their labor became so keen that 
Sambo’s compensation was increased.”20
Even before the extraordinary rise in production costs associated with the First World 
War, entering the naval stores business had become an expensive undertaking. For example, the 
expense of beginning and operating a twenty-crop operation in 1909 required building a camp, 
purchasing equipment, and leasing timber at a total cost o f  around $26,000. The greatest portion 
of this capital outlay was the timber lease, which amounted to around $20,000. Eight mules, 
three horses and saddles, harnesses, and wagons would run $2,100. Twenty shanties, costing $75 
each, along with two substantial dwellings to house the manager and overseer costing $300 a 
piece would total $2,100. Producers could expect to spend $1,250 for a twenty-five barrel still. 
Bams, a commissary building, and barrels added another $550. After this initial investment, 
operating the business over four years required $81,005, mostly for labor costs. Chipping
19 “Division of Cost of Producing Naval Stores,” Cary Collection, 1-3; Clifton Paisley, 
“Wade Leonard, Florida Naval Stores Operator,” The Florida Historical Quarterly 51 (April 
1973): 390; For figures related to annual wages see Appendix A.
20 Carson, “Increased Cost o f  Naval Stores Production,” 73.
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consumed the most, $17,400 or just over twenty-one percent o f wages. All other jobs—boxing, 
cornering, raking, dipping, scraping, hauling, inspecting, and distilling— would run $22,295 over 
the four years. Salaries for the number of white managers and guards sufficient to oversee work 
in twenty crops and food for their horses would total $11,280. The 2,360 turpentine barrels and 
8,240 rosin barrels required for four years cost just over $10,000. Interest, taxes, depreciation, 
and marketing costs added another $20,206, making the total cost over four years $101,211.21
Production costs typically decreased each year a crop was worked, usually by fifteen to 
twenty percent each year. The drop in the lease price each year accounted for much o f  the 
decline. Also the cost o f dipping dropped as gum yields declined, causing less need for dip, 
spirit, and rosin barrels as well. It was also half as expensive to raise the cups as to hang them. 
However, many costs continue unchanged. The same number of streaks was required in the 
fourth year as in the first, so that chipping cost remained constant The expense of hiring a 
distiller, teamsters, and woodsriders also stayed the same. Not only did the overall operating 
expenses decline after the first year, so did profits. Each year the gum flow decreased and the 
grade of rosin it yielded declined. Thus, despite the overall drop in yearly production costs, net 
returns diminished even more.22
The experience of the Leonard brothers reveals how some operators who entered the 
business around the turn of the century withstood the difficult years by expanding their business 
interests into areas other than naval stores. In 1900 the three brothers, all in their twenties, left 
North Carolina. Samuel and Wade relocated to Florida, where they went to work for other
21 In 1915 the cost of working twenty crops for four years was estimated to range 
between $119,480 and $156,040. The primary difference between this and the 1909 estimate 
was the expense of investing in cups and gutters, which ran between $9,450 and $11,550. 
Schorger and Betts, Naval Stores Industry. 52; Brower and La Fontisee, “Report of the 
Investigation on the Naval Stores Industry,” 60-61.
22 “Production o f Naval Stores;” Brower and La Fontisee, “Report of the Investigation on 
the Naval Stores Industry,” 11.
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turpentine producers, and Henry began his own operation in Mississippi. None, however, found 
immediate satisfaction or success. Samuel and Wade were unhappy laboring for others and, in 
1906, a hurricane destroyed Henry’s turpentine orchard. That year the three brothers formed a 
turpentine partnership ten miles south of Blountstown in Calhoun County, Florida. With Henry 
serving as manager o f their company, H. C. Leonard and Brothers, they began buying property. 
With their factor’s backing, they purchased three-fifths interest in Chipoia Turpentine Company, 
whose eight thousand acres extended for seven miles along the Chipoia River and Dead Lake in 
southern Calhoun County. The factor owned the other two-fifths of the operation. The brothers 
continued their land acquisitions, purchasing majority shares of the Maysville Naval Stores 
Company, which owned 20,000 acres near their other holdings in the county’s southern comer. 
They also purchased the five-thousand-acre Sterling farm in the northern part of Calhoun 
County. This property contained good pine timber as well as several hundred acres of 
agricultural land which grew com, cotton, sugar cane, and peanuts. With this operation 
conveniently located by the Apalachicola River, the Leonards began shipping their turpentine 
and rosin upstream to Chattahoochee by boat from where it went by rail to their factor in 
Jacksonville. Before the First World War their annual naval stores shipments reached 
approximately $100,000. Though the same channels the Leonards received tools and supplies for 
their naval stores and fanning operations and groceries, clothing, and medicine for their four 
commissaries, which served one hundred families.
Like other turpentine producers, however, the Leonards’ business suffered with the 
beginning of war in Europe. They attempted to hold rosin off the market, hoping for better prices 
in the near future, but with no success. To meet their debts, they mortgaged two pieces of 
property with a combined value o f $172,740. They survived the industry’s downturn during the 
war only by diversifying into other areas. By 1918 they ran six small mills producing cane syrup, 
which out-sold their naval stores. The same year they also began a lumber business. By the mid-
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1920s, with the financial disruption of the war behind them, the brothers branched out even 
further, owning a  drug company, livestock business, and two car dealerships. They accumulated 
$268,772 worth o f land and total assets worth $444,419. However their interests in Miami real- 
estate threatened to undo all they had worked for. When the Miami land boom busted in the late 
1920s they had to sell off some o f their cut-over acreage and once again mortgage property.
They survived even this setback, however, and continued turpentining until around 1940.23
The first half of the 1920s saw a partial industry recovery (fig. 9.6) as timber grew more 
available, operating costs decreased (fig. 9.7), prices recovered, and production grew more 
profitable (fig. 9.8). Following the First World War, the southern lumber industry entered a 
challenging period that required it to squeeze as much profit from its timber holdings as possible. 
Before 1910 companies rushed to purchase timber in anticipation o f  a predicted future shortage. 
The required capital outlay for their purchases, combined with increased taxes on the idle
Total Barrels of Gum Turpentine and Gum Rosin Produced
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Figure 9.6. Total Barrels o f  Gum Turpentine and Gum Rosin Produced, 1897-1933 
A. Stuart Campbell, Robert C. Unkrich, and Albert C. Blachard, “The Naval Stores Industry,” 
Studies in Forestry Resources in Florida 1 (May 1934): 39; For figures related to chart see 
Appendix B.
23 Paisley, “Wade Leonard,” 381-385,390-394,398-400.
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Figure 9.7. Total Cost Per Unit of Gum Naval Stores, 1919-1930
Donald Fraser Martin, Jr., “An Historical and Analytical Approach to the Current Problems of 
the American Gum Naval Stores Industry” (Ph.D. diss., University o f North Carolina, 1942), 
340; For figures related to chart see Appendix B.
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Figure 9.8. Net Cash Proceeds Per Fifty Gallons of Spirits o f Turpentine, 1907-1930 
Donald Fraser Martin, Jr., “An Historical and Analytical Approach to the Current Problems of 
the American Gum Naval Stores Industry” (Ph.D. diss., University o f North Carolina, 1942), 
338; For figures related to chart see Appendix B.
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property, placed a strenuous financial strain on companies. By the 1920s, lumber owners turned 
to turpentining to reduce the economic burden. They either turpentined their timber themselves 
or leased it to individual producers before it was cut. By this time companies had less to fear of 
turpentining’s damage to timber. In stands where cups were used there was only a two percent 
deterioration in the timber following turpentining. Improved transportation facilitated the 
movement of logging operations and thus lessened the time from the conclusion of turpentining 
to the beginning of timber harvesting, the period when fired disease, and insects hurt turpentined 
stands. Too, the promised timber scarcity failed to materialize, leading owners to relax their grip 
on forest resources. By 1920 the growing supply of timber from the Northwest and the increased 
use of other building materials—cement, steel, and brick—made southern timber less valuable.24
The new willingness o f lumbermen to lease their timber opened up the naval stores 
industry to a greater number of producers. Price increases after the First World War (figs. 9.9 
and 9.10), attracting the smaller producers who had steadily left the business in the first two 
decades of the century. Much of the industry growth occurred in the more eastern reaches o f the 
pine belt where by 1925, second-growth pines began to grow large enough in the older naval 
stores areas to enter production (figs. 9.11 and 9.12). Because this new regrowth tended to be 
sparsely scattered and less productive than the larger tracts o f  fully mature virgin trees, it 
attracted more smaller producers than large operations, the latter requiring greater contiguous 
acreage. As a result o f all these factors, after 1920 there was a  resurgence of small producers as 
timber leases grew more available and naval stores prices temporarily rose. In general, however, 
smaller producers lacked sufficient capital to invest in improved methods.25 They thus were less
24 Brower and La Fontisee, “Report of the Investigation on the Naval Stores Industry,” 
27-28; Martin, “Historical and Analytical Approach,” 122-123; For figures related to naval stores 
industry profitability see Appendix A.
25 Martin, “Historical and Analytical Approach,” 91, 118-119, 125-126; Brower and La 
Fontisee, “Report o f  the Investigation on the Naval Stores Industry,” 28, 59; Otho Monroe,
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well equipped to take advantage of an industry shift that had begun roughly ten years earlier.
Employing less than five wage earners on average, these small turpentiners either formed 
cooperatives to share the expense of distilling, sold their gum to larger operators with stills, or 
paid a central custom distillery to process it for them. It was difficult for a  producer to justify the 
expense of owning and operating his own still with less than five crops. In fact, to run a still full­
time, producers needed to work about twenty crops, which covered between four thousand and 
five thousand acres. This size business would supply enough gum to run a fifteen to twenty 
gallon still twice a day. Small producers most commonly sold their gum to custom distilleries 
whose numbers throughout the turpentine belt increased during the early twentieth century.
These still operators did business in areas where naval stores production was concentrated, not in
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Figure 9.9. Season Average Prices of Gum Rosin, 1900-1930
Naval Stores Statistics. 1900-1954 (Washington, DC: United States Department o f  Agriculture, 
1956), 22-23; For figures related to chart see Appendix B.
interview by Michael Garvey, 19 March 1975, Mississippi Oral History Program, McCain 
Library and Archives, University of Southern Mississippi, 6.
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Figure 9.10. Season Average Prices o f Gum Spirits, 1900-1930
Naval Stores Statistics. 1900-1954 (Washington, DC: United States Department o f Agriculture, 
1956), 22-23; For figures related to chart see Appendix B.
20,000
Annual Average Number o f  Wage Earners 
in the Gum Naval Stores In d u s tr y  by State 
1909 and 1919
18.000
16.000
14.000
12,000
10.000
8,000
6,000
4,000
FL GA AL LA MS TX SC NC
Figure 9.11. Annual Average Number o f Wage Earners in the Gum Naval Stores Industry by 
State, 1909 and 1919
Donald Fraser Martin, Jr., “An Historical and Analytical Approach to the Current Problems of 
the American Gum Naval Stores Industry” (Ph.D. diss., University o f North Carolina, 1942), 
316; For Figures related to chart see Appendix B.
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Figure 9.12. Number of Naval Stores Establishments with Wage Earners by State, 1900, 1909, 
and 1919
Donald Fraser Martin, Jr., “An Historical and Analytical Approach to the Current Problems of 
the American Gum Naval Stores Industry” (Ph.D. diss., University o f North Carolina, 1942),
317; For figures related to chart see Appendix B.
the port cities, which were often too distant from inland forests to justify the expense o f moving 
bulky gum. In 1900, for example, Lewis Charles Yaeger, a hardware man in Tallahassee, 
purchased land in Wakulla County to the south where he established a custom distillery, the 
largest such business between Jacksonville and Pensacola. His operation employed over one 
hundred workers and shipped out rosin and turpentine by the barrel by steam boat and railroad.26
Starting in the first decade of the twentieth century and continuing thereafter, rosin 
prices rose, creating a situation in which to survive operators had to shift their production focus 
to what heretofore represented nothing more than a byproduct of distillation. Two developments
26 “The Turpentiners,” The Magnolia Monthly 7 (October 1969); Schorger and Betts, 
Naval Stores Industry. 18; Brower and La Fontisee, “Report o f the Investigation on the Naval 
Stores Industry,” 44-45.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
424
that caused this shift occurred at roughly the same time, each encouraging the other. Increased 
uses for rosin expanded a demand for it. Whereas rosin remained an important ingredient in 
soap—improving that product’s ability to suds and fight germs—as well as in the manufacture of 
paints, varnishes, and lacquer, its growing use in paper production represented a significant 
change. Since around 1820, rosin had been used as sizing to reduce paper’s permeability by 
liquid. This use steadily grew until, by 1924, it became the most widespread application for 
rosin. Rosin was also used in the production o f plastic compositions such as sealing wax and 
roofing cement, in making ointments, plasters, and emulsifying compounds, as well as in 
linoleum production, which provided a market for low-grade rosins. As these new applications 
grew, they created an increased demand for high-grade rosin and producers increasingly shifted 
to the improved methods which were capable of yielding a better-quality product than older 
practices (fig. 9.13). These combined factors brought rapid change to the market.27 In 1908 the 
U. S. Forest Service made the startling announcement that “for the first time in the history of the 
naval stores industry, the production of rosin in the United States . . .  led turpentine in value”
(fig. 9.14).28
The growing market demand for rosin led to the regular practice of rosin mining. During 
the antebellum era only the highest grades o f rosin brought prices that justified the expense of 
marketing it. Consequently distillers disposed of most rosin by emptying in into a channel that
27 “Naval Stores History,” Naval Stores Review 100 (March/April 1990): 6; Eldon Van 
Romaine, “Naval Stores, 1919-1939,” Naval Stores Review 100 (July/ August 1990): 8,11; 
Bureau of Chemistry, “The Principal Uses o f Rosins and Spirits Turpentine,” in Naval Stores: 
History. Production. Distribution and Consumption, ed. Thomas Gamble (Savannah: Review 
Publishing and Printing Company, 1921), 99-100; Wyman, Florida Naval Stores. 42; Peter Koch, 
Utilization of the Southern Pines (Washington, DC: United States Department o f Agriculture, 
1972), 1490, 1492; “Rosin Passes Turpentine in Naval Stores Value,” Turpentine newsclipping 
file, Forest History Society, Durham, NC.
28 “Rosin Passes Turpentine in Naval Stores Value.”
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Percentage of Rosin of Different Grades 
1903-1934
Figure 9.13. Percentage o f Rosin o f Different Grades, 1903-1934
A. Stuart Campbell, Robert C. Unkrich, and Albert C. Blachard, “The Naval Stores Industry,” 
Studies in Forestry Resources in Florida 1 (May 1934): 46.
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Figure 9.14. Percentage of Producers’ Net Income from Turpentine and from Rosin, 1907-1930 
A. Stuart Campbell, Robert C. Unkrich, and Albert C. Blachard, “The Naval Stores Industry,” 
Studies in Forestry Resources in Florida 1 (May 1934): 50.
led from the still to a stream, river, or lake, or by simply dumping it on the ground near the 
distillery. The practice o f harvesting the discarded product began just after the Civil War, when 
a Union soldier in Sherman’s army learned o f a large rosin deposit near the town of Angier in 
Harnett County, North Carolina. The soldier returned two years later, bought the right to mine it,
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and profited from the venture until naval stores prices dropped with the resumption o f southern 
production. As new uses for rosin grew in the late nineteenth century, mining revived. Miners 
first hacked rosin out of beds created where the content of stills had been repeatedly emptied on 
the ground. Although normally covered by several feet of earth, land beds were easier to both 
locate and work. Using pick axes, laborers—most o f them black—hacked the dried rosin into 
transportable chunks, which when melted possessed the same qualities as the day it had drained 
from the still.29 During the first two decades o f the twentieth century, miners probably recovered 
more than 100,000 barrels of the discarded rosin.
One o f the most ambitious mining projects began around 1920 at the old Avirett North 
Carolina plantation, Richlands, that possessed one o f the largest and most inaccessible rosin 
beds. Over the course of half a  century, six different stills had operated at Richlands, all within a 
radius of four hundred to five hundred feet, and their rosin had flowed into Lake Catherine. Two 
brothers named Graham constructed a dam around the most rosin-rich portion o f the lake bed. 
After pumping the water out and removing the silt layer at the bottom, they began the laborious 
task of recovering the long-discarded product. As the rosin chunks came up from the former lake 
bottom, the brothers melted it in a vat at the old still site, ran it through a strainer and dipped it 
into barrels. Within less than a year, they had recovered 15,000 barrels of rosin and had yet to 
begin recovery o f  the main portion.30
29 C. Dorsey Dyer, “Histoiy o f the Gum Naval Stores Industry,” The AT-FA Journal 25 
(January 1963): 7; “The Place 3,” Stephens Papers, 24; John Drew, “The Early Days o f the Naval 
Stores Industry,” Naval Stores Review (November-December 1981): 16; “Naval Stores History,” 
6; Thomas Gamble, “Mining for Rosin in the Old North State,” in Naval Stores: History. 
Production. Distribution and Consumption, ed. Thomas Gamble (Savannah: Review Publishing 
and Printing Company, 1921), 37.
30 The practice of rosin mining could create legal disputes over the ownership of 
discarded rosin, as it did in the 1890s in South Carolina. In 1885 a Mr. Outlaw began operating a 
turpentine still. He quit after two years and rented the still to D. L. Poison. At that time, rosin 
prices were too low to justify transporting the product to market Outlaw and then Poison both 
made a practice o f  running the rosin into a pit at the still. The still produced so much rosin that it 
filled the pit and overflowed into a nearby stream. A dispute over the once worthless rosin’s
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At the same time that the rosin market created a shift in production emphasis to which 
operators had to adjust, gum naval stores producers faced growing competition from both 
domestic and foreign sources that could offer a  superior product Operators found themselves 
threatened by American wood naval stores manufacturers who used a radically different 
procedure to make similar products. The method of distilling a wide variety of products—tar, 
pitch, turpentine, pine oil, and charcoal—from pine stumps had been attempted in the early 1840s. 
In 1852 a patent was registered for making tar in a retort and, later that decade, James R. Grist 
installed one with a 2.5 to 5 cord capacity. The first partially successful plant was built in 
Wilmington, North Carolina, in 1872, but it and other late-nineteenth-century attempts at wood 
naval stores production only partially succeeded. Increases in naval stores prices around 1900 
revived efforts to perfect the process. In 1907 Homer T. Yaryan, a chemist, who years before 
had developed an improved linseed oil extraction method and new process to distill water, made 
substantial advancements in the technique of chemically extracting tar and turpentine from pine 
stumps at an experimental plant in Michigan. Two years later a plant using the Yaryan design 
and financed by a wealthy Toledo stock broker was completed in Gulfport, Mississippi. In 1912 
a  second such factory opened in Brunswick, Georgia.31
ownership erupted when prices rose high enough to justify mining it and transporting it out o f the 
woods. Poison, the renter, began selling it by the barrel. However, Outlaw’s policy while he 
operated the still was that if any of his clients desired the rosin from their gum, they were to 
provide the barrels in which to collect it, otherwise it was his. Thus, Outlaw claimed, Poison was 
entitled only to the rosin that he barreled during the year that he ran the still. Moreover, Outlaw 
argued, the rosin that Poison had sold from the pit was there before he rented the still because all 
the more recently produced rosin had spilled out and run down an embankment into a creek. The 
outcome of this dispute is unknown. Civil Suit Testimony, B.J.L. Stuckey v M.J. Outlaw and 
B.L. Outlaw, c. 1890, Darlington County Historical Commission, Darlington, SC; Gamble, 
“Mining for Rosin in the Old North State,” 37-39.
31 Richard C. Crosby, Jr., “Captains o f the Naval Stores Industry,” Naval Stores Review 
91 (September-October 1981): 15-16; “Naval Stores History,” 7-8; Drew, “The Early Days of the 
Naval Stores Industry,” 17; Martin, “Historical and Analytical Approach,” 109-111; Naval Stores 
Statistics. 1900-1954. Statistical Bulletin No. 181 (Washington, DC: United States Department 
o f Agriculture, 1956), 2; Janice Croft, “A Twin Success Story: Pensacola and Newport,” 
Pensacola Historical Resource Center, Pensacola, FL, 5, 7; Richard C. Davis, ed. Encyclopedia
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The destructive distillation method involved collecting wood from pine stumps, cutting it 
into smaller pieces, and placing it into retorts where it was heated with hot gases to the point o f  
charring. A system of iron pipes kept the heat uniform in the kiln. The temperature could be 
controlled to within one degree Fahrenheit of that desired. Distillation o f a charge required 
fifteen to twenty hours. By basis o f  weight, the process yielded seventy-nine percent rosin, nine 
percent turpentine, eight percent pine oil, and four percent other chemicals. The rosin settled to 
the bottom of the retort where it could be drawn off, barreled, and sold without further treatment 
or processed into separate products: creosote oils, acetic acid, and rosin oils. The vaporous 
extract was further refined into spirits in copper stills to ready them for market. What remained 
in the kiln was charcoal.32
The wood naval stores industry got off to a very slow and disappointing start. At first 
there were surprising difficulties securing an adequate supply of stumps to run the facilities, even 
though stumps were plentiful in the millions of cut-over southern forests. Lumber cutters tended 
to leave high stumps. In time their sapwood rotted, leaving only the resin-saturated heart. To get 
stump lightwood to the plants, workers had to move into the cut-over areas, blast the stumps from 
the ground with dynamite, load the pieces onto wagons, and haul them to the nearest railroad or 
river to be transported on barges to the plants. Subsequent improvements made stump 
acquisition easier, however. Hercules Powder Company developed a way to blast stumps out o f  
the ground without blowing them into tiny pieces. Later, motorized pullers extracted the stumps, 
which were then transported to the plants by trucks and trains.33
of American Forest and Conservation History (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company,
1983), s.v. “naval stores;” Carroll B. Butler, Treasures o f the Loncleaf Pines. Naval Stores 
(Shalimar, FL: Tarkel Publishing, 1998), 93-95,97.
32 Romaine, “Naval Stores,” 11-12; Naval Stores Statistics. 1900-1954.2; Richard C. 
Cook, “Early Industry Accounts Through 1920.” Naval Stores Review.” 77 (August 1967): 7-8.
33 Crosby, “Captains of the Naval Stores Industry,” 15-16; “Naval Stores Histoiy,” 7-8; 
Drew, “The Early Days o f the Naval Stores Industry,” 17; Martin, “Historical and Analytical
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At first the wood naval stores industry had to compete with gum naval stores producers 
who manufactured a better product Destructive distillation plants were initially constructed in 
anticipation of such a fast-approaching and devastating domestic pine forest depletion that the 
investors building them believed the United States faced a naval stores shortage. However, 
second-growth slash pine grew faster than expected, enabling the gum naval stores industry to 
continue, against which the wood naval stores industry early on faced a  distinct disadvantage. 
The destructive distillation process produced only one relatively low grade o f rosin and a 
substance known as pine oil. Not only was there was no market for pine oil, but gum rosin was 
superior in quality. However, improvements in wood naval stores production following the First 
World War allowed the industry to successfully compete with gum products. The well-financed 
wood naval stores plants turned to engineering and chemical and market research to develop 
superior naval stores of a uniform quality. They studied their consumers’ needs and created 
products aimed specifically at certain market sectors. They were thus able to offer buyers the 
exact type of turpentine and rosin they required. Wood naval stores makers also provided their 
customers technical advice to enable them to use the products most effectively and taught them 
about new products the industry developed. In addition, they carefully advertised their wide 
variety of new naval stores. The struggling and unorganized gum industry lacked the resources 
to devote such energy to product development and marketing, and their market standards 
remained independent o f the customers’ needs. They classified turpentine not by its chemical or 
physical properties, the most informative categorization for determining how best to use the
Approach,” 109-111: Naval Stores Statistics. 1900-1954.2; Croft, “A Twin Success Story,” 5, 7; 
Davis, Encyclopedia o f American Forest and Conservation History. 476-477; Butler, Treasures 
of the Longleaf Pines. 93-95, 97.
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product, but by how it was produced: Gum Spirits of Turpentine and Steam Distilled Wood 
Turpentine.34
As the wood naval stores industry gained stronger footing, more plants sprang up across 
the coastal area o f the South. After Yaryan’s wood naval stores facilities went up in Gulfport 
and Brunswick in 1909 and 1911, the next two plants to be constructed became part o f a large 
wood naval stores-producing operation which remains in existence today. Newport Turpentine 
and Rosin Company began as Arinin A. Schlesinger’s effort to provided his family’s small 
Milwaukee paper company with a steady and reliable supply of rosin for paper size. In 1913 he 
completed a plant at Bay Minette, Alabama, to extract rosin from pine stumps. The plant was 
capable o f processing seventy tons of stumps each day. Under a contract with the Bay Minette 
Land Company, which wanted to rid its cut-over land of stumps in the hope of converting it to 
farm land, Newport removed the stumps for free. Although Newport benefited from a large 
supply of stumps, the rosin it first made was too dark and soft for use as quality-grade paper size 
and its turpentine possessed an odd odor and dried too slowly for use as a paint thinner. Over the 
next three years, however, Newport researchers succeeded in producing marketable products. 
With growing success, Schlesinger moved to expand his operation. A new plant, constructed in 
Pensacola where a deep-water harbor, plentiful supply of area stumps, and three railroads 
combined to provide an ideal location, was completed in 1916 and had over twice the production 
capacity of the Bay Minette facility. As Pensacola’s first industry, the plant employed 
approximately six hundred workers, the majority o f them technical and managerial personnel 
brought from Milwaukee, where they had previous associations with Schlesinger.
34 “Naval Stores History We Never Knew ’Til Now,” Olustee Experiment Station Files, 
Georgia Agrirama, Tifton, GA, 4-5; Davis, Encyclopedia of American Forest and Conservation 
History. 477; Martin, “Historical and Analytical Approach,” 184-185; R.C. Palmer, “New 
Standard for Turpentines,” Pine Institute of America report, Turpentine Newsclipping file, Forest 
History Society, Durham, NC, I.
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Despite its eventual success in claiming a market niche, the wood naval stores industry 
developed slowly from 1910 to 1930. In 1910, the first full year o f operation for the initial 
Yaryan plant, wood naval stores made up only 0.3 percent o f all naval stores production in the 
United States fig. 9. IS). Ten years later wood naval stores comprised only three percent, an
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Figure 9.15. Wood Turpentine and Wood Rosin Production, 1897-1933
A. Stuart Campbell, Robert C. Unkrich, and Albert C. Blachard, “The Naval Stores Industry/'
Studies in Forestry Resources in Florida 1 (May 1934): 41.
increase of ten times, but still only a small portion of the total market.35 However with high 
product quality and low prices, industry observers predicted a surge in the wood naval stores 
market share within the near future. In 1921 Thomas Gamble explained that “no one doubts that
2 .
35 Martin, “Historical and Analytical Approach,” 21; Naval Stores Statistics. 1900-1954.
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in coming years that industry [wood naval stores] will play an ever increasing part in supplying 
the demand for turpentine and rosins as well as the other products of such plants. The 
standardization o f such products and the greater capital, business capacity, and technical skill 
called into play in the industry as a whole are placing it on a  basis of assured permanency and 
bring ready recognition of the value of its output throughout the world.”36 During the 1920s 
Gamble’s prediction began to come true. The wood naval stores industry’s greater attention to 
customer need, combined with the periodically low naval stores prices during the 1920s, allowed 
it to gain market share at the gum naval stores industry’s expense (fig. 8.4). Wood naval stores 
prices were only loosely based on the rates of gum naval stores set by the Savannah Board of 
Trade. Instead, individual wood naval stores producers set prices that varied somewhat between 
manufacturers but were consistently lower than gum naval stores prices. During market 
downturns, the lower production costs of wood naval stores manufacture enabled the plants to 
operate profitably and expand where the relatively high operating costs of gum producers lead to 
net losses in their industry. By 1930 wood turpentine made up 12.1 percent o f the spirits market, 
and wood rosin comprised 18 percent of the rosin’s market. Throughout the 1930s the market 
gain for wood naval stores would become much greater/7
Newport Company served as a leaders in the wood naval stores industry’s expansion. 
Demands for naval stores during the First World War kept both company plants working near 
maximum capacity, but an early 1920s recession hurt sales. In response to the downturn, the 
Pensacola facility developed extremely pale grades of rosin that could find buyers even in the 
poor market. With renewed vigor, Newport expanded again in the second half of the 1920s with
36 Thomas Gamble, Preface to Naval Stores: History. Production. Distribution and 
Consumption, ed. Thomas Gamble (Savannah: Review Publishing and Printing Company, 1921).
37 Martin, “Historical and Analytical Approach,” 21, 185, 193-194; Naval Stores 
Statistics. 1900-1954. 2; For figures related to the number o f wood naval stores establishments 
see Appendix A.
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the purchase o f a  wood naval stores plant in De Quincy, Louisiana, originally completed in 1922. 
Like the Pensacola plant, the one in De Quincy had a 150-ton capacity. Then in 1929 Newport 
helped organize Armstrong-Newport Corporation, which used the wood left over from the 
chemical extraction process to manufacture fiber insulation board and ceiling tile. After the 
1920s other companies moved to Pensacola to operate in conjunction with Newport.38
Although Newport dominated the wood naval stores industry in the 1920s, other 
companies contributed to the expansion. In 1920 Hercules Powder Company purchased the 
Yaryan plants in both Gulfport and Brunswick and, one year later, the Continental Turpentine 
and Rosin Company began operations at a new facility in Laurel, Mississippi. In 1928 Dixie 
Pine Products Corporation of Hattiesburg, Mississippi, completed its conversion from a lumber 
mill to a wood naval stores facility. The mill had operated at the site since the turn of the 
century, but with the exhaustion o f  the area’s timber supply in 1926, its conversion allowed the 
company to use the only remaining timber remaining, pine stumps.39
The development of the wood naval stores industry, like Herty’s cup system, shows that 
despite nineteenth-century efforts by southerners to establish such methods, it was the support of 
innovators from outside the region that resulted in the initial successes. Southerners attempted to 
produce naval stores products for wood as early as the 1840s, but it was a professionally-trained 
chemist, Yaryan, who first designed a viable facility in Michigan and then helped perfect the
38 “Naval Stores History We Never Knew ’Til Now,” 4; Croft, “A Twin Success Story,” 
4-7; John H. Appleyard Agency, “Draft.. .  Newport Talk for Historical Society...  April 19, 
1984,” Pensacola Historical Resource Center, 8; “Waste Stumps from Dixie Cut-over Land 
Become Hundreds o f Products at Plant,” 2 October 1949, Pensacola. Florida News-Joumal File, 
Pensacola Historical Resource Center, Pensacola, FL; Charlotte Wittwer, “Stumpwood to 
Resins—OIdest Pensacola Industry,” Pensacola. Florida News-Joumal File, Pensacola Historical 
Resource Center, Pensacola, FL; “Naval Stores History,” 8.
39 Gum turpentine producers also faced competition from a growing number of 
substitutes manufactured by the petroleum and coal tar industries. Crosby, “Captains o f the 
Naval Stores Industry,” 16; T.F. Dreyfus, “Old Stumps Yield New Wealth,” Illinois Central 
Magazine (May 1931): 14; “Naval Stores History We Never Knew ’Til Now,” 4.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
434
extraction method once an Ohio-based businessman backed the construction o f  a plant in 
Mississippi. And a Milwaukee family established the Newport company which broadened the 
industry’s market share. Southerners lacked trained scientist and engineers capable of designing 
such plants and did not possess the financial resources required to properly construct such large 
and technically sophisticated facilities.
Along with the expanding wood naval stores industry introduced from outside the region, 
southern gum naval stores producers faced competition from rising foreign manufactures that 
seriously threatened their export trade. As the world’s largest gum navat stores manufacturer, the 
United States’ production greatly surpassed its consumption, requiring foreign markets to absorb 
over fifty percent o f the supply (fig. 9.16). From July 1907 to June 1908, for example, the 
United States exported slightly more than half of its naval stores production, over eighty percent 
of it going to Europe (fig. 9.17). European countries received 2,203,672 barrels of rosin valued 
at $9,013,210 and 16,376,912 gallons of spirits valued at $8,300,679. Just over forty-four 
percent of spirits exported there went to the United Kingdom and 22.4 percent to Germany. 
However Germany received more rosin, 40.4 percent, to the U.K.’s 27.8 percent. London was 
the world’s largest importer of naval stores from America, which supplied much of the U.K.’s 
annual consumption o f 75,000 tons of rosin and 20,000 tons of turpentine. Because the U.K. had 
no domestic naval stores production, all o f its supplies had to be imported. It received seventy- 
eight percent of its rosin imports from the United States, eight percent from France, six percent 
from Portugal, and four percent from Spain. It purchased ninety-two percent of its turpentine 
from the United States and six percent from France.40 Belgium and the Netherlands were also
40 Brower and La Fontisee, “Report o f the Investigation on the naval Stores Industry,” 
62-63, 66; Martin, “Historical and Analytical Approach,” 188.
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important importers. Canada received most o f the naval stores exports within North America, 
Percentage of United States Rosin Production Exported
1908-1930
Figure 9.16. Percentage of United States Rosin Production Exported, 1908-1930
A. Stuart Campbell, Robert C. Unkrich, and Albert C. Blachard. “The Naval Stores Industry,”
Studies in Forestry Resources in Florida I (May 1934): 41.
and Brazil and Argentina purchased the bulk of supplies sent to South America. Each of these 
American regions, though, imported less than ten percent of the United States’ naval stores 
output. Asia, Africa, and Oceana, principally Australia, combined accounted for less than five 
percent of exports.41
41 Robert S. Blount, Spirits o f Turpentine: A History o f Florida Naval Stores. 1528 to 
1950 (Tallahassee: Florida Agricultural Museum, 1993), 26; Martin, “Historical and Analytical 
Approach,” 188-189; George H. Priest, Jr., Naval Stores: Production. Consumption and 
Distribution (Washington, DC: United States Department of Commerce, 1927), 19-20; 
“Turpentine Production for the Year Declined,” Cary Collection, 2.
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Because the industry relied so heavily on exports, the disruption in trade caused by the 
First World War was severely damaging. European exports were virtually halted, and naval
Figure 9.17. Naval Stores Exports to Various Continents, 1907-1919 
Thomas Gamble, “The World-Wide Distribution o f Naval Stores,” in Naval Stores: History, 
Production. Distribution and Consumption, ed. Thomas Gamble (Savannah: Review Publishing 
and Printing Company, 1921), 91-92.
stores deteriorated in their containers at American ports. The United States preparations for war 
boosted prices temporarily until they fell off again following the armistice. During the 1920s 
European consumption and exports rose, but never reached their pre-war levels. By the mid 
1920s the United States exported just over eleven million gallons of spirits, compared to over 
sixteen million during the 1907/08 season.42 Growing competition from foreign production
42 Brower and La Fontisee, “Report of the Investigation on the Naval Stores Industry,” 
62-63,66; Martin, “Historical and Analytical Approach,” 188.
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explained why (fig. 9.18).43 During the 1920s Spain, Portugal, Greece, and the USSR began 
production. By the mid-1920s, Spain ranked as the world’s third largest naval stores producer, 
although it produced only five percent of the United States’ volume. European markets, 
especially Germany, consumed the bulk of Spain’s 1925 exports.44 Germany also purchased a
World Gum Turpentine Production 
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Figure 9.18. World Gum Turpentine Production. 1925
Donald Fraser Martin, Jr., “An Historical and Analytical Approach to the Current Problems of 
the American Gum Naval Stores Industry” (Ph.D. diss., University o f  North Carolina, 1942),
325.
43 By the 1920s, foreign countries producing naval stores included France, Spain, 
Portugal, Greece, Germany, Sweden, Finland, Poland, India, Poland, Austria, and Mexico. Priest, 
Naval Stores.
44 Although during ancient times naval stores were produced in Spain, the modem 
industry did not begin until the late-1840s. By the early 1860s Spanish producers began using 
the French cup and gutter system. However, the Spanish industry failed to develop as rapidly as 
that in France. In 1879 a Franco-Spanish commercial treaty hurt Spanish producers by reducing 
their tariff on French naval stores. Spain also suffered from a less-developed transportation 
system, the slow growth rates o f its pine trees, and poor resource management which exploited 
the trees for gum at the expense of their wood. Spain manufactured 1,057,000 gallons o f spirits 
and 53,000 barrels o f rosin in 1925. One naval stores company, which operated a plant 
manufacturing 1,500 tons of paint and vamish, controlled the Spanish industry. That business 
consumed a large portion of its production. Romaine, “Naval Stores,” 9; W.L.E. Barnett, 
“Preliminary Report for Naval Stores Commission,” 23 August 1924, Cary Collection, 31-34; 
Priest. Naval Stores. 16-17.
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large portion of Greek naval stores production, which in 1923 amounted to 7,050 tons of gum. 
Before the First World War nearly all gum collected in Greece was exported in raw form but in 
response to rising world demand by the late-1910s, it began distilling a portion. Greeks used 
some of their rosin in soap manufacturing, but most o f the products were sold to other countries, 
the majority o f rosin exported to Italy and most o f the turpentine to Germany ,4S The Soviet naval 
stores industry developed incredibly rapidly in the late 1920s as part of Stalin’s forced 
industrialization program. Five thousand hectares o f Russian forests were used to collect gum in 
1926, but by 1932, 830,700 hectares were under production. Russian industries could not 
consume the vast quantities o f naval stores suddenly flowing from the country’s forests and large 
quantities were consequently exported using American commercial grades.46
Despite the rapid rise o f Spanish, Greek, and Soviet production, France developed as the 
United States’ greatest naval stores competitor and it ranked second in world naval stores 
production. In the first two decades of the twentieth century France experienced a rapid increase 
in naval stores exports despite considerable trade interruptions caused by World War I. From
45 Priest, Naval Stores. 18-19.
46 In 1914 Russia produced only 130 tons of rosin and 1,100 tons o f turpentine, both of 
very low quality. It imported most of its naval stores. But beginning in 1926 with government- 
forced efforts to develop the industry, naval stores production grew by leaps and bounds. In
1927, production reached 413 tons of rosin and five years later soared to 56,653 tons. The 
Soviets developed their industry so rapidly that they were unable to create a system tailored to 
their particular pine species—red pine and scotch pine—and climate. Initially they modeled their 
system after that of other countries with mature naval stores industries. Each year workers 
chipped faces about three feet up, the faces extending nearly all the way around the tree except 
for a two inch strip o f bark used to keep the trees alive. Because the cold climate prevented the 
resin from flowing freely, most gum had to be scrapped off after it hardened. The Russians soon 
realized they needed their own unique system of gum collecting and thus began extensive 
experimentation in 1930 at the Forest-Chemical Institute of Leningrad. “Recent Developments 
in the Naval Stores Industry in the U.S.S.R. (Russia),” Olustee Experiment Station Files, Georgia 
Agrirama, Tifton, GA, 1-3; K..M. Osoline and N.A. Oustinov, “Turpentine Experimentation in 
Russia,” Olustee Experiment Station Files, Georgia Agrirama, Tifton, GA, 1; “How Russia 
Obtains Naval Stores,” Forest Service newsclipping file, Forest History Society, Durham, NC, 1- 
2 .
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1900 to 1905, naval stores exports through Bordeaux rose over 2.5 times, from 27,790 metric 
tons to 71,600. Germany, England, Belgium, Holland, Austria, Italy, and Switzerland imported 
most of this supply. The war temporarily reversed this rapid growth; by 19 IS Bordeaux exported 
just 17,749 metric tons. However, naval stores production quickly recovered following peace 
(fig. 9.19) and by 1921, Bordeaux exported 93,732 metric tons o f naval stores to nearly all 
European nations and even to the United States, which bought France’s light grade rosin. 
Although American naval stores products were reputed to be of higher-grade quality, French 
producers had the advantage of close proximity to the European consuming market and exporters
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Figure 9.19. Value of French Turpentine Products, 1900-1923
J.F. Butler, “Production and Trade in Naval Stores in France,” 30 July 1924, Austin Cary 
Memorial Forestry Collection, Department o f Special Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries, 
University of Florida, 13.
could make quicker, on-detnand deliveries. By 1927, France manufactured twenty percent o f the 
world’s naval stores.47
47 J.F. Butler, “Production and Trade in Naval Stores in France,” 20 July 1924, Cary 
Collection, 17-18; Priest, Naval Stores. 12.
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Although France produced just a third of the U.S. supply, its superior conservation 
methods were the envy o f American observers. Not only did France maintain a vibrant and 
sustainable industry, but it did so on land that had once been barren sand dunes. At the 
beginning o f the nineteenth century, the Landes area in the southeastern comer of France 
represented one of the poorest in the country. Centuries earlier, fire and neglect had destroyed 
the original forest and dunes blew up, encroaching inland between two and a half and five miles 
for a distance of two hundred kilometers along the coast. The dunes choked steams and villages 
and killed the remaining vegetation in the area covering 2,500,000 acres. The region’s 
population dropped to 1,600, mostly sickly shepherds who suffered bouts of malaria.
In the early nineteenth century Napoleon began a program to bring back the forest. He 
had the dunes leveled and planted with tough grass and native pine trees. The maritime pine was 
well-suited to the area environment. Like the southeastern United States, the Landes region was 
very flat and sandy with a hard pan subsoil. The winters remained mild and humid with little 
frost and the summers warm and sunny. Rain fell principally in the late spring and autumn and 
averages ranged from 29.3 to 47.2 inches. The maritime pine grew rapidly in the area and 
formed a protective barrier between the ocean and the agricultural land and mixed forest that 
grew in the better inland soil. The French government continued reclamation efforts so that, by 
1865, the forest grew over most of the region. In 1892 the remaining portions of the dunes were 
planted. By the first decades of the twentieth century, this former barren, sandy wasteland 
comprised ten percent of the forest area in France, its population had grown to 14,000, and it 
represented one of the country’s most prosperous areas. The turpentine production area covered 
about 2,900 square miles, roughly the size o f four moderate-sized counties in Georgia.48
48 W.L.E. Barnett, “Preliminary Report for Naval Stores Commission,” Cary Collection, 
2-3, 35; Theodore S. Woolsey, Jr., “Conservative Turpentining By the French,” in Naval Stores: 
History. Production. Distribution and Consumption, ed. Thomas Gamble (Savannah: Review 
Publishing and Printing Company, 1921), 176; Butler, “Production and Trade in Naval Stores in 
France,” 1-3; Campbell, et al., Naval Stores Industry. 18; R. Zon, “Notes on French Turpentine
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Unlike American producers, the French followed a forest use pattern that permitted them 
both to harvest timber and continuously produce naval stores from the same stands. Tracts were 
divided into series, each varying in age by five years. Once a series reached twenty-five years o f 
age, some trees were designated for thinning. Those pines chosen to be cut were worked 
intensively for turpentine for three or four years. Then the exploited trees were cut and sold for 
lumber. The remaining pines were uniformly spaced ISO to 200 per acre. They had more room 
to grow, consequently produced large crowns, and thus experienced greater wood growth. They 
were allowed to grow another fifteen years before producers cupped them for turpentine. At this 
time operators cut only one face per tree which they worked for five years. The pines then rested 
for three to five seasons before they were cupped again. By the beginning of the next cupping 
most of the previous faces had healed. This cycle could continue for up to eighty years. Then 
once a series was designating for wholesale cutting, the trees were cupped in as many places as 
the trunk would permit and worked for four to five years before felled.49
Despite operating the most advanced gum naval stores industry in the world, the French 
took steps to ensure continued progress by establishing a research organization to focus
Industry,” 5 December 1918, Files transferred from Olustee Experiment Station, Georgia 
Agrirama, 1-3; Thomas Gamble, “The Production of Naval Stores in the United States,” in Naval 
Stores: History. Production. Distribution and Consumption, ed. Thomas Gamble (Savannah: 
Review Publishing and Printing Company, 1921), 81.
49 Also unlike the Americans, the French employed a tax system that encouraged sound 
forest use. Taxes were kept at relatively low levels and the rate was adjusted every ten years to 
reflect the forest’s changing value. To encourage their uninhibited growth, forests were not 
taxed at all for the thirty years after planting. The French government also allowed tax 
deductions for expenses incurred in preparing land for planting trees, improving drainage, and in 
preliminary thinnings. “Good Naval Stores Practice” (Washington, DC: United States 
Department of Agriculture, 1927), Cary Collection, 4; Butler, “Production and Trade in Naval 
Stores in France,” Cary Collection, 4-6; “The following brief description o f the management o f 
the Government owned Maritime Forests is given,” Cary Collection; I.F. Eldredge, “How the 
French Turpentine System Looked to an American,” in Naval Stores: History. Production. 
Distribution and Consumption, ed. Thomas Gamble (Savannah: Review Publishing and Printing 
Company, 1921), 169-170; Barnett, “Preliminary Report for Naval Stores Commission,” Cary 
Collection, 23-24.
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exclusively on production and consumption technology, a move that predated similar efforts in 
America by well over a decade. As an outgrowth of the Chemical Laboratory for the Study of 
Resins at the University o f  Bordeaux, the Institute du Pin, established in 1909, explored ways o f 
harvesting and handling raw gum and searched for new uses for spirits and rosin as well as for 
the wood and waste products left after turpentining. An associated agency developed practical 
applications for the processes developed at the Institute. Private gifts and government financing 
supported these efforts.50
American producers and forestry researchers were awed by the accomplishments of the 
French. Where France had created a highly successful naval stores industry from a once-barren 
sand region, the American South had accomplished the opposite, transforming a healthy pine 
forest into a near-worthless wasteland. Moreover, the southern United States possessed more 
environmental advantages than the Landes region, but was still outpaced. Although the territory 
and soil o f the both regions was similar, soils of the southern U.S. coastal plain were more fertile 
than those o f the southern France. Each tree species, the maritime pine and the Iongleaf pine, 
produced similar quantities o f gum, but the South enjoyed a longer growing season a climate that 
allowed a more constant and greater flow of gum, and more plentiful rain caused the gum to 
contain more spirits. Nevertheless, the French industry surpassed that in the southern United 
States because the French used superior methods. French turpentiners produced twenty-two 
percent more gum than southern producers did in their trees’ first year under production and 
twenty-eight percent more during their second. Moreover, the French did this on a sustainable 
basis.51
50 Priest, Naval Stores. 14; Butler, “Production and Trade in Naval Stores in France,” 16-
17 .
51 Barnett, “Preliminary Report for Naval Stores Commission,” 3S-36; “Annual Report of 
the Starke Branch for the Year 1929-30,” 25 October 1930, Cary Collection, 2.
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In 1924 the United States Naval Stores Commission found that “there are many things 
we can learn from France, if we take the pains to do so.”52 The Commission mentioned not only 
French production methods but the way the French supported the Institute du Pin to further 
research, their use of the Rosin and Turpentine Exchange to sell turpentine more economically to 
the customers, and their establishment of cooperative stills that permitted producers to enjoy the 
advantages of a state-of-the-art facility without having to carry the total cost individually. French 
steam distilleries were reportedly very similar in design principles to American facilities under 
construction at the same time. However refinements in design permitted the French not only to 
extract a larger percentage of spirits, but to manufacture higher grades of rosin as well.
Americans were also intrigued by the French method for paying workers shares o f production. 
Because laborers in the Landes region were paid according to the amount of gum they hauled to 
the still, they took greater interest in successful production than did American laborers, who were 
paid a fixed price per face no matter the amount produced or the state of the market In France, 
workers shared the risks with the forest owners.53 To varying degrees, American producers 
would eventually adopt these French innovations after 1930.
Intense government involvement explains much of the French system’s advancement 
over the American South’s. Beginning with replanting efforts in the early nineteenth century, the 
French government had carefully guided the naval stores industry down the path o f sustained 
yield by strictly controlling harvesting techniques. On government-owned land, where the state’s 
influence was greatest, conservation efforts were more successful. On privately held forest tracts 
the timber stands grew less dense and gum yields were lower. Private timber owners greatly 
resented the many government regulations and jealously guarded whatever property rights they
52 Barnett, “Preliminary Report for Naval Stores Commission,” 36.
53 Ibid., 37; Good Naval Stores Practice,” 4; Eldredge, “How the French Turpentine 
System Looked,” 171-172.
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could claim. Unlike in France, the American government’s forestry guidelines and regulation 
developed only gradually and after 1900. State involvement gained acceptance only after the 
industry faced the real threat o f  timber depletion. Although some American naval stores 
producers grumbled, the benefits o f government research and regulation led many to accept 
ultimately its involvement. The threat of substantial foreign competition also made the argument 
for government activity persuasive. That the Landes region’s superior timber management 
reflected intensive government control, not advanced economic development, is reflected in its 
lack of an efficient transportation system and inferior product grading and marketing system 
compared to the American South.54
As American turpentine producers struggled to survive in the challenge o f  international 
competition and reduced business profitability, their factors’ control over production and 
marketing intensified. Most o f  the turpentiners who survived the 1910s failed to expand into 
other businesses areas, as did the Leonard brothers, and ended the decade significantly indebted 
to factorage houses. A generally favorable market from 1919 to 1921 allowed some producers to 
pull themselves out of debt, replenish their operating capital, and extend their operations, but 
difficulties resumed as prices again dropped in 1924.55
Industry observers estimated that in the first decades of the twentieth century between 
seventy and ninety percent o f turpentiners used factors to finance their operations and market 
their products, indication that the South’s banking structure remained immature and that naval 
stores production continued as a relatively risky line of business. Once a factor came to know 
and trust a producer, he would open an account for the turpentiner and allow him a line of credit
54 Barnett, “Preliminary Report for Naval Stores Commission,” 3-6; Zon, “Notes on 
French Turpentine Industry,” 3, 5; Butler, “Production and Trade in Naval Stores in France,” 3-4, 
14-16.
55 Davis, Encyclopedia o f Forest and Conservation History. 476; “Turpentine Production 
for the Year Declined,” I.
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for needed expenses. The producer customarily obtained his loans from the factor with 
mortgaged property and agreed to market all turpentine and rosin through him. Factors advanced 
operating capital needed to pay workers and sold producers all the supplies and equipment they 
needed, the still, and the workers’ houses. The amounts borrowed by producers could become 
considerable. In the late 1920s a ten-crop operation required roughly $25,000 to finance, and 
factors had to supply nearly half these funds. However, factors usually loaned money relatively 
freely. Each house feared losing clients to competing firms if they did not agree to finance them. 
The factor charged interest on all sums borrowed, in part to cover its own interest expenses. 
Factors had some operating capital o f their own but needed to borrow a portion, typically about 
forty percent, from the same banks that would not loan to turpentiners. By mid-season factors 
generally had enough cash on hand from their own advances to repay the bank. Once the naval 
stores were produced factors sold the operators’ turpentine and rosin and applied all proceeds to 
their accounts. For this transaction, the factors charged their clients a 2.5 percent commission, a 
rate that had remained unchanged from colonial days.56
Factors usually secured loans to producers with mortgages on land, leases, and 
equipment and, to protect their interests, would take control o f poorly managed operations. In 
1915, for example, the Peninsular Naval Stores Company foreclosed on a St. Johns County, 
Florida, turpentine operation. Between 1912 and 1914, the producer had received loans totaling 
$ 19,566.59 by mortgaging his operation. In foreclosing, Peninsular collected 5 mules, 1 horse, 2
56 Factors sold the naval stores products that they controlled to dealers who handled their 
distribution to consumers. Dealers bought and stored naval stores products, risking price 
fluctuations, fire, theft, and physical deterioration before they were sold to consumers. Most 
dealers specialized in either domestic sales or exports. They sold to a variety of customers: 
distributors, who handled the secondary wholesale market; brokers; large industrial users; as well 
as individual users and retailers. Brower and La Fontisee, “Report of the Investigation on the 
Naval Stores Industry,” 5-6; Martin, “Historical and Analytical Interpretation,” 107,258-259; 
Campbell, et al., Naval Stores Industry. 25; Antwerp Naval Stores Company, et al. to W.F. 
Hottsman, 20 October 1933, Carry Collection; Maguire, interview with author; Eldridge 
interview, 9; Wyman, Florida Naval Stores. 40.
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wagons, 1 buggy and harness, 2 saddles, 1 dilapidated turpentine cup boiler, 35 dip barrels, 38 
second-hand spirit barrels, 54,000 galvanized cups already attached to trees, 29,000 clay cups 
also on timber, 12 barrels o f crude dip, 11 barrels o f cotton batdn, commissary stock, and feed. 
The greatest value of the mortgaged operation, however, was not its livestock, equipment, and 
supplies, but the cupped timber’s production potential. To protect the operation against fire, 
prevent any profit loss from an interruption in harvesting, or risk losing the assembled labor force 
during an idle period, Peninsular moved immediately to place the operation under new 
management. In a similar action three years later, Consolidated Naval Stores Company 
foreclosed on another St. Johns County operation, no doubt a casualty o f the business slump 
experienced during the First World War.S7 When factors came into possession o f such 
operations through foreclosures, they commonly went into partnerships with producers, who 
worked it for them. The factor retained fifty-one percent of the stock and the producer owned 
forty-nine percent. Producers often had to borrow from the factor to buy his forty-nine percent.
In some instances, however, factors sold the operation to someone who could take over the 
debt.58
The factors’ overall control o f the industry grew in the first part o f the twentieth century, 
not only from individual producers’ greater dependence on them, but increased market control.
As in the late nineteenth century, factors sought during the first decades o f the twentieth century
57 From this foreclosure, Consolidated collected 9 crops o f boxed and cupped timber, 
some two and mostly three years old, 3 horses, 9 mules, 2  four-horse wagons and harnesses, one 
buggy and harness, 3 turpentine stills and all fixtures, 1 cooper’s shop and tools, 40 shanties, 1 
gasoline pump, a commissary building and all stock, 70 turpentine barrels, 1 wagon and harness 
shed, 5 houses, 1 artesian well, 2 saddles and bridles, I horse, and 1 glue kettle.
s8 Martin, “Historical and Analytical Approach,’* 256; William L. Jenkins, monthly 
statement of account with Peninsular Naval Stores Company, 11 December 1914, Peninsular 
Naval Stores Company v Addie Jenkins, Inventory o f receiver, January 21, 1915, Affidavit of 
B.W. Blount, 26 December 1914, Special Masters Report, 28 May 1915, and Consolidated Naval 
Stores Company v J.A. Miller, et al., 20 May 1918, St. Johns County Court Cases, St. Augustine, 
FL.
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to stabilize the industry in an effort to perpetuate their business. They periodically withheld 
advances to producers who intended to bring more faces into production during years of 
declining prices. This action helped prevent prices from falling further and limited producers to 
levels that allowed them to meet their financial obligations. Factors also encouraged producers 
to adopt the new improved methods that had been clearly shown to be more economical and less 
destructive in the long run. By placing the producers on secure financial footing and prolonging 
forest use, factors hoped to keep themselves in operation.59
The rise of a huge new factorage house further intensified the factors’ power over 
producers. In 1902, four Florida and three Georgia factors merged to form the aptly named 
Consolidated Naval Stores Company, thus creating the largest naval stores trader in the United 
States, with offices in Savannah, Jacksonville, and Pensacola. Controlled by a Chicago banking 
firm, Consolidated possessed $1,950,000 of working capital and served over seven hundred 
operators who in all controlled a total of five million producing acres. By only the company’s 
second year it handled fifty percent o f the United States’ naval stores manufacture. Over the 
next few years Consolidated established several other companies to serve producers including 
Consolidated Grocery Company and Florida Export Company. Perhaps its most widely known 
such enterprise, Chattanooga Pottery Company, profited from government-sponsored research by 
manufacturing the cup developed by Hetty a member o f the Bureau o f Forestry. Another 
subsidiary, Consolidated Land Company, bought timber land to ensure continued naval stores 
resources in the future. By 1922 it owned over 1.5 million acres o f longleaf pine. To control the 
spiraling cost o f spirit casks, Consolidated purchased Florida Cooperage Company, giving it the 
ability to supply its clients with 390,000 casks annually. With the 1907 incorporation of the 
Florida Pine Company, Consolidated began working some of its pine land itself rather than
59 Brower and La Fontisee, “Report of the Investigation on the Naval Stores Industry,” 
50; Martin, “Historical and Analytical Approach,” 134-136.
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leasing it to independent operators.60 Over the course of its history, close to forty subsidiaries 
belonged to Consolidated Naval Stores Company.61 As both a horizontally and vertically 
consolidated conglomerate, the business represented a desire to impose order and efficiency on a 
notoriously risky and unpredictable trade and the ability of northern finance capital to crate such 
a large business in the South whose native investors lacked such substantial resources.
Producers held mixed feelings about their relationship with Consolidated and other 
factors. Some believed that the factors were fair, at least more so than northern bankers, whom 
operators believed would exploit them at any chance. Fellow southerners, producers assumed, 
would charge them more reasonable interest rates. Other producers believed factors exploited 
them by charging excessive prices for supplies, equipment, and interest on finance capital. Such 
turpentiners resented their dependence on the factors and the control over their operations that
60 A fierce battle apparently raged among the company heads over whether to use convict 
laborers in its naval stores production business. In 1908 the move failed amid strong discussion 
but the board o f directors approved leasing the next year. Three vice presidents submitted 
resignations to the board in response. Robert S. Blount, “Spirits in the Pines” (M.A. thesis, 
Florida State University, 1992), 83-87, 118; Robert S. Blount, Spirits o f  Turpentine: A History of 
Florida Naval Stores. 1528 to 1950 (Tallahassee: Florida Agricultural Museum, 1993), 31;
Butler, Treasures of the Longleaf Pines.” 164.
61 These businesses included Arcadia Naval Stores Company; Baker, Fentress & 
Company; Barnett National Bank; Barnett National Bank Securities Corporation; Chattanooga 
Pottery Company; Citrus Land Company; Clark Meggs Company; Consolidated Automotive 
Company; Consolidated Create & Lumber Company; Consolidated Financial Corporation; 
Consolidated Grocery Company; Consolidated Land Company; Consolidated Naval Stores 
Company; Consolidated Tidewater Pine Company; Consolidated-Tomoka Land Company; 
Covington Turpentine Company; Deen Turpentine Company; DeLeon Naval Stores Company; 
Downing Company; J.W. Dutton Company; Florida Cooperage Company; Florida Export 
Company; Florida Grocery Company; Florida Industrial Company; Florida Pine Company;
Forest McCoy Turpentine Company; Hall Naval Stores Company; Herty Turpentine Cup 
Company; Horseshoe Ranch; Kissimmee Island Cattle Company; Lake Childs Company; Lake 
Placid Land Company; Lake Wales Naval Stores Company; Naval Stores Investment Company; 
Pine Wood Naval Stores Company; Punta Gorda Naval Stores Company; Putnam Naval Stores 
Company; Salem Turpentine Company; Singler, Baldwin & Company; Smith-Edwards-Ewing 
Company; Tropical Investment Company; Tropical State Bank; and Williams Upchurch 
Company. Blount, “Spirits in the Pines,” 104-105.
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factors could exert if they disapproved of their management.62 One producer, drawing an 
analogy between the operators relationship with their black workers and the producers’ 
connection to their factor, explained that “we owned the niggers, and the factors owned us.”63
Although factors dominated financing from 1900 to 1930, there was a gradual increase in 
the use of banks. Banks began to appear across the South at the same time that the naval stores 
industry was growing more stationary. With the disappearance o f virgin pine stands, producers 
no longer moved about searching for fresh tracts, but rather remained in one general area and 
worked the increasing acres o f second growth pines. Using improved methods, they were able to 
harvest gum from the same acreage for more years than before. The increased ability of 
producers to work in one place for lengthy periods made banks more willing to accept their 
operations as security for loans. An estimated ten to fifteen percent o f producers turned to banks 
for financial help. The same changes that allowed turpentine operations to receive bank loans 
opened up credit opportunities for them with wholesale grocery companies, permitting even 
further independence from factorage houses. Only a few well established naval stores men 
operated on a cash basis and thus required the financial assistance o f neither banks nor factors.64
The naval stores industry faced considerable difficulties early in the twentieth century. 
Despite a stabilization of timber resources, pine acreage remained relatively scarce and 
expensive, especially after timber companies began efforts to conserve their remaining stands in 
the 1900s and 1910s. Other production costs, particularly labor, rose during the period, the 
greatest jump occurring during the First World War. Competition from the wood naval stores
62 Maguire, interview with author, Campbell, et al., Naval Stores Industry. 25.
63 Gay Goodman Wright, “Turpentining: An Ethnohistorical Study of a Southern 
Industry and Way o f Life,” (M.A. thesis, University of Georgia, 1979), 76.
64 Martin, “An Historical and Analytical Approach,” 107,25S, 13S; William Alonzo 
Register, interview, tape recording, Florida State Archives; Campbell, et al., Naval Stores 
Industry. 25,26; Wyman, Florida Naval Stores. 33.
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industry and from foreign gum naval stores production posed another serious threat to producers. 
After poor performance in its early years, wood naval stores plants proved capable of providing 
superior products possessing the specific qualities for individual consumers’ needs. And foreign 
gum naval stores producers, especially the French, were able to supply European consumers with 
superior gum naval stores products while operating on a sustainable basis. Largely as a result o f 
declining business profitability caused by these challenges, American producers found 
themselves more dependent on factorage houses, which increased their hold on the industry. 
Although producers faced difficult new circumstances in the early twentieth century, relatively 
little changed for naval stores industry workers.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter Ten
Persistent Patterns:
Constancy in Labor Practices and Camp Life
The naval stores industry’s use o f both peonage and convict leasing and the experiences 
of workers under those labor institutions persisted into the first decades o f the twentieth century. 
For the many laborers whom producers continued to hold in debt bondage, the work routine— 
except for the substitution of boxing with the cup and gutter system—remained virtually 
unchanged, as did life in the isolated camps. Prisoners leased to turpentine operations endured 
even harsher conditions than those held in peonage; their conditions were bleaker, the workload 
greater, and punishments more severe. For both convicts and peons, the life in the naval stores 
industry retained considerable continuity with the late nineteenth century and even antebellum 
years.
With the demand for labor so high in the turpentine region, employers went to great 
lengths to attract workers; they advanced wages, paid railroad fares, and even hired professional 
labor recruiters, despite laws against them. Because turpentiners had so much invested in 
laborers before they even began work, operators insisted that employees remain long enough to 
justify the expense. And as labor costs rose after the turn o f the century, producers grew 
increasingly concerned about preventing the loss of their outlay when laborers left. Operators 
sensed an increasing threat to labor stability, believing that high labor prices, especially in the 
191 Os, could allow a worker to labor just two or three days to support a spree for the rest o f  the 
week. Producers also feared that workers might desert their employer for another who offered 
substantial incentives, and thus render their business almost inoperable. One report held that a 
black worker secured one advance from a south Georgia employer, then left and received the
451
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same from another hirer. From the two men, he collected a total of four hundred dollars for 
which he worked three days.1
Evidence suggests that the operators’ fears were not totally unfounded. In 1922, 
Johnston, McNeill & Co., a turpentine operation in Okeechobee, Florida, had operating expenses 
of $53,026.41. $20,554.72, or nearly forty percent, went toward salaries and wages. The 
company spent another $851.57 on recruiting and suffered the loss o f $ 1,411.92 in advances to 
workers who apparently left its employment. The company’s loss of advance payments 
represented over 2.5 percent of production costs, a significant amount in an industry with narrow 
profit margins. It appears that in all, eighty-one workers quit the company that year, only ten o f 
them settling their accounts before leaving. The other seventy-one left owing an average o f 
$19.89. Some, however, owed considerably more than others. Ten workers, according to the 
company’s financial reports, left with money owed to them, though most of them walked away 
from less than $1. Only four workers who remained in the company’s employment had accounts 
in the black, two with substantial amounts, $132 J 6  and $104.61. For the next year it appears 
that, on average workers grew more indebted, although thirteen had credit with the company.2
In their struggle to secure adequate labor, producers repeatedly violated the industry’s 
gentlemen’s agreement not to “steal” each others’ workers. For 1912 the four turpentine 
operations run by the Ten Mile Lumber Company of Ten Mile, Mississippi, recorded an average 
“recruiting expense” o f $110.72 that most likely went toward advances.3 In the mid-1900s, one
1 “Wisconsin to Check Fraud on Employers,” Newsclipping and Frederick C. Cubberly 
to H.L. Anderson, 17 August 1906, Frederick C. Cubberly Papers, Department o f Special 
Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries, University o f Florida.
2 Report, Johnston McNeill Company, 2 April 1923, William C. Powell Papers, Special 
Collections Library, Duke University.
3 Elliott Maguire, interview by author, tape recording, St. Augustine, FL, 5 June 1996; 
Ten Mile Lumber Company ledger, 1912, Dantzler Lumber Company Papers, Special 
Collections, Mitchell Memorial Library, Mississippi State University; Gay Goodman Wright,
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reporter explained that “each well-equipped place has ‘cruiters’ on the road looking up laborers 
from other camps to bring them in by any means—by allurement, by threat, by arrest. Labor is so 
precious and so necessary that the getting o f it gilds a crime with virtue.”4 Operators even left 
trade meetings early to have an untethered opportunity to steal neighboring producers’ workers. 
The weekends offered the best opportunities for recruiting; owners or managers would depart for 
a recruiting mission on Saturday with a supply of moonshine. While clandestinely entertaining 
workers o f other camps with alcohol, the manager made extravagant claims about the superior 
wages and working conditions at his camp. It was dangerous to attempt to steal or recruit 
workers. If caught, the violator could be shot.5
Periods of transition offered recruiters the best opportunity to prey on other producers’ 
laborers. When turpentine operations relocated, as they periodically did, producers had trouble 
keeping their labor force intact. Changes in management also attracted heavy recruiting activity. 
The owner of one St. Johns County, Florida, turpentine business died in August 1914. When a 
receiver, sent by the deceased man’s factor to oversee the operation, arrived four months later he 
found that the “laborers were gone from the place and it became necessary for me at considerable 
expense to engage labor and bring it to the place.”6
Expansion of the naval stores industry into new regions placed a particularly high 
premium on black labor. In the areas where the naval stores industry grew in the early twentieth
“Turpentining: An Ethnohistorica! Study o f a Southern Industry and Way of Life,” (M.A. thesis, 
University of Georgia, 1979), 118.
4 Richard Barry, “Slavery in the South To-Day,” Cosmopolitan Magazine 42 (March
1907): 490.
5 Michael D. Tegeder, “Prisoners o f the Pines: Debt Peonage in the Southern Turpentine 
Industry, 1900-1930” (Ph.D. diss., University o f Florida, 1996), 196-199.
6 Peninsular Naval Stores Company v Addie Jenkins, St. Johns County Court Cases, St. 
Augustine, FL.
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century, especially in Florida, the black population was not large enough to supply the operators’ 
labor needs.7 Forester Asa L. Brower discovered that Florida turpentine production failed to 
increase as rapidly as it could in the first decade of the twentieth century because “operators were
still struggling against the annoying labor condition Labor was scarce,” he explained, “and
many of the operators were unable to effectively work all o f  the timber they had bled.”8
Compounding the producers’ frustration over tight labor was their persistent belief that 
blacks were unwilling to work. One newspaper article explained that white workers could be 
counted on to complete a labor contract and work off their debt. “Others, and they are found 
largely among the negroes,” the article explained, “seek to shirk the work to slip out of the duty; 
to neglect it and to scrap it, hoping that the creditor-employer will become disgusted and tell 
them to be gone.”9 One contemporary economist argued that the black man ‘■‘will probably 
continue to operate as a drag on southern progress and will serve to exaggerate the South’s 
relatively low standing in such matters as per capita wealth, income, and literacy.”10 Even a 
muckraking journalist critical o f the turpentine industry’s labor atrocities believed that “the 
negro, as he exists in Florida to-day, is content with merely enough to keep soul and body 
together, and this he can earn by working one day a week, since wages are relatively so high.
7 P.L. Buttrick, “Commercial Uses of Longleaf Pine,” American Forestry 21 (Spring 
1915): 901.
8 Asa L. Brower and John O. La Fontisee, “Report o f  the Investigation on the Naval 
Stores Industry and Statistics on the Production of Turpentine and Rosin for the Seasons o f 1907- 
8 and 1908-9,” 15 March 1909, Austin Cary Memorial Forestry Collection, Department of 
Special Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries, University o f Florida, 50.
9 Untitled newspaper article, Correspondence, Department of Justice Central Files, 
General Records o f the Justice Department, Record Group 60, National Archives.
10 R.P. Brooks, The Industrialization of the South (Athens, GA: Bureau of Business 
Research, 1929), 5.
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Frequently he works not even this necessary one day a week, but prefers to let his wench work 
the entire seven.”11
Under such labor conditions and racist perceptions, at the turn o f  the century the 
southern states intensified the legislation that supported peonage. In the lower South’s piney 
woods region, naval stores men joined the Georgia-Florida Sawmill Association in demanding 
more effective labor legislation, a demand to which the state legislators complied. The 
centerpieces of compelled labor were false pretenses and vagrancy laws, legislation passed in 
most southern states during the last quarter o f the nineteenth century.12 In classic terms, as 
defined by Assistant Attorney-General Charles W. Russell, the practice was defined “as causing 
compulsory service to be rendered by one man to another on the pretext o f having him work out 
the amount of a debt, real or claimed.”13 Beginning with Georgia and Alabama in 1903 and 
Florida in 1907, southern states passed false pretenses laws making the refusal to work or repay 
advances prima facie evidence of an intent to defraud. Before this legislation, workers could 
only be held to their work if their employer could prove they intended to defiaud at the time they 
contracted to work. Producers, however, could not easily establish liability even in sympathetic 
courts. The new false pretenses laws shifted the burden o f proof to the workers. They had to 
demonstrate that they did not plan to defraud at the time they received cash or merchandise 
advances with a labor contract.14 For example, turpentine worker Jack Richburg was arrested in
11 Barry, “Slavery in the South To-Day,” 488.
12 William Cohen, At Freedom’s Edge: Black Mobility and the Southern White Quest for 
Racial Control. 1861-1915 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1991), 239, 243; 
Jerrell H. Shofner, “Forced Labor in the Florida Forests, 1880-1950,” Journal of Forest History 
25 (January 1981): 15; Tegeder, “Prisoners o f the Pines,” 112.
13 Charles W. Russell, Report on Peonage (Washington, DC: Department o f Justice,
1908), 3.
14 Cohen, At Freedom’s Edge. 231; William Cohen “Negro Involuntary Servitude in the 
South, 1865-1940: A Preliminary Analysis,” The Journal o f Southern History 42 (February
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1908 under the new Florida law. On December 23, 1907, he had entered into contract with the 
Downing Park Naval Stores Company to perform turpentine work. Upon agreeing to the 
contract, he accepted cash and goods valued at seven dollars. When he quite the job before his 
contract expired, he was arrested for taking the advances with “the intent not to perform such
services.”15
The other important area of legislation, vagrancy laws, strengthened local law 
enforcement’s ability to arrest anyone not working. From 1903 to 1909 Alabama, Arkansas, 
Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, Texas, and Virginia adopted strict new vagrancy 
laws. Florida’s 1905 vagrancy law defined the offense so broadly that anyone deviating from the 
white South’s acceptable social standards could be arrested.16 It defined as a vagrant:
rogues and vagabonds, idle or dissolute persons who go about begging, common 
gamblers, persons who use juggling or unlawful games or plays, common pipers 
and fiddlers, common drunkards, common night walkers, thieves, pilferers, 
trader in stolen property, lewd, wanton, and lascivious persons in speech or 
behaviors, keepers of gambling houses, common railers and brawlers, persons 
who neglect their calling or employment and misspend what they earn and do not 
provide for themselves or for the support o f  their families, persons wandering 
from place to place able to work and who are without means and who neglect to 
earn their support and live by pilfering or begging, idle and disorderly persons, 
including therein those who neglect all lawful business and habitually misspend 
their time by frequenting houses of ill fame, gaming houses, or tippling shops, 
persons able to work but are habitually idle and live upon the earnings of their 
wives or minor children, and all able-bodied male persons over eighteen years of 
age who are without means of support, and whose parents or guardians are
1976): 43; Jerrell H. Shofner, “Mary Grace Quackenbos, A Visitor Florida Did Not Want,” The 
Florida Historical Quarterly 58 (January 1980): 283.
15 State of Florida vs Jack Richburg, Correspondence, Department of Justice Central 
Files, General Records of the Department o f Justice, Record Group 60, National Archives.
16 Cohen, At Freedom’s Edge. 239, 243; Shofner, “Forced Labor in the Florida Forests,” 
15; Tegeder, “Prisoners o f the Pines,” 112; Jeffrey A. Drobney, Lumbermen and Log Sawyers: 
Life. Labor, and Culture in the North Florida Timber Industry. 1830-1930 (Macon, GA: Mercer 
University Press, 1997), 176.
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unable to support them, and who are not usually in attendance upon some school 
or educational establishments, but who live in habitual idleness.”17
In 1908, a United States attorney in Alabama complained to the Attorney General that “between 
the vagrancy law, contract labor law and our new game law, the ignorant farm laborer is 
practically reduced to a condition of dependence on his employer or landlord, and whether he 
defrauds him or not he is so harassed by the fear o f prosecution under the various drastic statutes 
that he is often times afraid to leave the service of an employer with whom he would not remain 
if he were left to act at will.”18
Besides its strengthened legal support, one o f the new characteristics of early twentieth- 
century peonage was the involvement o f white workers in the system. In 1911, the Pensacola 
Journal reported that, at that time, fifty white men were serving sixty days for vagrancy. The 
article claimed that in ninety percent of the cases the men had been arrested by a Flomation, 
Alabama, officer, escorted to the state line, and arrested by a deputy sheriff in Florida who was 
paid a fee for each man he arrested. Recently-arrived Eastern European immigrants, however, 
perhaps represented the largest percentage of whites ensnared in peonage. Labor recruiting 
agencies opened in the northern cities and targeted immigrants who desperately needed work, 
would tolerate low wages, and lacked knowledge o f the nature of labor conditions in the piney 
woods. Many recruiters failed to explain to workers the circumstances of their employment. 
Some lied when they told them they would be working in a skilled trade when in fact they were 
sent to perform brutally hard turpentine and railroad construction work. Most agents also 
neglected to explain that the transportation costs to the South and the advance wages they
17 Russell, Report on Peonage. 30.
18 E. J. Parsons to Charles J. Bonaparte, 7 May 1908, Correspondence, Justice 
Department Central Files, General Records of the Department of Justice, Record Group 60, 
National Archives.
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received to buy food f r o m  the commissary would start them off in debt. One such New York 
agent sent an average o f  three hundred men a month to work in the turpentine camps.19
The experience o f Sam Fink, a Jewish immigrant from Staten Island, New York, was 
typical o f workers duped into agreeing to go South. On June 4,1906, Fink met a labor agent 
while hunting for a job in New York City. The agent offered to send Fink to Florida where, he 
was told, he could work for $1.90 a day. Each week, the agent explained, 500 would be deducted 
to cover the $13 traveling expenses. Fink accepted the offer and joined a group of around fifty 
other immigrant men on a ship headed south. They were not given their labor contracts to sign 
until aboard the ship, when it was too late to back out. From these documents they learned they 
were headed for a place called Buffalo Bluff, Florida, probably located a short distance south of 
Savannah, to work at a sawmill. When the shipped docked in Savannah, however, the work boss 
who met the men took them to a turpentine camp in the community of Maytown, located 150 
miles south of Jacksonville and accessible only by a train which passed twice each day.
Upon reaching the camp their induction into peonage began immediately. They had had 
little to eat on the trip and, once they arrived at the camp, were shown into the commissary and 
instructed to buy their food, which would be charged to their accounts. Because the shelves were 
short o f provisions the new laborers were allowed to purchase only one box of crackers for every 
two men. When they complained o f hunger, they were told they could receive no more food until 
they began to work. They did not start until three days later. Their first work day began early in 
the morning when a black guard woke them up and drove them ten to twelve miles through the 
woods to a place where two black guards on horses and two on foot showed them how to chip
19 “White Prisoners in Jail Sign Statement Telling o f Arrest,” The Penasacola. Florida 
Journal. 30 December 1911; Shofner, “Mary Grace Quakenbos,” 274-275; N. Gordon Carper, 
“Slavery Revisited: Peonage in the South,” Phvlon 37 (1976): 86-91; Barry, “Slavery in the 
South To-Day,” 490; Tegeder, “Prisoners o f the Pines,” 119-120.
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turpentine, forcing them to wade through waist-deep water to reach some trees. When the 
immigrant men complained about the work and the lack o f food, the foreman threateningly 
displayed his pistol and whip. Having had enough of the Maytown turpentine camp, the 
immigrants complained to the boss that their papers called for them to work at the sawmill and 
lumber business at Buffalo Bluff. The boss granted their request, but charged them the eight 
dollars each for transportation there.
Their experience at Buffalo Bluff was no better than at Maytown. They had to sign new 
contracts, charging them once more for the transportation, this time, eighteen dollars. The Jews 
among the group protested but the Germans signed willingly. The two groups were then 
separated, the Germans receiving houses in which to sleep while the Jews were given cabins with 
no beds, pillows, sheets, or blankets. The floor was filthy and falling apart. They nailed some 
boards together to make a bed. Unable to tolerate conditions at Buffalo Bluff, Fink and three 
other Jews escaped early one late-June morning, only to be caught while trying to board a train 
and forced to return. Two days later they ran away again. They made it to the third train station 
down the line and successfully boarded a passenger car. However, two Buffalo Bluff foremen 
also got on the train, recognized the immigrants, and demanded that the conductor remove them 
and have them locked up. Because they had paid their fare, the conductor refused. (It is not 
clear how the group got the money to purchase their tickets.) They went as far as Bostwick, a 
town about twenty-five miles south of Jacksonville, where they set off on foot. They had little 
food and asked some women they met on the street o f one town if there was any work available 
in the area. They were warned not to seek work there. The community had already received 
orders by telephone to lock up any strange white men who came through. So the group of four 
kept to the woods, avoided detection, and, after five days and nights o f walking, arrived in 
Jacksonville. The tenacious camp foreman found them there and, at his insistence, the sheriff 
took them to jail where they grew veiy sick awaiting their trial. The Jacksonville Jewish
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
460
community attempted to help. It succeeded in preventing the sheriff from chaining the workers, 
but he would not accept the money they offered to pay the men’s debts. The Jewish community 
continued to support them, bringing them food in jail and paying each one’s hundred-dollar bail. 
When finally released the immigrants quickly returned to New York.20
Where peonage carried over from the latter decades o f the nineteenth century, the early- 
twentieth-century turpentine laborers’ work routine, despite the replacement of boxing with the 
cup and gutter system, changed little from the industry’s antebellum and, in some instances, 
colonial days. When starting a turpentine operation, a woodsrider rode through the forest 
marking the trees that were to be harvested for gum. If the operator planed to use the traditional 
boxing method in which the worker cut a cavity into the trees’ base, then squads of six to seven 
workers went to work with axes in December. These laborers cut boxes in the same manner and 
to the same specifications as slaves before the Civil War. In establishments that used the newly- 
developed cup and gutter method, workers began the process known as “putting up virgin.” 
Beginning in December, a group of six or seven workers, a “hanging crew,” each member with a 
special task, began the job of installing the clay cups and galvanized steel gutters. An ax man 
shaved the bark from an appropriate area of the pine’s base and another worker smoothed the 
area with a hatchet. A team of two other workers cut eight-inch incisions for the gutters, with 
one holding a broad ax against the smooth face while the other hit it with a maul. Still two other 
workers were responsible for inserting the gutters into these cut grooves and driving in nails from 
which they suspended the cups. A six-man team could hang from 6S0 to 1,000 cups a day. For 
each year after a crop’s initial preparation, workers used the same procedure to raise the cups and 
gutters by two feet. However, instead of smoothing out the trees’ barky exterior, workers shaved
20 Sam Fink Affidavit, 11 October 1906, Correspondence, Classified Subject Files, 
Department o f Justice Central Files, General Files of the Department of Justice, National 
Archives; Tegeder, “Prisoners o f the Pines,” 125-129.
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down the streaked face to prepare an appropriate surface for the equipment. Because raising the 
cups required less ax work than when first installing them, young boys could perform this task. 
Most workers quickly learned the squad’s routine and their special function within it. Operators 
typically did not push their laborers hard in off-season work since it was not done under critical 
time constraints. Such labor during slow months served to benefit the producers’ and workers’ 
different interests. During the winter months, employers needed to provide work for laborers to 
counteract other producers’ enticement efforts. For their part, workers needed the income.21
With the advent o f the cup system, a new off-season job was added to raking and 
burning, boiling cups. After several seasons of use, cups became caked with dirt and dried gum. 
To clean them, workers collected them from the trees and placed them by the hundreds in large 
vats of boiling water, where the gum melted and washed off. Cleaning their cups periodically 
enabled producers to make a higher-grade rosin from the gum. But despite the benefits o f the 
higher grades, the cost of collecting, boiling, and rehanging the cups limited the frequency with 
which they could be cleaned. Some producers thus boiled their cups only in preparation for 
harvesting virgin gum.22
21 In a labor efficiency study, the United States Forest Service estimated that during a day 
one worker could cut 500 to 600 faces, another could make 1,000 to 1,500 incisions, and yet 
another could hang between 1,000 and 1,500 cups. Federal Writers’ Project, Florida: A Guide 
to the Southernmost State (New York: Oxford University Press, 1939), 378; A.W. Schorger 
and H.S. Betts, The Naval Stores Industry (Washington, DC: United States Department of 
Agriculture, 1915), 15-17; Robert S. Blount, Spirits of Turpentine: A History of Florida Naval 
Stores. 1528 to 1950 (Tallahassee: Florida Agricultural Museum, 1993), 37-38; Elliott 
Maguire, interview by author, James Berthold Berry, Farm Woodlands (Yonkers-on Hudson, 
NY: World Book Company, 1923), 344-345; Lenthal Wyman, Florida Naval Stores 
(Tallahassee: Florida Forest Service, 1936), 36.
22 Wyman, Florida Naval Stores. 21-23.
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As had been the procedure for over a century, between late February and early March 
chipping began, each worker covering between 1,500 and 2,400 faces a  day. In the several 
decades after 1900, faces rose progressively slower as the hack sizes grew smaller and workers 
were instructed to cut narrower and more shallow streaks than in previous years. Although the 
hack blade changed slightly, it differed little in the first half of the twentieth century from its 
design one hundred years earlier, a blade fastened to a wooden handle with an iron ball on the 
end to furnish momentum when a worker swung the tool downward, across the face. Workers 
continued to use pullers once the face grew too high for a hack to reach. The puller design had 
also changed little.23
Although the exercise of dipping gum from a clay cup differed somewhat from removing 
it from a box, little else about the job o f dipping changed. The task was performed by squads of 
three or four workers and, because it required so little skill, young boys around twelve years old 
could perform it. Depending on the trees’ productivity, dippers harvested gum every two to four 
weeks. After removing the dip cup and scooping gum out with a trowel, the workers transferred 
it to buckets, usually old nail kegs with gutter iron attached to the edge to scrape off the gum. 
Once a bucket was full, weighing about fifty pounds, it was taken to a dip wagon that followed 
the squad through the forest. The workers handed their bucket to the driver, often an older man, 
who emptied it into a barrel. Some producers, however, dispensed with wagons and simply 
placed empty barrels throughout the forest and collected them once the dippers filled them with 
gum. According to this routine, a teamster drove through the forest in a  drawn wagon, hammered 
a lid on each filled barrel, and rolled it on skids onto the wagon. Such teamsters often used the
23 Blount, Spirits o f Turpentine. 39; Berry, Farm Woodlands. 344-345; Asa L. Brower 
and John O. La Fontisee, “Report o f  the Investigation on the Naval Stores Industry,” 8-9.
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same draft animals with whom they reportedly formed a bond, caring for them and growing to 
understand their temperament.24
If a producer used the traditional boxing method, which required the gum to run down 
the entire length of the face into the box, workers had to remove the scrape, or dried resin, once 
the dipping season ended in the late fall. This operation was unnecessary on pines outfitted with 
cups since little gum hardened to their faces. Because the practice o f burning the forest 
persisted, workers continued to rake around the trees. Grass, straw, chips, and branches were 
cleared from around each tree for a distance o f from two to three feet. Workers could rake 
around four hundred to seven hundred trees a day. In raking and all other tasks, the amount of 
work expected from laborers depended on forest density more than acreage. More work could be 
done in woods with thick tree growth than on sparsely timbered tracts where laborers spent 
considerable time walking from tree to tree. Weather could also affect worker productivity. In 
1922, for example, work at one turpentine camp ground to a halt during four weeks of hard rain, 
which left water standing nearly knee-deep in some areas of the woods.23
The introduction of the cup method did nothing to relieve the challenge producers faced 
in trying to manage their workers who were spread out over as much as thousands of acres of 
forest. Producers continued to organize their operations by crops of 10,000 faces, although some
24 Maguire, interview by author; Blount, Spirits of Turpentine. 39; William Alonzo 
Register, interview, tape recording, Florida State Archives; Berry, Farm Woodlands. 344-345; 
Karen Harvey, “Maguire Bom Into Turpentine Family: Industry Once Had Major Impact on 
County,” The Compass. 26 April 1990,9; Hulda Summerall Baker, “Summerall Turpentine 
Still,” Museum o f Coastal History, Coastal Georgia Historical Society, St. Simons Island, GA, 
7; Wright, “Turpentining,” 103.
23 Brower and La Fontisee, “Report o f the Investigation on the Naval Stores Industry,” 
10; Wyman, Florida Naval Stores. 22; Berry, Farm Woodlands. 344-345; Federal Writers’ 
Project, Florida. 378; Stetson Kennedy, Palmetto Country (New York: Duell, Sloan and 
Pearce, 1942), 266.
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used a size of 10,500. As the first decade of the twentieth century progressed, however, the size 
of tasks tended to drop in some areas. As turpentiners began moving into second-growth pine 
forests, where trees commonly grew farther apart than in virgin stands, it became impossible for 
workers to tend 10,000 pines. Some laborers, consequently, found their task reduced to as few as 
5,000 trees, representing a considerable decline in their productivity.
Operators continued to rely on woodsriders to supervise their work force. Although 
most woodsriders were white, some were black. Black woodsriders had typically begun work in 
turpentine when they were young-dipping, raking, and helping around the still. As they gained 
experience they became dippers, teamsters, coopers, and distillers. The very best advanced to 
woodsrider. But no matter the woodsrider’s race, his principal job was to inspect the quality 
with which faces were worked and to make sure no trees were missed. On small operations the 
woodsrider tabulated how many trees each worker tended. Many operations, however, were 
large and employed too many workers for woodsriders to concentrate on both work quality and 
quantity. It was not uncommon for big operators to employ more than thirty men in the forest.
In the early 1920s, for example, one enormous turpentine business near Opal, Florida, was 
subdivided into eight operations which together employed four hundred black men in the forest 
and nine white woodsriders to oversee them. Workers who collected gum or scrape were paid by 
the bucket- or barrel-full, depending on which system o f collection they used. For jobs that did 
not create a measured end product like boxing, chipping, or attaching cups, producers used a 
tallyman to record each workers’ progress. Camp managers assigned each worker a code made 
up of either numbers or names. When a worker finished his task at one face, he called out his 
individual code word loudly enough for the tallyman to hear him up to several hundred yards 
away. The different codes hollered throughout the forest reportedly took on a rhythmic chanting 
sound. Each tallyman could record the work of no more than ten to twelve hands. The tallyman
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needed to be competent, trustworthy, and of good hearing, but age and strength mattered little. 
At one camp a ten year old boy was promoted from toting water to keeping the tally.26
Except for such light jobs as dipping and tallying, turpentining remained strenuous work 
requiring considerable physical strength. Evidence suggests that by the early twentieth century 
the number of hours turpentine laborers worked dropped to around twenty-five or twenty-six 
hours a week.27 “That was all a strong man could take or the hard physical labor would break 
him down,” a former turpentine laborer explained.28 One former producer believed that the 
'"turpentine man was the hardest working there is in the world for the number of hours he 
works.”29 In the woods, workers had to contend with underbrush and snakes, which made the 
work more taxing and dangerous. Snakes were plentiful in the pine forest, but the danger of 
being bitten appears to have been low. As long as workers used the pattern o f foot-wom paths to
26 Albert Pridgen, “Turpentining in the South Atlantic Country,” in Naval Stores:
History. Production. Distribution and Consumption, ed. Thomas Gamble (Savannah: Review 
Publishing and Printing Company, 1921), 104; Kennedy, Palmetto Country. 264-266; Freeman 
Ashmore, “Looking Back: The Woodsrider.” Wakulla Area Digest (September 1996): 13-14, 
16, 24; Albert G. Snow, Jr., “Research on the Improvement of Turpentine Practices,”
Economic Botany 3 (October-December, 1949): 379; Wyman, Florida Naval Stores. 9; Federal 
Writers’ Project, Florida. 378; Blount, Spirits of Turpentine. 36-37; Kenneth H. Thomas, 
McCranie’s Turpentine Still. Atkinson Countv. Georgia: A Historical Analysis of the Site. 
With Some Information on the Naval Stores Industry in Georgia and Elsewhere (Atlanta: 
Georgia Department o f Natural Resources, 1975), 33; Maguire, interview by author, Schorger 
and Betts, The Naval Stores Industry. 15; “The Pine Forests of the South,” De Bow’s Review. 
After the War Series, 3 (February 1867): 196; Register, interview; Harvey, “Maguire Bom Into 
Turpentine Family,” 9; Becky Vail, “Old-Timer Remembers "Hard Old Days’ in Woods,” 
Newsclipping File, Lowndes County Historical Society, Valdosta, Georgia.
27 Harvey, “Maguire Bom Into Turpentine Family,” 9; Vail, “Old-Timer Remembers 
"Hard Old Days’ in Woods”; Register, interview.
28 Vail, “Old-Timer Remembers ‘Hard Old Days’ in Woods.”
29 Register, interview.
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move between trees and made noise while at their work, snakes kept their distance. In the 
untouched underbrush, however, snakes and workers might meet. Workers feared the red-headed 
skink more than snakes. They incorrectly believed the skinks were poisonous and sighting one 
alone was thought to bring bad luck.30 While the work remained strenuous and dangerous, it 
continued as well to be extremely dirty. The men working around the gum got so much o f it 
spilled on their overalls that the cloth became stiff once it dried. When workers undressed at 
night they were unable to fold their overalls away and instead left them standing in the comer of 
their cabin.
Not only did labor in the forests remain difficult, but distilling persisted as a primitive 
craft. Producers continued to distill their gum in copper stills of the same design as those 
introduced in the 1830s, but in the early twentieth century technological innovations improved 
the regulation o f the process and thus the quality of the finished product. The addition o f water 
to the still at the beginning and during the distilling process continued from the late nineteenth 
century and enabled producers to extract more spirits and also resulted in both spirits and rosin of 
a somewhat higher quality than before. Along with the continued practice of adding water, the 
introduction o f a still thermometer helped in regulating temperature. The device, developed by 
Stephen Neal o f Cordele, Georgia, in 1907, took some o f the guess-work out of heating the still, 
gauging the time to add water and timing the release o f the rosin. However, older distillers, who 
had honed their skills in controlling the process by the sound of the boiling gum and the 
appearance o f the liquid that drained from the condensing tube, refused to use it, believing it 
degraded their craft. Younger distillers, though, found the thermometer invaluable. Even with
30 Diane Fisher, “Florida’s Turpentine Industry,” Florida Living Magazine 15 (October 
1995): 29; Vail, “Old-Timer Remembers ‘Hard Old Days’ in Woods;” Wright, “Turpentining,” 
103-104.
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the thermometer, the art o f distilling remained a highly sought after skill, and distillers continued 
to hold the highest status among turpentine workers. They usually lived in one of the best houses 
in the quarters. Distillers also received a higher wage and, unlike most workers, who were paid 
by piecework, the distiller received a salary. In many camps the distiller was black and 
responsible for the still’s operation, although the producer and woodsrider frequently checked on 
his work. At large camps that employed a manager to oversee the entire operation, the manager 
might supervise the distilling. At one camp the distiller’s position was so high, he served as the 
producer’s overall assistant31
As with distillers, technology changed but did not transform the role of coopers. 
Although many turpentine producers began buying factory-made spirit barrels, coopers also 
retained their status as skilled workers. At some operations the distiller served as the cooper, 
constructing barrels during the winter months when there was no gum to refine. By the early- 
twentieth century, few coopers’ jobs included collecting the wood with which to construct 
barrels. Instead, producers purchased machine-cut staves in bundles and hoop iron, which came 
in spools. Despite the use of machine-cut pieces, the cooper’s job remained little changed from 
years earlier. He began constructing a barrel by quickly stacking the staves up around a wooden 
hoop. Once the staves were in place, the cooper wrapped a cable around the ring of staves and 
tightened it. Once the staves were squeezed together, the cooper fastened on the hoops, which he 
created by cutting hoop iron the appropriate length from a coil and riveting each end to form a
31 Berry, Farm Woodlands. 344; Robson Dunwody, “Proper Methods of Distillation and 
Handling in the Production o f Turpentine and Rosin,” in Naval Stores: History. Production. 
Distribution and Consumption, ed. Thomas Gamble (Savannah: Review Publishing and 
Printing Company, 1921), 128; A. David King, III, interview by author, Georgia Agrirama, 
Tifton, GA, 14 June 1996; Carl E. Ostrom, “Histoiy of Gum Naval Stores Industry,” The 
Chemureic Digest 4 f IS July 1945): 222; Wright, “Turpentining,” 106,108; Baker, 
“Summerall Turpentine Still,” 9-10.
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ring. He beat the hoops around the staves using a special hammer-like took working his way 
around several times. Some coopers beat out a  rhythm as they hammered the hoops on, and a 
few reportedly even did a dance. As had always been the case, rosin barrels were less well- 
constructed than turpentine casks. Although the latter were not purchased ready-made, only the 
most skilled coopers constructed them. Even though a high standard was required for spirit 
casks, problems with their quality persisted. Some producers supplied their coopers with low- 
grade glue that failed to seal the cracks between the staves. Problems also occurred when barrels 
were constructed of incompletely dried staves to which the glue refused to adhere securely. To 
ensure a properly sealed cask, coopers added three coats o f glue. Because leaks were especially 
common around the casks’ heads, coopers had to turn the cask on each end for thirty minutes to 
permit glue to collect around the edges. No matter how well a cask was glued, however, if it did 
not dry for a sufficient time, the warm spirits sometimes dissolved the glue, causing the cask to 
eventually leak. Even the best producers sometimes neglected to allow the glued casks to 
properly dry.32
Turpentine workers received wages based on the difficulty of the tasks they performed; 
however, even skilled workers like distillers and coopers earned little. Turpentine wages closely 
resembled farm wages between 1900 and 1930. Before the outbreak of the First World War, 
wages paid to both farm and naval stores workers laboring for the same Florida employer 
averaged around $1 for a twelve to fourteen hour day. Between the outbreak o f the World War I 
and the United States’ entry into the war, turpentine wages dipped, just as they did in agriculture 
jobs. The outbreak of war interrupted trade causing naval stores prices to fall. To compensate, 
producers lowered wages. The Leonard brothers’ turpentine operation in Calhoun County,
32 Maguire, interview by author; A.V. Wood, “Notes on Glue for Sizing Turpentine 
Barrels,” S June 1922, Cary Collection, 1-2.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
469
Florida, for example, dropped its pay by as much as forty percent for chipping and twenty 
percent for dipping. Even the Leonards’ woodsrider had his wage cut from $2 a day to SI .80. 
Most naval stores workers during these years typically earned less than $1 a  day. But wages rose 
between 1917 and 1920 as the United States entered the war and required naval stores for 
preparation. However in the 1920s wages once again fell. By 1929 six chippers and dippers 
working in Washington County, Florida, earned on average around $1 a day, the pre-war wage. 
The highest paid received $441.98 for the year and the lowest $238.87. In the same county a 
distiller made considerably more, $75 per month. This rate was about the same as in other areas 
of the turpentine South, but regional variation did occur. In 1929 wages paid to turpentine 
laborers in Washington County, for example, were twenty percent lower than in Appling County, 
Georgia.33
Men, women, and children received different amounts of pay, probably because the men 
performed the most physically taxing and, thus, the highest paid tasks. On one typical day in 
1914, men at the Leonard Florida turpentine operation earned $1 to $1.25, women received 600, 
and children 300. Dipping, the job that required the least skill and strength, consequently paid 
the least. Dippers could expect to earn between 50 and 6.660 per filled bucket. But because the 
wage was based on piece work, earnings varied greatly between laborers. At the Leonard
33 Clifton Paisley, “Wade Leonard, Florida Naval Stores Operator,” The Florida 
Historical Quarterly 51 (April 1973): 387-388; Gavin Wright, Old South. New South: 
Revolutions in the Southern Economy Since the Civil War (New York: Basic Books, 1986), 
202-203; Brower and La Fontisee, “Report of the Investigation on the Naval Stores Industry,” 
50; Otho Monroe, interview by Michael Garvey, 19 March 1975, Mississippi Oral History 
Program, McCain Library and Archives, University o f Southern Mississippi, 5; F. Ray 
Marshall, Labor in the South (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), 94-95; Jeffrey A. 
Drobney, Lumbermen and Log Sawyers: Life. Labor, and Culture in the North Florida Timber 
Industry. 1830-1930 (Macon. GA: Mercer University Press, 1997), 142; E.A. Ziegler, A.R. 
Spillers, and C.H. Coulter, Financial Aspects of Growing Southern Pine. Washington Countv 
Florida (Tallahassee: Florida Forest Service, 1931), 56-57; Register, interview.
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operation, the fastest o f six chippers earned $2 in one day in May 1914, although typically he 
made only between $1.12 and $1.73 a day. One of the slowest workers, by contrast, received as 
little as 350 one day that same month. Chipping, which was a much more difficult and 
demanding task, paid better than dipping. The Leonards paid 750 per each one thousand faces.
In one week, one of their chippers earned $11.16. Chippers, who received payment for each chip 
whether the wound yielded gum or not, had an advantage over dippers in that their pay did not 
depend in large part on pine gum production, which could vary significantly between crop and 
season. Chippers were assigned a quota o f  faces they were to chip each week. Although each 
work assignment was designed to take five days, especially diligent workers could complete it in 
three or four days. No matter how many days it took them to complete the task, though, they 
were paid the same.34
Very few women worked in the turpentine forests. Instead, they remained busy in the 
quarters and worked at jobs both within and outside the camp. Women took care of the many 
children in the camp. In Washington County, Florida, for example, families o f turpentine women 
averaged between three and four children. Women also tended their households’ garden and 
looked after their chickens and pigs, which they bred, killed, cured, and cooked. Evidence 
suggests that the intensity o f this female-dominated domestic food production was related to the 
wage level in the camp. In Washington County, where pay for turpentine was lower than in other 
areas of the southeast and provided “the minimum of existence incomes,” the workers appeared 
to one forester “to do a little more gardening for raising vegetables.”35 Along with raising food,
34 Paisley, “Wade Leonard,” 387; Wright, Old South. New South. 202-203; Brower and 
La Fontisee, “Report o f the Investigation on the Naval Stores Industry,” 50; Monroe, interview.
35 Ziegler, et al., Financial Aspects o f Growing Southern Pine. 562.
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women also cooked two meals a day, canned, nursed the sick and injured, and boiled the 
hardened gum out o f stiffened overalls.36
Some women found odd jobs around the camp to earn extra income. Working in groups 
of two or three and accompanied by their small children and older daughters, some women 
gathered deartongue, a plant native to  the southeastern pine forest and used as an aromatic, and 
dried it on the tin rooftops at the camp. They then sold it by the pound to a buyer who marketed 
it. Other women worked as domestics for the turpentine operations’ white owners and 
employees. The women selected for these jobs reportedly considered themselves fortunate to 
have the steady work. Still other women found jobs planting trees and cleaning cups at the 
season’s end. In many cases women were limited to jobs at the camp because of its isolated 
location. However, if other white families lived nearby, the women could find jobs as domestics 
in homes outside the camp. At one less remote Florida camp, some women and older children 
worked in nearby potato fields.37
Marriages at turpentine camps were encouraged but few were legal. Marriages 
facilitated good camp government and economical use of housing. Therefore, producers pushed 
single men and women to marry in a “commissary wedding,” not unlike those performed in 
turpentine camps in the late-nineteenth century. The producers or camp managers would decide 
with a couple that they should marry, assign them a cabin, and open an account for them at the 
commissary. Husbands and wives generally grew up in either the same camp or in neighboring
36 Vail, “Turpentine Business,” 326; Wright, “Turpentining,” 109-112; Monroe, 
interview, 4; Maguire, interview by author, Thomas, McCranie’s Turpentine Still. C-3.
37 Vail, “Turpentine Business;” Robert N. Lauriault, “From Can’t to Can’t: The North 
Florida Turpentine Camp, 1900-1950.” The Florida Historical Quarterly 67 (January 1989): 
326; Wright, “Turpentining,” 109-112; Monroe, interview, 4; Maguire, interview by author; 
Thomas, McCranie’s Turpentine Still. C-3.
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camps. They usually married young. The camp community did not regard boys as adults until 
they wed and, until then, their fathers received their pay as part of his household’s income. If a 
couple had some extra money, a rare occurrence, they might go to the county courthouse and get 
a marriage license. In 1916, however, a minor scandal erupted over the informality of turpentine 
camp marriages. A white northern preacher learned o f the practice of commissary weddings and 
brought such intense public attention to bear on it that camp foremen were chided to get marriage 
licenses for their workers. Many of the couples had been together for decades. The scandal 
however, was short-lived and the practice o f commissary weddings continued.38
Couples and their families lived in clusters of cabins called “the quarters,” which made 
up part o f the camp complex. Camps were most often set in isolated locations so that workers 
could live near the forest in which they labored and producers could protect their workers from 
other operators hoping to recruit them away. In many camps the owner, manager, or woodsrider 
lived beside the only road into the camp, usually a two-rut path, to monitor who came and went. 
Usually quarters contained between twenty-five and forty houses arranged in a variety of 
patterns. At some camps shanties were scattered about the woods to provide a moderate amount 
of privacy. Other camps had cabins spaced according to a grid pattern. Still others lacked any 
organization at all, with houses built wherever the owner happened to choose. Separate quarters 
were provided for the single men away from the family cabins to prevent disruption caused by 
single men flirting with married women.39 Some workers preferred to live alone in the woods.
38 Kennedy, Palmetto Country. 266; Federal Writers’ Project, Florida. 37; Wright, 
“Turpentining,” 113; Maguire, interview by author; Tegeder, “Prisoners of the Pines,” 183.
39 Maguire, interview by author; Sandra Jo Forney, “The Importance o f Sites Related to 
the Naval Stores Industry in Florida,” (paper presented at the thirty-seventh annual meeting o f 
the Florida Anthropological Society, Daytona Beach, Florida, 198S), 3; Wright, 
“Turpentining,” 109-110; Baker, “Summerall Turpentine Still,” 7; Kennedy, Palmetto Country.
265.
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The houses, as in the nineteenth century, remained small and primitive, mere shanties. 
They customarily contained only between 260 and 550 square feet o f living space. Workers with 
important jobs received larger homes. A foreman at one Florida operation lived in a six-room 
house. If a family grew too large for its assigned cabin, rooms were added or the producer 
moved them to a somewhat larger dwelling. Evidence suggests that, despite arrangements made 
for large families, living space remained cramped. At one Florida operation, for example, nearly 
six people on average lived in each house. The wooden structures, with rare exception, were 
unpainted and lacked running water and electricity. Despite their modest character, most houses 
were reportedly neatly kept, the yards swept clean, and vegetables cultivated in backyard 
gardens.40 Zora Neal Hurston explained in her novel Seraph on the Suwanee that “teppentine 
[sic] shacks are not built for beauty. They are temporary shelters. In a few years usually the 
woods are worked out, and the camp is moved. The houses are tom down and put up again at the 
new location.”41
Camp living quarters were typically racially segregated. The black workers’ quarters 
were located at one end of the camp, and the white owners, manager, woodsriders, and their 
families lived in finer homes at the other end. As a general rule, white children did not play with 
black children and black and white adults did not socialize. Each race had constant contact with 
the other, however. White men had close contact with the black workers, whom they managed,
40 Maguire, interview by author; Fomey, ‘importance o f Sites,” 3; Wright, 
“Turpentining,” 109-110; Baker. “Summerall Turpentine Still,” 7; Kennedy, Palmetto Country.
265.
41 Zora Neale Hurston, Seraph on the Suwanee. in Novels and Stories. The Library of 
America (New York: Literary Classics o f the United States, Inc., 1995), 651.
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and the white women and children saw black men and women at work about the camp as well as 
in and around their homes.42 One white woman recalled that, as a child in a  turpentine camp, “I 
didn’t have any fear o f the colored families. We didn’t socialize with them, but we knew them 
all. They had gardens and brought fresh vegetables to my mother. We shared with them, too.”43 
Commissaries continued as the principal suppliers o f  the basic staples o f the turpentine 
worker’s diet: meat, lard, pork and beans, and peas, most of it sold in cans and at inflated prices. 
Even if a turpentine business failed to turn a profit, producers could usually count on their 
commissaries to operate in the black. In 1922 one Florida turpentine establishment had an 
operating deficit of $35,527.48. The commissary, however, showed a profit o f $2,230.46. In 
most moderately-sized operations the commissary opened only for a few hours, sometimes only 
in the afternoons or on Fridays. Purchases were made either on credit or with scrip paid to 
workers instead of cash. Some camps were located close enough to communities that workers 
could trade with town merchants. Workers also supplemented purchased goods with produce 
raised in their gardens and livestock that they tended. Men supplied the household with game, 
some hunting with dogs and an old single-barrel shotgun and others using a sack to catch 
opossum. During the weekdays men might take the opportunity at lunch to fish.44
42 Kennedy, Palmetto Country. 265; Monroe, interview, 3-4; Wright, “Turpentining,”
110.
43 Wright, “Turpentining,” 110.
44 Johnston McNeill Company, Report, 1922, Powell Papers; Register, interview; 
Paisley, “Wade Leonard,” 386; Wright, “Turpentining,” 103; Thomas, McCranie’s Turpentine 
Still. C-3; T.G. Willis report, 16 February 1931, Classified Subject Files, Department of 
Justice Central Files, General Records o f the Department o f Justice, Record Group 60, 
National Archives.
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Workers ate their breakfast and lunch in the forest. Every morning they carried their 
food in half-gallon lard cans and their water in gallon-sized bottles wrapped in a wet sack and 
tied with baling wire to keep it cool. Arriving around daylight by wagon, or after the 1910s by 
truck, workers might build a fire and eat breakfast as they waited for light. They usually used 
these breakfast sites as a “hang up place,” somewhere to leave their coats, lunch buckets, and 
water bottles. If the area had ants, workers employed a sapling as a “hang up tree.” Before 
hanging their lunch from the small tree’s branches, they shaved six inches of bark off the trunk, 
exposing the gummy wood which would trap hungry ants that attempted to raid the lunch. If the 
breakfast site was inconvenient, workers might make a hang up place closer to the day’s work 
area. Woodsriders and producers knew that if they needed to find a man in the forest, they need 
but arrive at the hang up place around lunch time. Lunch items included black eye peas, collard 
greens, slabs of fat sowbelly, and combread or biscuits with cane syrup. Other lunch entrees 
included canned salmon mixed with rice, tomatoes, and beans as well as a dish called dooby, a 
mixture of meat, onions, and combread. Lunches were usually eaten cold, but in chilly weather 
the workers might build a fire and heat them.45
Because of the long daily work hours, on weekday evenings there was little time for 
rowdiness. Families in the close-knit communities would visit and make their own music. On 
Sundays part of the camp community attended worship services. Some camps contained a 
church which during the week might serve as a schoolhouse. If a camp lacked a church, religious 
services were held in one of the cabins. In most camps a worker also served as a preacher. 
Turpentine workers also filled leisure time by celebrating holidays. At at least one Florida camp 
the black workers, for an uncertain reason, celebrated May 20 as “Freedom Day” by slaughtering
45 Wright, “Turpentining,” 100-101; Maguire, interview with author.
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hogs and having a large barbecue. On weekend nights, which offered the majority o f free time, 
most entertainment centered around the camp juke joint, a house where men and women gathered 
to dance, drink moonshine, and flirt. Men gambled, some playing skin, a  popular card game. 
Fights frequently broke out at the juke. A common weapon in such altercations was a three-sided 
triangular file used to sharpen hack blades. It reportedly produced a cut worse than a knife in 
that the skin could close, leaving the victim bleeding internally. Producers and woodsriders tried 
to limit the revelry and keep the peace on weekends. Some attempted to control the amount of 
moonshine that came into the camp. Others required that alt activity end at midnight on Sundays 
so the men would be in fit shape for work the next morning. Some producers, although not all, 
even recognized blue Mondays after the payday weekend because their workers were frequently 
too hung over to manage the strenuous labor with the precision necessary for successful 
operation.46 One very large Georgia operator reported that his workers refused to work on 
Mondays. “If you made them go to the woods,” he explained, “they’d break a hack or go to sleep 
or spend the whole day fixin’ it. They wouldn’t work.”47 Despite the time for drinking, 
carousing, and gambling, turpentine workers were never free from oversight. As historian Robert 
N. Lauralt explains, “whatever else the turpentiners did besides work was done within the 
precinct of work-in sight of the tall pines they bled for a living, beneath the roofs of the
46 Thomas, McCranie’s Turpentine Still. C-2, C-3. Blount, Spirits o f  Turpentine. 41; 
Federal Writers’ Project, Florida. 377-378; Wyman, Florida Naval Stores. 9; C.R. Clark, 
Florida Trade Tokens (St. Petersburg, FL: Great Outdoors Publishing Co., 1980), 7-8;
Maguire, interview by author; Forney, “Importance of Sites,” 3, 5; Kennedy, Palmetto Country. 
265; Vail, “Turpentine Business,” 265; Wright, “Turpentining,” 119-120, 123-124; Monroe, 
interview, 3; Tegeder, “Prisoners o f the Pines,” 192, 158.
47 Wright, “Turpentining,” 124.
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company shanties, under the sharp eye of the woodsrider who held a control over their lives 
difficult to imagine outside of slavery.”48
At perhaps the most notorious turpentine camp, the Cross City, Florida, camp owned by 
Putnam Lumber Company, entertainment included only a juke joint and gambling, both o f  which 
the captain, G. Alston Brown, oversaw. With his workers under unusually intense control, 
Brown reportedly encouraged and, on some occasions, even forced workers to gamble. On 
paydays Brown played poker with the workers, some games lasting from noon on Saturdays till 
Monday mornings at six o’clock. Workers did not enjoy playing with Brown because, no matter 
what hand they were dealt, Brown took their money. Even when Brown lost he would take the 
workers’ winnings, telling them he would put it toward their account. If a worker complained, 
Brown beat him over the head with his pistol. Despite prohibition, alcohol was available at the 
juke joint. A local moonshiner sold it to Brown, who in turn charged his workers twenty-five 
cents a drink. Each week the camp consumed between five and eight gallons of whiskey.49
The monthly payday was typically a special time in turpentine camps when everyone, 
including the producer and woodsriders, went to the nearby town—the workers riding in the back 
of a camp wagon or truck, some sitting on chairs. Zora Neal Hurston explained that whereas 
people in the turpentine belt traveled to towns within a thirteen- to fourteen-mile radius o f the 
area, “few ever dreamed of venturing any farther east or west”50 Although the camp’s visit 
brought much-welcomed business to the town merchants, townspeople feared the black workers,
48 Lauriault, “From Can’t  to Can’t,” 311.
49 John Bonyne reports, 14 November 1921,26 May 1922, 3 May 1922, Cubberly 
Papers; Gary Moore, “Prisoner o f Riverside,” Folio Weekly 10 (28 May 1996): 17.
50 Hurston. Seraph on the Suwanee. 599.
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considering them wild and unruly, and thought o f the white woodsriders as outlaws.31 One 
laborer reported that “when we come to town folks would clear the streets.”52 The frequent 
arrests of turpentine workers provided small communities with easy revenue since producers and 
mangers willingly bailed their workers out of jail, their labor too valuable to be sacrificed.33
The power of the producer and camp manager over his workers included the laborers’ 
vote. A referendum on the relocation of one Wiregrass Georgia county seat in the 1910s 
illustrates this point. Lumber and naval stores men who had built up their operations along a 
railroad line that ran three miles from the county seat wanted the government center transferred 
to a more accessible railroad town where they already conducted much o f  their financial 
business. The timber men planned to use the vote of their large black labor forces to win 
approval for the new site. Black votes, however, were at a premium and led to the kidnapping of 
at least one turpentine producer’s laborers. After midnight on election eve supporters of the 
current county seat took the workers to an old mill shed, where they entertained them with 
canned goods, crackers, and whisky. As soon as the polls opened, the kidnapped laborers 
obediently voted to keep the old seat just as their abductors instructed them. When their 
employer discovered the trick and protested that “every one uv them niggers is mine, and I 
challenge their vote,” it was too late. Throughout the voting day other lumber and turpentine 
men kept a close eye on their workers to prevent a similar occurrence. They brought their 
laborers in on horse-drawn wagons, treating them to whisky along the way, and guarded them
31 Wright, “Turpentining,” 123; Maguire, interview by author.
32 Wright, “Turpentining,” 124.
33 Ibid., 123-124; Maguire, interview by author.
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once they reached the poll. With the boss at the front, the workers lined up behind him with 
woodsriders on each side and in the rear, then the group approached the polls and voted 
according to their employer’s wishes. Nevertheless, the lumber and turpentine men lost the 
referendum by twenty-seven votes.54
Like producers who sought tight control over laborers, woodsriders believed that they 
needed to rule the workers completely and harshly in order to gain their respect, maintain order, 
and extract efficient work.55 One woodsrider explained that “you’ve got to get out with your 
labor. If I don’t come out here, they don’t work.”56 Another remarked that he “never let one of 
them know when I was cornin’ or where I was.”57 One Georgia overseer reportedly “ruled the 
roost where he stayed, and if one got out of line he took a blackjack or somethin’ and 
straightened him out.”58 Every morning the overseer at the Jackson Lumber Company’s 
turpentine operation near the Florida and Alabama boarder entered the quarters and struck those 
who moved too slowly for his liking with an ax handle. During the work day he punished 
unsatisfactory work by tying laborers to pine trees and beating them with a buggy whip. The 
screams o f  his victims could reportedly be heard through the woods for half a mile.59 In 1915
54 J.L. Herring, Saturday Night Sketches: Stories of Old Wiregrass Georgia (Tifton, GA: 
The Sunny South Press, 1978), 112-116.
55 Kennedy, Palmetto Country. 265-266; Wright, “Turpentining,” 119; “The 
Turpentiners,” The Magnolia Monthly 7 (October 1969).
56 Quoted in Tegeder, “Prisoners of the Pines,” 163.
57 Quoted in Ibid., 163.
58 Quoted in Ibid., 164.
59 Ibid., 168
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one forester found that “life in the turpentine camps is often even tougher and more primitive 
than in the old time logging camp, yet some o f the turpentine operators carry on their 
establishment in the spirit o f the Old South.”60
One former Florida camp manager explained that the foreman had to cause fear and 
instill respect in the workers: “in speaking to him they call him Capm, but among themselves 
they call him The Man. And believe me, he better be a man from the ground up! If he ever 
stands for any back-talk or shows a streak of yellow he’s through, and might as well quit. For 
they lose all respect for him and won’t mind him. Even though they keep up a pretense of 
respect to his face, they’ll laugh at him behind his back and gang up to make his life miserable. 
They like to be ruled by an iron hand and no velvet glove.”61 Some managers did not hesitate to 
use deadly force to intimidate workers. At one eastern Louisiana turpentine operation the camp 
manager shot one of a group of blacks who had come to the camp only to gamble. Another 
company boss, Big Joe Watts, had seven notches on his gun by the late 1920s. Each notch 
represented just the number of white people he had killed, his black victims apparently not worth 
commemorating. In 1913 nine black turpentine workers were killed in the vicinity of
60 P.L. Buttrick, “Commercial Uses o f Longleaf Pine,” American Forestry 21 (Spring 
1915): 901.
61 He also believed himself to be especially talented at managing turpentine workers. 
“Seems like I always had a knack of handling labor,” be explained. “Being bom and raised 
with turpentine niggers 1 learned their nature. They all liked me because I was fair and firm, 
and they’d do anything for me. If I quit a job and went to another, ever last nigger on the place 
would follow me if I told em to.” Kennedy, Palmetto Country. 265-266.
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Blountstown, Florida, by the Apalachicola River. As was typically the case, legal officials paid 
little attention.62
The manager o f a camp, whether it was the producer himself, his foreman, or his 
woodsrider, ruled with near complete authority, in many instances acting as the police, judge, 
jury, and, occasionally, the executioner. If their laborers were jailed for violence at the juke 
joint, the trouble and expense of paying the fine and retrieving them from jail on Monday 
morning created a burden and expense for operators. Many camps were so isolated in the woods, 
however, that law enforcement officers rarely appeared in times o f disturbance, even in cases of 
murder. Few workers were arrested for killing other blacks. Producers refused to call the 
sheriff, even for murder cases, because they did not want their workers sitting idly in jail. At one 
camp, a murder investigation consisted of five or six white workers interviewing all the witnesses 
and writing up a report based on the information they gathered. They then submitted that report 
to the coroner’s office where it was filed, ending the matter. The purpose of the investigation 
was to maintain the peace by providing the minimum response necessary to prevent the law’s 
involvement. Owners and managers were interested in keeping their operation running with as 
little interruption as possible. The mere appearance o f law officers could also cause a producer 
to loose many o f his workers. Because a large number of the turpentine laborers had been in
62 The next year however, two especially gruesome murders outraged the whole 
community to the point that the suspects were prosecuted. On October 8, 1914 the body of a 
naval stores worker was found shot. Three young and well-connected whites were arrested and 
charged with the murder. Not long afterwards an employee of the turpentine operation where 
the victim had worked and a material witness in the case went missing. His body was later 
found with one shot in the back of the head and another in his back. Iron weights had been tied 
to his body with barb wire, and his body sunk in the deep portion o f a nearby creek. Wade 
Leonard saw that justice moved quickly. He secured one of Florida’s best trial lawyers to 
assist the state attorney. After a trial that lasted but one day, the three defendants were 
convicted o f second degree murder and received life sentences. Monroe, interview, 6; Elwood 
R. Maunder, Voices From The South: Recollections of Four Foresters (Santa Cruz, CA: Forest 
History Society, 1977), 73; Paisley, “Wade Leonard,” 388-389.
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trouble with the law, just the sight o f  a sheriff or his deputies could cause many laborers to leave 
and start work at another camp. The relatives o f a murder victim often preferred to handle the 
matter in their own way as well. They tended not to trust the authorities. Not only did many 
workers have criminal records, but they knew from experience that the law would fail to take the 
matter seriously.63 To escape the vengeance of his victim’s family and friends, a murderer 
commonly had to run away. One camp manager explained that “we got rid of two people every 
time one man was shot.”64
The turpentine operation at the town of Fargo, bordering the Okefenokee Swamp in 
southeastern Georgia, reveals the tough and lawless nature of some o f these establishments.
Fargo was an old lumber town purchased by a naval stores concern and used as the operating 
headquarters for seven different turpentine camps spread out in the surrounding forests. With 
ninety-six crops in the 1920s, it was probably the South’s largest turpentine operation at the time. 
The company served as it own law enforcement agency over the 210,000 acres it controlled and 
had agreements with the sheriffs, in whose counties its operation extended, not to come to Fargo 
unless sent for. Because the company manager tolerated any activity that did not directly 
interfere with the turpentine operation, an assortment of criminals on the run in Georgia and 
Florida sought refuge in and around the community, which soon became known as “Bad Man’s 
Fargo.” The absence of law enforcement attracted bootleggers during the days of prohibition. 
With nineteen liquor stills hidden in the forest within ten miles of Fargo, the community was the
63 Tegeder, Prisoners o f the Pines,” 166,240-241; Maunder, Voices from the South. 74-
75.
64 Maunder, Voices from the South. 74.
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center of Georgia’s moonshine production. The liquor went out in trucks to as far away as
Cincinnati.65
Although an unusually extreme case, the near-absolute power exercised by G. Alston 
Brown at his Cross City, Florida camp provides another illustration of the power camp managers 
and woodsriders often possessed over their workers. Brown’s guards kept an unrelenting watch 
over the workers. Some of the guards were other black workers who either earned status as 
Brown’s pets by showing their loyalty or, in a few cases, were forced to serve against their will. 
The guards patrolled the camp at night and reported any trouble directly to Brown. They had 
orders to shoot anyone who attempted to escape and were given considerable incentive to prevent 
escapes. For every worker who got away under an individual guard’s watch, the escapee’s debt 
was added to the guard’s. Brown also restricted workers’ contact with the outside world. In the 
woods each guard, armed with a pistol and a double-barrel shotgun, oversaw between five and 
seven men. When relatives went in search of their family members, Brown prevented their 
contact. He read all incoming and outgoing mail and reportedly stopped some letters from 
reaching their intended receivers.66
The most common form o f punishment at Cross City, even for unsatisfactory work, was 
severe beatings or whippings. Brown, however, occasionally employed even more brutal 
measures. Some workers he had hanged by one thumb. In extreme instances, workers were 
brutally murdered. In the first o f three known cases, the death appears not to have been 
intentional. As a policy, laborers had to work even if they were sick. One worker, Washington
65 Ibid., 72.
66 John Bonyne reports, 10 June 1921, 14 November 1921,3 May 1922; Howard P. 
Wright report, 9 September 1921, and E J. Cartier reports, 16 May 1922,18 May 1922,23 May 
1922, Cubberly Papers.
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Menner, was too ill to work. According to the customary practice in such cases, Mose Brown, 
the captain’s nephew, beat Menner to force him to work. Brown hit him with a  stick, knocked 
him to the ground, then beat him with a pistol grip and kicked him in the face, sides, and 
stomach. Afterwards, Menner could not get up or talk. He was carried in a wagon back to the 
camp, where he bled from his ears and remained incoherent until he died after a week or ten 
days. The rest of the camp was threatened with the same fate if  they told of the incident.67
In the second instance, the worker’s murder was unquestionably intentional and 
calculated. In the summer of 1921 James Powell, a black truck driver for Brown, took some 
women to another nearby camp for a party. When they arrived, Powell quarreled with the 
camp’s white boss about a piece of machinery missing from the truck. When Powell returned the 
next morning to pick up a load of dip, the camp boss attacked him with a large stick. Powell, 
however, took the stick and used it to beat the boss. Afterwards, Brown locked Powell in the 
commissary for over a day. On a Monday night the beaten camp boss, the county judge, who 
was the boss’s brother-in-law, and another man tied Powell’s hands, put him in their car and 
drove off. Two days later cattle drivers found the bloody remains of Powell’s legs, arms, and 
clothing in an area away from the road. To prevent the attracted buzzards from making off with 
the remains, one cattleman tied them to a tree with wire. When told o f Powell’s fate, the local 
sheriff showed no interest. Only after he was contacted by the governor—who had been notified 
of the incident by letter—did he come to investigate. Upon inspecting the remains, which 
included clothing identifying the victim as a turpentine worker, the sheriff placed them in a bag 
and buried them.68
67 John Bonyne reports, 3 May 1922, 5 May 1922,23 May 1922, and Ben Doyle sworn 
statement, 17 May 1922, Cubberly Papers.
68 John Bonyne report, 5 May 1922, and E.J. Cartier report, 16 May 1922, Cubberly 
Papers.
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In yet another grizzly incident, Brown and a group of men marched turpentine worker 
Mose Nellem out to a secluded field. Brown carried a shotgun and rope and kicked Nellem on 
the way there. It is unclear what actually happened to Nellem, but one witness reported that the 
men crossed a bridge into a field, stayed an hour, and returned without Nellem. The next 
morning Brown had the field plowed to erase any evidence of the previous evening’s activities.69
Women at the Brown camp were in an especially vulnerable situation. Women Brown 
hired to perform domestic services were subjected to the same reduced pay and claims of debt as 
the male turpentine workers. Some women arrived to visit their husbands only to find that 
Brown refused to let them leave and put them to work cooking and washing for the other 
workers. Many o f these ensnared women faced sexual abuse from the men at the camp. One 
woman, who had come to the camp to visit her daughter, refused Brown’s advances; he had her 
severely beaten. On at least one occasion Mose Brown beat a woman with his pistol and raped 
her. Other women were forced into prostitution with the camp workers. As a regular practice, 
male workers could engage in sexual relations with any woman in the camp, whether she was 
single or married. Those who resisted were beaten until they cooperated. In the cases of married 
women, their husbands were held prisoner in the stockade for the evening of the encounter. To 
regulate the prostitution, Brown devised a system of “cross time slips.” Male workers paid him 
between one and five dollars. In many cases the fee was charged to their commissary account. 
Brown in turn gave them a cross time slip which they presented to their woman o f choice. After
69 John Bonyne report, 3 May 1922, Cubberly Papers.
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the encounter, the woman turned the slip in to Brown and received less than half of the original 
price paid for the service.70
Brown also subjected camp women to severe punishments. One woman received a 
beating for accidentally dropping water on Brown’s dog and a whipping for telling another that 
she wished Brown was dead. Brown also kicked and whipped a cook and wash woman for 
unknown reasons.71 Another woman, Lillie Johnson, Brown’s unwilling sixteen-year-old 
mistress with whom he fathered a child, received an appallingly brutal beating in the fall o f 1920 
after he suspected her o f seeing another man.72 Brown had raped her when she was twelve and 
continued a sexual relationship until the beating. While her mother watched, Brown had his men 
drag Lillie into the woods, strip her to the waist, and administer one hundred lashes with a strap. 
Then, under Brown’s orders, her hair was cut off to her scalp. That night her mother tended her 
wounds and for the next three weeks Brown forced her to stay in his house.73
Many southern blacks acknowledged the difficult existence o f turpentine workers, most 
of whom experienced nowhere near the agony as those laboring for Brown. Zora Neal Hurston 
describes the north Florida turpentine region as containing only “scratchy plantings” o f  com, 
cane potatoes, tobacco, and small patches of cotton, “the people being mostly occupied in the
70 John Bonyne reports, 3 May 1922, 10 June 1921, 14 November 1921, and M.J. Cronin 
and John Bonyne report, 8 May 1922, Cubberly Papers; Moore, “Prisoner of Riverside,” 16-17.
71 John Bonyne report, 3 May 1922, Cubberly Papers.
72 Her sister, Vina Lee Wright, also had a child by Brown. Brown had raped her when 
she was thirteen and continued repeatedly to molest and beat her.
73 M.J. Cronin and John Bonyne report, 5 May 1922 and John Bonyne report, IS July 
1922, Cubberly Papers.
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production of turpentine and lumber.” Life, she explained, revolved around the still and mill, 
“then too there was ignorance and poverty, and the every-present hook worm.”74 One former 
turpentine worker himself admitted that many laborers in the camps were ignorant, uninformed, 
and incapable of managing their own affairs, but added that the camps brutality, lack of schools, 
and economic exploitation and paternalism—all conditions created by white producers—made 
them this way.75
For its part, the white community generally agreed that black turpentine workers were 
different from other African-Americans, but disagreed as to whether turpentine workers were 
“good” blacks or “bad.” The wife of one producer explained that “a turpentine Negro was . . .  
different from all other Negroes.”76 Many had been bom and raised in the isolated camps and 
knew little of the world beyond the forest. They had little education and generally lacked skills 
in anything except turpentine production. When whites encountered workers on their monthly 
trips to town, they appeared ignorant, crude, and indolent, despite showing the customary respect 
toward whites77 One white man explained in 1910 that despite their shortcomings, black
74 Hurston, Seraph on the Suwanee. 599.
75 Maunder, Voices from the South. 36; Kennedy, Palmetto Country. 265; I.F. Eldredge, 
The 4 Forests and the Future of the South (Washington, DC: The Charles Lathrop Pack 
Forestry Foundation, 1947), 41; Paisley, “Wade Leonard,” 386; Maguire, interview by author; 
Register, interview; Nollie Hickman, Mississippi Harvest: Lumbering in the Loncleaf Pine 
Belt 1840-1915 (University: The University of Mississippi. 1962), 146-147; Tegeder, 
“Prisoners of the Pines,” 184.
76 Thomas, McCranie’s Turpentine Still.
77 Maunder, Voices from the South. 36; Kennedy, Palmetto Country. 265; Eldridge, The 
4 Forests. 41; Paisley, “Wade Leonard,” 386; Maguire, interview by author; Register, 
interview; Hickman, Mississippi Harvest 146-147; Tegeder, “Prisoners of the Pines,” 184.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
488
turpentine laborers were bard workers. “The negro o f the pineries,” he reported, “is careless, 
often brutal, always happy-go-lucky, but the men who employ him say that he works well with 
right management; in fact, is the best labor that can be had for the place, and that the business 
would not know what to do without him. He surely fits the scene and one would be sorry to miss 
him from it.”78 Writing in the early 1920s, a naval stores man argued that turpentine workers 
were the same as other blacks, who he believed were harmless when under a white man’s control. 
He did not believe that “a turpentine negro is any worse than others of his race under similar 
conditions. The country at large has somehow gotten the idea that the turpentine negro is worse 
than other kinds of nergoes. This impression is an erroneous one, and one which injustice to the 
turpentine negro, should be corrected.”79 A 1926 minstrel song described turpentine workers as 
satisfied with the steady work that kept them fed and allowed them to enjoy the outdoors. It also 
implied that they were concerned with forest fires as a potential threat to their livelihood.
De Woods o f  Pine
An old dark-y sing-in’ in de woods o f pine A work-in de trees for 
turpentine, My luch hit grows with the Pine-y Wood 
And while pines grow my luck stays good, Food in de kitch-en and de 
times ain’t hard When a man works out in God’s front yard.
Chorus:
Pay day’s com-in’ while de pine trees grow, Hits de sur-est thing dat a 
a man can know De wolf am a com-ing right in de door, When de 
old Pine-y Wood ain’t here no more.
78 Winthrop Packard, Florida Trails: As Seen From Jacksonville to Kev West and From 
November to April Inclusive (Boston: Small, Maynard and Company, Publishers, 1910), 281.
79 Pridgen, “Turpentining in the South Atlantic Country,” 104.
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List-en hon-ey if you want to farm Don’t  let de Pine-y Wood 
come to harm Dey’s al-ways workin for de far-mer hard Like 
great big soldier men a stand-in’ guard Keepin’ way drought de 
frost de bugs Oh hap-py am de farm de Pine-y Woods hugs.
Chorus
When you hear de wind a hum-min in de pine Hit makes a tune dat 
sounds mighty fine De big pine trees are a makin dat sound A 
talkin’ to dere ba-bies close to de ground Little pine babies growin’ 
down be-Iow Got-ta help dem babies if dey’s go-in’ to grow.
Chorus
When you hear de big old pine trees start to moan Dere’s fire in de woods dat 
Makes dem groan De lit-tle fire kills de lit-tle ba-by trees De 
grass and birds, but no ticks nor fleas Big fires kill de 
big trees too, We got-ta stop de fires, what-ev-er we do.
Chorus80
Other whites believed that black turpentiners were indeed lazy and dangerous. One 
Georgia producer complained that he was “short o f labor but that is the trouble with all of the 
turpentine people in this part of the state.”*1 John Casson, the president o f one of the most 
powerful naval stores factorage houses in the South, agreed that turpentine workers were lazy, 
but identified this laziness as a phenomenon o f the early 1920s. Casson maintained that “Sambo 
is not as strong, vigorous or healthy as he was thirty to forty years ago. Disease has made 
inroads into his constitution and he cannot give the service now as then even should he so desire. 
Today the producer pays exceedingly high wages for very poor work, the result being that it 
takes from two and one-half men to do one man’s work and the expense o f operating the average
80 Warren Nicke and Lucille De Mert, “De Woods of Pine,” (Chicago: De Mert and 
Dougerty, 1926).
81 W.M. Sharpe to Yeoman, 7 January 1907, Wilbur M. Sharpe Papers, South 
Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina.
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turpentine farm is ten times more than in the period mentioned.”82 In 1905 Florida explained that 
its rising crime rate resulted in part from “the rapid growth o f  the turpentine and lumber 
industries in Florida” which had “caused an influx o f a  floating population that follow this class 
of work.”83 Because many whites shared the view that turpentine blacks were dangerous, not all 
communities allowed operations in their vicinity. In the early 1900s, for example, the Taylor 
brothers sold their turpentine business in South Lake County, Florida, and moved about fifteen 
miles northward to the community o f Mascotte to start a new operation. However, Mascotte, 
which had no black residents and certainly did not want to add the likes of turpentine workers to 
their population, refused to allow the Taylors to bring their workers with them. Instead, the 
Taylors established their new operation a few miles to the east.84
A comparison of American and French turpentine workers reveals the harshness of the 
southern turpentine workers’ existence. Not only did French turpentine workers appear not to 
have suffered such intense prejudice, they experienced a very different work situation and 
apparently fared considerably better than their American counterparts in the first decade of the 
twentieth century. One major difference was the size o f the average French operator’s labor 
force, which tended to be considerably smaller than the dozens o f families who typically labored 
for each American producer. In fact many French producers worked their own trees with no
82 J.A.G. Carson, “The Increased Cost o f Naval Stores Production,” in Naval Stores: 
History. Production. Distribution and Consumption, ed. Thomas Gamble (Savannah: Review 
Publishing and Printing Company, 1921), 73.
83 The Eighth Biennial Report o f the Commissioner o f Florida for the Period Beginning 
January 1. 1903. and Ending December 31. 1904 (Tallahassee, FL: L.B. Hilson, State Printer, 
1905), 318.
84 William T. Kennedy, History of Lake Countv. Florida. Lake County Historical 
Society, Tavares, FL, 108.
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help. In the late 1910s, there were around 15,000 turpentine wood lot owners in the Landes 
region, but only around ten thousand laborers. Although French chippers worked hard at similar 
tasks to those of American workers, their pace appears to have been less intense. French 
chippers typically worked around eight thousand to nine thousand faces a week, compared to ten 
thousand for U.S. workers. Perhaps the greatest difference between American and French naval 
stores workers was their manner of compensation, which allowed the French considerably more 
autonomy. Where American workers received pay based on the number of individual tasks they 
performed, French laborers worked the turpentine forest on shares. Workers typically received 
half the value of the gum they collected and carried to the still. Some producers, however, 
capped the potential amount a worker could receive if the barrel exceeded a certain value. In the 
late 1910s this limit was around $11.58. Also, at certain operations the depreciation of the cups 
and gutters was deducted from the workers’ half of the value. Regardless of the restrictions and 
charges, by working on shares, laborers had added incentive to produce greater quantities when 
prices rose. This reaction helped prevent prices from reaching extremely high levels because, as
D f
the supply increased, the value declined.
Not only work, but the life experiences o f French turpentine laborers differed from those 
in the American South. Unlike American turpentine workers whose energy was focused almost 
solely on gum collection and processing, most French laborers also worked as small farmers. In 
many cases their small farms consisted of a vegetable garden, a few grape vines, and a forage 
crop. In all their work these farmers/turpentine laborers were assisted by their families. French 
turpentine workers also appear to have lived more comfortably than their American counterparts.
85 R. Zon, “Notes on French Turpentine Industry,” 5 December 1918, Olustee 
Experiment Station Files, Georgia Agrirama, Tifton, GA, 4; J.F. Butler, “Production and Trade 
in Naval Stores in France,” 20 July 1924, Cary Collection, 8,11; W.L.E. Barnett, “Preliminary 
Report for Naval Stores Commission,” 23 August 1924, Cary Collection, 8-9,24.
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French laborers lived in small villages with a schoolhouse, imposing Catholic church, sawmill, 
store, cafes, and inns. Their houses were constructed of stone, brick, or cement, and roofed with 
tile. In many cases a turpentine distillery was located nearby. Unlike American turpentine 
operations, in which the quarters and still would have been constructed at the same time, usually 
in a sparsely populated area, the French stills were constructed near previously settled villages, 
some centuries old.86
One of the greatest factors that created better circumstances for French turpentine 
workers over American laborers was the former’s labor organization. French workers 
established small regional syndicates which together formed the Federation o f Syndicates of 
Gum Gatherers of the Southwest. The active organization in 1906 launched a significantly 
disruptive strike which forced producers to agree to their terms. Workers were guaranteed half 
the price o f gum, less six francs to compensate the forest owner or lessee for transportation costs 
and depreciation on the cups and gutters. Also, according to the deal, turpentine barrels were to 
have a volume of 340 liters and the sale price was to be based on average market price.
Allotment of pines to workers by the owner or lessee was to be made by the first o f  each year and 
had to receive the approval of the Governing Board of the Union. Laborers agreed to perform 
the chipping and dipping according to the producers’ instructions, however they did have the 
right to make at least six to seven dippings, depending on the pine’s yield. They also agreed to 
work only the trees designated by the producers. By the late 1910s producers had organized
86 Butler, “Production and Trade in Naval Stores in France,” 8; Barnett, “Preliminary 
Report for Naval Stores Commission,” 23; Zon, “Notes on French Turpentine Industry,” 4; I.F. 
Eldredge, “How the French Turpentine System Looked to an American,” in Naval Stores: 
History. Production. Distribution and Consumption, ed. Thomas Gamble (Savannah: Review 
Publishing and Printing Company, 1921), 172.
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themselves to cope not only with their workers’ demands, but with the naval stores buyers who 
exercised considerable control over the market.*7
Although union organizers met with some success within the southern lumber industry, 
turpentine workers were never unionized. In 1910 supporters of the Industrial Workers o f the 
World organized the Brotherhood o f Timber Workers. Its membership rapidly reached a high of 
thirty thousand, most o f  the members from the western reaches of the pine belt, and its liberal 
race policy resulted in high participation rates o f black workers. Turpentine workers failed to 
join other timber industry workers in organizing for four reasons. First, within the highly racially 
stratified industry there was a general lack of willingness among black and white workers to 
cooperate; in most cases the white employees refused to join with the black majority o f the work 
force. The frequent movement of the workers prevented the establishment of a stable labor base 
from which to recruit union members. Thirdly, workers were so entirely dependent on the 
operators for everything-housing, food, and medical care-that striking would have seriously 
jeopardize their entire livelihoods. Finally, there was little sympathy in the South for labor 
organization or strikes and opposition to activity by timber industry workers developed early 
with the 1906 organization of the Southern Lumber Operators Association. All four of these 
factors affected the lumber industry as well. But because the naval stores industry felt their 
influence the greatest, its workers were wholly prevented from organizing while lumber workers 
only saw their unionizing activity partially restricted.**
87 Barnett, “Preliminary Report for Naval Stores Commission,” 9-10,24; Butler, 
“Production and Trade in Naval Stores in France,” 8.
88 Paisley, “Wade Leonard,” 387-388; Wright, Old South. New South. 202-203; Brower 
and La Fontisee, “Report of the Investigation on the Naval Stores Industry,” 50; Monroe, 
interview, 5; Marshall, Labor in the South. 94-95; Drobney, Lumbermen and Log Sawyers. 
142; Ziegler, et al., Financial Aspects o f Growing Southern Pine. 56-57; Register, interview.
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Just as American turpentine workers live an existence unlike that of their counterparts in 
France and other southern blacks, turpentine producers also worked and lived differently than 
other whites in the region did. Turpentine operators and woodsriders were considered by many 
southern whites as tough pioneer types. Not only did they have to maintain order in their camps, 
a potentially dangerous duty, but, like their laborers, they lived in the isolated forest and moved 
frequently. They lost regular contact with the outside world and, although they lived at a  better 
standard than their workers, the turpentine producers’ existence was not very high by the larger 
white community’s standards. Their diet differed relatively little from their laborers’, and their 
houses, which admittedly contained more room than anyone else’s in the camp, represented 
rather primitive construction. The only church to attend was often one for the workers and there 
was no school for producers’ children. School age children either had to attend a small, poorly 
funded school, learn from a tutor, or attend school away from home. Frequent camp moves 
challenged the access to and stability of their education. The son of one manager began school 
when he was six years old in a  small one-room log school house. Four years later the family 
moved to another camp one county away where the boy had to enter the new area’s little 
school.89
Wives o f producers and woodsriders faced many challenges in such isolated locations. 
The experience of Ida Willis illustrates the difficulties of white women in turpentine camps.
Mrs. Williams met her husband R. Allen Willis in the early 1910s through his sisters, with whom 
she attended Columbia College in South Carolina. Willis was a young turpentiner, just two years 
in the business. He worked an 11,000-acre operation twenty miles up the New River from 
Carrabelle, Florida, a small community on the Gulf and south, southwest of Tallahassee. When
89 Pridgen, “Turpentining in the South Atlantic Country,” 104; Kennedy, Palmetto 
Country. 265; Ashmore, “Looking Back: The Woodsrider,” 13-14, 16,24.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
495
they married Ida joined Allen at this location. Upon Ida’s arrival at the camp in June 1915, the 
curious stares of the black workers, who rarely if ever left the area and wanted to see the owner’s 
new wife, unnerved her. Moreover, the camp’s isolation and primitive nature immediately left 
her troubled. The only other human habitations in the area were other turpentine camps, but even 
they were a fair distance away. The journey to Carrabeile, the nearest town, required a three 
hour boat trip. However, because the boat was old and broke down frequently, it was an 
unreliable means of transportation. The trip could also be made by horse if the rider did not 
mind swimming with the horse across the river. Ida’s house sat next to the river. It had no 
running water, but had an outhouse in the yard. Once Ida settled in to her new home, she looked 
forward to purchasing her china and silver with money given to her by her parents for that 
purpose. The camp’s operating capital ran short, however, and her husband needed the money to 
pay the workers.90
Ida’s days were spent embroidering tablecloths and napkins, cleaning the house with the 
help of a washerwoman, and preparing meals for herself and her husband. The couple’s day 
began early. Allan rode into the woods on horseback to see that the men began work by daylight. 
He returned for his lunch at around one o’clock and took a nap before heading back to the woods. 
The Willis’ meals consisted of a monotonous staple of cabbage, venison, pork and beans, and 
poultry. A boat with supplies came once a week from Appaiachicola. Ida often bought 
something extra for the meals from i t  Despite their isolation, however, the Willises received 
mail every other day.
Ida saw little of the laborers. As was typical of turpentine camp layouts, the workers’ 
quarters were located far away from the owner’s house. Nevertheless, she feared the laborers.
90 Fifteen years later she was finally able to buy her wedding presents.
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many of whom were ex-convicts. In fact just before she arrived, one had attempted to kill Allen. 
She slept with a pistol when her husband was away. She also claimed that the workers stole from 
her twice, once taking a spoon and on another occasion her college annual. Although there was 
virtually no law enforcement in the isolated area, Allen and the distiller had no trouble 
maintaining order.
After less than two years, Ida left the camp. By the time her first child was bom in 1917 
she had moved to Greenwood, Florida, near the boarder of southeastern Alabama, where her 
husband became a farmer, then a store clerk, and finally a bank president. He had left the 
turpentine business, not out of respect for Ida’s feelings, but because price decreases had forced 
him out.91
Along with turpentine producers, woodsriders, and wage laborers, leased convicts shared 
the lonely rural piney woods environment, but endured working and living conditions of the most 
difficult variety. Like peonage, convict leasing targeted blacks. Thinking back to this period, a 
former convict supervisor recalled that “if a white man went to prison during the days of convict 
leasing, he had to be pretty bad. But a  nigger was sent up for anything and sometimes for 
nothing.”92 The same factors that strengthened peonage around the turn of the century—a tight 
labor market and the belief that blacks would not work unless compelled—made convict leasing a 
vigorous practice. During the first two decades o f the twentieth century, the leasing price for 
Florida convicts rose substantially, reflecting the intense demand for their labor. Once every 
four years Florida leased its convicts to the highest bidder, who in turn subleased them at a profit 
In 1902 the Florida Naval Stores and Commission Company leased all of Florida’s convicts for
91 Thomas, McCranie's Turpentine Still. C-l - C-4.
92 Quoted in N. Gordon Carper, “The Convict-Lease System in Florida, 1866-1923” 
(Ph.D. diss., Florida State University, 1964), 290.
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$ 150 a piece for a total o f  four years. Four years later another bidder paid $207.70. The next 
subleaser, the Florida Pine Company, won the bid in 1910, leasing between 1,400 and 1,800 the 
state’s convicts for $323.84 each for four years, more than double the cost eight years earlier. 
Despite the rise in leasing costs, profits from subleasing remained substantial, ranging from 
$ 100,000 to $ 130,000 annually.93 Income for the state was even greater. In the four years the 
Florida Pine Company held the lease, Florida received $1,293,252.20 for its convicts. During 
Florida’s convict lease system’s first thirty-two years, the state received $2,722,620.14. Until 
1902 the proceeds went in the state treasury’s general fund. Afrer that the state dispersed the net 
proceeds to the individual counties based proportionally on their average property value. In 
1903, for example, Florida’s counties received a total o f $156,687.78.
As in the late nineteenth century, convict leasing could solve many o f a producer’s labor 
difficulties. A 1910 report on Florida convicts explained that convicts were employed “in the 
most remote places and their labor used where free labor is hard to get or control.”94 One 
reporter explained that “the convict is a very desirable workman. He can be counted on for six 
days a week from dawn till dark, and that is more than can be said of any but a very few negroes, 
most o f whom obey their own sweet, wayward, indifferent will.”95 Convict leasing was 
especially popular among turpentine producers. In Georgia, where convicts were leased to a 
variety of businesses, it was believed their concentration was highest in the southern counties,
93 Matthew J. Mancini, One Dies. Get Another Convict Leasing in the American South. 
1866-1928 (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1996), 192; Barry, “Slavery in the 
South To-Day,” 484,486; Drobney, Lumbermen and Log Sawyers. 168; Marc N. Goodnow, 
“Turpentine: Impressions o f the Convict Camps of Florida,” The Survey 34 (1 May 1915): 107.
94 Eleventh Biennial Report o f the Commissioner o f Agriculture of the State of Florida 
for the Period Beginning January 1.1909. and Ending December 31. 1910 (Tallahassee, FL: T.J. 
Appleyard, State Printer, 1911), 567-568.
95 Barry, “Slavery in the South To-Day,” 486.
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the location o f most turpentine and lumber camps. In Florida, turpentiners were the principal 
lessees of convicts. The use o f convicts in Florida turpentine operations grew from twenty-seven 
percent o f the state prison population in 1899 to over ninety percent in 1910. In 1903 and 1904, 
about three hundred state prisoners worked in phosphate mining and approximately eight 
hundred in turpentining. In 1907 and 1908, there was an even greater divergence, nearly 160 
worked in phosphate and 1,736 in both turpentine and other lumber operations, but mostly in 
turpentine. Those businesses that worked the convicts found leasing very lucrative. In 1912 the 
average profit for a naval stores operation working convicts was reportedly $25,000.96 The 1909- 
1910 Florida Commission o f Agriculture report explained that “as Florida produces perhaps 
more than half o f the naval stores products o f the United States, and prices prevailing being high, 
we are able to secure the highest prices for the labor of our prisoners o f any section of the 
country.”97
An analysis of the convict population in Florida, where leasing was most common among 
turpentine producers, reveals its demographic patterns and demonstrates that it changed little 
from that of the late nineteenth century. At the beginning of 1903 Florida had 1,031 convicts. 
Over the course o f the year, the states added 463 to the population and lost 372 as a result of 
discharge (79 percent), parole (11 percent), death (5 percent), or escape (5 percent). Most of the
96 Clarissa Olds Keeler, The Crime o f Crimes or The Convict System Unmasked 
(Washington, DC: Clarissa Olds Keeler, 1907), 11; Jeffrey A. Drobney, “Where Palm and Pine 
Are Blowing: Convict Labor in the North Florida Turpentine Industry, 1877-1923,” The Florida 
Historical Quarterly 72 (April 1984): 417-418, 426-427; The Eighth Biennial Report of the 
Commissioner o f Agriculture o f the State of Florida. 1903-1904, 307, 309; Tenth Biennial 
Report of the Commissioner o f Agriculture o f  the State of Florida for the Period Beginning 
January 1. 1907. and Ending December 31. 1908 (Tallahassee, FL: Union Label, 1909), 395, 
473; Eleventh Biennial Report o f  the Commissioner o f Agriculture o f the State of Florida. 1909- 
1910, 567.
97 Eleventh Biennial Report of the Commissioner of Agriculture of the State of Florida. 
1909-1910, 532.
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prisoners added to the convict population were Florida natives (41 percent), but a substantial 
number were from other states: South Carolina (11 percent), North Carolina (S.7 percent), 
Alabama (5.5 percent), and other states and countries (35 percent). Of the convicts, 83 percent 
were black men, 13 percent white men, and 4 percent black women. Most o f the prisoners 
sentenced in 1903 were between the ages of seventeen and thirty and had been convicted of 
either murder, theft, or assault. Figures from 1907 and 1908 reveal that these statistics changed 
little during the early twentieth century.98
A sample o f  Florida turpentine camps that employed state convict laborers in 1913 
reveals that the typical camp held between thirty and fifty convicts, the majority of them black 
men. Some camps contained no white convicts and the ones with the largest number of whites 
held only ten percent. Only one black woman was held in a camp. However, the number of 
convicts at any one camp could vary widely through the year. In 1914 the population of the 
Waller Turpentine Company camp, for example, fluctuated between sixty and thirty-four 
convicts. At the Belmore Naval Stores Company camp as many as forty-five convicts and as few 
as thirty-four worked that same year. These camps averaged one guard for every five convicts 
and one bloodhound per every twelve convicts. Each camp had one captain.99
In the mid-1910s, the number of county convicts worked at individual turpentine camps 
varied widely. Some operations employed as few as seven and others as many as fifty-five, 
although the typical camp appears to have worked over forty. Some contained only whites and
98 Eighth Biennial Report of the Commissioner of Agriculture o f the State o f Florida. 
1903-1904, 340-345; Tenth Biennial Report of the Commissioner of Agriculture of the State of 
Florida. 1907-1908.
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Archives; F.J. Titeaub to W.A. McRae, 30 September 1913, R.R. Tomline to W.A. McRae, 31 
October 1913, T.D. Titeaub to W.A. McRae, 1 November 1913, and T.D. Titeaub to W.A.
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others only black convicts, however many worked both races, with whites representing a 
minority of the prisoners. Only in exceptional cases were incarcerated black women found in 
turpentine camps. The great majority o f  convicts came from either the county in which they 
labored or from neighboring counties.100
According to Florida state regulations, they were not to be away from the camp before or 
after dark. However wardens frequently kept prisoners out much longer. Convicts worked long 
hours in the turpentine forest, longer than wage-earning laborers. They left the camp at sun up 
and returned at sun down. In an effort to have convicts at work by daylight, guards tended to 
march them out o f the camp well before dawn. The farther the prisoners had to go to get to their 
work, the earlier they rose. Prisoners also returned late to the camp if the warden wanted them to 
work until sundown. Convicts went to and from the camp and the forest on foot, some at a quick 
walk, others on the run. A mounted guard set the pace, and other guards brought up the rear with 
drawn guns. Not all convicts could withstand the quick march, especially after a  long, hard day’s 
work, and many collapsed. Some guards allowed these stragglers to follow in the rear at their 
own pace, while other guards meted out brutal punishment for falling behind. The guards stayed 
with the convicts as they labored. The convicts were divided into squads and spread out through 
the forest. When one inspector visited a turpentine camp in 1913 he only saw some of the 
prisoners because the others were so scattered in the woods he could not reach them. To prevent 
escape o f convicts who worked spread out through the woods, it was best for the guards to be 
mounted. With probably two guards and maybe some hounds watching over them, the squads 
each performed different jobs, either specializing in dipping, chipping, scraping, or boxing.
100 Inspectors’ reports, September 1913 to February 1914, Convict Lease Program 
Subject Files, 1889-1916, Board of Commissioners o f State Institutions.
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Work was coordinated so that each squad completed its work to accommodate the other
groups.101
Like antebellum slave masters and free labor employers after the Civil War, turpentine 
convict camp operators continued to organize work using the task system. Tasks were designed 
for workers to complete them by working all day long from Monday to either Friday or Saturday 
morning. Any extra time was for rest For over a century the task system was used as an 
incentive to encourage rapid work. Most convicts reportedly preferred this system to gang labor, 
where they worked all day every day with no hope of extra time off no matter how hard they 
labored. To complete their job during the week, convicts worked extremely hard. Some convict 
camps expected convicts to reach production levels as much as fifty percent above that o f  free 
workers. But some convicts found their tasks more burdensome than others.102 Prisoners serving 
shorter sentences, thirty days for example, reportedly were worked harder than those serving for 
several years. Because a camp only had men with short sentences for a limited time, it lost 
nothing by working them to exhaustion for the duration of their sentence. Richard Barry 
observed that “a convict serving a sentence of several years would be well taken care of, his body 
being as valuable a chattel as that of a horse ”103 Teenage boys also experienced special
101 C.J. Sullivan to G.J. Whitefield, 21 May 1914, Commissioner o f Agriculture to 
Florida Naval Stores and Com. Company, 5 April 1902, N.A. Blitch to N.B. Broward, 5 April 
1906, and J.D. Ferrell to W.A. McRae, 28 March 1913, Convict Lease Program Subject Files, 
1889-1916, Board o f Commissioners o f State Institutions; Goodnow, “Turpentine: Impressions 
of the Convict Camps of Florida,” 104; Barry, “Slavery in the South To-Day,” 487.
102 Goodnow, “Turpentine: Impressions of the Convict Camps o f Florida,” 104, 107; 
Drobney, “Where Palm and Pine Are Blowing,” 425; C J. Sullivan to G.J. Whitefield, May 21, 
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hardships in meeting their assigned tasks. Despite their small size, boys were expected to dip as 
much gum as grown men, fifty-two buckets each day. A thirteen-year-old boy at one camp could 
only manage thirty buckets a day and consequently received daily beatings with a leather strap 
for failing to meet his task.104 Even for grown men, the labor at a turpentine camp was incredibly 
burdensome compared to even the other strenuous areas of production that employed convict 
labor. In 1901 a group of desperate convicts, apparently just leased to a naval stores operation, 
wrote the Florida governor explaining that “we the undersigned, convicts at Mr. Buttgenbacks’ 
Floral City camp, beg to state, that we would like to remain at the phosphate mines in preference 
to going to the turpentine farms. Some of the men here have worked at both places, and they are 
all unanimous in stating, that they prefer the mines.”105
Like turpentine camps that employed wage labor, convict camps tended to be found in 
isolated locations. O f Florida’s twenty-eight camps employing convicts in 1903, the least remote 
was two miles away from the nearest town and the most was fifteen miles from a community.
One Florida convict camp visited by reporter Marc Goodnow in 1915 was probably typical. The 
camp held around forty convicts and sat near a railroad track. It consisted of a cluster of 
whitewashed, rough board buildings surrounded by a high stockade of similar construction. Two 
roughly fashioned raised platforms at opposite comers o f the stockade served as guard posts.
The yard possessed no trees, grass, or shade, only hot white sand, and scattered stumps. During 
particularly wet seasons, such barren yards could quickly turn into muddy quagmires. The 
bunkhouse, the most prominent building on the site, was long and low and filled with individual
104 Carper, “The Convict-Lease System in Florida,” 259.
105 John B. Kertzinger et al. to Governor Jennings, 20 May 1901, Board of 
Commissioners o f State Institutions.
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iron beds which supported, what Goodnow observed to be, filthy mattresses. Goodnow does not 
make clear the construction of this bedding, but the most commonly used materials of the time 
consisted o f cheap ticking stuffed with straw. Such mattresses harbored bed bugs and wore out 
quickly, since their ticking split and the straw bunched up. The bunkhouse Goodnow visited had 
no ceiling or finished walls. The room smelled strongly o f disinfectant, which the captain 
insisted was used everyday after the floor was scrubbed in the morning. Wall decorations were 
limited to the Ten Commandments, several illustrated pictures, and a list o f the state prison 
authority’s rules and regulations. Next to the only door into the bunk house stood a protective 
cage built o f heavy timber and furnished with a chair and heating stove where a guard kept a 
nightly watch. A partition separated the sleeping quarters from the dinning room. At meals 
convicts ate at zinc-covered tables while sitting on boxes and broken chairs. They ate with only 
spoons; knives and forks could too easily be used as weapons. The kitchen was housed in a 
separate building. During the food’s preparation two huge hogs and six to seven dogs wandered 
in and out on the dirt floor through the kitchen’s open door. Other camps appear to have also had 
problems with unsanitary kitchens.106 The camp Goodnow visited appears to have met the state 
standards, but not all camps did. Others had severe problems with cleanliness, ventilation, and 
adequate space in the bunkhouse and in dinning rooms.
Convicts subsisted on a monotonous diet that differed little from that of free turpentine 
workers and dated well back to the previous century. Registers of provisions issued to convicts 
in 1914 reveal that biscuits and combread made up the staples of convicts’ diets. Prisoners also
106 Mancini, One Dies. Get Another. 65; Goodnow “Turpentine: Impressions o f the 
Convict Camps o f Florida,” 104-106; J.D. Ferrell to W.A. MacRae, 29 March 1913 and 30 
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1902, and N.A. Blitch to N.B. Broward, 5 April 1906, Board of Commissioners o f  State 
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received regular servings o f rice, beans, molasses, and coffee. Irregular servings o f  meat, 
whether it be ham, sausage, salt pork, or fresh beef or pork, were also issued to prisoners. Some 
months they might receive only one serving of meat every day and on some days none at ail. 
However, there were slight variations between camps. At one, for example, convicts received 
peas and sweet potatoes where another camp did not provide these. The latter, however, did 
serve ham and fresh pork more often than the former. According to convicts at the camp 
Goodnow visited, breakfast consisted o f three biscuits and a piece o f meat; lunch—which they ate 
in the woods—was made up of biscuits or combread and meat; and supper—which was taken at 
the camp—consisted o f biscuits, meat, and beans. Pork remained the typical meat. However, at 
some camps in the early twentieth century, convicts complained o f being fed very poor grades of 
pork and also not receiving enough food for breakfast. Some convicts supplemented their regular 
menu with raccoons and possums which they caught in the woods.107
There was seasonal variation in convict diet, with more varieties of vegetables available 
during the summer months. At one camp, Irish potatoes, squash, and green beans appeared on 
convicts’ plates in June. That same month at another camp convicts consumed melons, green 
com, green peas, okra, squash, and fresh tomatoes. Many o f these fresh vegetables were grown 
in camp gardens. Diets also changed for major holidays, the addition o f fresh meat being the 
greatest deviation from standard fare. In 1913, for example, the thirty-one convicts at a Santa 
Rosa County, Florida, turpentine camp celebrated July 4 with a big barbecue and picnic, 
presumably with fresh pork. For the same holiday, convicts at the DeLeon camp received fresh 
beef and those at the Waller camp received both fresh beef and fresh pork. For Christmas the
107 Commissioner of Agriculture to Florida Naval Stores and Com. Company, 5 April 
1902 and N.A. Blitch to N.A. Broward, 5 April 1906, Board o f Commissioners o f  State 
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same year convicts at the DeLeon Camp enjoyed pickles, fresh beef and pork, bread, and Irish 
potatoes along with their usual fare.101
Although their diet appears to have been adequate, convicts suffered health problems 
associated with turpentine work and life at the camp. The relentless hard labor with heavy, 
wooden-handled tools caused sore and blistered hands.109 In July and August the regular rain in 
Florida brought on ague, chills, fever, and pneumonia. Daily rain caused the countryside to 
flood, forcing workers to trudge through waist-high water in some places. “Dats de time it gits 
yo,” one convict explained. “Mah Gawd, man, hit’s sho’ awful, standin’ in watah an’ runnin’ all
day long in the wet grass up to yo’ waist ”n0 Failure of camps to provide adequate footwear
in the wet environment appears to have been a persistent problem. At one camp in 1906 a 
prisoner cut his foot and preferred to work with it wrapped in a cloth than confined in an ill- 
fitting boot. Convicts at another camp were forced to work barefoot when their shoes wore out 
and the camp manager delayed acquiring new ones. In 1907 it was reported that at one 
turpentine camp no convict possessed a whole pair o f shoes. There, the men had cut feet from 
working among the sharp saw palmetto. Such exposed cuts became infected from continued 
exposure to the forest and, in some instances, caused blood poisoning.111 Goodnow noticed that
108 F.J. Titeaub to W.A. McRae, 10 April 1913, J.D. Ferrell to W A. McRae, 28 March 
1913, F.J. Titeaub to W A  McRae, 13 May 1913, J.D. Ferrell to W.A. McRae, 28 May 1913, 
R.R. Tomlin to W A. McRae, 31 July 1913, and De Leon Naval Stores Company and Waller 
Turpentine Company, convict provision registers, 1914, Board o f Commissioners o f State 
Institutions.
109 J.D. Howe to W.A. McRae, 30 August 1913, Board of Commissioners of State 
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the convicts* feet at the camp he visited were “swollen and misshapen.” “They were spread out, 
broken down, cut, gouged, blistered and scratched,” he reported, “and the nails of many o f their 
toes were gone ” One convict explained that when men, who were not used to the work, first got 
to camp, their feet swelled so much that once in the stockade they went barefoot because their 
shoes no longer fit. Syphilis was also a major problem among convicts. In 1910 the governor of 
Florida estimated that seventy-five percent of black convicts suffered from various stages o f the 
disease.112
Historian Jeff Drobney finds that according to official reports the annual death rate for 
Florida convicts was just below five percent Diseases—especially lung infections and intestinal 
problems—and inadequate medical treatment along with being shot while attempting to escape 
were the most common causes. At the camp visited by Goodnow, seven convicts died in one 
year from disease. According to state regulations, convict camps were supposed to receive 
medical care from a doctor although the request was not always granted. One Orange County, 
Florida prisoner, for example, died o f inadequate medical attention to sores on his feet.
Sentenced to labor in a turpentine operation in 1906, in a few months his feet became so diseased 
he could not walk to and from work. On March 22 a doctor examined his sores and prescribed a 
disinfectant wash which apparently had no effect. Over the next week his feet grew worse and a 
emitted a foul odor. He was thus moved to a building outside the stockade, where he lay 
unattended and very ill with his feet wrapped in pus-soaked rags. He died at the end of the 
month. In an example of how the Progressive reform measures could sometimes be enforced, the 
captain and two guards were indicted for manslaughter because they failed to provide the convict
112 Goodnow, “Turpentine: Impression of the Convict Camps of Florida,” 105-106; N.A. 
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with necessaiy food, care, nursing, medicine, and treatment. Found guilty by the county court, 
the captain was fined him $2,500.'13
Incompetent guards, such as the ones charged in Orange County, appear to have 
presented a persistent problem at convict camps throughout the period, despite state efforts to 
recruit better personnel. The number of guards employed by a county convict camp roughly 
reflected the number o f convicts held, but the typical camp employed between seven and eight 
guards. With low pay and requirements that the guards live at the isolated camps, the job 
attracted only those who could find no other employment. And although captains might have 
proved overall more experienced and reliable, many o f them were shown to be inadequate as 
well, despite relatively good salaries. In 1905 camp wardens made approximately S I50 a month, 
or between $1,200 and $1,800 annually. In a few cases they could make as much as $2,500. 
Guards, by comparison, made only $25 a month, but if they owned their own horse they could 
receive as much as $35. In many cases guards were very young men, often no more than 
nineteen years old.114 Goodnow described the guards he observed as “husky young men, 
mounted upon horses and wearing large black slouch hats, with long barreled pistols protruding 
from their hip pockets.”" 5 While on duty guarding the stockade, Goodnow explained, the
113 Drobney, “Where Palm and Pine Are Blowing,” 428; Eighth Biennial Report o f the 
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guards, armed with long-barreled pistols, lazily smoked cigarettes. At another camp guards spent 
the night telling dirty jokes in loud voices, keeping the convicts awake. The night guard had 
written “smutty poetry” and pasted it on the wall for all to read."6
Prison inspectors complained about both incompetent guards and hot-tempered 
wardens.117 In 1902 the Florida Commission of Agriculture explained that “where guards and 
captains are disciplined you find good conduct, good work, cheerful prisoners, and few 
complaints from prisoners.”118 However much o f the trouble at camps, state officials believed, 
resulted from guards and captains who failed to conduct themselves properly. For example, 
guards commonly set their guns down on the guard stand and entertained visitors while 
supposedly on watch. Captains commonly proved hot-tempered in dealing with convicts and 
provided insufficient management for the guards. The problem seems to have been so pervasive 
that when inspectors who encountered a camp where “the captain controls his guards and 
prisoners well” considered it noteworthy. Because the captain was an employee, hired by the 
actual lessee to manage the camp, the state encouraged lessees to keep a close eye on their 
facilities, observe the guards and captain in the execution of their duties, and occasionally 
discuss camp conditions with the prisoners. Nevertheless, many lessees apparently neglected 
their responsibility.119
116 Ibid., 104; Drobney, “Where Palm and Pine Are Blowing,” 425.
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Camp discipline, administered largely by incompetent guards, rested squarely on a 
system of punishment that centered on the strap. A whipping boss usually administered the licks. 
He ideally used the strap in moderation and carefully recorded each whipping for state records.120 
And some wardens appear to have held to this philosophy. The captain in charge of the camp 
visited by Goodnow claimed that “‘tisn’t necessary to handle the men roughly except when they
get incorrigible or commit some act that requires punishment Yes, we use a strap; but not
very much. I don’t have much trouble.”121 Others had different ideas. The Florida 
Commissioner o f Agriculture report for 1903 and 1904 explained that new convicts, especially 
those from larger towns, required considerable punishment. “They have never learned the lesson 
of obedience, are indisposed to labor and are more insolent,” the report stated. “For a time they 
disturb the temper o f those who are working smoothly. Nothing but corporal punishment, 
sometimes repeated and more severe, will have any effect on them. Some prisoners could bear 
severe punishments and never show the effects, while others with light punishment, will bear the 
marks plainly.” Despite the acknowledged heavy use o f the strap, the report maintained that “it 
is seldom a prisoner receives more severe punishments than is merited.”122 Each convict camp 
was required to keep a monthly prison punishment record to be submitted to the Board of 
Commissioner o f State Institutions and the Commissioner of Agriculture in Tallahassee. For 
each punishment, camps were to provide the prisoner’s number, name, and the date on which the 
punishable offense occurred. They were also to note the number o f licks the prisoner received, 
whether the convict’s skin was lacerated from the beating, whether it was that individual
120 Ibid., Drobney, Lumbermen and Log Sawyers. 171.
121 Goodnow, “Turpentine: Impression of the Convict Camps o f Florida,” 106.
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convict’s first or second offense, who performed the whipping, and who recommended it. The 
punishment reports submitted to the state of Florida reveal that approximately ten percent of the 
convicts were whipped each month an average o f nine licks. The number o f licks, however, 
depended on the convict’s offense and varied among camps.123
An analysis of three different turpentine camps’ punishment reports from 1914 illustrates 
the types of offenses captains found punishable in the early twentieth century and the severity of 
the whipping for each offense. Because different camps had different standards and different 
ways of categorizing offenses, it is necessary to look at each camp separately. At the Lemon Bay 
Turpentine Company camp in Sarasota County, Florida (then Manatee County), the most 
common punishable offense was for “bad work.” Fifty-nine percent o f all whippings were 
administered for this violation and an average of 7.5 licks were given. “Laziness,” 21 percent, 
and “missing task,” 12 percent, represented the next most common offenses, both resulting in an 
average of 7.8 licks. Convicts also received beatings for “fighting,” “refusing to work,” 
“sassing,” “bunching timber,” and “disobedience,” each transgression receiving 8 to 10 licks. 
Escaping, obviously a more serious offense, brought 15 licks. At the Noma Naval Stores 
Company camp in Holmes County, 50.5 percent o f punishments were for “not working,” 18.7 
percent for “bad work,” and 15 3  percent for “impudence.” Each of these offenses carried an 
average price of 7.6, 6.8, and 8.7 licks respectively. Other convicts were punished for 
“disobedience,” “breaking tools,” and pretending to be sick. The penalty for these ranged 
between 6 and 8 licks. The apparently more grave offense of “slipping out mail” carried a
123 Drobney, “Where Palm and Pine Are Blowing,” 430; Lemon Bay Turpentine 
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penalty o f 10 licks. At the Waller Turpentine Company camp most whippings, 61.6 percent, 
were for “not working.” Workers there received an average o f 5.2 licks for malingering. 
Gambling made up 11.6 percent o f offenses and brought an average o f 8 licks. Other offenses 
included “sassing guard,” “idleness,” “disobedience,” “bad conduct,” “fighting,” “cursing,” and 
even “selling hat.”124
Although each camp demonstrated somewhat different punishment policies, closer 
analysis reveals common patterns. Although poor work precipitated the great majority of 
discipline, this infraction was among the most lightly punished. Disruptive behavior, whether 
classified as “sassing,” “disobedience,” or “impudence,” was also not tolerated. But although 
punishment for these violations occurred far less frequently than for work-related offenses, 
convicts received more licks for them. Fighting was a common, if not pervasive, problem among 
all camps. Gambling was permitted in some camps, but others, such as the Waller Turpentine 
Company camp, considered it a moderately serious offense. Lacerations were surprisingly 
reported to have occurred only three time out of the total of 251 punishments for 1914 at all three 
camps, a rate just over one percent and so low that it calls into question the accuracy o f the 
punishment reports with respects to the severity o f whipping.123
Despite the punishment reports’ goal of regulating and limiting whippings, excessive 
punishments appear to have remained far from uncommon. At a camp in Manatee County, 
Florida, the inspector found that convicts received beatings too frequently and o f too severe a 
nature. The convicts, consequently, appeared to be in poor condition. The inspector recommend
124 Lemon Bay Turpentine Company, Noma Naval Stores Company, and Waller 
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that either the captain or the whipping boss be removed. At another camp in an Orange County 
when the inspector had the convicts strip for observation, he found that seven o f the forty-five 
convicts in the camp showed signs o f the strap. Two possessed extremely large scars. The 
inspector provided the excuse that the prisoners had received a beating when the strap which was 
supposed to be soft, had been used after it was left in a pool of water overnight, had dried hard, 
and had not been rubbed back into shape. The inspector believed that in addition to the strap’s 
lack of conditioning, it was too heavy and he insisted the captain get another one. At some 
camps, convicts reportedly received random beatings for no offense and at others they were 
beaten so severely they could not work.126
Aside from beatings with a strap, spontaneous and brutal forms of punishment occurred 
as guards attempted to force convicts to work at a quicker pace in the forest. One convict, for 
example, experienced difficulty carrying his dip bucket in his sore, raw hand, but could not work 
rapidly enough while carrying it on his arm. A guard threatened him with death unless he 
worked to standard and, when he failed, the guard shot and killed him. The guard claimed he 
acted in self-defense, but he was not believed by the camp manager and subsequently discharged 
and black listed. In another incident, three convicts persisted in dipping inadequately after 
receiving warnings from the captain. Two submitted to punishment, but the third drew his hack 
and threatened the captain. The captain responded by striking him on the head with a tree limb. 
In yet another instance a convict fell from exhaustion on the march back to camp. The other 
convicts found him too heavy to carry. Ordering the other convicts on, the guard tied the 
exhausted prisoner to his saddle and dragged him for three miles along the road. The convict
126 N.A. Blitch to N.B. Broward, 6 March 1906 and 5 April 1906, Board of 
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died the next morning. Evidence suggests that such brutality occurred more frequently at camps 
employing county convicts. In his 1903 and 1904 report, the Florida Commissioner of 
Agriculture explained that seventy-five percent o f the reports o f cruel and inhumane treatment 
originated in the county convict camps.127
Convicts often tried to escape from turpentine camps, and their relatively high success 
rate did nothing to discourage others. Because prisoners were not shackled while they worked 
and labored in woods which obstructed the guards’ view of the activity, prisoners could, with 
relatively little difficulty, clear the range of the guards’ rifles. One deterrent from escape 
reportedly was the prisoners’ fear o f the bloodhounds. When an escape occurred, bloodhounds— 
trained to track convicts during mock escapes attempts—began searching for the escapee’s trail 
while mounted guards followed. On average, county camps kept four dogs for tracking escapees 
but that number too varied considerably. One camp kept none and another maintained eleven. If 
the camp guards and bloodhounds failed to capture a criminal within a few hours of escape, the 
likelihood of ever finding him dropped to less than thirty percent. In 1913, for example, two of 
the eighteen convicts leased by a Washington County turpentine operation successfully escaped. 
The lessee had them moved to the camp before the stockade was completed, allowing the two to 
slip out o f  the camp after making it through the roof of the bunkhouse. Later that year a convict 
at Wakulla County turpentine operation escaped while working in the forest. He dodged shots 
fired at him by guards, survived a four-mile chase through the woods, and finally crossed the St. 
Marks River by boat. At yet another camp two years later, nine convicts broke out o f the back of 
the stockade while a partially-deaf guard tended to other camp duties. The convicts were on the
127 J.D. Ferrell to Park Trammell, 30 April 1913, Board o f Commissioners o f State 
Institutions; Barry, “Slavery in the South To-Day,” 487; Eighth Biennial Report of the 
Commissioner of Florida. 1903-1904,308.
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run for three hours before their absence was detected. The camp hounds picked up their scent, 
but were unable to catch up to them.12*
Despite efforts, Florida’s recapture rate was only about fifty percent In 1903, foe 
example, most escapees (58 percent) were recaptured. In 1912, there were 96 escapees among 
the 1421 state convicts. O f these, 47 were captured. In some cases prisoners were able to slip 
away only to be captured a  short time later. Some escapees were caught within a matter o f days, 
but remaining on the run for half or a whole year was more common. One convict even eluded 
authorities for four years before recaptured. Others were prevented from making successful 
escapes with deadly force. When one convict attempted to run from the work squad in 1906, he 
was ordered to stop then shot in the abdomen and arm. He died five days later at the state 
convict hospital in Ocala.129
Most escapees had been convicted o f theft, although some were sentenced for murder. 
The majority were in their teens and twenties. Although whites made up 13 percent of the 
prisoner population, they represented only 7.5 percent o f escapees. This skewed racial 
representation may be explained by the white prisoners’ much greater ability to obtain pardons 
compared to blacks. Whites received the greatest number of pardons (55 percent) despite making
128 Inspectors’ reports, September 1913 to February 1914, Convict Lease Program 
Subject Files, 1889-1916, Board of Commissioners o f State Institutions. Goodnow,
“Turpentine: Impression of the Convict Camps of Florida,” 104-106; Eighth Biennial Report of 
the Commissioner o f Florida. 1903-1904, 330; Ninth Biennial Report o f  the Commissioner of 
Agriculture of the State of Florida. 1905-1906,285; Drobney, “Where Palm and Pine Are 
Blowing,” 424; J.D. Ferrell to W.A. McRae, 29 March 1913, and R.R. Tomlin to W.A. McRae, 
31 July 1913, Board o f Commissioners o f State Institutions.
129 Drobney, “Where Palm and Pine Are Blowing,” 424; Drobney, Lumbermen and Log 
Sawyers. 162; Goodnow, “Turpentine: Impression o f the Convict Camps o f Florida,” 106; F.J. 
Titeaub to W.A. McRae, 28 February 1914 and N.A. Blitch to N.B. Broward, 5 April 1906, 
Board o f Commissioners of State Institutions; Eighth Biennial Report o f  the Commissioner of 
Florida. 1903-1904, 347-350.
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up only a small minority o f prisoners. A convict was reportedly more likely to try escape during 
his first three to four months in the camp. The hard work and tough living conditions made them 
sullen and entertain thoughts o f getting away. But after a few months they grew more 
accustomed to convict life and resigned themselves to their new state.
Despite the long hours o f hard work and the less-than-ideal living conditions, convicts at 
some camps found time for recreation. Despite state rules forbidding card playing and profane 
language, Florida convicts amused themselves with games of poker, dirty jokes, dancing, and 
singing. During Goodnow’s camp visit, he witnessed convicts singing and telling jokes in the 
dining room. While he was there, the convicts entertained him with an original skit, “The Old 
Plantation.” The main character, old Uncle Eph, donned fake whiskers, a cane, corncob pipe, 
and straw hat, and returned to his home plantation after forty years absence to see “de mammy 
and the chillun,” the latter he refereed to as “big hunks o’ midnight.” A young black man played 
Mammy Liza with a bandanna tied around his head and falling over his shoulders. As part of the 
skit, Uncle Eph sang “Pickin Cotton” while seven prisoners danced. After the skit another group 
of convicts sang “plantation and camp-meeting songs and hymns.” The convicts, according to 
Goodnow, ran through the routine often and had made money by performing for visitors the 
previous Christmas. One early afternoon Goodnow also witnessed a camp baseball game. Under 
the watchful eye of armed guards, the convicts played a six-inning game. “It was crude, of 
course, but full of life,” Goodnow explained, “each side bantering and joking with the other over 
an error or a ‘strike-out.’” The catcher and the first baseman used gloves fashioned of hemp 
sacking stuffed with straw. The other men used their bare hands.130
130 Eighth Biennial Report o f the Commissioner of Florida. 1903-1904, 330, 347-350; 
Goodnow, “Turpentine: Impression of the Convict Camps of Florida,” 105-106; Drobney, 
“Where Palm and Pine Are Blowing,” 425.
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During the first decades of the twentieth century, relatively little changed in the lives of 
turpentine workers. Debt peonage remained an important labor practice and, except for the job 
of hanging cups which replaced boxing, the work routine o f  turpentine laborers continued 
virtually unaltered from the late nineteenth century and even the antebellum period. The labor 
force remained predominantly black and was supervised by white woodsriders who ruled over it, 
seldom relying on outside law enforcement. Camps remained rough and isolated places where 
workers lived in clusters o f  small shanties. Unbridled revelry at the juke joint and an occasional 
trip to the nearest town broke the monotony but, for convicts, the work demand was greater and 
conditions at the camps even bleaker than those of wage laborers. Despite small physical 
improvements in camp buildings and a limited rise in diet quality and variation, brutality and 
abuses continued. The difficult lives of workers compelled to labor under either the peonage or 
convict lease systems continued through much o f the early twentieth century despite the efforts 
of Progressive reformers who attacked both institutions during the period.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter Eleven
Forced Labor Attacked:
Reformers Target Peonage and Convict Leasing
In the first decades o f the twentieth century, a series of attacks on the systems of forced 
labor that supported the naval stores industry succeeded in ending convict leasing and seriously 
threatened peonage. At the same time that states tightened labor laws to strengthen debt 
servitude, the United States Department of Justice began investigations of suspected producers 
for violation of the Thirteenth Amendment. The press coverage o f the investigation focused 
national attention on the widespread use of peonage and spurred public outcry that drove the 
institution underground. With the same zeal, reformers also attacked convict leasing. Although 
not as widely practiced by the naval stores industry as peonage, convict leasing proved less 
capable of withstanding organized opposition.
Just as southern states began strengthening their labor legislation and incorporating 
whites in the grip of peonage, the United States Justice Department began efforts to end the 
system of forced labor, charging it was unconstitutional under the Thirteenth Amendment At 
the turn of the century, Fred Cubberly, the Department’s Commissioner for the northern district 
of Florida, noticed a large number of arrests under the state’s “false provision law” of 1891. At 
the request of employers, local officials had charged workers with obtaining goods and money 
and refusing to deliver the labor promised under their contact. None of these cases ever went to 
trial; instead compromises were worked out under which the laborer agreed to return and work 
off his debt and the cost o f his arrest Cubberly also learned that some employers enforced the 
law without help from officials, making their own arrests and holding their own courts.
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In February 1901, Cubberly witnessed this extralegal action firsthand at a turpentine 
distillery in Meredith, Florida, in Levy County. While speaking with the owner, a Mr. Meldon, 
another naval stores operator, J.O. Elvington from Otter Creek—about eleven miles southwest of 
Meredith—who had just arrived by train, asked whether a white man named Higgins, his wife, 
and six year old daughter had come to the area the day before. Higgins, who was indebted to 
Elvington for forty dollars, had come from South Carolina to Elvington’s Florida operation to 
work as his cooper. When he arrived, however, he had to dip turpentine instead, and he and his 
family had to live in a shelter that formerly housed horses and mules. He had tried to work off 
the debt but the longer he stayed the more indebted he became. Meldon informed Elvington that 
they had arrived, he had employed the man to run his operation, and they were in a nearby house. 
Within a few minutes there was loud talking, screaming, and profanity, and the family ran from 
the house with Elvington, apparently armed with a pistol, chasing them. While Mrs. Higgins 
pleaded for their freedom, Elvington cursed them, ordered them to gather their daughter, and 
begin the fifteen mile journey back to his operation on foot. Meldon loaned them a  team of 
horses which Elvington permitted only the girl and her mother, who was ill, to ride, and they all 
set off for Otter Creek. Back in his Bronson, Florida, office, Cubberly studied the issue and 
approached the U.S. Attorney o f the Northern District with the suggestion that a  test case be tried 
under the federal peonage statute o f 1867, which outlawed all debt slavery. With the attorney’s 
approval Elvington was indicted. After Secret Service operatives located missing witnesses in 
190S, Elvington plead guilty to the peonage charge and received a one thousand-dollar fine.1
1 Frederick C. Cubberly to H.L. Anderson, 17 August 1906, Cubberly’s description of 
Clyatt case, 17 August 1906, and Frederick C. Cubberly to Alexander Irvine, 31 January 1907, 
Frederick C. Cubberly Papers, Department of Special Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries, 
University o f Florida; N. Gordon Carper, “Slavery Revisited: Peonage in the South,” Phvlon 37
(1976): 87.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
519
Soon after observing the incident with Elvington and Higgins in Meredith, Cubberly 
witnessed an even more egregious example of peonage. While waiting for a  train in Gainesville, 
he saw three armed men in the waiting room on their way to Bronson, Florida, in search of 
escaped workers. A few days later a naval stores producer named J.R. Dean contacted him about 
the illegal arrest o f some laborers at his camp, coincidentally by the same men Cubberly had met 
at the train depot. According to Dean, a prominent Tifton, Georgia, citizen, Samuel M. Clyatt, 
served warrants for the arrests o f five black workers—who had left his employment and gone to 
work at Dean’s camp near Rosewood, Florida—charging them with gambling. When Clyatt 
arrived in Levy County he turned his Georgia warrants over to a Florida deputy, who reportedly 
did not read them. The deputy dutifully arrested the four men whom Clyatt pointed out. Clyatt 
eventually released two o f them but retained the others, Mose Ridley and Will Gordon. To 
Dean’s protest, Clyatt responded that the men owned him money and that he was taking them 
back to Georgia to serve as examples to others who might try to leave. After Clyatt rejected 
Deen’s offer to pay what the men owed him, Clyatt forced one of Dean’s team drivers to take 
him and his men, along with Gordon and Ridley in leg chains, to the railroad. The men then 
went directly back to Georgia, with no court proceedings in Florida.
Cubberly quickly set to work. He arrested the deputy. After gathering the facts from 
him, Cubberly summoned Clyatt as a witness and had him arrested when he returned to Florida. 
Cubberly faced considerable obstacles in building his case, however. Despite efforts by the 
Secret Service, the two victims, Gordon and Ridley, were never found. Also, the case created 
considerable interest in the South, and by the time of the trial, $90,000 had been raised for 
Clyatt’s defense, $5,000 of which was raised in a single night by the Georgia-Florida Sawmill 
Association. Nevertheless, Clyatt became the first person tried and convicted for violating 
statutes outlawing peonage. Local papers, by inaccurately reporting that most of the jurors were 
black, argued that the trial was unfair. In March 1905, the Supreme Court overthrew the Clyatt
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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conviction, arguing that the defendant’s intentions were clear, but that the government had failed 
to establish Gordon and Ridley’s indebtedness before their abduction. At the same time it upheld 
the federal peonage statute and ordered that Clyatt be retried. The Justice Department, however, 
was unable to secure the necessary witnesses to make its case. Clyatt went free; Gordon and 
Ridley were never heard from again.2
Cubberly was not alone in his fight against peonage. As immigrants who escaped the 
institution in the South made their way back to New York, reports about the brutality in the 
southeastern turpentine camps spread through the ethnic communities. By 1906, Russian Jews, 
Hungarians, Italians, Greeks, as well as some native New Yorkers contacted Mary Grace 
Quackenbos about male family members held against their will in southern lumber and 
turpentine camps. An economically independent, reform-minded woman with legal training, 
Quackenbos ran the People’s Law Firm in Manhattan, which helped immigrants adopt to life in 
the United States. With a three hundred dollar grant from S.S. McClure, publisher o f McClure’s 
Magazine, and additional funds from the Jewish Aid Society, she assumed her maiden name, 
Winterton, and traveled through Florida posing as a reporter. She reported her shocking findings 
to the Department of Justice and received its support for an investigation.
As a result of her pressure, F J. O’Hara, a partner in the lumber and naval stores business 
at Buffalo Bluff and Maytown from which Fink and his colleges escaped, along with some of 
O’Hare’s supervisors, were tried for peonage. The trial took place in Jacksonville, headquarters 
of the Turpentine Operators Association, home office of the United Grocery Company, which
2 Authorities had made an attempt in 1899 to enforce the peonage law only to have a 
judge dismiss the indictment. Afterwards, no further action was taken until the Clyatt case. 
Frederick C. Cubberly’s description o f Clyatt Case, 17 August 1906, Frederick C. Cubberly to 
Russell, 18 December 1906, and Alexander F. Irvine to Roosevelt, 1 December 1906, Cubberly 
Papers; Carper, “Slavery Revisited,” 87-88; “Peonage in the South,” The Independent 55 (9 July 
1903): 1618; Michael D. Tegeder, “Prisoners of the Pines: Debt Peonage in the Southern 
Turpentine Industry, 1900-1930” (Ph.D. diss., University o f Florida, 1996), 90-99.
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supplied turpentine camp commissaries, and home o f the Florida Times-Union. a major 
newspaper sympathetic to producers. All three institutions opposed the peonage investigations 
and created an environment that made conviction difficult. Moreover, the defense attorney in the 
case was W.M. Toomer, president of the Turpentine Operators Association, and the jury 
foreman, C.B. Rogers, served as president of United Grocery Company. After a nine-day trial 
the jury took just seventeen minutes to find all parties innocent.3
Other peonage cases in the piney woods South ended with similar results. Not only were 
local juries unsympathetic to the plight of workers held in peonage, but, as the U.S. Attorney 
General was informed, “it is extremely difficult to get evidence in cases of this kind. The guilty 
parties are white men, and, in nearly every instance, the persons held in peonage are negroes.”4 
In many instances the local prosecutors were slow to act on peonage complaints. One anti­
peonage activist, who clipped newspaper articles dealing with peonage and sent them to the 
Justice Department, complained in October 1906 that the department continued to refer him to 
the district attorneys where the abuses occurred. These officials, he argued, were as likely to act 
on the peonage cases as the labor lords themselves since ‘‘these attorneys are motivated by 
southern people ruled by democratic office-holders and reign—some o f these sheriffs hold office 
for twenty-five years—until they have enough to live comfortably the rest of their days.”5
3 Jerrell H. Shofner, “Mary Grace Quackenbos, A Visitor Florida Did Not Want,” The 
Florida Historical Quarterly 58 (January 1980): 275-279; “Verdict o f  Acquittal Ends First o f the 
Peonage Cases,” Jacksonville. Florida Times-Union. 25 December 1906.
4 John M. Chevey to United States Attorney General, 21 April 1906, Correspondence, 
Classified Subject Files, Department of Justice Central Files, General Records of the Department 
of Justice, Record Group 60, National Archives.
5 Professor Livingston to Lock, 14 October 1906, Correspondence, Classified Subject 
Files, Department o f  Justice Central Files, General Records of the Department of Justice, Record 
Group 60, National Archives.
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The Justice Department began having better success with its prosecutions once sounder 
cases appeared. One victory came in the 1907 trial o f the Graham brothers. In the spring o f that 
year, a black man named James McCants and his wife Rosa left the Grahams’ Flomation, 
Alabama, turpentine camp and moved ten miles south into Escambia County, Florida, where 
James began work for a  Mr. Mayer. On the afternoon o f May 17 the Graham brothers and their 
driver arrived at Mayer’s camp. The Grahams refused to accept Mayer’s offer to pay McCant’s 
debt and forced him back to their operation. When the brothers returned later for Rosa, an 
argument broke out, shots were fired, and the Grahams’ retreated. When the McCants swore out 
a warrant against the Grahams, the husband and wife received death threats, prompting them 
both to go into hiding until the trial began. In November 1907, both brothers were convicted of 
peonage in Pensacola, one sentenced to the state penitentiary and the other to the county jail.6
Although the attack on peonage was certainly fueled by the same reformist zeal that 
initiated attacks on child labor, illiteracy, and convict labor, it was also probably a response to 
the increase in the practice o f forced labor.7 Given the labor climate, it is not surprising that 
instances of peonage rose after 1900. William Cohen maintains that the fact that opposition to 
the practice came at the same time that racism was on the rise indicates that peonage was 
becoming more widespread. “Had peonage and other forms of involuntary servitude been 
constant across the decades,” he explains, “it would be far more likely that white southern 
opposition would have surfaced earlier, rather than in 1903, when racism was at floodtide.”8 But 
because the practice tended to be well-hidden and involved the informal use of law enforcement,
6 Charles W. Russell, Report on Peonage (Washington, DC: Department o f Justice,
1908), 7.
7 Pete Daniel, The Shadow of Slavery: Peonage in the South. 1901-1969 (Urbana: 
University o f Illinois Press, 1990), 9-10.
8 William Cohen, At Freedom’s Edge: Black Mobility and the Southern White Quest for 
Racial Control. 1861-1915 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1991), 292.
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no documentation with which to quantify its frequency exists. Assistant Attorney General 
Charles Russell admitted in 1908 that the government had no idea how many workers were held 
in peonage. He explained that “how many cases are in existence is the same kind of a question 
as though the crime were pension fraud, or counterfeiting, or public land fraud, or fraud on the 
revenue. Where we have found several cases we may conclude that there are, or have been, or 
are likely to be, others; but this is speculation.”9 In fact, the Justice Department most certainly 
prosecuted only a tiny portion of the peonage violations. Most workers were unable to complain 
to Department officials and, when they did hear o f possible violations, attorneys often lacked 
sufficient evidence to prosecute because of threats, intimidation, and disappearance of 
witnesses.10
In the early twentieth century, the national press published exposes on peonage and the 
difficulty o f trying the cases, outraging Progressive northern readers who then supported 
intensified attacks on the system. Reporters went to great lengths to expose the evil. One went 
undercover as a worker but became exhausted from the hard manual labor and returned home.11 
In July 1903, The Independent, a nationally-read magazine, informed readers that “we find the 
South relapsing into a state of virtual slavery, in which the negro and the poor white man find 
their condition worse than that of the average slave o f ante-bellum days.”12 Such writers 
appealed to desires for law and order by explaining that the institution flew in the face of the 
Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and that both producers and corrupt authorities employed 
extralegal measures in their attempts to return escaped workers. In an appeal reminiscent o f
9 Russell, Report on Peonage. 8.
10 Tegeder, “Prisoners of the Pines,” 213,215-216.
11 Alexander Irvine to Frederick C. Cubberly, 13 April 1907, Cubberly Papers.
12 “Peonage in the South,” 1617.
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abolitionists’ claims of a slaveholders’ conspiracy, readers were informed that tyrannical labor 
lords ignored the federal laws against peonage, viewing it as an infringement on their rights. 
Reporters also explained how a small but powerful interest group—turpentine producers-exerted 
undue power to have its way.13
Five months after the one in The Independent another article told of how twenty-six 
indictments for peonage had been returned by a federal grand jury against seven o f  Georgia’s 
most prominent citizens, three o f them members of the McCree family of Valdosta. One o f the 
McCrees, Edward, plead guilty to thirteen charges and was fined one thousand dollars. The 
article implied that, as a wealthy and powerful man who owned 37,000 acres in south Georgia 
and served as a member of the state legislature, Edward McCree had received a light sentence.14 
The article described how the Turpentine Operators Association raised thousands o f  dollars with 
which to defend the forced labor practices. It also appealed to the Progressive era’s concern for 
family by explaining how the families lived in the camps and that if a worker ran away, his wife 
and children were detained. In one case, the piece added, an employer withheld “young children 
from both father and mother for the purpose of forcing the payment of a debt.”15 In case such 
stories failed to draw sympathy because the victims were black, writers recounted such stories as 
one of “a whole family of white persons, including young children, forced at the muzzle of a gun 
to leave their home and return to the swamp labor camp of the father’s former employer some 
miles distant, there to remain until a small indebtedness due the employer was worked out by the 
father at wages which the employer arbitrarily fixed.”16
13 Ibid., 1616-1618.
14 “Peonage in Georgia,” The Independent 55 (24 December 1903): 3079-3080.
15 “Peonage in the South,” 1617.
16 Ibid., 1618.
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Another, more shocking article, appeared in Cosmopolitan in 1907. Entitled “Slavery in 
the South To-Day,” the article by Richard Bany jolted readers by claiming that northern 
businessmen, not southerners, were the root o f  the evil and that “whites are better and more 
dependable workers, and therefore in the enslavement process are preferred prey.”17 Barry 
assured readers that he did not use the term figuratively but rather described “the actual physical 
slavery that keeps men worse than animals.” In fact, he argued, this early-twentieth century 
“slavery” was far worse that the antebellum version. “Where in negro slavery,” he explained, 
“there was often sentiment, a marked exchange of affection between master and slave, there is 
nothing in this new form except the basest and most cold-blooded calculation joined with an 
indifference to human life which transcends anything that has gone before it.”18 Barry candidly 
admitted that the peonage employers had erred when, in their arrogance, they strayed across the 
racial divide and targeted whites. As long as only blacks fell victim to producers’ greed, few 
whites cared, but when members of their own race, even if  most were recent immigrants, became 
caught in the system, whites demanded action.19 In 1911, readers of The American M agazine 
were likewise informed that “under the guise o f a contract for labor many negroes and, indeed, 
some white men have been held-and illegally held—in a form of peonage not essentially different 
from slavery.”20
Reports of peonage in popular magazines never failed to emphasize the abomination of 
whites held in “slavery.” Richard Barry argued that the recent inclusion o f whites resulted from
17 Richard Barry, “Slavery in the South To-Day,” Cosmopolitan Magazine 42 (March 
1907): 482.
18 Ibid., 481-482.
19 Ibid., 483; Tegeder, “Prisoners o f the Pines,” 104.
20 Ray Stannard Baker, “A Pawn in the Struggle for Freedom,” The American Magazine 
72 (September 1911): 608.
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a dearth o f adequate labor for the new businesses entering the area. He maintained that black 
workers were too few and lazy and that whites could not be attracted to the region because they 
could not endure the climate. Desperate employers, according to his interpretation, therefore 
resorted to keeping whites in debt peonage to support their fortunes.21 The authors themselves 
drew a distinction between how whites and blacks fell into debt bondage. Black workers were 
usually described as getting themselves into peonage because o f  their innate tendencies to be 
lazy, steal, and suffer from what reporter Herbert Ward called a “borrowing mania.” Whites, in 
contrast, became victims o f peonage despite their diligence and hard work, because the corrupt 
system trapped them. Ward’s account o f Bob English from Coffee County, Georgia, proved 
typical. He described English as a poor white man who rented a small farm on which he grew 
cotton. In the spring of 1903, his landlord’s son started a fire in a honey tree to smoke out the 
bees. After the fire smoldered for a number o f days, the landlord ordered English to extinguish 
it. English, busy with his cotton crop and as a cash renter under no obligation to do his 
landlord’s bidding, forgot A small fire started and burned some o f the owner’s turpentine trees, 
causing fifty dollars worth o f damage. The landlord had English and his two grown boys 
arrested and charged with criminal negligence. For their release they agreed to work for the 
owner to repay the damage. “Thus Bob signed himself and his two boys into slavery.” After 
three months of work during which they received scant rations, they had only worked off $3.28, 
by the owner’s accounting. The three peons broke out of the stockade where they were kept and 
walked five nights until they reached the Florida state line eighty miles away. The landlord was 
indicted for peonage.22
21 Bany, “Slavery in the South To-Day,” 484.
22 Similar stories appeared describing like situations in other piney woods industries. In 
September 1907, for example, The Independent told the story o f Mike Trudies, a  twenty-four 
year old Hungarian peasant who immigrated to New York and was duped by a labor agent into 
accepting a job at an Orlando-area sawmill, which was advertised as paying $1.50 a day but 
turned out to be a $1 a day job in a remote timber camp. Workers there were subjected to long
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Like northerners, southern blacks supported the peonage investigations and aided the 
fight. Peonage victim, Jack Richburg, wrote the U.S. Attorney General explaining his plight and 
requesting the Justice Department’s assistance. In late summer of 1908, Richburg reported, he 
escaped from the Taylor Company turpentine operation near Perry, Florida. He made his way as 
far as the next county, where he was arrested and carried back to Perry. There he stayed in jail 
for six days before his new employer came, bailed him out, and apparently took him back with 
him. The new employer attempted to pay Richburg’s debt, only to be told by the camp’s 
manager that “he did not want the money but he wanted the damn negro.” If  not for his new 
employer’s willingness to put up the bail, for which Richburg was enormously grateful, he would 
have been forced back to the turpentine camp or put on the county chain gang while he awaited a 
court appearance. Richburg called on the Attorney General “as a legal advisor of the government 
for protection,” to conduct a comprehensive investigation in the area, and to assure him that there 
were many cases in the area like his that could result in prosecutions.23 In April 1909, a group of 
black petitioners from Polk County, Florida—located in the center o f the peninsula—also asked 
the Attorney General to investigate “the way colored people are mistreated and Odious 
Impositions and Severe punishment Imposed on the Colored Race and also Some White People.” 
They felt sure that the county officials were taking action outlawed by the Constitution and 
added that the county’s jail and convict camps were full o f  African-American people who could
days of backbreaking work and inadequate shelter. Mike and other workers attempted to escape 
only to be tracked with blood hounds, captured, forced to return to camp at a quick march, and 
then beaten. Abuses at the camp continued until the boss was tried for peonage in November 
1906 and convicted. “The Life Story o f a Hungarian Peon,” The Independent 63 (5 September 
1907): 559-563; Herbert D. Ward, “Peonage in America,” Cosmopolitan Magazine 39 (August 
1905): 427.
23 Jack Richburg to United States Attorney General, 10 September 1908, 
Correspondence, Classified Subject Files, Department o f Justice Central Files, General Records 
of the Department of Justice, Record Group 60, National Archives.
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provide evidence. The petitioners offered to assist in any investigation.24 It is unclear what 
became of the group’s offer.
Even a few white southerners attacked the institution of peonage. In 1905, The 
Independent charged that “the best people of the South are opposed to the peonage system and 
condemn it in unmeasured terms. Many employers are opposed to it, but have been compelled to 
lean toward it in self defense, the local courts as a rule not protecting the laborer, and in some 
instances the officials receiving compensation from one employer for annoying and harassing 
other employers.”25 In the Florida state legislature, a Representative Reese led opposition to that 
state’s 1907 contract labor bill arguing, as the Tallahassee Morning Sun explained, that “the 
measure is unconstitutional and would give the unscrupulous employer an opportunity to 
intimidate and bind an employee to servitude against his will, which practically amounts to 
peonage, or imprison for debt.”26 Not even all those involved in the naval stores industry 
supported peonage. One turpentine man believed that, although peonage legislation was 
originally intended to serve the honest purpose o f protecting the employer’s advances, in practice 
the legislation had become a curse. Writing with twenty years of hindsight, he argued that the 
laws had left employers with such a feeling of legal protection that they had made more generous 
advances than earlier, resulting in huge debts among the workers that could never be paid off. 
Turpentine producers who were desperate for labor, however, would sometimes pay the debt to
24 O.C. Buey, et al. to United States Attorney General, 22 April 1909, Correspondence, 
Classified Subject Files, Department of Justice Central Files, General Records of the Department 
of Justice, Record Group 60, National Archives.
25 “Peonage in the South,” 1618.
26 Few legislators listened to Reese’s argument. The measure passed by a vote o f forty- 
four to eight. “‘Pernicious Measure’ Passed in House,” Tallahassee. Florida Morning Sun. 7 May 
1907; Mary Grace Quackenbos to United States Attorney General, 18 May 1907, 
Correspondence, Classified Subject Files, Department o f Justice Central Files, General Records 
of the Department o f Justice, Record Group 60, National Archives.
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gain the laborers’ services, thus greatly increasing their production costs.27 The turpentiner’s 
explanation of why he opposed peonage testified to the wide variety of motives that led 
southerners to oppose the practice. Some white critics focused on the institution’s inclusion of 
their own race. The Attorney General learned from one southerner that “peonage is a species of 
slaveiy that is endangering the liberties o f the people. At first only colored men were subjected 
to it-but now it operates without regard to race or color.”28 Other whites opposed the practice 
because o f the harm it caused its victims. They sometimes helped provide legal assistance for 
blacks who where trapped in peonage. In 1907, a convict camp guard was arrested and placed 
under $ 100 bond after Ed Williams, a black turpentine worker, declared before a judge that the 
guard had brutally beaten him for failing to perform his assigned work. The word of a black 
worker against a white guard probably would not have stood, except that Williams was 
“supported in his case by a number of humane people who believed his story.”29 The next year a 
white man wrote a letter to the Justice Department on behalf o f a Sam Taylor, a  turpentine 
worker who owed his employer a debt. The operator held Sam’s wife Jamie in peonage at 
Albrin, Florida.30
Some critiques of peonage, both from within and outside the region, blamed the rise of 
the practice on certain classes of southerners. The New South business class appears to have
27 Albert Pridgen, “Turpentining in the South Atlantic Country,” in Naval Stores:
History. Production. Distribution and Consumption, ed. Thomas Gamble (Savannah: Review 
Publishing and Printing Company, 1921), 104.
28 E.W. Reeves to United States Attorney General, 6 June 1907, Correspondence, 
Classified Subject Files, Department of Justice Central Files, General Records o f the Department 
of Justice, Record Group 60, National Archives.
29 “Convict Camp Guard is Charged With Assault,” Tampa. Florida Tribune. 28 June
1907.
30 Neil Sinclair to Department o f Justice, 20 May 1908, Correspondence, Classified 
Subject Files, Department o f Justice Central Files, General Records of the Department of Justice, 
Record Group 60, National Archives.
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been a favorite target. Herbert D. Ward began his 1905 Cosmopolitan piece by arguing that 
“peonage is neither a race nor a negroe problem any more than astigmatism [sic] is. It is purely a 
labor question.”31 And it was a product of the post-war South. The planters and their 
descendants, he maintained, had not created debt peonage. Rather men who practiced peonage 
descended “from the very slave-driver, or from the white brute whose degenerate poverty put him 
on a par with the colored freemen, and who hated the negro as one hates a  rival. He it was who 
by chicanery, cheating the negro, and oppressing him, gradually acquired possessions and so 
wielded an almost baronial local power. The South is full o f such slimy upstarts whose influence 
and wealth are the great menaces o f the South’s prosperity.”32 Writing in the same publication 
two years later, Richard Barry agreed that peonage was the product of “this ambitious new blood 
[that] has ousted the ancient aristocracy that once gave Florida the distinction of age and 
chivalry. Ready to the hand were great forests in which slept turpentine and lumber, and deep 
mines from which could be disgorged great wealth in phosphate.”33 He also blamed northern 
capitalists, the railroad and lumber trusts, for imposing peonage on the region in their attempt to 
exploit both black and white southerners. Still other critics blamed the lower classes. Writing 
from St. Petersburg, Florida, in 1912, a minister placed blame for the system on the heads of 
“good-for-nothing, ignorant Florida ‘Crackers’” whom he witnessed arresting over a dozen white 
and black men who had traveled from the north seeking employment.34
31 Ward, “Peonage in America,” 423.
32 Ibid., 425.
33 Barry, “Slavery in the South To-Day,” 484.
34 Ibid., 482-483; Rev. Leon Ray Livingston to United States Attorney General, 6 March 
1912, Classified Subject Files, Department of Justice Central Files, General Records of the 
Department of Justice, Record Group 60, National Archives.
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Although some southerners did in fact oppose peonage, the loudest voices that arose 
from the region either denied its existence or supported its practice, especially after 1906. That 
year the conviction of five officials o f the Jackson Lumber Company, which manufactured naval 
stores among its other timber products, shook the southern pine belt. It was the largest business 
of its kind in the United States, and its general manager was well-connected, wealthy, and held in 
high regard in his community. Months later, in early 1907, three other events outraged the 
Florida political and business power structure. Recently appointed U.S. Attorney General 
Charles J. Bonaparte announced his intention to continue his department’s attack on peonage. 
Mary Grace Quackenbos was appointed Assistant U.S. Attorney to help in prosecuting peonage 
cases. And Richard Barry’s expose of peonage, focusing on Florida, appeared in Cosmopolitan 
and another version in the New York Evening Journal.
In the wake of high-profile convictions and renewed investigations, Florida business and 
political leaders denied that peonage existed in the state and began a campaign to discredit the 
federal officials who had brought the charges. The Turpentine Operators Association, United 
Grocery Company, the Georgia-Florida Sawmill Association, and newspapers across Florida, 
especially the Jacksonville Florida Times Union, began a campaign to convince the public that 
peonage investigations amounted to nothing more than unfounded accusations and commotion 
stirred up by trouble-making outsiders who threatened the area’s labor system.35 At a 1907 
meeting of the Florida Board of Trade, one participant complained that “if this practice [of 
investigating] is to continue, if  this principal is to prevail, no man’s liberty is safe.”36 A 
newspaper article complained that lazy and conniving blacks would accept advances from an
35 Charles Russell to United States Attorney General, 24 November 1906, Classified 
Subject Files, Department o f Justice Central Files, General Records of the Department of Justice, 
Record Group 60, National Archives; Shofher, “Mary Grace Quakenbos,” 277-278.
36 “Ask Congress for Peonage Investigation,” Jacksonville. Florida Times Union. 21 
February 1907.
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employer and then attempt to work so poorly that the boss would release him. Under the cloud 
of the peonage investigations, the paper complained, if  their plan fails “the debtor-workman of 
the negroe race runs hot-foot to the nearest United States court and calls out; ‘peonage.’”37 
Florida’s political establishment rushed to address the peonage accusations. U.S. 
Congressman Frank Clark of Florida came to his state’s defense in Washington. Clark denounced 
the Attorney General on the House floor and in February 1907 drafted a  resolution requesting 
that the House investigate the peonage investigations and that the Attorney General disclose how 
much money his department had spent on the Florida cases. Clark also wanted the Justice 
Department to explain Quackenbos’ connection to the Department—what official position she 
held, what salary she drew, and what her official duties were. He further demanded an 
explanation for why the Department used special attorneys to prosecute peonage cases instead of 
the regularly appointed U.S. Attorneys in Florida’s two judicial districts. Shortly thereafter the 
Florida legislature passed a resolution condemning Richard Barry and his publisher, William 
Randolph Hearst for articles in Cosmopolitan and the New York Evening Post.38 Then in April 
the Florida Times Union thanked both Clark and the Florida legislature for their defense o f the 
state and assured its readers that the Barry articles amounted to nothing more than “false, 
malicious, and defamatory libel.”39
37 Untitled peonage article, Correspondence, Classified Subject Files, Department of 
Justice Central Files, General Records of the Department of Justice, Record Group 60, National 
Archives.
38 Shofner, “Mary Grace Quackenbos,” 277,279; Representative Clark, House 
Resolution No. 886 Submission, 25 February 1907, Correspondence, Classified Subject Files, 
Department of Justice Central Files, General Records o f the Department o f Justice, Record 
Group 60, National Archives.
39 “Strong Resolutions Adopted Condemning Barry and Hearst,” Jacksonville. Florida 
Times-Union. 4 April 1907.
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On January 6, 1908, Clark submitted yet another resolution to the House Judiciary 
Committee to form a House Committee on Peonage, which he believed would dispel any further 
accusations. The resolution called for the Speaker of the House to appoint a committee o f five to 
investigate the peonage allegations, the activities of Quakenbos, and the Justice Department’s 
manner of prosecuting the cases.40 The resolution charged that national media reports o f  peonage 
at turpentine operations, railroad camps, and lumber camps had frightened away prospective 
settlers to the region. Clark also complained that the Justice Department ignored the U.S.
District Attorneys already in the region. Furthermore, he argued that “numbers of innocent men 
have been indicted upon the testimony of prejudiced witnesses, and put to great expense in 
defending themselves against charges that prove upon trial in open court to be entirely 
groundless.” Despite such serious allegations the committee apparently rejected the resolution. 
Later that month, the Tampa Chamber o f Commerce complained to the U.S. Secretary o f State 
that recent magazine articles were filled with “the basest untruths” which misrepresented “the 
good people of the South.” Floridians especially, he claimed, had suffered from the “injustice” 
of Quackenbos long investigations and “‘trumped-up charges’” brought by “such disinterested 
sleuths.” One o f the most scurrilous slanders reportedly made in the media came from a “Negro 
woman . . .  who declares that white girls are worked side by side with negro convicts in our 
turpentine farms.”41
In 1911, the U.S. Supreme Court dealt the peonage system and its defenders a serious but 
by no means fatal blow when it ruled in favor of Alabama peon Alonzo Bailey. In 1908, Bailey,
40 Representative Clark, House Resolution No. 115 Submission, 6 January 1908, 
Correspondence, Classified Subject Files, Department of Justice Central Files, General Records 
of the Department o f Justice, Record Group 60, National Archives.
41 C. Fred Thompson to Elihu Root, 28 January 1908, Correspondence, Classified 
Subject Files, Department of Justice Central Files, General Records o f the Department o f  Justice, 
Record Group 60, National Archives.
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a black farm laborer, contracted to work for Riverside Company o f Montgomery, Alabama. He 
received a fifteen-dollar advance, which he agreed to pay back at $ 1.25 a  month for a  year of 
service. After only one month, however, he left the farm without paying his debt. Once captured 
Bailey received no hearing and the only witness against him was his employer, but he was found 
guilty under Alabama’s false pretenses law, which presumed he intended to defraud his employer 
from the beginning. He was sentenced to 136 days hard labor and ordered back to work for 
Riverside, where legal charges and court fees were added to his debt to be worked off. On 
appeal to the Alabama Supreme Court he lost. But the U.S. Supreme Court overturned the state 
decision, arguing that the law’s presumption of guilt violated the federal Peonage Act of 1867 
and the Thirteenth Amendment. The court also found that a state could only impose involuntary 
labor sentences as punishment for a crime. No man could command another to labor for the 
payment of debt.42
Although the Bailey case declared unconstitutional one of the important legal 
underpinnings that supported the peonage system, the practice persisted in the South. A 
collection of new state laws and the failure of local law enforcement to uphold the ruling 
conspired to perpetuate debt servitude. In the same year its prima facie law was overturned, 
Alabama replaced it with one that continued to uphold peonage but returned the burden of proof 
to the employer. The next year South Carolina took similar action, and North Carolina’s 
Supreme Court ruled against the false pretenses clause but found nothing wrong with the rest of 
that state’s peonage statute. Georgia’s high court let its statute stand, prima facie clause and all, 
noting that the Bailey decision did not apply to them because Georgia had no law restricting 
rebuttal testimony in such cases. In 1913, Florida also passed legislation that omitted false 
pretenses, but in 1919, the legislature enacted another statute that reinstated it. Until 1944, when
42 Carper, “Slavery Revisited,” 92-93; Baker, “A Pawn in the Struggle for Freedom,” 
608-609; Cohen, “Negro Involuntary Servitude,” 43.
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the U.S. Supreme Court once again ruled against false pretenses, both Georgia’s and Florida’s 
laws remained in force. But whether a state had a  prima facie peonage statute or not, its 
enforcement at the local level enabled the practice to continue unchanged. The fact that Georgia 
and Florida, the two most important turpentine-producing states, retained the clause made it 
much easier for officials in those states to maintain debt servitude.43
The perpetuation of peonage following the 1911 Supreme Court ruling also rested in part 
on producers’ heightened efforts to control workers as the southern labor market grew tighter 
with the outbreak o f the First World War. The end of the flow of European immigrants into the 
United States created a labor shortage in the North, which forced employers to recruit black 
southerners. Northern black newspapers encouraged southern African-Americans to leave the 
repressive South for the relatively freer North.44 In a  report on 1918 naval stores production, the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Bureau of Chemistry found that “most o f  the producers had 
experienced so much trouble in securing and holding labor, and getting the work done only 
partly, and poorly at that, that many o f  them were inclined to underestimate their total 
production.”45 The Turpentine Operators Association, the Georgia-Florida Sawmill Association, 
boards of trade, and civic and political leaders urged local governments to require northern labor 
agents to pay costly license fees to operate in the Southeast. They also encouraged officials to 
harass and threaten both the agents and black workers who attempted to leave.46
43 Cohen, “Negro Involuntary Servitude,” 44; Carper, “Slavery Revisited,” 93.
44 Gavin Wright, Old South. New South: Revolutions in the Southern Economy Since the 
Civil War (New York: Basic Books, 1986), 19-20.
45 “Turpentine and Rosin Production Reported for Season of 1918,” 1918, Austin Cary 
Memorial Forestry Collection, Department of Special Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries, 
University of Florida, 2.
46 Jerrell H. Shofner, “Forced Labor in the Florida Forests, 1880-1950,” Journal o f  Forest 
History 25 (January 1981): 19.
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Despite intimidation efforts, such a large number of blacks moved that the resulting 
demographic shift caused problems in both northern and southern communities. Prominent black 
southerners offered assistance in remedying the crisis in the region. R.R. Robinson, a black 
leader in Jacksonville, held meetings with other blacks, white employers, and even the governor, 
explaining that improved working conditions and better wages, not repressive labor laws, would 
keep blacks from leaving Florida. To aid in black resettlement and make the most efficient use 
of labor for the war effort, the U.S. Department o f Labor created the Division o f Negro 
Economics and sent agents to the states to ease the difficulties. The Department appointed W.A. 
Armwood, a prominent member o f Tampa’s black community, as its agent in Florida. Armwood 
spoke to groups of both races around the state about the need for cooperation, hard work, and 
production for the war. But to many white Floridians, the black federal agent hearkened back to 
the perceived atrocities o f Reconstruction. When Armwood refused to discourage black workers 
from joining unions, the Turpentine Operators Association and the Georgia-FIorida Sawmill 
Association came to see him as an enemy agent who encouraged African-Americans to leave 
their camps and mills. These producers subsequently lobbied the Department o f Labor to 
dismantle the Division, a goal they achieved through the efforts o f an influential northern-owned 
lumber company representative.47
Once the war ended, the strong pull of black workers northward subsided but tight labor 
conditions persisted—as did the practice of peonage as a remedy. Some turpentiners, like Frank 
Rose of South Georgia, were forced out o f the business in the 1920s because labor was so hard to 
find.48 Those who remained in the business continued to use debt to force workers to remain
47 Ibid., 19-20; Robert S. Blount, Spirits o f Turpentine: A History o f Florida Naval 
Stores. 1528 to 1950 (Tallahassee: Florida Agricultural Museum, 1993), 26-27.
48 Wright, Old South. New South. 207; Becky Vail, “Old Timer Remembers ‘Hard Old 
Days’ in Woods,” Newsclipping file, Lowndes County Historical Society, Valdosta, GA.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
537
with them. In 1921, one turpentine man complained that “now it costs, in accounts that have to 
be paid, recruiting expenses, and transportation, probably two hundred dollars per head for each 
head of family he brings in, and sometimes in addition to this a lawsuit and a heavy court fine for 
violation of a ‘Labor Law.’”49 In 1923, three partners in a Calhoun County operation, two of 
them county commissioners, were charged with keeping workers in debt and using a whip and 
sweat box to enforce their control.30 In 1929, Oscar Bailey, a black worker at a turpentine 
operation in Appling County, Georgia, escaped and made his way as far as the adjacent county, 
where his employer tracked him and had the sheriff arrest and lock him up without a warrant.
The next day the sheriff returned Bailey to Appling County and jailed him in the county seat of 
Baxley. To hide the obvious peonage violation, four days later the employer had his brother and 
silent partner swear out two warrants against Bailey for misdemeanor liquor possession. Soon 
afterward the producer paid the Appling sheriff for costs and forced Bailey back to work in the 
woods. Reportedly, as in Oscar Bailey’s case, it was still common for “the turpentine men who 
work many negroes in this vicinity [to] have a way o f taking out some kind of warrant in addition 
to their warrant for debt and holding them in jail trying to force a settlement of debt or of forcing 
the laborer to go back to work.”31 In another case an operation in southeastern Georgia’s Long 
County was said to hold three hundred men in peonage in 1930. Workers were forced to 
purchase all their food through the company at twice the normal price despite the availability of 
local produce venders eager to sell in the quarters.32
49 Pridgen, “Turpentining in the South Atlantic Country,” 103.
50 Shofner, “Forced Labor,” 22.
31 H.J. Lawrence to United States Department o f Justice, 1 July 1929, Correspondence, 
Department of Justice Central Files, General Records of the Department o f Justice, Record 
Group 60, National Archives.
32 Letter to United States Department of Justice, 16 December 1930, Correspondence, 
Department of Justice Central Files, General Records of the Department o f Justice, Record 
Group 60, National Archives.
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It is difficult to gauge how widespread such practices of peonage were in the 1920s. 
Complaints were fewer than in the first two decades of the century and a higher level o f black 
migration indicates that workers were freer to move as they chose. William Cohen maintains 
that the trend in lynching can serve as an indicator of peonage’s extensiveness. Because 
intensive racism underlay each, he argues, it can be assumed that as lynching declined so did the 
occurrence of peonage. Investigators in the isolated naval stores areas, however, reported 
peonage remained widespread. A drop in cases brought by the Justice Department may indicate 
its care in selecting cases rather than a decline in the practice. At one turpentine operation near 
Hotopaw in Osceola County, south of Orlando, two workers attempted to escape and one was 
shot to death. The Justice Department refused to act, claiming it lacked enough evidence for 
conviction. As was not uncommon in such cases, the local authorities took no action on the 
murder.53 In late 1930, the Justice Department also refused to investigate the poor treatment of 
the Union Turpentine Company workers in south Georgia because “it does not appear from the 
facts stated that the persons in question are being held on account of a debt, and as this is an 
essential element of the peonage law, the same must be present to afford a basis for Federal 
Action.”54
That the most egregious peonage case occurred in the early 1920s lends strong support to 
the argument that the practice continued after the flurry of investigations and trials of the 
century’s first two decades. The case centered around W. Alston Brown, manager o f the Putnam 
Lumber Company’s turpentine camp at Cross City, Florida, about forty-five miles west of
53 Cohen, At Freedom’s Edge. 292-293, 297; Pete Daniel, The Shadow of Slavery: 
Peonage in the South. 1901-1969 fUrbana: University of Illinois Press, 1990), 148; Shofner, 
“Forced Labor,” 22.
54 Nugent Dodds to Frank Brown, 30 December 1930, Correspondence, Department of 
Justice Central Files, General Records of the Department of Justice, Record Group 60, National
Archives.
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Gainesville. The region and the turpentine operation there developed simultaneously. Around 
1920 the area surrounding the company’s 300,000 acres became Dixie County, splitting off from 
Lafayette County, and Cross City, an unincorporated community o f only a few hundred residents, 
mostly black, and accessible only by railroad, became the county seat. Brown in fact served as 
one of the county commissioners. He had begun his employment in the turpentine business as a 
crew boss when northern-owned timber firms moved into the area just before the turn of the 
century. Within two decades he was working for Putnam Lumber Company, a business whose 
reputation for treating laborers unfairly Brown developed to new heights.55
Brown’s notoriously brutal camp at Cross City, Florida, relied on systematic violence 
and intimidation to hold all the company’s workers in debt peonage. Brown sent labor agents to 
Savannah, Jacksonville, and other southern cities and convinced workers to come to Cross City 
by the promise o f good wages. Once in Brown’s clutches, however, they were forced to labor all 
day long every day, even on Sundays and holidays, rain or shine, sick or well. Brown maintained 
absolute control over his camp. At night all the workers were locked behind a high barbed wire 
fence. Everything they needed had to be purchased from the camp store owned by Brown.
Brown forbade them to leave, claiming all the workers owed him money, usually between twenty 
and three hundred dollars. But the debts for which Brown kept his employees as prisoners were 
fabrications. Brown took money from each worker’s weekly pay and also skimmed money from 
the cash laborers gave him to pay off their alleged debts. Workers who successfully slipped out 
of the camp stockade were tracked down by Brown and forcibly returned, often with the aid of 
Dixie County law enforcement officials. One of Brown’s standard tactics was to have the 
runaway workers convicted o f a crime and fined. Brown paid the fine, making the worker 
obligated to him for labor to work off the amount Brown secured the desired legal rulings by
55 Gary Moore, “Prisoner o f Riverside,” Folio Weekly 10 (28 May 1996): 15-17.
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forcing workers to testify falsely. On many occasions he brought the captured workers before 
the judge, sometimes in the evening at his home, and instructed the judge of the crime and the 
sentence. Brown typically had his escaped workers charged with assault and battery in the event 
that a conviction for violation o f labor contract did not hold. Because Brown also worked 
convicts, he sometimes had workers put on the county chain gang and work for him in that 
capacity. Except for different clothing, it mattered little whether one worked for Brown as a 
convict or peon.56
In 1921, Fred Cubberly discovered the widespread peonage practiced at the Brown camp, 
and the Bureau of Investigation began an extensive inquiry during June of that year. Putnam 
Lumber Company denied any knowledge o f the atrocities at Cross City. It knew that Brown’s 
camp never lacked for labor while others had problems, but apparently company officials never 
bothered to inquire as long as production continued efficiently. As the investigation began the 
general manager of Putnam Lumber Company in Jacksonville terminated Brown and instructed 
the company’s representative at Cross City to prevent any undesirable visitors, especially Brown, 
from entering the camp. The manager claimed to have fired Brown for “business reasons,” 
which probably surrounded Brown’s theft o f money generated by the juke joint.57
Although the company cooperated with federal efforts, local officials worked to impede 
the investigation. The county judge not only evaded an agent, but delayed handing over copies 
of records. Even more damaging to the case, Dixie County law enforcement officials intimidated 
witnesses, who consequently proved far less than fully cooperative in the investigation. One
56 John Bonyne Reports, 14 November 1921,3 May 1922, 3 June 1922, E.J. Cartier 
Reports, 16 May 1922, 18 May 1822,23 May 1922, Howard P. Wright Report, 9 September 
1921, and Howard P. Wright to Frederick C. Cubberly, 26 May 1922, Cubberly Papers; Moore, 
“Prisoner o f Riverside,” 16.
57 Shofner, “Forced Labor,” 20; Moore, “Prisoner o f  Riverside,” 16,18; E.J. Cartier 
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evening in early July 1922, for example, a car of three witnesses returning from Gainesville 
broke down two miles outside of Cross City. The sheriff arrived and asked each man his name 
and if he had been to Gainesville to give evidence against Brown. All three denied that they had 
and no other action was taken, but the incident greatly frightened the men and they reported it to 
government agents. Three nights later a deputy appeared at the home o f  one witness.
Frightened, the worker ran out the back door and the deputy shot at him five times. The witness 
was unharmed but the incident understandably intimidated all the camp workers.38
Brown, for his part, denied the charges against him, claiming that he maintained a strong 
labor force because of his kindness toward workers whom, he claimed, actually begged to work 
for him. He blamed the investigation on competing employers in the Cross City area who feared 
that their laborers would leave and come to work for him. The grand jury apparently accepted 
Brown’s explanation. Despite the generally consistent testimony of over forty witnesses who 
bravely testified against Brown in the face of threats, the grand jury refused to indict him.39
A few years later another more successful case developed from peonage charges at Mood 
Davis’s turpentine camps, one in Calhoun County and the other in Bay County, Florida. At these 
camps, laborers found it impossible to work themselves out o f debt Davis threatened that if they 
left he would force them to return and beat them, tn an act of desperation, four men, two of them 
accompanied by their wives, escaped. After leaving the women at a relative’s house, the four 
men continued through the forest Davis’s search patrol discovered the women, who were then 
held in custody in the community of Wechalahka where the runaway men were soon found.
After one member of the search patrol threatened to take them up on a bridge and shoot them, 
Davis ordered one escapee to whip the other three. With a pistol shoved in his side, the runaway
38 M.J. Cronin Report, 9 June 1922 and Charles R. Jordan to Howard P. Wright, 9 July 
1922, Cubberly Papers.
39 “Peonage Charge is Erroneous Declares W. Alston Brown,” Cubberly Papers.
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worker was forced to deliver such savage licks that he tore the skin off o f  the others’ backs. All 
four were then returned to their camps and threatened with death if they attempted to leave again. 
Within days, however, Justice Department investigators descended on the Davis operations and 
collected evidence that eventually resulted in peonage charges against Davis. The four runaways 
and eight other witnesses were kept in protective custody in Pensacola. Their ordeal resulted in 
the conviction of Davis. But despite such successes, the peonage investigations failed to end the 
institution. Instead, by the late 1920s, producers began practicing debt servitude with greater 
caution in an effort to disguise the labor system’s reality.60
Although peonage and convict labor each represented an entirely different method of 
forced labor, in places lines between the two systems blurred. At some camps convicts and 
peons worked together and occasionally lived together. Some peons were threatened with the 
chain gang if they misbehaved. If paid workers complained or tried to escape from their 
employer, the latter could have them charged for a petty crime, pay their fine, and thus gain legal 
rights to their labor while they worked off the debt. In some counties where the turpentine 
operators were especially powerful, they could have their workers arrested on trumped up 
charges and, once they were convicted and sentenced, lease them as convict labor. When given a 
choice, peonage was the logical preference over the latter option. Peonage at least allowed the 
worker to remain with family and friends and permitted him relatively more autonomy at work 
and in the quarters. Peonage and convict leasing were also linked in that both depended on the 
collusion of local officials and large employers. When in the first part o f the twentieth century, 
Florida passed an act making it a misdemeanor to accept money or goods for labor and fail to 
perform the work, the violation carried a $500 fine. Thus, workers charged with violating labor 
contracts faced stiff fines, as well as court costs which were far too high for them to pay and
60 Tegeder, “Prisoners of the Pines,” 202-215.
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would lead them further into indebtedness with their employer or into a convict work camp. In 
1907, for example, twenty-percent o f  the Florida convicts working on county farms or turpentine 
camps had been sentenced for violating labor contracts. By 1913 the blending o f peonage and 
convict leasing continued only in the three states—Alabama, Florida, and Georgia—where leasing 
persisted and naval stores represented a major industry61
At the same time that peonage came under national attention and attack, convict leasing 
attracted widespread outrage. The authors of exposes focused on the same issues they used 
against peonage. Richard Barry informed the readers o f Cosmopolitan that the leasing system 
rested on political corruption. In Florida, for example, all the state’s 1,200 convicts were leased 
to one man in 1906. No other bidder came forward because all understood that state politics 
ensured that they had no chance. Readers also learned that Floridians in the neighborhoods o f 
turpentine camps were outraged at the tales o f cruelty that came out of nearby camps.62 As with 
peonage, one of the most shocking facets o f convict leasing for many reformers was that, as one 
put it, “many hundreds o f white men, women + children (minor boys) are at present working out 
under the most revolting conditions imaginable.”63 Progressives were outraged to learn of the 
experience of one nineteen-year-old white man arrested while walking down a highway and
61 Matthew J. Mancini, One Dies. Get Another: Convict Leasing in the American South. 
1866-1928 (Columbia: University o f South Carolina Press, 1996), 196; Carper, “Slavery 
Revisited,” 97; Shofner, “Forced Labor,” 20-22; William Alonzo Register, interview, tape 
recording, Florida State Archives; E.V. Meadows to John E. Wilkie, 5 September 1906 and A J .  
Hogh to United States Attorney General, 4 February 1907, Correspondence, Classified Subject 
Files, Department o f Justice Central Files, General Records o f the Department o f Justice, Record 
Group 60, National Archives; “Peonage in the South,” 1617; Barry, “Slavery in the South To- 
Day,” 488-489; John Bonyne Report, 3 May 1922, Cubberly Papers; Tegeder, “Prisoners o f the 
Pines,” 223, 109; Drobnev. Lumbermen and Log Sawyers. 172.
62 Barry, “Slavery in the South To-Day,” 484,486; Shofner, “Forced Labor,” 19.
63 Reverend Leon Ray Livingston to United States Attorney General, 1 May 1912, 
Correspondence, Classified Subject Files, Department o f Justice Central Files, General Records 
of the Department o f  Justice, Record Group 60, National Archives.
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convicted of vagrancy. Leased to a state senator to work off a  six-month sentence at his 
turpentine camp, the white man endured almost daily beatings and whippings because he could 
not do as much work as the experienced black hands with whom he served. In 1903, the readers 
of The Independent discovered the plight o f black children ensnared in the convict lease system. 
In one instance, two young black boys were sent to a  camp for seven months after being 
convicted of stealing a watermelon. In another case a black girl languished in a camp from late 
spring to the early winter for her inability to pay a bogus fee charged for an overnight stay in 
Valdosta. She was released only after her mother located her and paid fifteen dollars for her 
release.64
To convey the cruelty of the convict lease system, writers used analogies to other, more 
commonly-recognized atrocities. In a  1907 pamphlet, reformer Clarissa Olds Keeler explained 
that, in the southern portion of Georgia where turpentine operators were most prevalent, “there 
are the stockades, the blood-hounds, the whipping post and every adjunct of the slave trade.”65 
She went on to claim that in Florida “stories told of the ill-treatment o f convicts working on 
railroad construction, and at turpentine culture in pine forests, would compare favorably with the 
torture practiced during the Spanish Inquisition”66 An expose of peonage and convict labor in 
Georgia argued that leasing was “a system which is in some respects a worse disgrace than 
Lynching, because it is created and protected by law.”67 In an effort to induce guilt in reform- 
minded readers, Marc Goodnow asked them to recognize that “when you cut or bum your finger 
and run to the medicine cabinet for a bottle of spirits o f turpentine, you seldom stop to think of
64 N. Gordon Carper, “The Convict-Lease System in Florida, 1866-1923” (Ph.D. diss., 
Florida State University, 1964), 362; “Peonage in Georgia,” 3080.
65 Keeler, Crime of Crimes. 11.
66 Ibid., 13.
67 “Peonage in Georgia,” 3080-3081.
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the way in which this medicine is gathered; how much more o f pain it involves than the pain 
which you seek to allay by its use; what bodily and mental travail; what cost in human life; what 
degradation of a great and beautiful state merely for the sake of a few paltry dollars—the 
continuation, in fact, o f a  slavery even blacker in its sin than before the war.”68
In response to wide public criticism, Florida, in the early 1900s, enacted new standards 
for convict treatment. Regulations required employers to provide insulated and ventilated bunk 
houses rather than the crude shacks they had been using. Prisoners were to sleep in individual 
beds instead of sleeping together on long platforms and the night chain was to be replaced by a 
guard. A building was to be set aside for use as a hospital and a physician was to be called to 
tend the sick. Also, lessees were to maintain an office for transacting business between their 
company and the state. Some regulations focused on sanitation. Each convict was required to 
wear a state prison uniform at all times and to have two suits o f cloths, one hat, and one pair of 
boots. They were also to receive night-shirts and bedding. They were required to have a bath 
once a week, and a sanitary system had to be installed in their bunkhouse. Employers were to 
provide separate rooms for sleeping and eating, both to be swept clean each morning. Once a
68 Goodnow also asked his readers to “just look through the glass walls of that small vial 
of turpentine in your medicine cabinet and recall the story o f the liquid particles. See those 
hundreds o f ebony faces, burnished by the seat of fever and disease; the striped bodies wet to the 
waist with dead and stagnant waters half-running at their tasks from the rising o f the sun till the 
falling of night; the swollen misshapen clubs that once were feet and that probably will never 
again rest within a shoe that fits the prone black figure writhing under the biting lash of a leather 
thong! See them dance and sing, more like puppets than human beings! Above all, watch the 
half-dozen, blood-hungry hounds beating and baying through the pine woods in Sunday morning 
pursuit!” But even when expressing sympathy for black men, who comprised the greatest 
segment of the convict population, Goodnow, as other Progressive reporters, expressed the racist 
sentiments of his day. For example, in describing the concluding moments o f a horrifying scene 
in which a black convict was forced to run through the forest in order that camp blood hounds 
could practice tracking, he explains that “with an agility surprising to see in a  body seemingly 
spent from long pursuits, the black arms shot up, the legs came up under the thick trunk, and the 
Negro in one giant, primitive spring, had landed six or seven feet up the stock o f a virgin pine- 
straddling it as a gorilla would a grapevine—and ‘shinned’ on up to a place well beyond the reach 
of the dogs.” Marc N. Goodnow, “Turpentine: Impressions o f the Convict Camps of Florida,” 
The Survey 34(1 May 1915): 103, 107-108.
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week the dinning room floor was to be scrubbed. The state required closer scrutiny and 
restriction of convict activity as well. Convicts were to be accompanied by guards whenever 
they left the stockade and they required the warden’s permission to speak to anyone from outside 
the camp. No gambling was permitted of any kind. Florida also wanted detailed records kept on 
the treatment o f convicts. Lessees were to keep a daily record o f food issued to convicts. All 
information regarding a prisoner’s death was to be sent to the state. Only a designated person 
was to administer punishments and a report of punishments was to be kept each month. The state 
too regulated certain areas of camp management. During the hottest time of the year, June 15 to 
September 16, convicts were to be given at least one and an half hours at noon for rest and lunch. 
Before a lessee removed a captain, he had to receive the supervisor’s consent and the supervisor 
had to be notified before the transfer o f convicts from one camp to another. Finally, these rules 
had to be posted in a visible place at the camp.69
In response to criticisms o f poor morality within camps, Florida required that a minister 
preach to convicts once a month. In most cases their sermons, prison administrators believed, 
reinforced camp discipline and improved moral. But “occasionally we have noted where a 
minister has unwittingly made use of expressions at the camps that were not calculated to aid 
discipline. So many o f our prisoners being of the negro race, they are ready to catch at every 
straw of sympathy dropped by a visitor or minister and to use the same as meaning that they are 
to be much pities on account of being placed in prison by the cold, harsh requirements o f law.”70 
The state also provided $375 to buy reading material, especially a Bible, for each camp.71
69 Jeffrey A. Drobney, “Where Palm and Pine Are Blowing: Convict Labor in the North 
Florida Turpentine Industry, 1877-1923,” The Florida Historical Quarterly 72 (April 1984): 422; 
Drobney, Lumbermen and Log Sawyers. 160; The Eighth Biennial Report of the Commissioner 
of Florida for the Period Beginning January 1. 1903. and Ending December 31. 1904 
(Tallahassee, FL: L.B. Hilson, State Printer, 190S), 385-388.
70 Tenth Biennial Report o f  the Commissioner of Agriculture o f the State o f Florida for 
the Period Beginning January 1. 1907. and Ending December 31. 1908 (Tallahassee, FL: Union 
Label, 1909), 422.
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In addition, Florida made efforts to oversee the quality of guards at camps. Not only was 
turnover high, but, as the Commissioner of Agriculture explained in 1907, “with some 
exceptions, those who will follow as a business the work of guarding convicts are not o f that 
class who have much ambition in life.” Before, lessees maintained no record of guards, and an 
unfit guard could be discharged from one camp and find employment at another without his new 
employer’s knowledge of his background. With the introduction of a new guard application and 
record system, the Commissioner o f Agriculture’s office in Tallahassee could check the 
background of all camp guards. In another safeguard against unsatisfactory camp personal, the 
state required that former guards have a letter from their previous employer stating their 
qualifications before they could be hired by another. State regulations also prohibited hiring as a 
guard anyone “addicted to any kinds of stimulants,” had relatives in the state prison system, or 
had been discharged for unseemly conduct. In an effort to attract more competent guards, the 
state also demanded that they be paid from $18 to $25, plus room and board, per month.
Florida’s efforts to secure more qualified guards, however, apparently met with little success.72
In the first decade of the twentieth century Florida also imposed regulations to reduce the 
chances of convict escape. State legislation required lessees to employ one guard for every five 
prisoners, to ensure that at least one o f the guards was mounted for every twenty-five prisoners, 
and to keep two trained bloodhounds. In the event that a convict did escape, Florida formulated 
procedures to facilitate capture. Lessees were to keep a photograph and description of each 
convict. If one escaped, his picture and description were to be sent to the local sheriff and police
71 Ibid., 423.
72 Eighth Biennial Report o f  the Commissioner o f Agriculture o f  the States of Florida. 
1903-1904,303-307; The Ninth Biennial Report o f  the Commissioner o f  Agriculture o f the State 
o f Florida for the Period Beginning January 1. 1905. and Ending December 31. 1906 
(Tallahassee, FL: Capital Publishing Company, State Printer, 1907), 295.
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and the lessee was to post a $ 100-reward for his capture. In 1906, Florida also had a book of 
photographs and descriptions made of all escapees over the previous ten years.73
In the 1910s, the state offered still more reforms. In 1910, the state required that female 
convicts be kept separate from the men. Before this time they had been housed in the same 
camps as the men, where both male convicts and guards sexually abused them. Pregnancy was 
not an uncommon result. In 1911, the state purchased 15,652 acres in Bradford County in the 
northern peninsula to be used as a prison farm, and after 1914 the state sent to it all female 
convicts as well as male convicts unfit for hard labor under the lease system.
Florida also improved its inspection system to ensure these new requirements were met.
In 1899, Florida employed its first supervisor o f state convicts, whose job was to enforce 
regulations set by the Board of State Institutions. At the Commissioner of Agriculture’s 
suggestion, in 1902, precautions were taken to avoid using prisoners’ names in reports to prevent 
the prisoner from suffering retribution. By 1910, Florida had four investigators who inspected 
all the camps monthly and submitted reports to the Commissioner of Agriculture. They tried to 
ensure that prisoners were not tortured and that they received adequate food, shelter, and 
clothing. The supervisors had the authority to send sick or injured convicts to the state convict 
hospital.74
It appears that the state convicts’ condition received far greater scrutiny than that of 
those leased out by individual counties. At best counties maintained a minimal involvement in 
their convicts’ oversight. Gadsden County, for example, funded a guard at one naval stores camp
73 Ninth Biennial Report of the Commissioner of Agriculture of the State of Florida. 
1905-1906, 282-284.
74 Drobney, “Where Palm and Pine Are Blowing,” 421-423,431-432; Drobney, 
Lumbermen and Log Sawyers. 159-160; Commissioner o f Agriculture to Florida Naval Stores 
and Com. Company, 5 April 1902, Convict Lease Program Subject Files, 1889-1916, Board of 
Commissioners o f State Institutions, Florida State Archives.
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that leased its convicts and, in Osceola County, one of the county commissioners paid a monthly 
inspection visit to the turpentine camp that leased its convicts. In the 1900s, Florida requested 
that the Clerks of Circuit Court report to the state how many convicts their counties leased, for 
whom the convicts worked, and the monthly price paid for use of the convicts. But unless a 
county created its own system of inspection, no one looked out for the prisoner’s welfare.75
A comparison of state and county camp inspection reports reveals that when Florida did 
begin oversight of county convicts, they received far less attention than those leased by the state. 
The state had information on the general condition of camps leasing its convicts and, if there 
were problems, what they were. Camps employing state convicts still received a rating of “good” 
if there was a problem with no pillows or night shirts and “fair” if the cells needed cleaning. If 
there was no problem it was noted. At some camps, however, inspectors found a multitude o f 
problems. At the Daniel brothers, camp there was no mounted guard in the woods, the guards 
were incompetent, the captain unstable, and three women were apparently being abused.
Another camp had an unsanitary kitchen, no hospital, and a captain with a hot temper who 
punished the convicts severely. County camps apparently received far less scrutiny. They were 
usually listed as being in “good condition” or “good shape” with no details added. One inspector 
did note receipt of a complaint of severe punishment but claimed he found no evidence to 
support it. The lax oversight of county convicts supports historian Matthew Mancini argument 
that state regulations were not always enforced and actually served the system’s defenders more 
than the convicts by supplying the appearance o f greater change than actually occurred.76
75 Mitchel to Jennings, May 18, 1903, John M. Lee to M.S. Jennings, 18 May 1903, C.M. 
Knott to N.B. Broward, 18 August 1905, Walter F. Hancock to M.A. Brown, 11 August 1905, 
John C. Calhoun to M.A. Brower, 11 August 1905, and John M. Lee to M.S. Jennings, 20 May 
1903, Convict Lease Program Subject Files, 1889-1916, Board of Commissioners of State 
Institutions; Barry, “Slavery in the South To-Day,” 486.
76 Commissioner o f Agriculture to Florida Naval Stores and Com. Company, 5 April 
1902, N.A. Blitch to N.B. Broward, 5 April 1906, TJ. Titeaub to W.A. McRae, 1 November
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Where some reformers pushed for improvements to the convict lease system, other 
Progressives called for the practice to be replaced by state chain gangs and prison farms.77 The 
reform opposition to the convict lease did not imply a belief that convicts should not work hard. 
Progressives typically believed that the region’s economic sluggishness could be corrected with 
better infrastructure and offered little challenge to southern race or class relationships. Most, 
like the writer of a Florida newspaper piece who wanted “to see the convict lease system 
abolished” because it was “a disgrace to the state and age,” felt the convicts should labor for the 
direct benefit o f the state. Some suggested that convicts work at a state farm, the proceeds going 
to hire expert labor to build good roads.78 Other progressives wanted convicts themselves to 
work on state roads. The plan satisfied Progressives in two ways; it offered not only improved 
transportation infrastructure but allowed for well-ordered social control by placing the convicts 
under the direct supervision of the state where their work and treatment could best be monitored. 
The movement toward a program of state chain gangs began in North Carolina and was soon 
followed in Florida at the urgency of the Florida Good Roads Association.79 Alex Lichtenstein 
explains that “the substitution of the public chain gang for the private convict lease did not bring
1913, and R.R. Tomlin to W.A. McRae, 28 February 1914, Convict Lease Program Subject Files, 
1889-1916, Board of Commissioners of State Institutions; Mancini, One Dies. Get Another. 64.
77 Drobney, “Where Palm and Pine are Blowing,” 431.
78 “The Everglades and State Convicts,” attached to Leon Ray Livingston to United 
States Attorney General, 6 March 1912, Correspondence, Classified Subject Files, Department o f 
Justice Central Files, General Records of the Department o f Justice, Record Group 60, National 
Archives; James C. Cobb, Industrialization and Southern Society. 1877-1984 (Chicago: The 
Dorsey Press, 1984), 30.
79 Alex Lichtenstein, “Good Roads and Chain Gangs in the Progressive South: ‘The 
Negro Convict Is a Slave,’” The Journal of Southern History 59 (February 1993): 87-91;
Drobney, Lumbermen and Log Sawyers. 172-173; Shofner, “Forced Labor,” 17.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
551
about the demise o f these antimodem tendencies in the region but rather reconciled them with the 
advent of modernity.”*0
The increasing expense of leasing convicts also helped erode the practice. Matthew 
Mancini has shown that the end of the lease system in Georgia coincided with a reduction in its 
profitability. When the state permitted subleasing, market demand drove up the price o f convict 
leasing. Where producers could work a convict for $225.52 a year in 1904, by 1907 the cost had 
nearly tripled to $670, an amount not much different from a free worker’s wage. That year, the 
Panic of 1907 make convict leasing especially unprofitable. As market prices sunk, producers 
found they were stuck with unneeded work crews whose fee they had already paid and who 
continued to require food, clothing, and the oversight o f hired guards. Once cheap, convict labor 
had now become an economic burden. Finally, in 1908, Georgia’s General Assembly’s Convict 
Investigating Committee recommended an end to leasing. The governor and legislature agreed 
and with the expiration of the last contracts in 1909 the practice ended in that state.81
Nearly a decade later Florida began similar action. By this time, many Floridians had 
joined the national outcry against leasing in their state. Newspaper editors, civic leaders, the 
Florida Humane Society, and national muckraking periodicals focused on the abuses o f leasing.82 
In 1917, Florida, which wanted to build good roads to boost tourism, sent three hundred convicts 
to the state roads department. With the completion of a new penitentiary at Raiford, Florida,
80 Lichtenstein, “Good Roads and Chain Gangs,” 110.
81 Mancini, One Dies. Get Another. 224-227.
82 Southern criticism of convict leasing was not new. In 1884, one year before he left his 
native South for exile in New York, George Washington Cable condemned convict leasing, 
explaining that convicts received long sentences for minor crimes as a means of providing forced 
labor to certain southern businesses. His broader message, however, was that prisoners should 
not have to pay for themselves. George W. Cable, “The Convict Lease System in the Southern 
States,” The Century Magazine 27 (February 1884): 583-594; Drobney, Lumbermen and Log 
Sawyers. 173; Shofner, “Forced Labor,” 19.
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ended its leasing program and sent its convicts to work on its roads under the highway 
department’s jurisdiction. Matthew Mancicni explains that such a change represented a 
reallocation o f forced convict labor from the private to the public sector. But even after Florida 
dismantled state convict leasing, county prisoners continued to labor in privately-owned work 
camps, including those producing turpentine.83
In 1923, national publicity surrounding the death of a young North Dakota man in a 
Florida county convict timber camp helped to finally bring an end to the system. In the fall of 
1921, twenty-one year old Martin Tabert left the Munich, North Dakota farm, where he lived 
with his parents, to see the country. His strategy of working part-time while moving from place 
to place succeeded until he arrived in Florida and found he could not sell his labor in a market 
that preferred cheap forced black labor. Out of money, he hoboed his way across the Florida 
panhandle on a train until, on December 15,1921, he reached Leon County where a deputy 
sheriff arrested him. A jury found him guilty of vagrancy and fined him twenty-five dollars. 
Unable to pay, he received a sentence o f ninety days and like all Leon County convicts, was 
turned over to the Putnam Lumber Company, which leased the county’s prisoners for twenty 
dollars each per month. Tabert’s family sent him the money for the fine, but because he had 
already left the county jail for the work camp, the sheriff returned the letter.
Two months later, the Putnam Lumber Company sent his family a letter saying Martin 
had died February 1. Only after the Tabert’s attorney and a North Dakota state attorney 
investigated the incident and witnesses came forward did the whole story unfold. Martin, like 
other convicts at the Putnam camp, rose at four o’clock in the morning and boarded a flatcar,
83 The lease continued in Alabama where virtually all convicts labored in coal mines. 
Alabama finally ended the practice in 1928. Drobney, Lumbermen and Log Sawyers. 174; 
Mancini, One Dies Get Another. 105, 116, 196,221; Jerrell H. Shofner, “Postscript to the Martin 
Tabert Case: Peonage as Usual in the Florida Turpentine Camps,” The Florida Historical 
Quarterly 60 (October 1981): 161, 163; Drobney, “Where Palm and Pine are Blowing,” 433; 
Drobney “Forced Labor,” 69.
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which they rode for fifteen miles through swamps. When the car stopped, they had to walk 
another several miles, sometimes through hip-deep swamp water. Martin’s feet swelled, and the 
swamp water caused an infection which his ill-fitting, tight shoes made worse. His request for a 
larger pair of shoes was ignored. By late January, Martin was very ill. He suffered from 
headaches and occasional fever and had developed swollen areas in his groin so severe that one 
inflammation had to be lanced. When he grew too weak to keep up with the demanding work, 
Tabert received regular beatings. On one occasion, in fiont o f eighty-five to ninety convicts, he 
was beaten forty-five to fifty times with a four-foot long whip made o f three-ply leather and 
weighing seven and a  half pounds. By then Martin ate very little. He wasted down to 125 
pounds and his back was covered with cuts and scabs. Blind with fever by late-January, he lay in 
a stinking bed with his own froth coating his pillow. The doctor only saw him a few times before 
he finally died. Martin was buried in a runaway convicts old cloths in an unmarked grave in 
Perry, Florida, of which no one could seem to remember the location. Putnam Lumber Company 
reported that his death was due to malaria and Martin’s refusal to take his medicine.
At the North Dakota legislature’s request, the Florida legislature began an investigation 
of the incident that eventually lead to a trial. Testimony revealed that the Leon County sheriff 
used his office to supply convict labor for Putnam Lumber Company. In the seven months before 
the sheriffs deal with Putnam, he had arrested only twenty men for vagrancy. In the same period 
after the deal, 154 men were arrested on the same charge. With no defense attorney present, the 
sheriff typically instructed the suspect to plead guilty at a sham trial which sometimes occurred 
late at night in front o f  drunken officials. At the trial that resulted from the Florida legislature’s 
investigation, the camp’s whipping boss was found guilty o f second degree murder and sentenced 
to twenty years. However, he was acquitted on a technicality at a new trial ordered by the
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Florida Supreme Court. For its part, Putnam Lumber Company settled with the Tabert family for 
twenty thousand dollars and received public absolution of blame.*4
Although the Florida legislature’s Investigating Committee focused most of its efforts on 
uncovering the facts of the Tabert case, its efforts also revealed evidence o f  abused and 
overworked convicts laboring in turpentine camps owned by state senator T J . Knabb. The wife 
of a local postmaster informed state investigators that guards had killed nine convicts at the camp 
as well as a woman and her daughter. The most sensational story to come out o f  the Knabb 
inquiry was that o f Washington, D.C., native Paul Revere White, who ended up in Knabb’s camp 
after an arrest for vagrancy. Because White could not perform the expected turpentine work, he 
was kicked, beaten, and whipped almost daily. By the time the state convict supervisor removed 
him from the camp, the skin was rubbed off his hands, deep ulcers had developed on his legs, at 
least one of his ribs was broken, and he had narrowly escaped freezing to death while trying to 
sleep in eighteen-degree temperatures with no covering.85
The Tabert case and evidence of convict abuse at other camps forced the issue of county 
convict leasing to the forefront in Florida.86 National publications detailed the tragedy of 
Tabert’s demise and the efforts by crooked county officials and the Putnam Lumber Co. to 
conceal camp abuses. The Literary Digest covered the affair in a piece carrying the eye-catching 
title of “A Victim o f Convict Slavery.”87 The article noted that the citizens o f  Florida had 
believed that convict leasing had ended in 1919, when the state abolished the hiring out o f its
84 “A Victim o f Slavery,” The Literary Digest 77 (21 April 1923): 41-43; N. Gordon 
Carper, “Martin Tabert, Martyr o f an Era,” The Florida Historical Quarterly 52 (October 1973): 
116-126.
85 Carper, “The Convict-Lease System in Florida,” 126-127.
86 Drobney, “Where Palm and Pine are Blowing,” 434.
87 “Victim of Convict ‘Slavery,’” 40-46.
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prisoners. The piece explained that the leasing of county convicts had continued, despite efforts 
by the governor, because the people o f Florida had no knowledge o f the practice. It also 
reminded readers that Putnam Lumber Company, the company at the center o f the Tabert case, 
was owned and operated out of Wisconsin, and that Florida newspapers were calling for justice 
in the case. As newspapers and organizations across the country campaigned for the system’s 
end, the Florida legislature agreed that it should be abolished and, in April 1923, voted to end 
county convict leasing. In less than a month, it approved another bill ending corporal 
punishment in the prison system. The governor signed both acts.8* Newspapers across Florida 
echoed the Pensacola News’ self-congratulatory refrain that “the name of Florida has been 
cleared from the charge o f  willfully being party to this crime against humanity, through the 
action of the Legislature in the abolition of peonage and the flogging of convicts.”89
Despite such erroneous claims about the demise o f peonage, the practice of convict 
leasing did in fact end. After two decades of reform efforts, the hiring out o f convicts 
succumbed to public pressure, the growing expense of leasing, and the demand for chain gang 
work on state projects. Although closely associated with the practice of convict leasing, peonage 
survived an even more substantial attack. As southern states strengthened peonage legislation 
with false pretense and vagrancy laws and employers started drawing whites into the system, the 
Department of Justice began investigations and trials of employers for violating the Thirteenth 
Amendment However, despite intense national interest and the practice’s apparent wide-spread 
use, only a relatively small number of producers were tried for peonage and fewer still convicted. 
Although the fear of prosecution drove the practice out o f full public view, peonage continued 
into the 1940s.
88 “Victim of Convict ‘Slavery,’” 43; “Florida ‘Comes Clean’ By Ending Convict 
Camps,” The Literary Digest 77 (16 June 1923): 38-40; Carper, “Martin Tabert,” 128; Carper, 
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Chapter Twelve
Government Aid to the Rescue:
Federal Assistance Supports the Naval Stores Industry
Where federal involvement in the first decades of the twentieth century proved a mixed 
blessing for operators, helping them improve production techniques but at the same time 
attacking their labor practices, during the 1930s and 1940s help shifted decidedly in the 
producers’ favor. Over these decades, government assistance for the naval stores industry 
increased over what it had been earlier in the century, both in terms o f research and direct 
financial support, and interference with labor relations subsided. The aid became so great, in 
fact, that it temporarily sustained the struggling business as it teetered on the edge of collapse. 
Previous government efforts to reverse forest depletion began to pay off by the early 1930s, and, 
with it, federally-funded research intensified. The government studies led to significant 
advancements in harvesting, refining, and marketing. Most important, federal economic 
assistance programs substantially subsidized gum naval stores production, enabling the weak 
industry to weather the ravages of the Great Depression. But as turpentine producers enjoyed 
heightened government support, they sought to deprive their laborers of similar aid in the form of 
New Deal worker benefits.
The southern forests’ failure to regenerate remained a concern in the early 1930s. A 
survey at the time estimated that of the fifty-two million acres in the naval stores belt, fourteen 
million acres lay as cutover waste, over thirty-five million acres had only second-growth trees of 
various growth stages and sizes, and virgin pine growth covered only three million acres. The 
largest portion o f this new growth was young and not of sufficient size to use. Nevertheless, 
desperate land owners attempted to squeeze any profit they could from the saplings. By 193S,
556
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fifty-six percent o f  all turpentine trees were smaller than seven inches in diameter, prompting one 
forester to complain that the naval stores industry continued at the expense o f its future well­
being. What it needed, he argued, was a scientific plan to preserve the timber and thus sustain 
the industry. Another forest industry observer complained that in Florida “the forest had been 
treated as a mine.” The time was not distant, he warned, when Florida would require its 
diminishing stands for its own needs. If timber owners did not encourage and protect second 
growth trees, Florida would become a timber-importing state. The saplings that were emerging, 
however, offered a chance for reforestation. In the early 1930s, thirteen thousand ten thousand- 
cup crops of turpentine were produced on thirteen million of the thirty-five million acres of 
second growth forest. If folly stocked with trees, protected from fire, and worked conservatively, 
it was estimated, the existing second-growth stands could in a few years support seventy 
thousand crops. And if  the fourteen million acres o f cutover waste area were replanted and 
protected, in forty-years they would add an additional twenty-eight thousand crops.1 If producers 
took these measures, a factor concluded, “there would appear then to be no danger of a future 
shortage in Naval Stores.”2
In the 1930s and 1940s, reforestation efforts did indeed quicken as success with rapidly 
growing second growth forests demonstrated that the turpentine industry, if it wisely used its 
resources, could survive on such stands. Several factors contributed to the southern forest’s 
resurrection. First, many cutover acres proved inadequately fertile to serve as farmland and
1 R.E. Benedict, “The Naval Stores Industry,” Austin Cary Memorial Forestry 
Collection, Department of Special Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries, University o f 
Florida, 1; W.G. Wahlenbere. Loneleaf Pine: Its Use. Ecology. Regeneration. Protection.
Growth, and Management (Washington, DC: Charles Lathrop Pack Forestry Foundation, 1946), 
9-11; Lenthall Wvman. Experiments in Naval Stores Practice (Washington. DC: United States 
Department of Agriculture, 1932), 4; E.A. Ziegler, A.R. Spiders, and C.H. Coulter, Financial 
Aspects of Growing Southern Pine. Washington Countv Florida (Tallahassee: Florida Forest 
Service, 1931), 5-6, 16.
2 Benedict, “Naval Stores Industry,” 1.
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remained available for reseeding. Second, despite some continuation o f regular burning, the 
practice diminished as foresters’ persistent sermons against it began to win converts. Finally, 
there was also a reduction in the use of small timber as the gospel o f conservation began to take 
hold. The first plantings o f any significance began, in 1924, by timber owners in southeast 
Georgia. They and the landowners who followed their example in the late 1920s transferred 
slash pine seedlings lifted from low-lying areas where the young trees had volunteered. By the 
1930s, federal, state, and private nurseries grew pines for restocking. Trees were best planted 
during their dormant season from December 1 to March 15 and at spaces of around ten feet by 
ten feet or twelve feet by twelve feet, when the ground contained moisture. Once the pine 
branches began to touch each other after ten to fifteen years, the stands were thinned. Between 
1935 and 1936 foresters and landowners planted six million seedlings, mostly slash pine, in 
Florida. The project cost land owners around $ 1.50 per acre. The Civilian Conservation Corps, 
which, in 1936, operated twenty-four camps and employed 4,776 workers in Florida, assisted in 
planting the stock. Administered by the U.S. Forest Service, much of the CCC’s reforestation 
efforts took place in four national parks that together contained over one million acres. 
Reforestation also began in Mississippi during the 1930s, but made its greatest strides there after 
1940 when the state legislature revised the state tax code to encourage the growth and protection 
of young trees.3
3 By the late 1930s the growth of the southern pulpwood industry led to expanded efforts 
to replant cutover forest land. By this time pulpwood production had surpassed the naval stores 
industry in capital investment, value added to products, and payrolls. It was organized on the 
idea of growing timber as a crop, a  unique distinction at the time. The industry’s appetite for 
both slash and loblolly pine led landowners to plant their land in these species rather than 
iongleafs. Some believed that with the rise of the pulpwood industry, the seemingly-stabilized 
naval stores industry, and the region’s remaining sawmills, timber industries might offer a new 
and sustainable economic base to replace the cotton economy which appeared to be fighting a 
certain death during the 1930s. “These days the South is talking and thinking o f  itself in new 
economic terms,” University o f Georgia forestry professor P.L. Buttrick argued in 1939. “It is 
saying that cotton is at long last an uncrowned king, to be retired on a pension by the AAA, and 
it is preparing to crown king pine from whom all blessings are to flow, chiefly in the form of 
paper pulp products.” In the late 1930s a Tift County, Georgia turpentine operator had good
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By the early 1930s, Florida producers harvested eighty percent o f their product from 
second-growth trees and twenty percent from old growth. Of all the stands used, longleaf 
represented sixty percent and slash forty percent. But because most o f  the old-growth pines were 
longleaf and the second growth was primarily slash, turpentine producers more and more turned 
to the latter. To their delight they found favorable results. Experiments conducted in the first 
half of the 1930s indicated that slash pine actually yielded twenty-five percent more gum than 
longleaf. Studies found that chipping affected the trunks of slash pine more than it did longleaf 
and led to greater resin duct formation above the face, which resulted in greater gum production. 
Unlike longleaf, slash pine did not put forth the largest amount o f gum the first day after 
chipping, but extended the flow more evenly across the seven-day interval between chippings, 
yielding its greatest portion on the second day. Because the streaks on slash pine oozed gum 
longer than those on iongieafs, their optimal chipping interval was longer, requiring fewer 
chippings and thus lowering labor costs. And because slash pine gum ran more freely than 
longleaf, a lower portion of its yield was in the form of scrape. Since scrape contained less
results with gum harvested of trees planted in 1924. He had planted the trees 140 to the acre on 
abandoned farm land. Adequate space and management had allowed them to grow to eleven 
inches in diameter in only about fifteen years. In another case a  stand o f eight-inch diameter 
pines were tapped in 1946 just fourteen years after their planting. “Welcome,” (presented at the 
annual meeting of the Georgia Forestry Association, Savannah, Georgia, 8 May 1942), Georgia 
Forestry Association Papers, Special Collections Division, The University o f Georgia Libraries, 
University o f Georgia, 5-6; “The First Forest,” Southern Forest Institute Papers, Special 
Collections Division, The University o f Georgia Libraries, University o f Georgia, 4; A.R.
Shirley, Working Trees for Naval Stores (Athens, GA: Georgia Agricultural Extension Service, 
1946), 36-38; Lenthall Wvman. Florida Naval Stores (Tallahassee: State o f Florida Department 
of Agriculture, 1929), 43; Federal Writers’ Project, Florida: A Guide to the Southernmost State 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1939), 32; Robert S. Maxwell, “The Impact of Forestry on 
the Gulf South,” Forest History 17 (April 1973): 35; Robert S. Blount, Spirits o f Turpentine: A 
History of Florida Naval Stores. 1528-1950 (Tallahassee: Florida Agricultural Museum, 1993), 
45; P.L. Buttrick, “The Hopes and Dangers in the South’s New Forests,” (presented at the annual 
meeting of the Georgia Forestry Association, Savannah, Georgia, 19 May 1939, Georgia Forestry 
Association Papers, 1, 8-9; R.D. Forbes and R.Y. Stuart, Timber Growing and Logging and 
Turpentining Practices in the Southern Pine Region (Washington, DC: United States Department 
of Agriculture, 1930), 2.
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spirits and produced a lower quality of rosin than soft gum, its lower percentage o f  the harvest 
made the slash pine a more lucrative species to work.4
By the late 1930s relieved industry observers believed that the current rate o f 
reforestation could sustain the gum naval stores industry. The pine forest remained only a 
fraction of its original size, but what remained appeared to be stabilizing. Florida, for example, 
in 1939 possessed only a fourth of its original supply of marketable lumber, including young 
growth, but pine land still covered roughly twenty-five percent o f  Florida’s 58,560 square miles. 
Over 5.4 million acres were under the protection o f  the forest conservation agencies.5 Yet 
despite such a reduction the industry continued. One naval stores researcher remarked in 1938, 
that “during the past several decades one o f the oldest and most picturesque of American 
industries has waited with rather hopeless appreciation for its raw material to give out. But at 
last a new day has dawned for this unique industry.”6 Some problems remained, however. One 
forester admitted that the new forests were not o f the same quality as the older ones; their stands 
usually being thin. Most supported half the number of trees they potentially could and some 
grew no more than thirty percent7
4 A. Stuart Campbell, Robert C. Unkrich, and Albert C. Blachard, The Naval Stores 
Industry (Gainseville, FL: Bureau of Economic and Business Research, College o f Business 
Administration, The University of Florida, 1934), 27; Austin Cary, “Studies on Flow o f Gum in 
Relation to Profit in the Naval Stores Industry: A Condensed Account of Experiments Conducted 
from 1920 to 1931,” Olustee Experiment Station Files, Georgia Agrirama, Tifton, GA, 4, 12, 15; 
V.L. Harper and Lenthall Wyman, Variations in Naval Stores Yields Associated with Weather 
and Specific Days Between Chippings (Washington, DC: United States Department o f 
Agriculture, 1936), 20, 22, 29.
5 Florida Writers’ Project, Florida. 31-32; Blount, Spirits o f Turpentine. 24-25.
6 V.L. Harper and T.A. Liefeld, “A New Day in the Naval Stores Industry,” Journal of 
Forestry 36 (November 1938): 1128.
7 Buttrick, “Hopes and Dangers,” 2.
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Because during the 1930s and 1940s turpentiners began turning to second-growth stands 
that covered previously-worked acres, the naval stores industry began a new trend; ending its 
characteristic mobility, it anchored itself in the areas where it had dominated in the early years of 
the century. The bulk of production continued to come from south Georgia and north Florida, 
the two areas claiming eighty percent of the United States’ annual production. Despite the 
challenges posed by deforestation, the region contained the best soil and climate for turpentine 
forests, the greatest concentration of equipment and trained workers, and the most convenient 
and available access to distribution through factorage houses. Georgia, having retaken the 
position as top producer from Florida during the 1920s, manufactured around fifty-seven percent 
of turpentine and rosin made in the U.S. Florida produced around twenty-six percent of the 
national naval stores production, somewhat less than twenty percent of the world production, and 
employed 14,000 men, most o f  them black. Alabama manufactured the third largest quantity, 
just over ten percent, far less than Georgia or Florida. Other southern states—South Carolina, 
Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, and even North Carolina—made only small quantities, a combined 
total of just over six percent. Tar production persisted in scattered areas of the Southeast: eastern 
North and South Carolina, south Alabama and Mississippi, south Louisiana, and east Texas. By 
the second World War, however, its manufacture, arguably the oldest form o f manufacturing in 
America, ended.8
The pattern of naval stores trade activity at southern ports reflected the end o f the 
industry’s regional migration. Through the 1930s, the same ports that became well-established in 
the handling o f naval stores in the early twentieth century remained the principal exporters. As
8 Benedict, “Naval Stores Industry,” 1-2; Florida Writers’ Project, Florida. 88, 378; F.P. 
Veitch and C.F. Speh, “Second Annual Naval Stores Report on Production, Distribution, 
Consumption, and Stocks of Turpentine and Rosin of the United States,” American Turpentine 
Farmers Association Papers, Georgia Agrirama, 2; John K. Cross, “Tar Burning, A Forgotten 
Art?,” Forests and People 23 (Second Quarter 1973): 21.
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Georgia was the largest naval stores producer, its ports handled the bulk o f the product’s trade. 
Savannah remained the greatest naval stores port, although it had briefly surrendered its position 
to Jacksonville between 1905 and 1923. Not only was Savannah closest to the largest naval 
stores-producing area, but it also enjoyed an excellent regional transportation system that 
included five railroad lines that linked it to the interior forests. The city boasted a number of 
large distilleries capable o f processing substantial quantities of crude gum and six factors to 
service producers. Finally, the presence in the city o f  the Savannah Board o f Trade, which 
continued to oversee the U.S. naval stores market, strengthened the ports’ hold on the business. 
Although it never approached Savannah’s importance in the naval stores trade, Brunswick 
became an important outlet for turpentine and rosin produced in extreme southeastern Georgia. 
Having risen to prominence as a naval stores market around 1890, the Brunswick port, which 
was serviced by several railroads and steamship lines, enjoyed a steady business in naval stores, 
most of it exported directly to Europe. Although its market was closed to all but one dealer, 
Downing Company, the port offered a large rosin yard and two turpentine storage tanks. It was 
also the home of the Hercules Powder Company’s steam distillation plant, the largest such 
facility in the world.9
Jacksonville, the United States’ second-most important naval stores port and the largest 
handler of products in Florida, offered as wide a range o f services as Savannah but, by the 1930s, 
served a less active area of production than it had earlier in the century. Adequate railroad
9 By 1950 the Savannah Board of Trade’s job o f setting prices and collecting and 
reporting statistics was assumed by the Department o f  Agriculture. As the major steamship lines 
established direct connections with southern ports, New York played less o f a  role in naval stores 
export activity. Some products, however, continued to arrive in New York via coastwise trade 
for reexport and in that respect New York remained important in naval stores purchasing 
activities for all over the world. Campbell, etal., Naval Stores Industry. 14-15, 18; Richard C. 
Davis, ed. Encyclopedia o f American Forest and Conservation History (New York: Macmillan 
Publishing Company, 1983), s.v. “naval stores;” For figures related to turpentine production by 
state see Appendix A.
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service and especially an excellent road system linked the Jacksonville port to producers in the 
northeastern portion o f the panhandle and peninsula. By the early 1930s, seventy-five percent of 
Florida’s production reached market by truck. The St. Johns River also serviced the port, but the 
amount o f naval stores arriving by water was much less than in previous years. With several 
steam distillation plants, Jacksonville could easily process the delivered raw gum, and its many 
factorage houses and dealers could see to the sale and distribution of the refined product. The 
Jacksonville naval stores yard, the largest in the world and owned by the city, covered over fifty 
acres on the St. Johns River and offered storage room for 250,000 barrels o f rosin and over 
130,000 o f turpentine. A covered turpentine shed eight hundred feet long and one hundred feet 
wide could shield seventy-five thousand barrels of turpentine from the sun. Four steel storage 
tanks were capable of holding another twenty thousand barrels. Storage space at nearby 
Commodore Point offered room for an additional thirty-six thousand barrels. Jacksonville’s 
docks could accommodate at one time five large ocean-going vessels with thirty-foot drafts. By 
the early 1930s, naval stores was Jacksonville’s most important export, followed by lumber and 
cotton.10
Although it ranked fourth in volume behind Savannah, Jacksonville, and Brunswick, 
Pensacola continued to handle naval stores produced in Alabama and Florida’s western 
panhandle. The city enjoyed good railroad connections with most important interior towns from 
which naval stores could be collected for shipping. However, the port had a closed market with 
only one factor and one dealer handling sales and distribution. Although its gum exports
10 A loosely woven wire cage which conducted lightning away from the flammable 
turpentine casks covered the sheds. By the 1930s, twelve electric trucks provided quick transfer 
of turpentine and rosin to the docks, replacing the old labor-intensive method of rolling the 
barrels. Campbell, et al., Naval Stores Industry. 15-16, 51; A. Stuart Campbell and Alvin Cassel, 
The Foreign Trade of Florida fGainseville. FL: Bureau o f Economic and Business Research, 
College o f Business Administration, University of Florida, 1935), 73-74, 51, 82; Federal Writers’ 
Project, Florida. 189.
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remained relatively small, the location and operation o f the Newport wood naval stores plant in 
Pensacola added greatly to the port’s export value. With a facility' covering forty acres, the plant 
could store up to 300,000 gallons of turpentine and 290,000 gallons of pine oil. Along with 
Pensacola, Panama City handled a small quantity of naval stores produced around the western 
area of Florida and Mobile, and New Orleans exported the tiny amount manufactured in 
southwestern Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana.11
By the early 1930s, a sophisticated quality-control system involving both federal and 
state inspectors improved the handling and grading o f the rosin and turpentine that flowed 
through the ports and thus helped strengthen trade. At the state level, inspectors, none of whom 
could be financially connected with the industry and all o f  whom worked under an appointed 
supervisor, used the USDA grading system. Once the gum arrived at market, inspectors weighed 
and graded it by visual inspection. They then determined both the grade of gum and the yield of 
turpentine and rosin that various grades would produce once distilled. The inspectors determined 
yield by the percentage of chips, bark, trash, dirt, sand, and water present in the gum, usually as 
the barrels were emptied into large vats. If the gum was not dumped, inspectors pushed a pole to 
the bottom of the barrel and pulled it out to inspect the amount o f foreign matter that adhered to 
the stick. Once the grade was determined, factors assigned its price. Although most inspectors 
worked at the market, some graded products at the stills. Supervising inspectors regularly visited 
each naval stores yard in their states, examining the stock, sampling the barrels, and examining 
the books. The owner of the product paid the inspectors’ fees, 60 per barrel o f rosin and 90 per 
barrel of turpentine. The supervisor received .50 for each barrel o f naval stores inspected in his
11 It appears that small naval stores handlers charged a  greater percentage o f  the value to 
market it. Larger naval stores ports like Savannah, Jacksonville, and Brunswick charged 4.75 
percent to 7.5 percent in marketing fees where producers shipping through Pensacola and Mobile 
paid 10 and 12 percent respectively to market naval stores. Campbell, et al., Naval Stores 
Industry. 17-18, 51; Campbell and Cassel, Foreign Trade o f  Florida. 73.82.
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state, the fee shared equally by the buyer and seller. In compliance with the 1923 U.S. Naval 
Stores Act, which prohibited the domestic and foreign trade of adulterated or mislabeled rosin 
and turpentine, federal inspectors performed the same procedures as their counterparts at the 
state level. Because most naval stores products left the south, nearly all received two
inspections.12
Those producers caught violating the inspection laws faced stiff penalties. Anyone 
attempting to market adulterated naval stores had the product confiscated and sold to the highest 
bidder, half the proceeds going to the informant and the other half to the state. The inspector 
received none o f the reward. Attempting to produce, sell, or ship uninspected naval stores could 
bring a five-hundred-dollar fine and/or three months imprisonment. For altering the inspector’s 
grade or false markings by the inspector, the guilty party could receive a five-hundred-dollar fine 
and/or six months imprisonment. Fraudulently packing naval stores or grading by anyone other 
than a licensed inspector carried a  one-hundred-dollar fine and/or three months imprisonment.13
Not only did government inspection and enforcement strengthen quality standards, 
during the 1930s naval stores research intensified with federal support. The Naval Stores 
Research Division o f the Department of Agriculture’s Bureau of Agriculture and Industrial 
Chemistry stepped up research into production, grading, and new uses. Whereas the Forestry 
Service focused attention on broad issues affecting woodland and forest products industries 
across the country, the Naval Stores Research Division concentrated exclusively on improving 
the turpentine industry. Its agents working for the division demonstrated pioneering methods and 
new still equipment in the field. The Division also distributed helpful literature to producers
12 Shirley, Working Trees for Naval Stores. 30; Campbell, et al., Naval Stores Industry.
81-83; Production o f Naval Stores (Washington, DC: United States Department o f Agriculture,
1942), 6.
13 Campbell et al., Naval Stores Industry. 83-84.
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through the mail and offered individual assistance upon request. It also collected statistics on 
naval stores production, both stock on hand at the stills and ports and that held by dealers and the 
consuming industries. The Division’s ability to assist producers intensified with the opening of 
the Naval Stores Experiment Station, built in the Olustee National Forest in Florida on ten acres 
donated by the Forest Service and with $40,000 appropriated by Congress. The Olustee forest 
contained a equal mix of longleaf and slash pines and was accessible to producers from the most 
productive naval stores regions in Georgia and Florida.14 It thus offered convenient research 
opportunities on both of the most common species used in turpentining. When the station 
opened in 1932, it consisted of a fire still, auxiliary buildings, and a physical plant building that 
housed chemicals and processing equipment. Three years later a chemical laboratory was added. 
As the world’s first naval stores research station, the Olustee facility worked in cooperation with 
the Bureau o f Forestry’s naval stores research laboratory in Washington, which studied the 
composition and properties o f pine gum and better ways to prepare, use, handle, and transport 
naval stores. By the late 1930s, the Naval Stores Division operated on a budget o f nearly 
$80,000, split evenly between experiments on improved production practices and studies of 
chemical composition and use. In 1943, the Division headquarters was moved from Washington, 
DC, to New Orleans, and eight years later, to Olustee. From 1953 until its termination in 1973, 
research at Olustee continued under the Agriculture Research Service.15
14 Competition for the station’s location was stiff with ten communities in Georgia and 
Florida offering free sites and facilities; For figures related to naval stores consumption see 
Appendix A.
15 The naval stores industry benefited indirectly from the Southern Forest Experiment 
Station, established in 1921 with its base in New Orleans and substations in Ashville, North 
Carolina, McNeill, Mississippi, and Starke, Florida. Its studies o f fire damage, wood growth, 
soil conservation, and the effects o f animal grazing on forest restitution assisted all forest 
products industries. Campbell, et al., Naval Stores Industry. 76,79-80; Sandra Jo Forney, “The 
Importance o f Sites Related to the Naval Stores Industry in Florida,” (paper presented at the 
annual Florida Anthropological Society meeting, Daytona Beach, Florida, 1985), 6-7. “Locate 
Naval Stores Station in Osceola Forest of Florida,” Turpentine newsclipping file, Forest History 
Society, Durham, NC; G.E. Hilbert, “Twenty Years o f Research by the Naval Stores Station,”
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Government studies produced considerable advances in turpentining techniques. One 
improvement was a better understanding o f burning practices. Burning away underbrush 
exposed seedlings to frost in cooler months, excessive heat in warmer ones, and rapid drying of 
the soil. Given this understanding, conscientious producers had begun intensive fire suppression 
efforts. For example, one operator in the early 1930s built his own seventy-foot high fire tower 
which he had manned from eight in the morning to five in the afternoon. Because the tower had 
no telephone, the watchman had to climb down and ride a mile on horseback to headquarters to 
report the fire. To fight blazes, the same producer employed an old army surplus jeep with a 
water tank mounted on its back. By the 1930s, progressive producers had joined efforts with 
Forest Service to suppress fire in their forests. In 1939, around 125 Florida operators protected 
approximately one million acres of turpentine forest, about a fourth of the state’s total protected 
lands. As a result of their efforts, less than three percent o f these lands were burned over as 
compared to fifty-five percent of the unprotected areas.16
Research conducted in the 1930s and 1940s demonstrated that the issue o f  burning was 
actually more complex than originally believed. Researchers agreed with earlier experts who 
found that even small, low-burning fires could damage trees, especially if they swept through the 
forest in the late spring and summer. Severe fires were capable o f consuming a tree’s entire
The AT-FA Journal 15 (January 1953): 6; “25 Years of Help.” Naval Stores Review: 13-14; 
“Gum Naval Stores,” The Papers of Theodore Bilbo, Archives and Manuscript Department, 
McCain Library and Archives, University o f Southern Mississippi. The Naval Stores Research 
Lab supported by the AT-FA also continued efforts to find new uses for gum turpentine and 
rosin. Davis, Encyclopedia o f American Forest and Conservation History. 476. “Report of 
President to the Georgia Forestry Association,” (presented at the annual meeting o f  the Georgia 
Forestry Association, Savannah, Georgia, 18-19 May 1939), Georgia Forestry Association 
Papers, 4.
16 Forbes and Stuart, Timber Growing and Logging and Turpentining Practices. 7; 
Freeman Ashmore, “Looking Back: The Woodsrider,” Wakulla Area Digest (September 1996): 
24; Florida Writers’ Project, “The Story o f Naval Stores . . . , ” Florida Highways 11 (July 1943): 
32.
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crown and so badly scorching its trunk that it soon died. Fire also caused partial deforestation, 
reduced the rate of wood growth, and even devoured a large portion of the soil nitrogen to a 
depth of forty-five inches, thus reducing its fertility. But by the 1940s, after over a decade of 
diligent fire suppression, researchers realized that an accidentally-set blaze in an area fixe of fire 
for several years might be even more damaging than frequent bums. With fire suppressed, debris 
built up to deep levels on the forest floor, providing enough fuel to turn any unintentional fire 
into a roaring and extremely destructive conflagration. In 1934, for example, the effect of a 
forest fire which burned through 15,000 acres in southeast Georgia varied greatly between 
previously-burned and unbumed plots. In areas where light, frequent burning had been 
permitted, none o f the turpentined slash and longleaf died and only a few of the round second- 
growth pines perished. In another part, protected from fire for fifteen years, fifty percent of the 
turpentine trees and eighty percent of the young second-growth pines died. Studies also showed 
that whereas fire could damage pines in different ways, it also improved growing conditions. 
Although fire consumed soil nitrogen, it added nutrients through ash that leached into the ground 
with rain. Moreover, the removal of forest floor debris exposed soil to the direct rays of the sun, 
increasing its temperature. Rises in soil temperature increased a pine’s ability to absorb water 
and thus raised gum production. Moreover, the absence of dead plant material and low-growing 
vegetation increased the chances that pine seeds would reach the soil where they could sprout. 
Once the seedlings emerged, fires lowered the threat of brown spot needle disease and reduced 
competition from grass.17
17 Cary, “Studies on Flow of Gum,” 4; V.L. Harper, Effects of Fire on Gum Yields of 
Longleaf and Slash Pines. (Washington, DC: United States Department of Agriculture, 1944), 7- 
9, 12-15, 18,21-22,26-27; Campbell, etal., Naval Stores Industry. 32; Wahlenberg, Longleaf 
Pine. 201-202; Norman R. Hawley, “Burning in Naval Stores Forest,” in Proceedings. Third 
Annual Tall Timbers Fire Ecology Conference (Tallahassee, FL: Tall Timbers Research Station, 
1964), 87; Howard E. Weaver and David A. Anderson, Manual o f  Southern Forestry (Danville,
IL: The Interstate Printers and Publishers, Inc., 1954), 233.
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Thus foresters, by the mid-1940s, recommended carefully controlled burning over none 
at all. Producers could manage the intensity and spread o f fire by plowing fire lanes and burning 
between sundown and eight in the morning, when the wind was less likely to shift to a new 
direction. It was also best to bum during the winter months and following rain and to confine the 
fire to smaller, more easily-controlled areas. For stands intended for new production, producers 
enjoyed optimal results of burning just before the installation o f cups. Operators were also to 
follow a rotation pattern so that plots were burned every three to five years raking around the 
trees before each firing.18
Because free range cattle and other livestock herders were responsible for much o f the 
burning in the southern forest, researchers tried to coordinate forest and range research. As late 
as 1950, livestock herders considered it their right to practiced free-range grazing year-round 
with very little supplemental feeding and minimal control over the number o f cattle or the season 
in which they used a given area or the number o f cattle feeding there. Very little planning went 
into their forest burning practices either. Foresters showed that herders were harming their own 
interests with their haphazard burning. Studies found that the South’s best forage lands were 
indeed in the southern pine belt, but that between July and early March grazing was poor and 
could not be improved by burning. Researchers also showed that burning commonly killed an 
area’s Bermuda grass, which offered the best grazing, and left only weeds and wiregrass, the 
latter two required from seven and a half to thirty acres to sustain one cow for the five-month 
grazing period. Such findings contributed to the decline of free-range grazing in the piney 
woods.19
18 Shirley, Working Trees for Naval Stores. 40-41.
19 Weaver and Anderson. Manual of Southern Forestry. 155, 158-161, 175; Florida 
Writers’ Project, Florida. 32.
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Government researchers also thoroughly examined factors affecting gum yield.
Scientists already had a general understanding that crown size influenced yield, but new research 
revealed that this quality became more important in the third and subsequent years o f  harvesting. 
Trees possessing less than forty percent crown greatly decreased their gum production in their 
later years. Experiments also showed that rapidly-growing trees with large crowns had the least 
decline in yields from year to year and that second-growth trees tended to make more than old- 
growth of the same diameter because they usually possessed more foliage. Researchers also 
found that temperature influenced gum yield. If temperatures dropped below forty-five degrees, 
little or no gum flowed. When temperatures rose to around fifty-two degrees, both slash and 
longleaf pine required nearly six days to yield ninety percent of their yield for the week. But 
with average temperatures hovering around eighty-two degrees, as they usually did in the 
turpentine belt during the summer, longleaf produced its weekly yield in the first forty-eight 
hours after chipping and slash pines in the first ninety-six hours. Thus, it was profitable to chip 
more frequently during the warmer summer months than in the spring and fall in order to 
encourage a perpetual gum flow. Researchers assured producers that the heavy summer chipping 
schedule would not harm the tree. They also showed that intense turpentining did indeed provide 
a twenty-five percent larger yield in the first year than conservative turpentining, but in all 
subsequent years the trees gum production experienced drastic declines. Likewise, an advanced 
streak made approximately thirty days before the chipping season brought good early season 
yields, but after the first eight weeks yields declined in proportion to the early rise. Experiments 
also showed that backfaces produced approximately fourteen percent less gum than the front 
face.20
20 Wahlenberg, Longleaf Pine. 200-201,205; T.A. Liefeld, “Relation of Naval Stores 
Yields to Frequency of Chipping,” Journal of Agricultural Research 64 (15 January 1942), 92; 
Ralph W. Clements, Manual: Modem Gum Naval Stores Methods (Asheville, NC: Southeastern 
Forest Experiment Station, 1960), 2-4,9,24; 10-11.
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Through their efforts, forestry researchers were able to make more precise conclusions 
regarding the effect of turpentining on tree growth and forest depletion than were previously 
known. Growth reduction proved more related to the size and number of faces on a tree than the 
actual volume o f gum extracted. Wide and multiple faces slowed tree growth. The 
recommended average-size single face caused about a twenty-five percent reduction in wood 
formation. With healthy, rapidly growing trees with large crowns, however, the slowed rate 
could be as little as five percent. Discoveries concerning the rate of tree depletion led to better 
recommendations regarding the pattern with which pines should be turpentined and harvested. 
Earlier suggestions recommended long rest periods between the conclusion of work on the front 
face and the start o f harvesting from the back. This lengthy interval, foresters discovered, 
permitted pitch-soaking, rot, and insect damage to work their way up the truck above the face. 
Foresters thus began recommending the rapid working of trees, using safe methods, and cutting 
the stands promptly with the end of chipping.21
By far one of the greatest industry advancements made by government researchers 
working at the Naval Stores Research Division was the design o f a central distillery developed at 
the Olustee station. Costing between $20,000 and $250,000, depending on size and 
sophistication, central distilleries employed the most up-to-date and efficient methods to produce 
standardized naval stores of a higher quality and at a lower cost than did old-style copper fire 
stills. Because these outfits had storage capacity for up to fifty thousand barrels o f  crude gum, 
the product could be refined and marketed year-round, reducing the annual fluctuation in market 
prices.22
21 Cary, “Studies on Flow of Gum,” 14; Clements, Manual. 10; R.P. True and R. D. 
McCulley “Defects Above Naval Stores Faces Are Associated With Dry Face,” reprint from 
Southern Lumberman (15 December 1945), Olustee Experiment Station Files, Georgia Agrirama,
Tifton, GA, 1-3.
22 Davis, Encyclopedia o f American Forest and Conservation History. 477; Donald 
Fraser Martin, Jr., “An Historical and Analytical Approach to the Current Problems o f  the
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With central distilleries, producers could enjoy the advantages o f better and cleaner 
equipment operated by highly trained specialists, all at a lower cost than running their own stills. 
Operators delivered the gum to an unloading deck at one o f the large facilities. The raw 
turpentine arrived in sealed barrels that were weighed before proceeding to a receiving area.
Here workers turned the barrels up-side-down over receiving vats to drain. After the gum 
stopped oozing from their containers, steam jets directed into each barrel melted the last bit o f  
gum which ran out into the vat. Barrels were then returned to the unloading deck to be 
reweighed in order to determine the gum’s net weight. From the bottom o f the vat, raw 
turpentine was pumped into another chamber, where it was melted with steam before proceeding 
through two sets of screens that removed such trash as insects, dirt, bark, and straw. The filtered 
gum then entered a wash tank were it was cleaned of water-soluble contaminants. Once cleaned, 
a carefully measured amount o f gum entered the still. In the still, which could hold from one 
hundred to two hundred barrels o f gum, heat was applied with submerged steam coils.
Technicians carefully regulated the distillation process until the water-turpentine flow from the 
condenser reached a rate o f nine to one. At that point the molten rosin was pumped from the still 
and packaged. Central distilleries processed between one thousand to two thousand barrels of 
crude gum each week. By comparison, a fire still could manage only a maximum of 180 barrels 
a week.23
The introduction of central distilleries coincided with several developments that made 
their success possible. First, road improvements in the naval stores region and the wide 
availability of motorized trucks enabled producers to haul their gum many miles to a large
American Gum Naval Stores Industry” (Ph.D. diss., University of North Carolina, 1942), xiv, 
227-228; Campbell, et al., Naval Stores Industry. 97-98.
23 A.J. Panshin, E.S. Harrar, J.S. Bethel, W.J. Baker, Forest Products: Their Sources. 
Production, and Utilization (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1962): 454; Shirley, 
Working Trees for Naval Stores. 34; Hilbert, “Twenty Years o f Research,” 8.
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distillery more cheaply than operating a badly equipped and poorly run fire still themselves. 
Second, an increasing number o f new gum producers, many of whom could not afford their own 
still, created a demand for such facilities. Third, stricter marketing requirements, which the 
central distilleries could meet more easily than fire stills, enhanced the former’s popularity. 
Finally, competition from wood naval stores producers, who were growing more and more 
capable of producing finer, standardized product grades, necessitated that gum producers turn to 
specialized distillers able to refine similar products. All four factors, combined with the central 
distilleries clear economic advantages, led to their rapid construction across the Southeast in the 
1930s and 1940s.24
Large naval stores producers and consumers built most of the government-designed 
central distilleries, with factorage houses playing little role in their construction. Several were 
built around Jacksonville, but most were located in Georgia. In 1936, Glidden Company built the 
first central processing and distillation plant in Jacksonville, Florida, and later one in Valdosta 
and Collins, Georgia. A group o f large operators organized Filtered Rosin Products Company, 
which, by 1942, operated stills in Brunswick, Baxley, Douglas, Valdosta, and Jacksonville. The 
Langdales of Valdosta began construction of a plant late during the Second World War, after 
they received authorization to acquire the steel and brass necessary for the project. Their 
distillery opened July 1, 1945, at the cost o f $75,000. Employing the latest designs and 
equipment, it was the third such distillery erected in the southeastern Georgia community. 
Located just outside of town adjacent to the Georgia and Florida and the Georgia, South, and
24 Davis, Encyclopedia o f American Forest and Conservation History. 476-477; Shirley, 
Working Trees for Naval Stores. 30,33-34; I.F. Eldgredge, The 4 Forests and the Future of the 
South (Washington, DC: The Charles Lathrop Pack Forestry Foundation, 1947), 21; Nelson 
Courtlandt Brown, Forest Products: The Harvesting. Processing, and Marketing o f Materials 
Other Than Lumber. Including the Principal Derivatives. Extractives, and Incidental Products in 
the United States and Canada (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1950), 185; Naval Stores 
Statistics. 1900-1954 (Washington. DC: United States Department o f Agriculture, 1956), 1-2; 
Elliott Maguire, interview by author, tape recording, S t Augustine, FL, 5 June 1996.
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Florida Railroad lines, it replaced the roughly twenty-five stills the Langdales operated at their 
own operations and also served other producers in South Georgia and northern Florida. 
Approximately fifty miles to the southeast of Valdosta in Lake City, Florida, the Newton family 
opened a similar facility not quite two months later. For three generations the Newtons had 
produced naval stores, beginning in North Carolina and spreading geographically until, by 1945, 
they were engaged in the business in all the pine states but Texas. Billed as the most modem 
processing plant between Jacksonville and Valdosta, the Newton facility competed with the 
Langdales for producers’ business.25 By the mid- to late-1940s, approximately thirty central 
distilleries were in operation in the naval stores region, processing close to eighty percent o f the 
crude gum. Whereas approximately 1,300 fire stills were operating throughout the southern pine 
region in the mid 1930s, by 1950 only around sixty-three fire stills remained in operation in the 
South, most running on an irregular basis. The shift from independent distillation to central 
facilities was so rapid that, by 1948, economist Joseph B. Hosmer observed that “the gum 
segment has changed from a sprawling industry characterized by twelve or thirteen hundred 
small wood-fired stills (‘fire stills’), which creaked at the joints and leaked profit at every gasket, 
to a compact group of thirty to forty efficient distillation plants.”26 Thus, in the 1940s, gum 
naval stores producers returned to the status operators before the mid 1830s in that they became 
gum harvesters who relied on large distilleries to process their turpentine.
25 Harley Langdale, Jr., interview by Harold K. Steen, 1991, Forest History Society, 9; 
“Langdale’s New Processing Plant Will Open July 1st,” The AT-FA Journal (June 1945): 5; 
Carroll B. Butler, Treasures o f the Longleaf Pines. Naval Stores (Shalimar, FL: Tarkel 
Publishing, 1998), 91; M.E. Henegar, Slash and Longleaf Pine Growers Handbook: Practical 
Information and Suggestions for Growing. Protecting, and Realizing Maximum Utilization (Lake 
City, FL: The Newton Company, Incorporated), Olustee Experiment Station Files, Georgia 
Agrirama, Tifton, GA, i, iii.
26 Joseph B. Hosmer. Economic Aspects o f the Naval Stores Industry (Atlanta: State 
Engineering Experiment Station, Georgia School o f Technology, 1948), 1.
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Even as central distilleries gained popularity, the Olustee Station researchers also 
assisted producers with improvements to the old fire still design. Their new still used fuel more 
economically, heated the kettle more evenly, provided better fire protection, proved easier to 
regulate, and consequently produced better results than the previous design, which had remained 
virtually unchanged for a century. The new fire still’s fumace was designed with thick walls, 
allowing the maximum fire protection and durability. The redesigned flue and fire path allowed 
for more even distribution o f heat, the still structure itself was constructed o f heavy gagged 
copper and thoroughly welded together, and the size and strength of the worm, condensing tub, 
and the foundation it rested upon were increased. A thermostat provided automatic control o f the 
temperature and water flow into the condenser tub. Rosin strainers were enlarged to handle the 
still’s entire content without workers having to check the flow as it drained. The strainers were 
lined with aluminum and fitted with a hydraulic lift to raise the vat high enough for its contents 
to run into barrels, eliminating the need for workers to dip it out.
In the early 1930s, one Baxley, Georgia, producer began construction of what was 
probably one of the first o f  the improved stills. The Baxlev News Banner informed the curious 
that it was located close enough to the highway for passersby to see it work. During the first 
several years of the 1930s, ninety such stills were reportedly built in Florida. By 1934, around 
fifteen percent of stills in the South were of the government design and another eight percent 
employed some of its features. Only a large operation could afford a still o f  such quality so most 
stills in operation at the time used none of the improvements. An estimated seventy-eight percent 
of fire stills continued to use sound rather than the recording thermometer to regulate the process. 
As late as the 1960s some o f these primitive facilities continued to operate. Many other
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producers abandoned the use of their existing fire stills or, when constructing new camps, 
decided against building stills and instead relied on the central distilleries to process their gum.27
Intensified wartime government research resulted in yet another advance in turpentine 
production, the use o f  acid spray to increase chipping efficiency. In the early 1930s, Germany 
and Russia began studies into the use of an acid solution to stimulate gum flow. U.S. studies 
followed in 1936 at the Olustee Experimental Forest as a cooperative effort between the 
Southern Forest Experiment Station and the U.S. Forest Service. Few resources were initially 
allocated to the project since surplus of naval stores and low prices in the late 1930s reduced 
interest in methods to increase production. When the Second World War increased naval stores 
demand, research into acid treatment accelerated. The studies showed that a fifty percent water 
and sulfuric acid solution would collapse the wood cells lining the resin ducts, thus enlarging 
their openings and allowing for a longer period o f gum flow. Moreover, the acid held the resin 
ducts open for two weeks, after which new streaks and acid were necessary. Thus, labor costs 
could be cut because workers needed to visit trees only half as often. Another benefit was the 
faces’ slowed movement up the trunk. By 1946, researchers announced the method ready for the 
industry’s adoption.28
27 Campbell, et al., Naval Stores Industry. 80; Wyman, Florida Naval Stores. 28; “Cross- 
sectional View of Turpentine Fire Still Layout at the Naval Stores Station,” (Olustee, FL: Naval 
Stores Station), Bilbo Papers; Shirley, Working Trees for Naval Stores. 33; “Ten Mile Notes,” 
The Baxley News Banner 3 February 1932; “Before Tourism-Turpentine,” Southern Living 
(October 1986), St. Augustine Historical Society Research Library, St. Augustine, FL; Butler, 
Treasures of the Longleaf Pines. 79; Jo Meldrim, interview by author, tape recording, St. 
Augustine, FL, 19 August 1996.
28 Carl E. Ostrom and Worden Waring, “Effect of Chemical Stimulation o f Gum Flow on 
Carbohydrate Reserves in Slash Pine,” Journal o f Forestry 44 (December 1946): 1076; Panshin et 
al., Forest Products. 443; Kenneth B. Pomeroy, “Modem Trends in an Ancient Industry,” Journal 
of Forestry 50 (April 1952): 297; Peter Koch, Utilization o f the Southern Pines (Washington,
DC: United States Department of Agriculture, 1972), 1479-1480; Norman R. Hawley, “A 
Summary of the Histoiy o f the Naval Stores Conservation Program,” in Historical Background o f 
the Naval Stores Conservation Program. Olustee Experiment Station Files, Georgia Agrirama,
14; C. Dorsey Dyer, “History of the Gum Naval Stores Industry,” The AT-FA Journal 25
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Government researchers studied other industry issues as well. They examined a wide 
range of naval stores packaging methods: dip barrels, turpentine storage and shipping containers, 
and rosin packages. It investigated the composition and derivatives o f resin, rosin, and spirits. 
And it studied the industrial uses o f naval stores, the origin and composition o f the color o f rosin, 
the causes o f deterioration of turpentine in storage, and statistics of the production, consumption, 
and stocks of naval stores.29
Thanks to government-sponsored studies, turpentining techniques, by 1950, were vastly 
improved from what they were in 1900 and considerably different from just twenty years earlier. 
In the 1930s and 1940s, bark chipping, acid treatment and the introduction o f two-quart cups 
transformed the practice of harvesting gum, significantly reduced the damage to trees, lowered 
labor requirements, and increased yields. Producers also had a variety o f cup design options 
from clay to elongated metal to conical-shaped metal cups. New double-headed nails made nails 
easier to see and remove, solving the problem of saw blades striking them. With the introduction 
of central distilleries, producers were no longer burdened with the expense o f distillation. Start­
up costs included only cups, gutters, and the tools required to work the trees.30
Despite advances, however, the Great Depression hit the naval stores industry hard (fig. 
12. I). Lack o f restraint on the part o f producers in the late 1920s resulted in over extension and 
overproduction, making operators wholly unprepared for the sudden economic downturn. The 
United States’ high protective tariff worsened the Depression’s impact on the naval stores 
industry, since in raising the price o f imported goods, the government crushed foreign trade and
(January 1963): 8; Clements, Manual. 11; M.D. Mobley and Robert N. Haskins, Forestry in the 
South (Atlanta: Turner E. Smith and Co., 1956), 157.
29 “Gum Naval Stores,” Bilbo Papers, 3.
30 Davis, Encyclopedia o f American Forest and Conservation History. 477; C.S. 
Schopmeyer, “Labor Requirements for Working Turpentine Faces,” Naval Stores Review 64 
(April 1954): 17; “Naval Stores Equipment,” The Forest Farmer 9 (September 1950): 8-10.
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made it impossible for other nations to purchase American goods, including naval stores. 
Producers, attempting to remain in business, responded with desperate measures. Turpentiners 
slashed operating expenses as much as possible by lowering wages to bare subsistence levels and 
refusing to replace worn out equipment. They also reduced their overall level o f production, 
although in many cases not by choice. Producers either lost the means to operate on the scale
Net Cash Proceeds Per Fifty Gallons of Spirits o f Turpentine
1920-1939
$70.00
$60.00
$50.00
$40.00
$30.00
$20.00
$ 10.00
$ -
1922 19241920 1926 1928 1930 1934 1937 19391932
Figure 12.1. Net Cash Proceeds Per Fifty Gallons of Spirits o f Turpentine, 1920-1939 
Donald Fraser Martin, Jr., “An Historical and Analytical Approach to the Current Problems of 
the American Gum Naval Stores Industry” (Ph.D. diss., University of North Carolina, 1942), 
338.
they once had or went broke and saw factors foreclose on their operations. Many producers 
worked their reduced number o f crops intensely in an effort to extract as much gum as possible 
over the short term. Despite increased forest exploitation, the drop in the number o f producers 
(fig. 12.2) resulted in the 1932/33 crop year being the smallest in the previous thirty-five years. 
Although the economy began to crawl slowly toward recovery, in 1933 the growing use of
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competing solvents, especially wood naval stores and mineral spirits, lessened the benefits of the 
increased business activity for the remaining gum naval stores producers. Combined with this 
increased competition, the economic dip of 1937-38 dealt the industry another blow, causing 
turpentine prices to drop further and still more operators to quit.31
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Figure 12.2. Number of Gum Naval Stores Establishments, 1921-1939
Joseph B. Hosmer, Economic Aspects of the Naval Stores Industry (Atlanta: Georgia School of 
Technology, State Engineering Experiment Station, 1948), 11; For figures related to chart see 
Appendix B.
31 A 1933 policy, however, served turpentine producers as a partial counter-measure to a 
slump in world naval stores demand. By going off the gold standard, the U.S. towered its 
currency value in the world market resulting in lower naval stores prices than the French could 
offer. Despite stagnation in world naval stores consumption, American producers were able to 
export more o f their product at the expense of the French. Martin, “An Historical and Analytical 
Approach,” 144, 195; Campbell, et al., Naval Stores Industry. 22, 89-90. As the naval stores 
industry suffered, so did transportation companies and especially the equipment manufacturers 
who serviced producers. J.E. McCaffrey, interview by Elwood R. Maunder, Oral History 
Collection, Forest History Society, Durham, NC, 92; I. James Pikl, A History o f  Georgia Forestry 
(Athens: Bureau of Business and Economic Research, University of Georgia, 1966), 34; Robert 
M. Newton to P.N. Howell, 25 September 1937, Dantzler Lumber Company Papers, Special 
Collections, Mitchell Memorial Library, Mississippi State University.
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To make conditions worse for naval stores producers, just as the Depression was 
reaching its worst levels, a severe drought hit the southern pine belt. Problems began in 1930 
with persistent warm winds and high temperatures, part o f a weather pattern that contributed to 
the Dust Bowl in the plains states. Although rainfall remained relatively normal that year, the 
winds, heat, and low humidity caused rapid evaporation and a reduction in moming dews, all of 
which strained vegetation. Then, over the next two years, rainfall amounts dropped sharply.
With drought conditions technically beginning when precipitation drops off fifteen percent o f the 
average, parts o f the pine belt saw declines o f from twenty percent to thirty percent The lack of 
rain caused soil moisture to decline to 2.11 percent at a depth of three inches and 2.32 percent at 
a twelve inch depth when it rarely dipped below four percent and, then, only for brief periods. 
Under these extreme conditions, trees began dying. Longleaf pines, with their deep tap root, 
faired better than slash pines, yet even the former’s mortality rate shot up. Overall tree loss 
amounted to 9.4 percent, or ten times higher than normal. Death rates were the highest in 
crowded stands and those on soils with high sand content. With pines under considerable stress, 
gum yields declined, even in stands worked conservatively and for only a few years. Overall, the 
faces yielded twenty percent less gum in 1932 than they had the year before. As desperate 
turpentiners continued working the strained trees, the incidents of dryface and ips beetle attack 
increased. Partial defoliation, combined with enormous quantities of debris contributed by dead 
pines greatly, increased the risk o f fire.32
Some producers began sideline businesses as means to raise extra cash with which to 
weather the economic and environmental devastation. Some raised cattle and farm crops such as 
sugar cane, sweet potatoes, com, and hay. Those who owned their forests attempted to market
32 John C. Hoyt, Droughts of 1930-34 (Washington, DC: United States Department o f the 
Interior, 1936), 2, 11; “Report,” Southern Forest Experiment Station, 11 May 1932, Cary 
Collection, 2; “Effect o f  1931-32 Drought,” Cary Collection, 1-7; “Report on Survey of 
Conditions of Timber in a Portion of the Naval Stores Belt,” Cary Collection.
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their previously-turpentined trees to lumber mills. But trees scarred with eight- and ten-foot 
faces produced at most only a few saw boards. Such pines’ pitchy bottom sections, however, 
could be cut and sold as ties and poles. Because only a few pulpwood mills dotted the South in 
the 1930s, there was a limited market for the principal product of a turpentined trees, wood
chips.33
Many producers recognized that then new federal initiatives aimed at helping farmers, 
not sideline enterprises, offered their best chance for survival. Where earlier in the century the 
United States Justice department’s peonage investigations had led turpentiners to condemn 
federal involvement as a menace, the clear benefits o f government-backed studies during the 
191 Os and 1920s, which in no way threatened the industry’s labor system, led operators to view 
Washington’s actions as beneficial. Before their petitions for funding under the farm assistance 
programs stood a chance, however, producers needed to convince government officials that the 
naval stores industry was, in actuality, agriculture. When the 1923 Naval Stores Act, which 
established product grades, passed Congress, it mentioned nothing about the status of naval 
stores as either industrial or agricultural products. The act gave the Secretary of Agriculture the 
duty of overseeing its enforcement only because his department administered the Forestry 
Service and naval stores, no one denied, were forest products. But when producers requested 
relief under the federal Agricultural Marketing Act of 1929, which sought to stabilize farm prices 
through cooperatives that received low interest federal loans and through sales to foreign 
countries, officials rejected them, ruling that turpentine and rosin were not defined as agricultural 
products under the legislation. Gum naval stores operators then began a campaign to reclassify 
their business as agriculture, a task that required them to differentiate themselves from wood 
naval stores producers, who, with large, heavily capitalized, and mechanized plants employing
33 Benedict, “The Naval Stores Industry,” 2.
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hundreds of workers, clearly represented a form o f industry, but produced the same product as 
gum turpentine manufacturers.34
Gum producers pointed out that the typical operator required relatively little capital to 
run his business, compared to wood naval stores operations, and that, unlike the technologically 
sophisticated wood naval stores industry—whose large plants and elaborate equipment permitted 
them to run year-round—gum producers used primitive methods and operated on a seasonal cycle. 
Where wood naval stores were produced by only a few large operations widely scattered across 
the South, gum naval stores were made by around 2,200 relatively small-scale operators. Also, 
they maintained, a significant percentage of gum producers cultivated crop land in conjunction 
with their turpentine business, raising cotton, com, tobacco, peanuts, pecans, with the same 
workers. Producers further argued that they, like farmers, were subject to hazards such as 
uncooperative weather and seasonal over-production and they compared turpentining to maple 
syrup production, which was itself classified as agriculture.35
Once producers presented their reasonably valid case that gum collection was 
agriculture, they faced the slightly greater challenge o f maintaining that distilling the gum, which 
many operators continued to do themselves, did not represent industry. Producers cleverly 
argued that, like changing any agricultural product from its “originally produced” state to its 
“first processed” state, distilling did not change turpentine and rosin’s nature as agricultural 
commodities. Converting a raw material into a primary raw material fit for future manufacturing 
purposes, like processing food products into a less-perishable form, producers argued, did not
34 A.L. Brogden, Memorandum, 10 August 1940, Bilbo Papers; Martin, “An Historical 
and Analytical Approach,” 149-150.
35 Leon Henderson to T.F. Dreyfus, 1942, Bilbo Papers; “Gum Turpentine and Gum 
Rosin: Supporting Brief Filed by Producers Committee that Gum Naval Stores Are Agricultural 
Commodities,” 20 November 1933, William M. Colmer Papers, Archives and Manuscripts 
Division, McCain Library and Archives, University o f Southern Mississippi, 2,4-6,9.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
583
transform the essence of the product. Therefore, according to their logic, distilling gum was no 
more an industry than ginning cotton, curing tobacco, or boiling maple syrup. Like these 
processes, distilling added and took away nothing from the gum. It caused no transforming 
chemical process, but merely separated spirits and rosin. In distilling, producers were merely 
preparing the gum for market. Furthermore, they maintained, naval stores products’ ultimate use 
for industrial purposes changed nothing about their nature as an agricultural commodities. Flax 
and linseed oil, for example, were agricultural commodities with industrial uses.36 As one 
industry observer explained “the turpentine gum farmer is in exactly the same [class] as other 
American farmers. His residence, his terminology, his business, his standard of living and mode 
of thought places him in the same category as the producers of other agricultural commodities.”37
The gum producers succeeded in persuading the government o f their arguments validity. 
Senator Walter George of Georgia exercised considerable influence in the revision of the 1929 
Marketing Act to include naval stores producers.38 In 1931 Congress amended the act to include 
as an agricultural commodity “crude gum from a living tree, and the following products as 
processed by the original producer o f the crude gum from which derived gum spirits of 
turpentine and gum rosin as defined in the Naval Stores Act approved March 3, 1923 ”39 The 
amendment made gum naval stores producers eligible for loans through the Federal Intermediate 
Credit Bank set up as part of the Federal Farm Board.40
36 “Gum Turpentine and Gum Rosin,” Colmer Papers, 6-10; Martin, “An Historical and 
Analytical Approach,” 17.
37 “Gum Turpentine and Gum Rosin,” Colmer Papers, 10.
38 “Memorandum Concerning Senator George and Naval Stores,” 29 June 1938, Colmer 
Papers, 1-2.
39 Martin, “An Historical and Analytical Approach,” 150; R.H. Crosbey to Howell, 31 
March 1939, Colmer Papers; Memorandum, A.L. Brogden, 10 August 1940, Bilbo Papers.
40 Soon after receiving federal recognition, the principal naval stores-producing states 
enacted their own legislation designating naval stores as agricultural commodities.
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With their new official definition, turpentiners immediately set to work to stabilize the 
naval stores market. In 1931, they attempted to raise prices by forming a cooperative association, 
the Gum Turpentine-Rosin Marketing Association, which would use federal loans to purchase a 
large portion o f the output With around one thousand operators, who accounted for seventy 
percent of total production, as members, the Association received government loans through the 
Federal Intermediate Credit Bank o f Columbia, South Carolina. By July, after just three months 
of activity, the Association stockpiled 62,000 barrels o f spirits and 260,000 barrels or rosin. At 
this point, the Association had exhausted their $2.5 million loan and, in the face of world 
industrial decline, had failed to raise naval stores prices significantly. Over the next four years 
supplies accumulated by the Association depressed the naval stores market even further until the 
surplus was fully disposed of.41
Although the Gum Turpentine-Rosin Marketing Association’s efforts failed, the 
producers’ success in including naval stores as an agricultural commodity enabled them to 
benefit from the Agriculture Adjustment Administration, which the Roosevelt administration 
created in 1933. The AAA sought to help the farm economy by reducing production and 
bringing supply and demand into balance. Its goal was to achieve parity, a point where farm 
products had the same purchasing power that they did from 1909-1914, when agricultural 
commodities presumably had a fair exchange value for non-farm goods. Turpentine producers 
petitioned the AAA for a reduced-acreage plan whereby, like cotton, wheat, and tobacco farmers, 
they would be paid for land taken out of production. Given Congress’ recent reclassification of 
naval stores, the Department of Agriculture ruled that turpentine was indeed an agricultural
Memorandum, A.L. Brogden, 10 August 1940, Bilbo Papers; Campbell, et al., Naval Stores 
Industry. 76.
41 Martin, “An Historical and Analytical Approach,” 150-151; Campbell, et al., Naval 
Stores Industry. 88; Butler, Treasures o f the Loneleaf Pines. 248.
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commodity and eligible for a marketing agreement with the Agency. But because turpentine and 
rosin were not basic commodities like other crops, the Department decided that gum naval stores 
producers were not eligible for reduced production compensation. The government did not 
control this marketing agreement; instead it was run by a control committee elected by the 
producers. In the election for representatives, producers received one vote for each unit of naval 
stores produced in the preceding year. Thus large producers easily controlled decisions. 
Operators from all the naval stores-producing states were represented, as were factors, dealers, 
and industrial consumers. Producers from Georgia and Florida selected three members from 
each state and Alabama, North Carolina, South Carolina, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas each 
chose one.42
Factors, concerned over the agreement’s limited focus on industry problems and its 
exclusion of anyone but gum producers, made their own recommendations to the AAA. Because 
environmental problems persisted, factors requested that as part o f the agreement, producers be 
restrained from harvesting from trees too small to handle the stress. Factors also believed that 
part of the plan’s administrative fees should go toward research. They strongly felt that factors 
should have a say in the plan since they had so much invested in production. Moreover, they 
pushed for all sectors of the industry to work together. Factors argued that they, distillers, and 
wood naval stores producers should be included in the program if  the entire industry was to pull 
itself out of its slump. To include all areas of the industry, they recommended the creation of a 
nine-member executive committee made up o f three producers, two factors, two distillers, two
42 Gilbert C. Fite, Cotton Fields No More: Southern Agriculture. 1865-1980 (Lexington: 
The University Press of Kentucky, 1984), 128; “Proposed Marketing Agreement for Gum- 
Turpentine and Gum-Rosin Processors,” 13 November 1934, Cary Collection; Campbell, et al., 
Naval Stores Industry. 84,90; Memorandum, A.L. Brogden, 10 August 1940, Bilbo Papers; R.H. 
Crosbey to Howell, 31 March 1939, Colmer Papers; Kenneth H. Thomas, Jr., McCranie’s 
Turpentine Still. Atkinson Countv. Georgia: A Historical Analysis o f the Site. With Some 
Information on the Naval Stores Industry in Georgia and Elsewhere (Atlanta: Georgia Institute of 
Community and Area Development, 1975), 8.
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wood naval stores manufacturers. The factors were worried that the plan would hurt the small 
producers if the larger ones had a more powerful vote. They also feared that foreign producers 
would use the advance notification o f reduced U.S. production to increase their output, thus 
negating any benefits o f the plan.43
Approved by the Secretary o f Agriculture in February 1934, the marketing agreement 
provided for a compulsory restriction o f output to prevent over-supply and increase prices and 
financial gains for producers. The agreement drawn up by the control committee proposed to 
reduce the 1934/35 crop by ten percent from the previous year in an effort to raise prices to the 
1909-1914 level o f sixty cents per gallon for turpentine and thirty-eight dollars for three and a 
third barrels o f rosin. Through the program, individual operators were allotted a production 
quota based on their previous four-year production averages. The committee supplied each 
producer with a number o f tags equal to his allotment for the year plus additional tags equal to 
the naval stores owned by him on December 31, 1933. Beginning January 1, every package of 
gum turpentine or gum rosin shipped by the original producer was required to have a tag. Each 
tag had a number indicating the producer, the tag’s serial number, year o f production, and the 
contents: crude gum, clean gum, turpentine, or rosin. The control committee kept a record of 
information related to each tag. By October 15 o f each year, the committee would estimate the 
amount of turpentine and rosin that would be available on December 31 and determine the 
volume of naval stores to be marketed in the coming year. Based on this figure, the committee 
would allot each producer a  percentage of the quantity determined to be marketed in the 
forthcoming year. Operators unsatisfied with their allotment could petition the committee for 
more tags. When a producer sold or leased any part or all of his timberland, a proportionate 
share of his allotment accompanied the transfer, provided the new owner or lessee could prove to
43 Antwerp Naval Stores Company, et al. to W.F. Holtsman, 20 October 1933, Cary 
Collection.
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the committee his ability to fulfill the allotment. So as not to exclude new producers, each year 
the committee reserved three percent of the total allotment for operators beginning in the 
business. However, no new producer’s allotment could exceed one thousand barrels of raw 
turpentine. As the factors had wished, restrictions were placed on the size o f pines to be 
harvested. Under the plan, operators agreed not to harvest from trees less than nine inches in 
diameter four and one half feet from the ground or to work two faces in a tree less than fourteen 
inches in diameter. To maintain the program, producers paid to the committee assessed charges 
approved by the Secretary o f Agriculture. At its inception, the plan called for a fee o f fifteen 
cents for each barrel of turpentine and five cents for rosin. Any funds remaining after 
administration costs would be used for industry research or product advertisement. The wood 
naval stores industry created a similar agreement which became effective in May 1934. As a 
designated industry, however, wood naval stores production fell under the jurisdiction of the 
National Industrial Recovery Administration.44
Despite its promised benefits, producers were unsatisfied with the allotment program. 
They wanted the same price support payments that farmers received under the AAA. Using 
arguments similar to those made in 1931, turpentiners successfully asserted that gum naval stores 
were agricultural products and, in the second half o f 1935, they were added to the list of 
commodities that benefited from price support. Thus producers became entitled to funds 
collected under customs laws for the purpose o f encouraging exports and domestic consumption, 
and, most importantly, price adjustments. No sooner had the turpentine producers won this 
privilege, however, than the U.S. Supreme Court found the AAA unconstitutional.45
44 Proposed Marketing Agreement for Gum-Turpentine and Gum-Rosin Processors, Cary 
Collection, 8-10, 27; Campbell, et al., Naval Stores Industry. 84-92.
45 A.L. Brogden, Memorandum, 10 August 1940, Bilbo Papers; Blount, Sprits of 
Turpentine. 29.
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In the face o f this enormous setback, efforts to bring control to the naval stores market 
intensified under the powerful leadership of Judge Harley Langdale of Valdosta, Georgia, the 
world’s largest gum naval stores producer. Langdale’s turpentine empire grew from a modest­
sized operation his father started in the late nineteenth century. Bom in South Carolina in 1860, 
the Judge’s father, John Langdale, moved as a young man to Statesboro, Georgia, then to 
Council, on the edge o f the Okefenokee Swamp where he had begun turpentining by 1894. Until 
his death in 1911, John Langdale produced gum naval stores, crossties, lumber, and cattle, which 
he grazed on the open range. His estate, consisting o f eighteen to twenty-thousand acres of 
property in south Georgia, was divided among his six children upon his death.46
Harley Langdale, bom in 1888, graduated from Mercer University law school the year 
after his father’s death and began practice in Valdosta some forty miles to the west of the family 
home. Harley’s law practice progressed rapidly, and he was soon elected a municipal judge. But 
he retained an interest in naval stores production, having helped his father in the business since 
he was ten. In 1922, he began purchasing timber land around Valdosta and, over the next few 
decades, expanded his holdings in Lowndes, Ecoloes, and Clink Counties. During the 1930s, he 
further increased his pine acreage by purchasing large quantities of reforested cotton land 
available at low prices following the boll weevil’s destruction. Langdale relied on partners for 
efficient management o f his far-flung operations. When beginning a new establishment, 
Langdale would find the most competent partner available, whether he could finance part of the 
venture or not, then borrow the money from a factor and set up the operation. By the late 1930s, 
Langdale, either by himself or in partnership with other operators, worked approximately 315
46 “Histoiy o f Gum Naval Stores,” American Turpentine-Farmers Association Papers, 2; 
Harley Langdale, Jr. “Brief Facts on the Langdale Company,” Lowndes County Historical 
Society, Valdosta, GA, 1; Downing Musgrove, “A Tribute to Judge Harley Langdale, Sr.,” in 
Historical Background of the Naval Stores Conservation Program. Olustee Experiment Station 
Files, Georgia Agrirama, Tifton, GA, 1; Jane Twitty Shelton, Pines and Pioneers: A History of 
Lowndes Countv. Georgia. 1825-1900. (Atlanta: Cherokee Publishing Company, 1976), 184-185.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
589
crops (3,150,000 faces) on nearly three million trees. His twenty-five camps and stills, which 
were scattered from the Carolinas to Florida, produced approximately 14,000 units (one cask of 
spirits and three and a third barrels o f  rosin equaling a unit) o f naval stores, over 2.5 percent of 
the naval stores manufactured in the U.S. As the chairman o f  the board o f  Langdale Companies, 
which produced naval stores and processed and dealt in gum turpentine products and production 
supplies, Langdale held a powerful position not only in the naval stores industry but in Georgia 
and the South as well. Guests for deer hunts on his vast property included Senator “Cotton Ed” 
Smith of South Carolina, Georgia Senator Walter George, and Georgia governor and later senator 
Richard Russell. When producers met in Washington in the mid-l930s to secure financial help 
from the AAA, Langdale was among them, flexing his political muscle.47
What individual producers, including Langdale, continued to fear were low prices, ever- 
rising debts, and increased competition from substitute products. Langdale and other influential 
turpentiners understood that industry cooperation offered the only hope that the Depression 
would not swallow both large and small producers. In 1936, one producer argued that “if  all of 
our fanners will cooperate now and from now on we will come into our own but it must be done 
now or we are sunk and will never get another chance.”48 They also recognized that, in a buyers’
47 Langdale was greatly involved in a variety o f organizations. During his lifetime he 
was a member of the First Baptist Church; Rotary Club; Shriners; Valdosta County Club; Sons of 
the American Revolution; 4-H Club Advisory Group; Valdosta and Georgia Bar Association; 
Honorary Life Member o f American Forestry Association; Herty Foundation Laboratory;
Georgia Game and Fish Commission; a  director of the Citizens and Southern National Bank, the 
Valdosta Times, and 4-H Club Foundation; Chairman o f the Board o f Lowndes County-Valdosta 
Hospital Authority; President of the American Turpentine Farmers Association and Valdosta 
Chamber o f Commerce; member o f  the Board of Trustees o f  Mercer University; and Honorary 
Kentucky Colonel. Mary Beth Arceneuax, “Captains o f the Naval Stores Industry,” Naval Stores 
Review 90 (September-October 1980): 8-9; Martin, “An Historical and Analytical Approach,” 
232-233; Langdale, “Brief Facts on the Langdale Company,” 1; Shelton, Pines and Pioneers.
185; Musgrove, “A Tirbute to Judge Harley Langdale, Sr.,” 1; Harley Langdale, Jr., interview, 1; 
Antwerp Naval Stores Company, et al. to W.F. Holtsman, 20 October 1933, Cary Collection, 6.
48 Frank W. Boykin to Aaron A. Lowenstein, 11 July 1936, Colmer Papers.
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market in which they competed for customers with wood naval stores products, improved 
products, tailored to meet the needs o f  the consumer, represented the only way to remain 
competitive.49
With the end o f the AAA and the marketing agreement it had overseen, Langdale in 1936 
founded the American Turpentine-Farmers Association, whose mission was to unify gum naval 
stores producers into a cohesive force that could work to stabilize the market and industry. 
According to its charter, the AT-FA sought to provide improvements in production and 
marketing of gum turpentine and rosin and their byproducts. It also hoped to achieve more 
economical production and orderly marketing and distribution. The AT-FA promised to act on 
its members’ behalf with government and business and to cooperate in the planting and 
conservation of pines. It also claimed the power to purchase and store any surplus turpentine in 
an effort to control prices and to borrow money with which to make advances to members.50
The association was administered by a board o f directors elected by producers to serve 
one-year terms. For purposes of representation, the naval stores-producing states were broken 
down into districts. The state of Georgia was one district and elected four o f the nine directors. 
Another district, consisting of Florida and Alabama, contributed three directors. A third district 
made up of Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas, and a fourth representing the Carolinas, elected 
one director each. The association proved very conservative in changing leadership. Langdale, 
for example, served as its president until 1966. Membership was open to both races and 
reportedly some blacks did join. Blacks even served on some of the committees, but none held
49 J. Lundie “A Few Words o f Appreciation,” 20 April 1966, American Turpentine- 
Farmers Association Papers; Martin, “An Historical and Analytical Approach,” 280.
50 Arceneaux, “Captains o f the Naval Stores Industry,” 8; Martin, “An Historical and 
Analytical Approach,” 155, 157; Downing Musgrove, (paper presented at the Naval Stores 
Breakfast, 31 October 1961, Washington, DC), 1 and Charter, American Turpentine-Farmers 
Association Papers; Blount, Spirits o f  Turpentine. 29.
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positions as officers or directors. To fund the association, members paid no more than five cents 
for each unit o f naval stores they produced annually.51
Members received their money’s worth and then some. The association had a significant 
effect in improving the market It successfully encouraged the federal government to conduct 
research into improved processing and new uses for gum naval stores which could keep the 
products in demand. One of the greatest changes it brought was the marketing of turpentine in 
small containers. In the late 1930s, only five percent of gum turpentine was sold in small bottles 
or cans for individual household use. Most consumers simply took a bucket to a store where they 
drew the spirits from a barrel. In 1939, however, the AT-FA began a $200,000 national 
campaign to promote the consumption o f turpentine in association-approved containers which 
carried the “AT-FA Seal o f Approval.” By 1959, eighty percent of gum turpentine was sold in 
bottles and cans. The AT-FA also actively supported research. In 1937, the association 
contracted with G & A Laboratories Inc. o f Savannah to develop new uses for naval stores. For 
the project it retained Charles Herty, the pioneer of the American cup and gutter system, as an 
advisor. The Association too promoted efforts to reduce damage to trees caused by harvesting 
and provided members and their employees with group life and hospitalization insurance at about 
half the cost of individuals. Members received issues of its trade journal and invitations to its 
annual convention held each year in April.52
51 General Counsel and Assistant to the President [of the AT-FA] to John Slusser, 12 
April 1966, American Turpentine-Farmers Association Papers; Davis, Encyclopedia of American 
Forest and Conservation History. 476.
52 By 1943 the convention featured the Miss Gum Spirits Competition. Each AT-FA 
director chose a girl from his district to compete for the title. Wearing pine needle skirts and 
suntops decorated with pine cones, the girls stood on a stage at the Valdosta 4-H camp while 
Langdale, whom it is believed conceived o f both the contest and costumes, judged the winner. 
There was no talent competition. The winner not only enjoyed recognition Miss Gum Spirits for 
a year, but she received a scholarship and was featured in a photograph standing beside a tree 
scarred from turpentining in the next year’s Association calendar. Martin, “An Historical and 
Analytical Approach,” 279-280, xiii; A.R. Shirley, “Gum Naval Stores Long Linked With 
Industrial Development” Valdosta. Georgia Daily Times. 18 November, 1959; Maguire,
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Perhaps the association’s greatest achievement came immediately after its formation, 
when it succeeded in having the benefits o f a new government support program extended to 
include gum turpentine producers. In response to the Supreme Court’s decision declaring the 
AAA unconstitutional, Congress repealed the legislation that created the administration and 
within six weeks replaced it with a new agricultural support plan, the Soil Conservation and 
Domestic Allotment Act, which substituted processing taxes and acreage quotas with benefit 
payments for soil conservation. Crops were taken out of production to be replaced with grasses 
and legumes, which could add fertility and stop erosion. On March 25, 1936 Georgia senator and 
Langdale friend Walter George, two other senators, several House members, and representatives 
of the AT-FA met to convince Department o f Agriculture officials that turpentine was entitled to 
assistance under the program. The AT-FA argued that the Soil Conservation and Domestic 
Allotment Act afforded the naval stores industry the opportunity to adopt improved methods. 
According to their contrived argument, more conservative harvesting practices would facilitate 
greater tree growth, which in turn would provide a regular, yearly supply of needles on the forest 
floor that would decompose and restore soil fertility. In making the naval stores industry healthy, 
the Soil Conservation Service would, in turn, create a healthy forest. The AT-FA proposed that 
twenty percent o f the then roughly 7,340,000 turpentined acres be removed from production and 
that the Service reimburse producers for their loss. In late June 1936, Congress passed a bill 
appropriating funds for gum naval stores price support under the Soil Conservation Act.53
interview by author; Harley Langdale to Secretary o f Agriculture, 13 October 1947, Colmer 
Papers; Sherrie Farabee, ‘“ Miss Spirits’ Graced Turpentine Calendar,” Valdosta. Georgia Daily 
Times. 28 June 1989.
53 Although they occurred thirty to fifty years earlier, the technological and marketing 
improvements o f the Louisiana sugar industry bear a  strong resemblance to those o f the naval 
stores industry. Like nineteenth-century turpentine production, the late-antebellum sugar 
industry enjoyed a favorable market, the latter compliments o f the 1842 tariff which raised the 
tax on imported refined sugar. As long as sugar prices were high and competition virtually 
nonexistent, historian John Heitman explains, “no edge in the market place as necessary.” Some 
producers consequently made no efforts to improve their product or increase manufacturing
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During the first few years of government financial assistance, turpentiners received aid 
through two separate programs. The first was o f a price support program administered by the 
AT-FA. The Association used support loans to stabilize the market at a base price by purchasing 
and stockpiling naval stores surpluses when prices weakened. The program ended the violent 
price fluctuations that had persistently plagued producers, especially the smaller ones. Langdale 
considered this market stabilization to be the AT-FA’s greatest achievement. The second 
program provided financial support to operators who reduced their production. The Naval Stores 
Conservation Program, which began July 16,1936, was hastily formulated. It called for a 
twenty-five percent overall reduction in worked faces and the adoption of some moderate 
conservation practices. Participation was voluntary, and only around 924 producers, about sixty
efficiency just as with the American naval stores industry, which until the early twentieth century 
was unchallenged by foreign producers. Another characteristic that sugar production shares with 
turpentine operations pertains to the development o f industry improvements. A dependence on 
slave labor discouraged the sugar industry horn adopting scientific technology. Not only did 
producers believe that more complicated methods were beyond their slaves’ mental capacities, 
but they feared that if slaves did manage to master new sophisticated production technology, they 
could then use their skill as leverage against their masters, question the masters’ authority, and 
possibly revolt. Also, neither the federal nor state governments, nor the unorganized sugar 
industry, allocated the resources required for scientific and technological innovation. In the 
postbellum period, however, competition from other countries, especially from large and 
sophisticated sugar refineries in Britain and France spurred Louisiana sugar producers to attempt 
changes. In 1877 the Louisiana Sugar Planters Association formed with the goal o f  gaining 
control of the increasingly complex market and promoting technological research leading toward 
industry improvements. To these ends the Association set rules and regulations regarding the 
sale and delivery of sugar, established standards o f  weighing and grading, and provided relief to 
those producers unable to fulfill their contracts. With the assistance of the United States 
Department o f Agriculture, the Association encouraged research into improved methods, much 
of the ideas borrowed from German and French inventions. Like the sugar industry, naval stores 
producers formed an association and encouraged scientific research with government aid, only 
when faced with serious competition from more advanced foreign producers and the threat of 
deforestation. John Alfred Heitman, The Modernization of the Louisiana Sugar Industry. 1830- 
J910 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1987), 3, 35, 38-40,44,48, 50,96, 137, 
266, 143; George B. Tindall, The Emergence o f the New South. 1913-194S (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1967), 404. Martin, “An Historical and Analytical Approach,”
157; Robert M. Newton, ‘Statement from American Turpentine Farmers Association to 
Agricultural Adjustment Administration” and “Memorandum Concerning Senator George and 
Naval Stores,” 29 June 1938, Colmer Papers; A.L. Brogden, Memorandum, 10 August 1940, 
Bilbo Papers.
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percent, signed up. Those who did adopt the plan were forbidden from cupping trees that 
measured smaller than nine inches in diameter four and a  half feet from the ground and from 
placing more than one cup on trees smaller than fourteen inches. (That year thirty percent of 
worked trees were smaller than nine inches.) Producers who followed these guidelines were 
permitted to drop up to forty percent o f their total faces from production and receive 
reimbursement for their toss. They were paid twenty-five cents for each face no higher than 
sixty-six inches from the ground. This amounted to $2,500 per crop. The next year, however, in 
response to improved naval stores prices, many producers opted to keep their trees in production. 
Only 664 turpentiners representing just a  third of the crops in operation participated. However, 
the increased production and a renewed economic recession drove prices lower in 1938 and 
participation consequently rose to 1,799 operators, or seventy to seventy-five percent o f total 
faces. Many new participants were small producers who worked less than two crops. Payments 
for participation were substantial and often paid for stands with low profitability. In 1938, for 
example, one producer removed 1,356 faces, which had been badly burned the preceding fall, 
and 5,291 one-year-old boxes which were so scattered they scarcely justified working. For these 
unproductive boxes he received $444.74.54
After 1938 the two different programs merged into one. In the spring of 1939, naval 
stores prices dipped to a near forty-year low, and the AT-FA successfully applied for a loan to 
keep the summer production off the market. However, only members o f the AT-FA and
54 Shirley, “Gum Naval Stores Long Linked; A.R. Shirley, “Gum Naval Stores and the 
American Turpentine Farmers Association Cooperative,” American Turpentine-Farmers 
Assertion Papers, 4-7; Arceneaux, “Captains of the Naval Stores Industry,” 8. Dyer, “History of 
the Gum Naval Stores Industry,” 8; Frank E. Fulmer, ‘“ The First Voice Ordered: ‘Shoot Them.’ 
Then the Bullets Started!’,” in Historical Background o f  the Naval Stores Conservation Program. 
5; Martin, “An Historic and Analytical Approach,” 158-160,202; Koch, Utilization of the 
Southern Pines. 1478; Norman Hawley, “A Summary o f  the History o f the Naval Stores 
Conservation Program,” in Historical Background of the Naval Stores Conservation Program. 14. 
Newton Naval Stores Company to P.N. Howell, 22 January 1940, Dantzler Company Papers.
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participants in the conservation program could benefit. After the crisis, the loan and 
conservation programs remained combined. Operators had to participate in the conservation 
program, removing from fifteen to thirty percent of their faces from production, for which they 
were reimbursed, to enjoy the benefits o f the price support program. The number of participants 
rose from 1,799 in 1938 to 2,511 in 1939 to 2,785 in 1940, and to 4,264 the year after that.
Those involved in the program enjoyed a better chance of operating profitably (figs. 12.3 and 
12.4)55
Profit or Loss Per Gum Unit for Naval Stores Firms Not Participating in 
Government Conservation Programs 
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Figure 12.3. Profit or Loss Per Gum Unit for Naval Stores Firms Not Participating in 
Government Conservation Programs, 1931-1940
Donald Fraser Martin, Jr., “An Historical and Analytical Approach to the Current Problems of 
the American Gum Naval Stores Industry” (Ph.D. diss., University of North Carolina, 1942),
340.
55 Martin, “An Historical and Analytical Approach,” 159-164; “Memorandum 
Concerning Senator George and Naval Stores,” Colmer Papers, 3; Thomas, McCranie’s 
Turpentine Still. 8; For figures related to production costs and the government support program’s 
ability to end violent seasonal price fluctuation see Appendix A.
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Profit or Loss Per Gum Unit for Naval Stores Firms Participating in 
Government Conservation Programs 
1931-1940
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Figure 12.4. Profits or Loss Per Gum Unit for Naval Stores Firms Participating in Government 
Conservation Programs, 1931-1940
Donald Fraser Martin, Jr., “An Historical and Analytical Approach to the Current Problems of 
the American Gum Naval Stores Industry” (Ph.D. diss., University o f North Carolina, 1942), 
341.
The U.S. Forest Service had the sometimes difficult task o f ensuring that producers did 
indeed remove the promised faces from production and that they did not excessively face trees. 
Oversight was organized out of the Service’s regional office in Atlanta and coordinated with 
smaller district offices in Savannah, Jacksonville, and Pensacola. A supervisor and two assistant 
inspectors staffed each of the district offices. (Later these three offices were combined into a 
single office centrally located in Valdosta.) Around forty men worked in the field for all three 
districts. The job o f inspecting attracted men between twenty and forty years of age who wanted 
steady, relatively well-paying jobs funded by the federal government during the Depression. 
Some inspectors had previously held jobs with the Forestry Service, especially through the 
Civilian Conservation Corps. Others had some experience with trees, either as workers in their
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father’s naval stores operations or as college students studying forestiy. One had even worked as 
a tree surgeon in Kent, Ohio. After a  short course in gum naval stores production at the Oiustee 
experiment station, inspectors were assigned to NSCP offices, mostly in rural communities from 
North Carolina to Mississippi.56
The inspectors faced the daunting task o f winning the trust o f rural producers who had 
never had a Forest Service agent on their land and continued to distrust government interference 
despite its benefits. Smaller producers in the more rural areas especially resented someone 
coming onto their property and telling them what to do. While taking a tree count at one 
operation in August 1936, for example, two inspectors working out o f  Vidalia, Georgia, were 
met with gunfire and forced to run for their lives from the forest. The government vehicles 
assigned to inspectors did nothing to make their jobs easier. Many were worn out cars 
confiscated by the Revenue Department. Many were riddled with bullet holes, said to be 
evidence of the kind of welcome some inspectors received when they attempted to perform their 
job. One inspector found that producers in his assigned area distrusted him because he drove a 
government car, a sure sign that he was in fact a revenuer looking for their still. Once the 
inspector explained his true mission to the sheriff, who himself ran a still, word circulated and 
his inspections proceeded more smoothly. Inspectors also found difficulty in convincing
56 Thomas, McCranie’s Turpentine Still. 8; Arthur G. Steedly, ‘“ Doctors, Lawyers, 
Teachers, Merchants, and Widows, Call to Ask Advice.,” in Historical Background o f  the Naval 
Stores Conservation Program. 12; Charles T. Shea, . .  The Ones on the Northside Are 
Northern Reds and the Ones on the South Are Southern Reds,’” in Historical Background o f the 
Naval Stores Conservation Program. 11, 16; Arthur A. Murphy, “‘Good Forestry Has Advanced 
25 Years, I Believe, Because of NSCP.,”’ in Historical Background o f the Naval Stores 
Conservation Program. 7; John K. Cross, “‘Without a Doubt the Naval Stores Program Has Had 
a Profound Influence . . in Historical Background of the Naval Stores Conservation Program. 
4; E.O. Powers, “‘With Pearl Harbor Our World, o f  Course, Turned Upside Down,”’ in 
Historical Background of the Naval Stores Conservation Program. 8; Jim A. McArther, “‘During 
the War, I Trained 22,000 German Prisoners-of-War to Work Naval Stores and Cut Pulpwood,’” 
in Historical Background of the Naval Stores Conservation Program. 6; Fulmer, “‘The First 
Voice Ordered: ‘Shoot Them.’", 5.
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operators and their woodsriders to keep the proper records, which would allow the inspectors to 
evaluate the operation’s compliance with the program. Although the inspectors themselves 
gained the trust o f some producers in the NSCP, many were won over only after witnessing the 
success of more prosperous producers who followed the program. The inspectors’ gentle but 
persistent push for conservation practices combined with the government’s financial support 
propelled the wise-use practices well ahead of where they stood before the program began.57
Although the AT-FA actively sought government assistance for its members, it worked 
hard to deny turpentine workers the benefits of federal programs. The Social Security Act, when 
originally passed in 1935, excluded farm workers and domestics but not turpentiners. Langdale— 
who believed that the control of adequate labor was paramount for the industry’s success—and 
the AT-FA argued to federal officials that the m a jo r i ty  of gum turpentine producers also grew 
such agricultural commodities as cotton, com, and tobacco, and commonly used the same labor 
in the fields that they used in the pine forest. The AT-FA further pointed out that state and 
federal legislation already recognized gum turpentine production as agriculture and, as such, it 
received price support loans and crop reduction payments. But because no decision was made by 
the time the program began in 1937, some operators began paying the tax, although others 
refused. Government investigators looking into producers who refused to pay discovered 
workers too frightened to cooperate, and investigators who entered camps without warrants 
found themselves in jail for trespassing. Finally in November, a District Court judge in Georgia 
ruled that gum turpentine “is an agricultural pursuit and the labor employed by complainants
57 Fulmer, “‘The First Voice Ordered: ‘Shoot Them.’", 5; McArther, “‘During the War, I 
Trained 22,000 German Prisoners-of-War,” 6; Powers, “‘With Pearl Harbor Our World,” 8; 
Steedly, “‘Doctors, Lawyers, Teachers, Merchants, and Widows,” 12; Marion W. Ruffin, ‘“ . . .  I 
Had No Office, No Adding Machine, No Typewriter, and No Maps . . in Historical 
Background of the Naval Stores Conservation Program. 16; Gay Goodman Wright, 
“Turpentining: An Ethnohistorical Study of a Southern Industry and Way o f Life,” (M.A. thesis, 
University of Georgia, 1979), 92; J. Lundie Smith, “A Few Words o f Appreciation,” 20 April 
1966, American Turpentine-Farmers Association Papers, 7.
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therein is agricultural labor.” Turpentine workers who had received their social security cards 
only six months earlier now found themselves excluded from the program. The Social Security 
Board contested the ruling. In April 1940, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in New Orleans 
ruled in favor of the producers, stating that turpentine workers were indeed engaged in 
agriculture and therefore not covered by the act. The AT-FA also met success in its efforts to 
exclude the industry from the Fair Labor Standards Act o f 1938. The law’s minimum wage and 
overtime provisions would have sounded the death knell for the piece work payment method 
used since the end of slavery and driven wages to prohibitively high levels. Thus naval Stores 
operators built exactly the relationship with the federal government for which they had hoped; 
the received financial assistance with minimal disruption of their labor practices.1*
The AT-FA’s efforts to secure government assistance for themselves and deny it for their 
workers led to vigorous opposition from the gum turpentine producers’ rival, the wood naval 
stores industry. Wood naval stores producers complained throughout the 1930s and 1940s that 
the government’s support of the gum naval stores industry placed them at a disadvantage as 
manufacturers of the same products. First, they argued, gum turpentine production was in no 
way a form of agriculture. Unlike farmers, turpentiners grew nothing, but only collected gum 
from trees already growing. Also, very few producers owned the timber they worked and, in a 
large number of cases, lessees were not individual producers but large concerns that operated on 
an industrial scale and processed the gum at central distilleries, some as large as small wood
58 Memorandum Relating to Status of Turpentine Farmers, 27 May 1938, Colmer Papers; 
Prince K. Reed, interview by author, 19 August 1996, St. Augstine, FL; A.L. Brogden, 
Memorandum. 10 August 1940, Bilbo Papers; Stetson Kennedy, Palmetto Country (New York; 
Duel), Sloan and Pearce, 1942), 263; Shelton, “Pines and Pioneers,” 184; Campbell, et al., Naval 
Stores Industry. 92; Decision o f George L. Shelton, et al. vs Marion H. Allen, 16 November 
1937, Bilbo Papers; Gene Burnett, “To Bum in a Turpentine Hell,” Florida Trend (October 
1976): 102; Butler, Treasures o f the Lonaleaf Pines. 174; John W. Langdale, interview by Harold 
K. Steen, 1991, Forest History Society, 12; American Turpentine-Farmers Association 
Resolution, passed 20 April 1938, Bilbo Papers.
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naval stores plants themselves. Like the gum naval stores producers, wood naval stores 
manufacturers reported their production to the Department of Agriculture, which also graded 
their products by the same standards used to grade gum naval stores.59 “If the gum naval stores 
people are agriculture,” wood naval stores manufacturer R.H. Crosby argued, “then we should 
certainly be classified as agriculture, as well as every saw mill in the South.”60
Second, the wood producers claimed, the classification o f gum naval stores as agriculture 
represented nothing more than dirty politics. With over half of the wood naval stores plants 
located in Mississippi, they alleged, the congressmen from Georgia and Florida—in an effort to 
help their constituency at the expense of wood producers outside their states—made political 
bargains with congressmen from the Northwest to support their tax bill in exchange for the votes 
declaring gum naval stores agriculture. As a result o f the government price support, gum 
producers received considerably more in return for their product than did wood naval stores 
producers, causing the former to produce greater quantities at a profit while the latter languished 
in a stagnant market. With such price divergence, the wood naval stores producers claimed they 
struggled to keep afloat. To make matters worse, no large consumers stocked up on rosin. They 
instead waited in anticipation of the government unloading large quantities of its stock on the 
market, a move it would almost certainly have to make to rid itself o f supplies stored in wooden 
barrels that succumbed to weathering and decay after two years. The wood naval stores industry 
estimated in the late 1930s that an estimated fifteen to twenty million dollars in plant investment 
was bringing no return. Some of the smaller industrial operations shut down while others 
reduced production by half, causing layoffs and hurting landowners by reducing stump prices.
59 Continental Turpentine and Rosin Company to William Colmer, 30 December 1939, 
R.H. Crosbey to William Colmer, 7 June 1949, R-H. Crosby to Robert M. Newton, 25 May 
1946, and R.H. Crosby to William Colmer, 25 February 1939, Colmer Papers.
60 R.H. Crosby to William Colmer, 28 June 1940, Ibid.
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Wood naval stores producers desired that either the price supports end so the two branches of the 
industry could compete in a fair market or that wood and gum naval stores prices be 
supplemented equally.61
Third, wood naval stores producers argued that gum producers constituted a drag on the 
economic development o f their region by hurting the environment and engaging in unfair labor 
practices. Where the wood naval stores plants used stumps and waste wood to manufacture their 
product, they put forth, the gum producers harvested from living trees, severely damaging and 
retarding their growth. Moreover, wood naval stores plants paid their workers according to 
federal wage and hour legislation and paid the Social Security tax, from which the gum naval 
stores producers were exempt.62
Finally, the wood naval stores producers argued that the government’s policy merely 
represented the unfair use o f tax money to hurt them. Rather than a loan, they argued, the NSCP 
amounted to nothing more than the government purchase of gum naval stores at inflated prices.63 
So frustrated was one Mississippi wood naval stores producer with Democrats and the Roosevelt 
administration over the NSCP that in the November 1940 election he planned “to vote a split 
ticket,” one vote for Democratic Representative William M. Colmer and the other for Republican 
presidential candidate Wendell Willkie. “I hate like hell to have to vote for Willkie,” he 
commented, but believed it was his “ last resort against New Deal unfair competition.”64 Like
61 R.H. Crosby to William Colmer, 25 February 1939 and 1 March 1939, Continental 
Turpentine and Rosin Corp. to William Colmer, 30 December 1939, V.A. Anderson to William 
Colmer, 17 September 1943, R.H. Crosby to Robert M. Newton, 25 May 1946, R.H. Crosby to 
William Colmer, 7 June 1949, R.H. Crosby to Robert M. Newton, 25 May 1946, and Robert M. 
Newton to Harold Crosbey, 23 May 1946, Ibid.
62 R.H. Crosby to William Colmer, 25 February 1939, Colmer Papers; “Naval Stores 
History.” Naval Stores Review 100 (March/April 1990): 8.
63 R.H. Crosby to William Colmer, 1 March 1939, 25 February 1939, and 7 June 1949, 
Colmer Papers.
64 R.H. Crosby to William Colmer, 15 July 1940, Ibid.
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this wood naval stores manufacturer, other such producers resented what they perceived as a 
contrived argument to use federal tax money to prop up a primitive business that brought no hope 
of economic development and all at the expense o f an industry that did indeed promise 
advancement.65
Where federal assistance failed to reach the wood naval stores industry and gum naval 
stores laborers, it found its way to producers. Government-funded forestry efforts began to pay 
off by the early 1930s with the stabilization o f timber resources. Because producers turned 
increasingly to the government-planted and protected second-growth stands in areas already 
damaged by turpentining, the industry’s migration, which had characterized it for centuries, 
ended. Turpentine producers settled firmly into south Georgia and north Florida. Intensified 
federal research into burning practices, gum yield, harvesting methods, and distillation further 
aided producers by demonstrating the most efficient use of second-growth stands. Most 
significantly, the federal government provided economic assistance as the weakening industry 
faced collapse during the Great Depression. After several failed efforts by producers to gain 
financial support, the new and powerful American Turpentine-Farmers Association won both 
low interest loans to stabilize the market and price support payments to those individual 
producers who practiced conservation methods. But as the AT-FA secured federal assistance for 
its member operators, it worked to deny turpentine workers the benefits of federal aid, a 
contradiction that the gum producers’ rival, the wood naval stores industry, argued was not only 
unjust, but retarded economic development. Such a persistent pattern of labor exploitation 
ultimately helped undermine gum turpentine manufacturing.
65 R.H. Crosby to William Colmer, 1 March 1939,25 February 1939, and 7 June 1949,
Ibid.
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Chapter Thirteen
The Industry Withers:
Labor Conditions and the Decline of Gum Naval Stores Manufacturing
The new role of government and resulting scientific advancements did not change the 
gum naval stores industry’s continued use of exploitative labor practices, and primitive 
manufacturing methods, both o f which ultimately spelled the businesses demise. The lives and 
work routines of naval stores workers and producers’ labor management techniques remained 
relatively unaltered during the 1930s and 1940s from what they were decades earlier. Such 
continuing practices as low wages, debt peonage, brutality, and close worker oversight did little 
to attract laborers to the business, especially after the United States’ entry into World War II. 
That conflict and post-war developments challenged the industry by encouraging an increased 
demand for lumber, loosening the binds of peonage, and creating a labor scarcity, conditions that 
prevented gum turpentine producers from effectively competing with the highly-mechanized 
wood naval stores industry. By the 1950$, large industrial plants, not independent operators, 
manufactured the great majority o f  American naval stores.
The improved methods developed by government researchers required that workers 
change the older harvesting practices to which they were already accustomed. Bark chipping 
proved especially difficult for some workers to master. Whereas traditional chipping removed a 
thick strip of bark and wood from the trunk, bark chipping only took off the rough outer and 
white inner bark to expose the surface o f the wood. The procedure caused less drain on the 
tree’s vitality, resulted in greater gum flow and reduced incidents of diyface. Although it was 
less physically taxing than traditional chipping, workers used to the older methods required 
thorough retraining to master bark chipping. Seasoned chippers, who had for fifteen or twenty
603
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years cut into the trunk hard enough to remove pieces o f wood, often found it challenging to 
begin cutting lightly. Workers who persisted in swinging the bark hack with great force could 
damage the blade, which was not designed to endure such pressure. Producers reported that, in 
many cases, it was easier to train laborers who had never used the regular hack before to bark 
hack rather than reteach experienced hackers.1
Another innovation, acid spray, required that workers pay especially careful attention to 
their task. When first introduced, the technique, required workers to spray acid by blowing 
through a mouth piece into the spray container. Workers greatly disliked this method, and 
researchers quickly replaced the blow sprayer with a plastic squeeze bottle. For best results, 
workers needed to follow a regular fourteen-day chipping schedule using a sharp bark hack and 
spray bottle with a clean nozzle capable of discharging a spray of acid. Laborers first chipped 
only enough bark to expose the wood. Then, holding the sprayer at a forty-five degree angle, 
workers aimed the acid at the top o f  the streak with the nozzle one to two inches below the top of 
the streak and one to two inches away from the tree. Moving the sprayer across the streak in a 
single steady motion, they sprayed the top of the streak and under the overhanging bark.2 Only 
enough acid to wet the streak completely was to be applied, but not enough to drip down the 
face. Proper applications allowed the solution, over fourteen days, to penetrate one-half to three- 
quarter inches above the streak. Over-application resulted in excessive tissue loss. Because in
1 Ralph W. Clements, “The Bark Hack: Techniques of Using This Efficient Method,” 
reprint from Naval Stores Review (January and March 1953), Olustee Experiment Station Files, 
Georgia Agrirama, Tifton, GA.
2 The exact distance of the nozzle from the streak depended on the individual bottle’s 
spray pattern. Poor treatment resulted if a worker incorrectly adjusted his technique to the 
stream delivered by a particular sprayer. Another potential problem occurred if the bottle was 
tilted too far downward, causing the nozzle to discharge a stream rather than a fine spray. When 
a stream hit the face, the force caused it to spatter and a large portion ran down the face and into 
the cups and gutters corroding them. If the worker held the sprayer too close to the tree, he could 
not see if he was correctly directing the acid and, if  he held it too far away, his the aim could be 
poor.
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such cases double streaks were required to reach living wood, excess acid use caused the face to 
be used up too quickly, reducing the period in which a tree could be worked and thus lower
yields.3
To facilitate effective treatment o f higher faces and reduce the risk o f acid falling back 
on workers as they sprayed upwards, researchers developed a spray-puller. The device, 
essentially a bark puller and acid sprayer in one, held a supply o f acid in a plastic bottle located 
at the lower end of the aluminum stock. Workers had to exercise considerable skill and patience 
to use the spray puller accurately. Holding the puller stock firmly and placing the blade and 
nozzle at the precise angle, a worker squeezed the plastic bottle while cutting the new streak. By 
the sixth year of working a face, which required a sixty-inch long puller, accurate placement of 
the chip and spray was especially difficult.4
Although acid treatment brought overall benefits to the industry, problems did arise. 
Some workers misapplied acid, either providing inadequate and spotty application or spraying 
too much, the latter leading to the corrosion o f tin and metal cups. Because so much could go 
wrong with acid sprayers, foresters emphasized the necessity of proper labor supervision to 
producers. “Success or failure of the bark chipping and acid treatment,” one researcher found, 
“can usually be traced to the amount and thoroughness of supervision given laborers in the 
turpentine woods.” Workers required adequate instruction and constant supervision until they
3 Prince K. Reed, interview by author, tape recording, 19 August 1996, St. Augustine,
FL; Ralph Clements, “Field Supervision Important When Using the Bark Chipping-Acid 
Stimulation Method,” Naval Stores Review 61 (June 1951): 24-26; Ralph W. Clements, Manual: 
Modem Gum Naval Stores Methods (Asheville, NC: Southeastern Forest Experiment Station, 
1960), 13-15; H.L. Mitchell, “Information on the Use of Chemical Stimulants to Increase Gum 
Yields.” Savannah Weekly Naval Stores Review and Journal o f Trade 55 (7,14, 21 April 1945), 
Olustee Experiment Station Files, Georgia Agrirama, Tifton, GA; M.D. Mobley and Robert N. 
Hoskins, Forestry in the South (Atlanta: Turner E. Smith and Co., 1956), 159-161; A.R. Shirley, 
Working Trees for Naval Stores (Athens. GA: Georgia Agricultural Extension Service, 1946), 
25-29.
4 Clements, Manual. 22-23; Shirley, Working Trees for Naval Stores. 25-29.
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mastered the technique. For optimal performance producers were also instructed to frequently 
inspect and promptly repair the equipment5
Acid use also posed both a real and perceived work hazard. Rumors associated with its 
use provoked fear among some producers as well as workers. It was said that acid not only 
attracted lightning to treated trees, but the sprayed areas sprouted mushrooms that were fatal to 
cattle. Word also spread that acid runoff turned swamp water black and imbibed it with 
properties that burned the feet and legs of workers who had to wade through it on their rounds. 
One worker expressed the reservations that many laborers held when he concluded that “anything 
that will eat the parts off a man will surely kill a tree or a cow. And I bet it will give you cancer 
too.”6 While all these rumors proved unfounded, acid bums did pose actual risks to laborers. 
Under normal circumstances there was vety little worker contact with the acid. However, a 
nozzle improperly screwed onto a bottle or a bottle punctured by the sharp edges of gutters or by 
hack blades could ooze acid onto workers hands.7 Producers were given the obvious advice to 
“never assign a leaking gun to a laborer. Good laborers can be kept longer this way.”8 If 
producers did not supply their workers with spray pullers, forcing them to use regular bottles and 
hacks instead, acid could easily blow down on a worker’s head and clothes. Laborers usually 
tried to make a quick pass with the spray in an effort to escape the drift, usually resulting in poor
5 Clements, “Field Supervision Important,” 24-26; “Naval Stores Equipment,” The Forest 
Fanner 9 (September 1950): 9-10; Shirley, Working Trees for Naval Stores. 25-29.
6 Gay Goodman Wright, “Turpentining: An Ethnohistorical Study o f a Southern Industry 
and Way o f Life,” (M.A. thesis, University of Georgia, 1979), 103.
7 Carl E. Ostrom, “Gum Yields Affected by Quality o f Acid Applied to Streak,” The AT- 
FA Journal (June 1945): 6; John K. Cross, “‘Without a Doubt the Naval Stores Program Has Had 
a Profound Influence . . . , ” in Historical Background of the Naval Stores Conservation Program. 
Olustee Experiment Station Files, Georgia Agrirama, Tifton, GA, 4; “Naval Stores Equipment,”
9.
8 “Naval Stores Equipment,” 9.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
607
coverage of the streak. Exposure to the acid was not especially harmful if  the area of contact was 
washed immediately, but in the forest that was often impossible. If not immediately removed, 
acid ate through clothing and seriously burned skin. Such incidents were apparently all too 
frequent. At one St. Johns County, Florida operation, workers had to buy their own soda to treat 
acid bums. Another Florida laborer known as “Red Eye” had seriously-reduced vision from 
exposure to acid on his face.9
Despite the innovations o f bark chipping and acid spraying, the basic seasonal pattern of 
turpentine work continued (fig. 13.1) and the tasks remained as challenging as ever. Since labor
Number of Wage Earners in the Gum and Wood 
Naval Stores Industries by Month 
1937
4.500
4.000
3.500
3,000
2,500
2,000
1.500
1.000
500
Jan. Mar. May June July Aug. Sept.Feb. Oct.Apr. Nov. Dec.
Figure 13.1. Number o f Wage Earners in the Gum and Wood Naval Stores Industries by Month, 
1937
Joseph B. Hosmer, Economic Aspects o f  the Naval Stores Industry (Atlanta: Georgia School of 
Technology, State Engineering Experiment Station, 1948), 13.
9 Clements, Manual. 22; Mobley and Hoskins, Forestry in the South. 160-161; Stetson 
Kennedy, Jim Crow Guide: The Wav It Was (Boca Raton, FL: Florida Atlantic University Press, 
1959), 139.
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was paid by piece work, experience was required to perform the tasks rapidly enough to make a 
living. Experienced workers knew how to cover their task efficiently by taking the shortest and 
quickest route from tree to tree. But by the mid 1940s, tending the trees apparently required 
more walking than previously. Many of the second-growth stands had been burned and cut, 
creating stands so thin that workers spent as much as two-thirds of their time in the woods 
walking from tree to tree. They then had time to tend only five thousand faces a week, half of 
the number that had been expected of workers for well over a century. Experienced turpentine 
workers sometimes refused to work in such scattered stands where the piece work system 
ensured they would receive less pay.
Workers were expected to chip a certain amount each week which required most workers 
to labor all day, Monday through Friday, and half a day Saturday. But if  rain during the weekday 
prevented work, laborers had to work all day Saturday and even on Sunday to catch up. Some 
camps had workers known as utility people who did not have a crop of their own but performed 
chipping in crops where certain workers got behind. As they maneuvered about the forest, 
workers faced several challenges and hazards. If the woods were not burned, as was frequently 
the case during the 1930s, the thick undergrowth made it extremely difficult for workers to move 
about. It took a full year for workers to beat down paths to facilitate easier movement. Snakes 
made travel through some areas potentially treacherous. On one pine-covered Florida island, for 
example, rattle snakes were so numerous that a worker who was promised a dollar for every one 
he killed quickly earned ninety-six dollars.10
10 Reed, interview; Clements, “Bark Hack;” Kathy Hawk, “Turpentine: An Ancient 
Technology Almost Tapped Out in S t Johns County,” St. Augustine. Florida Ancient Citv 
Beacon (25 June 1982): 1; Keith W. Dorman, “High-Yielding Turpentine Orchards: A Future 
Possibility,” The Chemureic Digest 4 (29 September 1945): 293-295; Freeman Ashmore, 
“Looking Back: The Woodsrider,” Wakulla Area Digest (September 1996): 36; Robert M. 
Newton to P.N. Howell, 15 October 1937, Dantzler Lumber Company Papers, Special 
Collections, Mitchell Memorial Library, Mississippi State University; Florida Writers’ Project, 
“The Story of Naval Stores . . . , ” Florida Highways 11 (May 1943): 36.
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Woodsriders remained an integral part of turpentine operations; they continued not only 
to keep the tally of piece work, but made sure that tasks were completely and carefully executed, 
and that tools were maintained in good condition. Most woodsriders were white, around ninety- 
five percent by one estimate. At particularly large operations, woodsriders during the period 
relied on subordinates called underriders who supervised twelve to sixteen individual workers. 
Once a week the woodsrider checked on the underrider. Although most underriders were white, 
some were black. As a rule, woodsriders seldom interfered in workers’ family matters or 
quarrels, but they would exercise their power to end a fight. The manager of a Georgia 
turpentine camp, in the 1940s, described his occupation as a fifteen-hour job. He hauled laborers 
to the woods, checked their work, took the sick to the doctor in Valdosta, paid their delinquent 
debts to local merchants, managed the commissary, and maintained law and order. The standard 
of living for most woodsriders probably fell below the median standard of southern whites. In 
1932, for example, one woodsrider received a fifty dollar monthly salary and a house that he 
found infested with mosquitoes and without indoor plumbing.11
Woodsriders apparently continued to resort to brute violence to force unwilling workers 
to remain at their tasks. In the early 1930s, the manager and woodsrider at a turpentine camp in 
the Perry, Florida, area beat two black men, one severely, for refusing to work. To escape 
punishment for their brutality, they determined to remove the beaten men from the area. During 
the ride northward the car in which the men were riding overturned. The two black workers were 
so badly beaten, by one of the white accomplice’s admission, that “they could not lift a thing”
111.F. Eldgredge, The 4 Forests and the Future of the South (Washington, DC: The 
Charles Lathrop Pack Forestry Foundation, 1947), 42; Reed, interview; Elliott Maguire, 
interview, Oral History Collection, Research Library, St. Augustine Historical Society, St. 
Augustine, FL; Florida Writers’ Project, “Story of Naval Stores,” 36; Zora Neal Hurston, 
“Turpentine Camp—Cross City” in Writers Program, Florida, “Turpentine Camp at Cross City,” 
Department o f Special Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries, University of Florida, 4; 
William P. Langdale, interview by H.K. Steen, 1991, Forest History Society, Durham, NC, 4-5; 
Ashmore, “Looking Back: The Woodsrider,” 24.
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and were unable to help right the vehicle. Once more on the road, the party made it as far as 
Valdosta, Georgia, around sixty mites from Perry, where the black men were left with fifteen 
dollars each.12
As was the case since colonial times, producers, in the 1940s and 1950s, relied on cheap, 
black labor which they believed to be inherently unreliable. Almost all chippers, dippers, 
coopers, and ordinary still workers were black. Even as late as the 1930s, one investigator 
explained that for “generation after generation they have followed its [the naval stores industry’s] 
southward migration, and the majority of those engaged in it today are descended from a long 
line of turpentine workers.”13 A 1943 report by the Florida Writers Project explained that “the 
naval stores negro is in a class by himself. He knows his business and feels at home in the open 
woods, enjoys the free and easy atmosphere of his quarters remote from the city temptations that 
frequently got him messed up with the law.”14 One industry observer expressed the prevailing 
view held by whites, in the 1930s, when he explained that “the workers for the woods operation 
in naval stores production are almost entirely negroes, as the work is too severe and pay too 
small for white laborers. Too there is a feeling among the white workers that such disagreeable 
work is negroes work and that white men would demean themselves by doing it.”IS “The negroes 
are a shiftless class,” he complained, “and it is estimated that 3/4 o f them are constantly in debt. 
Without any motive they frequently leave one producer and go to work for another, usually
12 Richard E. Smith, Federal Bureau of Investigation Report, 23 December 1936, 
Correspondence, Classified Subject Files, Department o f Justice Central Files, General Records 
of the Department o f Justice, Record Group 60, National Archives.
13 Stetson Kennedy, Palmeto Country (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1942), 261.
14 Florida Writers’ Project, “The Story of Naval Stores,” 14.
15 A. Stuart Campbell, Robert C. Unkrich, and Albert C. Blachard, The Naval Stores 
Industry (Gainseville, FL: Bureau o f Economic and Business Research, College o f Business 
Administration, The University o f Florida, 1934), 32.
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leaving an unpaid debt behind.”16 He recommended that producers establish a central agency to 
maintain records on the whereabouts of naval stores laborers as a means of limiting their 
movement.17
Although the labor force in the gum naval stores industry remained predominantly black, 
more whites working in the pine forests during the 1930s than in previous decades. The number 
of small, white producers who performed their own labor rose, as did that of poor, backwoods 
farmers who engaged in turpentine production to supplement their meager incomes. The latter 
group constituted around four or five percent o f  the work force and performed the same tasks and 
received the same pay as black laborers. During the depths of the Depression, some unemployed 
whites, desperate for any work, threatened black turpentine laborers with death if they did not 
give up their jobs. After several hundred white men lost their jobs in 1932, for example, a group 
of six of the unemployed entered a turpentine camp and told the black workers that if they did 
not leave they would be shot the next night. Twelve to fourteen blacks fled for their lives and 
never returned.18
Workers continued to be paid by piece work, not by the hour, and wages remained low. 
They were paid only once a month but could charge merchandise at the commissary throughout 
the period. At the end of the month, the woodsrider or camp manager would calculate how much 
work had been done and then deduct the amount owed the commissary. If their accounts were in
16 Ibid., 32.
17 Ibid., 98.
18 Reed, interview; Robert Cook, “Photographing the Turpentine Industry at Cross City, 
Florida” in Writers Program, Florida, “Turpentine Camp at Cross City,” Department of Special 
Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries, University o f Florida, 1; Florida Writers’ Project, 
“The Story o f Naval Stores,” 14; Robert N. Lauriault, “From Can’t to Can’t: The North Florida 
Turpentine Camp, 1900-1950.” The Florida Historical Quarterly 67 (January 1989): 315; 
Eldredge, The 4 Forests. 42; E.F. Dean to Department o f Justice, 1 June 1932, Correspondence, 
Classified Subject Files, Department of Justice Central Files, General Records of the Department 
of Justice, Record Group 60, National Archives.
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the black, workers received the difference in cash. During the Depression, however, wages fell 
to levels that allowed only the most frugal laborers to remain debt-free (fig. 13.2). Whereas
Average Weekly Gum Naval Stores Wages Per Wage Earner
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Figure 13.2. Average Weekly Gum Naval Stores Wages Per Wage Earner, 1924-1940 
Donald Fraser Martin, Jr., “An Historical and Analytical Approach to the Current Problems of 
the American Gum Naval Stores Industry” (Ph.D. diss., University o f North Carolina, 1942), 
339; For figures relates to chart see Appendix B.
workers could expect $1.25 for chipping a thousand faces in 1927, by 1933 they received 
between 500 and 700. In an effort to attract the best chippers and thus receive the best output, 
some producers paid more to workers chipping virgin faces. By the time the face reached waist- 
high, the pay went down and regular chippers were used. Dippers, who in 1927 had made $1 
from each barrel dipped, only earned between 400 and 600 in 1933. Workers could fill two to 
five fifty-two gallon barrels a day, depending on the worker’s speed and the trees’ density.
Rapid laborers usually did not quit early, opting instead to accomplish more and receive more
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pay. At these rates, turpentine workers made only $30 a month at the same time a common 
laborer earned $40.19 Even John Langdale, Judge Langdale’s son, admitted that, in terms o f  pay, 
the naval stores laborer was on the “bottom of the totem pole.”20
Almost all workers continued to languish in debt. Even hard workers could become 
deeply indebted to the commissary during periods of rainy weather or market downturns when 
work slowed and income dropped while commissary-purchasing continued. If a worker moved 
from one camp to another, whether both camps belonged to the same operator or not, he incurred 
a charge, sometimes as much as ten dollars. But if the worker remained at the job for a year, the 
moving charge was removed from his account. Older workers were especially susceptible to 
indebtedness. As aging laborers grew less physically capable, and their work pace slowed, their 
income, based on piecework, declined accordingly. Older workers were, however, reportedly 
permitted to continue charging groceries and supplies even though producers knew they had no 
chance of paying their debt. Sick workers also grew deeply indebted, not only because they were 
unable to work, but because the cost o f medicine and doctor visits were charged to the operator, 
who paid the bills and added the amount to the worker’s accounts.21 When a member of the 
camp died, the burial expenses created even great debt. Upon a death, everyone in the camp, 
including the boss, donated money, but rarely enough to cover the full costs. In at least one 
instance a dead man’s family was unable to afford the funeral homes’ fifty-dollar charge and 
opted to bury their relative themselves. Despite the challenges posed by a low standard o f  living
19 Reed, interview; William P. Langdale, interview, 4, 6; Clifton Paisley, “Wade 
Leonard, Florida Naval Stores Operator,” The Florida Historical Quarterly 51 (April 1973): 390; 
Campbell, et al., Naval Stores Industry. 31.
20 John W^Langdale, interview by Harold K. Steen, 1991, Forest History Society, 
Durham, NC, 6. '
21 Workers, however, did not always resort to these expensive measures. Herb remedies 
and magic were common substitutes.
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during the Depression, turpentine laborers found their situation less desperate than that o f  some 
sharecroppers. Unlike these poor farmers, who found themselves turned off the land as a  result 
of New Deal agriculture programs, turpentine workers could at least depend on receiving food, 
clothing, and shelter—even though it was sparse and resulted in greater personal debt. For many, 
the period offered no better option.23
The plight o f Depression-era turpentine workers was the subject o f  Georgia-bom blues 
singer Tampa Red’s (Hudson Whittaker) 1932 recording “Turpentine Blues.”23
Turpentine is all right providing that wages are good 
Turpentine is all right providing that wages are good 
But I can make more money now out somewhere chopping cord wood
Turpentine business ain’t like it used to be 
Turpentine business ain’t like it used to be 
I can’t make enough money now to even get on a spree
I ain’t gone work no mo, I tell you the reason why 
I ain’t gone work no mo, tell you the reason why 
Because everybody wants to sell, but nobody wants to buy
You can work in the fields, you can work at the sawmill too 
You can work in the fields, you can work at the sawmill too 
But you can’t make no money at nothing you try to do
22 Maguire, interview, St. Augustine Historical Society; Federal Writers’ Project,
Florida: A Guide to the Southernmost State (New York: Oxford University Press, 1939), 452; 
Richard E. Smith, Federal Bureau of Investigation Report, 12 November 1936, Correspondence, 
Classified Subject Files, Department o f Justice Central Files, General Records of the Department 
o f Justice, Record Group 60, National Archives; Kennedy, Palmetto Country. 261; John W. 
Langdale, interview, 6, 13-14; Reed, interview; Ashmore, “Looking Back: The Woodsrider,” 36; 
W.J. Kelly and A.L. Brogden to Our Turpentine Farmer Friends, 12 April 1940, Andrew D. 
Popped Papers, Florida State Archives; Elliott Maguire, interview by author, tape recording, St. 
Augustine, FL, 5 June 1996; Becky Vail, “Old-Timer Remembers ‘Hard Old Days’ in Woods,” 
Newsclipping file, Lowndes County Historical Society, Valdosta, GA; Gavin Wright, Old South. 
New South: Revolutions in the Southern Economy Since the Civil War (New York: Basic Books, 
Inc., 1986), 15,199; Hurston, “Turpentine Camp-Cross City,” 2.
23 Lawrence Cohn, ed., Nothing But the Blues: The Music and the Musicians (New York: 
Abbeville Press, 1993), 164-165.
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So Lawdy please tell me what we turpentine people are gone a  do 
Lawdy please tell me what we turpentine people gone a do 
We may work one week, but we got lay off a mon or two
Turpentine is like dying, shoot you up on the loose 
Turpentine is like dying, just shoot you up on the loose 
That’s the reason why I’ve got those turpentine blues24
The example o f distiller Jim Byrd, who worked for a  large Florida operation in the 
1930s, reveals how even a worker in a relatively high position in the gum naval stores industry 
could find his opportunities at once limited and better than most other alternatives. Byrd, a sixty 
year old black man, was originally from Bainbridge, Georgia. When he was young, he had 
helped his widowed mother with farm work so he received very little education. He started work 
in turpentine as a scraper in Georgia making $1.25 a day. By the 1930s, he made $15.00 a week 
as a distiller, but his salary barely paid for the basic necessities—rent, food, clothing, medical 
care, and life insurance. Although he received satisfaction from knowing that his employer 
valued his work highly, Byrd wished to become a farmer. He stayed in turpentine, however, 
because borrowing the money to farm would set him back too far financially and, as a distiller, 
he was able to support his family, better than if he took whatever work he could get as a common 
day laborer.25
Turpentine workers like Byrd continued to make most of their purchases from the 
commissary. At one commissary workers could buy such meat products as sausage and bologna, 
but fresh meats came from local farms. If commissaries lacked a needed item, it could be 
obtained by filling out an order. At one camp workers could even acquire suits this way. 
However, women sewed most clothes with cloth they purchased by the bolt from the
24 Tampa Red, “Turpentine Blues,” Legends of the Blues, vol. 2, audiocassette,
Columbia Records.
25 Hurston, “Turpentine Camp—Cross City,” 1-4.
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commissary. In many cases, commissaries remained a practical necessity, the nearest town was 
usually fifteen to twenty miles away from the camp. However, in areas where commissaries took 
business away from merchants, resentments flared. In 1940, for example, Florida merchants 
unsuccessfully demanded that a judge order turpentine commissaries to pay the state sales tax 
required of all other retailers in the state.26
Commissary prices remained typically higher than those at ordinary retail stores, 
between ten and one hundred percent more. According to one estimate, commissaries made a net 
profit of twenty percent at a  time when retail stores earned between five and eight percent 
Producers justified the inflated prices in different ways. One maintained that “we weren’t in the 
grocery business. We just wanted to make up for bad debts.”27 Another explained that “of 
course we have to charge the niggers more, but they save in the long run. Just think how much it 
would cost them to drive thirty miles into town for vitals if they had cars.”28
Workers’ eating habits persisted with little changed from earlier periods and women 
continued to dominate food cultivation, purchases, and preparation. Staples of the turpentine 
workers’ diet remained pork—mostly fat back-com—usually prepared as combread—sweet 
potatoes, beans, peas, collards, mustard greens, eggs, chicken, and occasionally beef. Along with 
the goods and produce purchased at the commissary and grown in family gardens, workers 
continued to supplement their diet with small game and birds men hunted in the woods, and fish, 
especially brim and perch, caught by women and children. According to one report, however,
26 Commissaries used a variety of methods to register worker purchases—tokens, check 
cards, and coupon books—which were advanced to workers and charged to their accounts, or they 
simply kept a tab. Reed, interview; Maguire, interview by author; Vail, “Old-Timer 
Remembers;” Wright, Old South. New South. 15, 199; Hurston, “Turpentine Camp-Cross City,” 
2.
27 Wright, “Turpentining,” 114.
28 Kennedy, Palmetto Country. 259.
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during the depths o f the Depression, some turpentine workers subsisted on a diet o f bread, sugar, 
and water. Workers’ wives prepared their breakfasts in time for them to get to the woods early in 
the morning, usually around 4:00 or 4:30. Wives also had to make their husband’s lunch and 
pack it in any available container. At one camp, an empty one-gallon syrup bucket served as a 
common lunch pail. At least once a brutal Cordelle County, Georgia woodsrider beat a worker’s 
wife who failed to have her husband’s breakfast prepared in time.29
Workers continued to live in isolated quarters during the 1930s and 1940s. Most 
contained around fifteen cabins housing forty to sixty people. Camps built during this period 
consisted of more substantial two- and three-room cabins with exterior painted pine boards.
Some had glass and screened windows and painted interior walls. A few possessed electric lights 
and running water. Women did not typically work in turpentine but did live in the quarters with 
their families. Although single men lived two or three to a cabin, nuclear families each had their 
own dwelling. Families usually kept their houses neat and swept their yards clean o f all debris 
and vegetation, save for a few flowers. Backyard garden plots yielded collards and yams. Many 
families also kept a  few chickens and a coon dog. But not all workers lived in the quarters. 
Because automobiles and paved roads provided easier access to local communities than in 
previous periods, an increasing number of workers lived in adjacent towns and commuted to 
work.30
29 Harley Langdale, Jr., interview by Harold K. Steen, 1991, Forest History Society, 13; 
Lauriault, “From Can’t to Can’t,” 324; Ashmore, “Looking Back: The Woodsrider,” 24. Reed, 
interview; Florida Writers’ Project, “Story of Naval Stores,” 14-15; Kennedy, Palmetto Country. 
263; Kennedy. Jim Crow Guide. 139.
30 Maguire, interview, St. Augustine Historical Society; Eldredge, The 4 Forests. 43; 
Florida Writers’ Project, “Story o f Naval Stores,” 14; Jo Meldrim, interview by author, tape 
recording, St. Augustine, FL, 19 August 1996; Kenneth H. Thomas, Jr., McCranie’s Turpentine 
Still. Atkinson County. Georgia: A Historical Analysis o f the Site. With Some Information on the 
Naval Stores Industry in Georgia and Elsewhere (Atlanta: Georgia Institute of Community and 
Area Development, 1975), 34; Nelson Courtlandt Brown, Forest Products: The Harvesting. 
Processing, and Marketing of Materials Other Than Lumber. Including the Principal Derivatives. 
Extractives, and Incidental Products in the United States and Canada (New York: John Wiley
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Although workers had increasing access to towns, the camp church and especially the 
juke joint remained the principal forms o f distraction from the monotonous work routine. One 
worker explained o f turpentine laborers “thats all they got to do beside work—go to church and 
drink shine.”31 Camps usually contained a small church where either a visiting preacher or a 
worker led services every Sunday. At some camps, Baptist and Methodist preachers conducted 
worship on alternating Sundays. On weekdays after work a few laborers held prayer meetings on 
weekends after work. Turpentine workers who were religious tended to be very devout but a 
larger number o f laborers still reveled at the juke joint, particularly on Saturday nights.
Typically operated by an entrepreneurial worker, jukes provided a place for laborers to drink 
moonshine, dance, and gamble. A few establishments also sold food such as hamburgers and 
fish. Along with food, sex could also be purchased at some of these establishments. Prostitutes 
roamed from camp to camp, usually arriving on payday. The juke on Saturday night retained its 
character as a violent place where fights and even murders were not uncommon. When revelry at 
the juke continued through Sunday, many workers were too hungover to work the next day. On 
such occasions one innovative woodsrider administered his own hangover medicine consisting o f 
a mixture of moonshine, 666 (a cold tonic), Raymond’s Little Kidney Pills, Black Drought (a 
strong laxative), and any other medicine he had handy. The combination probably only 
exacerbated a hangover, but the woodsrider claimed it left his laborers folly recovered for work 
the next day.32
and Sons, Inc., 19S0), 186; Duncan, “Report on Trip to Cross City” in Writers Program, Florida, 
“Turpentine Camp at Cross City,” Department o f  Special Collections, George A. Smathers 
Libraries, University of Florida, Gainseville, FL, 6.
31 Kennedy, Palmetto Country. 263.
32 Reed, interview; Florida Writers’ Project, “Story of Naval Stores,” 14-15; Kennedy, 
Palmetto Country. 263; William P. Langdale, interview, 4-5.
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Despite child labor laws, throughout the 1930s and 1940s children performed a limited 
amount of work at turpentine operations. Most commonly they dipped to support their families’ 
income. Producers even issued different sizes o f nail kegs as dip buckets to correspondingly- 
sized children. Children, along with women, also labored in nearby potato and cabbage fields, 
hundreds working at one time.33
Although not available to children at all turpentine camps, schools did become more 
accessible during this period. By the 1940s, some camps had one-room schoolhouses, but most 
commonly the church served as a classroom during the weekdays. Whether supported by the 
producer or the local county government, camp schools were notoriously underfunded. At a 
camp in MacClenny, Florida, in the late 1930s, one teacher was responsible for fifty-two children 
crammed into one room. At another camp, 250 students and 8 teachers were crowded into a 
church. In many cases teachers were traveling instructors who visited several camps during the 
week. Only six to nine grades were available and children were usually able to achieve a basic 
level o f literacy at best. If, in the unusual case, a county school was nearby, children walked or 
were driven by a worker. No buses provided transportation.34 At some camps, however, no 
school of any kind was available within an accessible distance. Even where schools were 
available, several factors still discouraged regular attendance. When the weather grew warm 
enough for gum to run, attendance rates dropped thirty percent as children began assisting with 
dipping. During cold weather, some children failed to attend because they lacked warm clothing.
33 Reed interview; W.W. Barber to Newton, 14 April 1945, Dantzler Lumber Company
Papers.
34 Lauriault, “From Can’t  to Can’t,” 325; Florida Writers’ Project, “Story of Naval 
Stores,” 15; A. Philip Randolph to Homer Cummings, 5 March 1937, Correspondence, Classified 
Subject Files, Department o f Justice Central Files, General Records of the Department of Justice, 
Record Group 60, National Archives; Hurston, “Turpentine Camp-Cross City,” 15; Wright, Old 
South. New South. 113-114; Kennedy, Palmetto Country. 262; Reed, interview; Meldrin, 
interview.
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Along with limited educational opportunities and poor living conditions in camps, 
decades-old labor practices persisted. Worker recruitment continued in the tight labor market 
despite a gentlemen’s agreement among producers to refrain from such activity. Even in the late 
1940s, a camp manager would leave for a nearby community carrying moonshine and a black 
worker who knew other men in the area who might be persuaded to change employers. After 
giving a recruit some drinks and bragging about the superior working conditions at his camp and 
the availability of jobs, a manager would bring the new worker back to the camp. In some cases 
cash advances were required to coax workers from their employers. Typical advances amounted 
to twenty-five dollars or less, although during the periods o f greatest labor scarcity advances 
could rise as high as five hundred dollars.35 Some recruiters employed more creative means of 
attracting laborers. One black Florida voodoo practitioner employed magic to attract labor for 
his employer. On a recruiting mission to Georgia when prospective workers proved unwilling to 
accept his offer, he rubbed two pebbles together, glared at the men, and threatened to hex them if 
they did not return with him. The prospective workers then obediently climbed into his waiting 
truck. No matter the means used to hire workers, the following Monday morning, as was 
common, the manager would arrive at the recruited worker’s former camp, collect his 
belongings, and pay off his account.
Turpentiners attempted to control their labor by closely monitoring their quarters, an 
activity made possible by the camps’ continued isolation in the pine wilderness. As had been the 
case since the antebellum era, many were located between twelve and twenty miles from the 
nearest road and could be reached only by a company road winding through murky swamps and 
dense forests to an inaccessible spot. One member of the Florida Writers Project found the area
35 William P. Langdale, interview, 3; Kennedy, Jim Crow Guide. 137; Federal Writers’ 
Project, Florida. 377; Richard E. Smith, Federal Bureau o f Investigation Report, 12 November 
1936, Correspondence, Classified Subject Files, Department of Justice Central Files, General 
Records of the Department of Justice, Record Group 60, National Archives.
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between Cross City and the Gulf, where many camps were scattered, to have no towns, the open 
pine flats broken only by small cypress swamps and hardwood hammocks, and the region 
penetrated by only a few long dirt roads. Turpentiners and free-range hog and cattle raisers were 
commonly the only inhabitants in such regions. Many producers wanted to know the business of 
ail who visited the camp and any details of outsiders’ discussions with workers.36 One 
investigator o f forced labor practices succeeded in gaining access to a camp in Front Cove, 
Florida, only after he told the manager he was there to record folk songs. Once the songs were 
recorded and the satisfied boss left, the investigator began his interview. With the white boss 
gone, one worker admitted that “the only way out [of the turpentine camp] is to die out ”37
Some turpentine producers went to considerable lengths to protect their precious labor 
force. In the summer of 1936, for example, Bunnell, Florida, turpentine producer George Allen 
had the local sheriff detain three young men whom he feared were recruiting his workers. Two 
turpentine laborers in Allen’s employment had sent word requesting employment with another 
producer, W J. Ward, of Baldin, Florida, approximately fifty miles to the northeast. But when 
Ward’s two sons, Kevin and Leslie, and a black man named Giles arrived at Allen’s quarters they 
were ambushed by Allen’s men who forced the three into a car and drove them to the county seat 
of Bunnell. There the sheriff and Allen locked them in the jail on the charge of “being 
unlawfully in the quarters of Mr. Allen’s camp.” The sheriff released them with Allen’s 
approval only after they spent a  week in jail and vowed never to return to the area nor attempt to 
recruit any more o f Allen’s turpentine workers.38
36 Lauriault, “From Can’t to Can’t,” 327; Cook, “Photographing the Turpentine Industry 
at Cross City, 5; Duncan, “Report on Trip to Cross City,” 1,4; Federal Writers’ Project, Florida. 
376; Maguire, interview, St. Augustine Historical Society.
37 Kennedy, Jim Crow Guide. 136; Kennedy, Palmetto Country. 262-263.
38 Richard E. Smith, Federal Bureau of Investigation Report, 12 November 1936, 
Correspondence, Classified Subject Files, Department o f Justice Central Files, General Records 
o f the Department o f Justice, Record Group 60, National Archives.
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This example o f restricted labor movement and further evidence suggests that peonage 
remained a  common practice in the 1930s. An investigator with the Workers Defense League 
found that “peonage is nothing unusual in Florida. There are several sections in which it 
flourishes but these are veritable ‘no-man’s lands’ where one must tread softly if wishing to 
live.”39 When one turpentine worker, James Day, escaped from a turpentine camp in Manioh, 
Georgia, the owner falsely claimed that Day owned him two hundred dollars and held his four 
small children as ransom for his return. After unsuccessfully appealing to the U.S. District 
Attorney and the FBI, Day went to court for the return of his children only to be jailed for 
abandoning them. The sheriff offered to release Day only if he agreed to return to the producer 
for work. In another instance, Lige James Johnson, a black turpentine worker for Charles A. 
Gaskins near Wewahitchka, Florida left his job free of debt for employment in Panama City. But 
in 1938 Gaskins alleged that Johnson owed him thirty-five dollars and forced him to return to the 
turpentine camp for four more months of work. Three years later Gaskins claimed, after 
examining his books, that Johnson still owed him twenty-two dollars and wanted him to return to 
the camp. This time Johnson resisted, a struggle ensued, and Johnson was forced into Gaskins’ 
car. During the thirty-mile long ride back to the camp, Johnson jumped from the car and ran into 
the woods. Gaskins’ subsequent trial for peonage attracted the attention o f the American 
Turpentine-Farmers Association. Fearing that Gaskins’ conviction might disrupt the industry’s 
labor practices, the association lent the services o f its own attorney to the defense. Despite their 
efforts, however, Gaskins was convicted o f peonage. But on appeal, the U.S. District Court in 
Pensacola overturned the conviction, citing that Johnson had escaped from the car before
39 Jerrell H. Shofner, “Postscript to the Martin Tabert Case: Peonage as Usual in the 
Florida Turpentine Camps,” The Florida Historical Q u a rte r ly  60 (October 1981): 169.
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returning to work at the camp. Thus Gaskins had attempted but not succeeded in placing 
Johnson in debt servitude and consequently was not guilty of a crime.40
Two powerful institutions historically associated with the naval stores industry— 
factorage houses and the criminal justice system—helped perpetuate the peonage system. Factors 
would only advance capital to producers whom they trusted to manage an operation profitably. 
The secret to success, as one former producer explained, “was that if you could handle the labor, 
most all turpentine labor was black, if  you could handle those and knew how to get the work out 
of them, well then you could get along with the factors pretty good because you could operate.”41 
Although the official leasing of convicts had ended in the early 1920s, the practice continued to 
be sustained by the criminal justice system. If a worker left an operation, his employer could 
have him charged with a crime, taken to court, convicted, and then sentenced to the worker’s 
choice of either twelve to eighteen months in prison or a fine. Workers typically chose the latter. 
The employer then paid the fine, obligating the convicted worker to labor for him to pay off the 
debt. The sheriff usually threatened the worker with the chain gang if he left again.42
The absence o f labor union activity in the gum naval stores industry allowed such abuses 
to go largely uncontested. Although many of the white laborers, who dominated the skilled 
positions at pulp and paper mills were organized, the majority of black workers involved in 
harvesting timber and stumps and virtually all of the gum naval stores were not.43 A. Philip
40 Kennedy, Jim Crow Guide. 40; Shofher, “Postscript to the Martin Tabert Case,” 171- 
172; Jerrell H. Shofher, “Forced Labor in the Florida Forests, 1880-1950,” Journal o f Forest 
History 25 (January 1981): 24.
41 Reed, interview; Harley Langdale, Jr., interview, 7.
42 Shofher, “Postscript to the Martin Tabert Case,” 164-167; Reed, interview; Pete 
Daniel, The Shadow o f Slavery: Peonage in the South. 1901-1969 (Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 1990), 180.
43 Eldredge, The 4 Forests. 43.
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Randolph believed that black workers were exploited “because there is no labor organization in 
the South that has the strength and power to prevent the exploitation of Negro and white 
workers.”44
The investigation and trial o f turpentiner Will Knabb demonstrates the degree to which 
peonage and brutality persisted among some producers. On October 13, 1936 three black 
turpentine workers—Ed Backer, his son-in-law Arthur Smith, and Alfred Smith-decided to quit 
work for Knabb to find better wages. They came to R.T. Boyd’s residence in Coleman, Florida, 
and requested work at his still. They also asked that a truck be sent to MacCIenny, Florida, to 
move their belongings and that Boyd pay their accounts. The next day Boyd and a worker named 
William Simpson went to MacCIenny to move the three men and their families and settle their 
debts. Boyd first settled the account o f Alfred Smith for $9.22 at a separate camp under the 
management of Knabb’s son Earl, for which Boyd received a receipt. He then loaded Smith’s 
household goods onto his truck and proceeded to MacCIenny to Camp 17 to settle the other 
accounts and load the other two workers’ belongings. But upon entering the Camp 17 office, 
Boyd found the owner Will Knabb, his woodsrider Fred Jones, and Earl Knabb, who had 
proceeded them to MacCIenny, all armed with pistols. Knabb refused to let Boyd take the three 
workers and accused him of recruiting his labor, at the time a crime in Florida.43 The three men 
cursed and threatened Boyd. Laying his hand on his pistol, Knabb informed Boyd that he could 
not leave the office until he accepted the return o f the $9.22 he had paid Earl on Alfred Smith’s
44 A. Philip Randolph to Homer Cummings, S March 1937, Correspondence, Classified 
Subject Files, Department of Justice Central Files, General Records of the Department o f Justice, 
Record Group 60, National Archives.
43 The Florida statute read that “whomever shall entice or persuade by any means 
whatsoever any tenant, servant or laborer, under contract with another, whether written or verbal, 
to violate such contract, or shall employ any servant or laborer, knowing him or her to be under 
contract or aforesaid, shall be punished by imprisonment not to exceed sixty days or $100.00 
fine.” C.B. Winstead, Federal Bureau of Investigation Report, 19 March 1937, Ibid.
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account. Knabb also claimed that Arthur Smith owed between thirty and forty dollars for 
burning part o f  a forest. The three man forced Boyd to unload Alfred’s belongings at Camp 17.
In the mean time, Knabb called Alfred and Arthur into his office and asked if they were trying to 
leave. Upon replying in the affirmative, they were threatened with severe beatings, a response 
reported to be typical of Knabb when disciplining workers who attempted to leave.
Several days after the incident, Ed Baker escaped and made his way to Boyd’s camp, but 
his wife, daughter, and belongings remained with Knabb. Knabb warned the two women that he 
would have their shack guarded and if  they left he would have them arrested. Knabb also 
prevented the Smith men from leaving the camp, and they continued work in the woods.46 In an 
effort to at least get Alfred and Arthur out, Ed sent word for them to meet him in Baldwin,
Florida early one morning and rendezvous with Boyd’s truck on its run to Jacksonville with a 
load of turpentine and rosin. According to the plan, the Smiths left the camp at night, walked 
along the highway, and reached a depot by daylight. But before the Boyd truck passed, Ed Hall, 
one of Knabb’s woodsriders, drove up. When Hall instructed Arthur to get in his truck he 
complied. But when he approached Alfred and explained, “boy, Mr. Knabb sent me down and 
told me to bring you back,” Alfred refused. When Hall then approached him with a gun, he ran 
for cover behind a box car. Because a group of whites were watching, Hall retreated to his truck 
and left with Arthur. Alfred, however, failed to meet the Boyd truck, returned to Knabb’s camp, 
and went back to work.47
A few days later the FBI Jacksonville Bureau Office received a letter from Boyd 
describing the experience surrounding his attempt to remove the three workers from Knabb’s 
employment. On October 23, 1936, Boyd, Simpson—who had accompanied Boyd to Knabb’s
46 Richard E. Smith, Federal Bureau of Investigation Report, 12 November 1936 and 13 
December 1936, Ibid.
47 Richard E. Smith, Federal Bureau of Investigation Report, 12 November 1936, Ibid.
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camp—and Ed Baker all visited the Jacksonville office and related the story in person. A week 
and a half later, Will and Earl Knabb, Fred Jones, and Ed Hall were subsequently charged with 
peonage violations and taken into custody by Bureau agents and U.S. Marshals. All three men 
pleaded not guilty and were each released on one-thousand-dollar bonds. Once the Knabbs were 
arrested, Arthur and Alfred Smith and Baker’s wife and daughter were all moved to Boyd’s 
camp, where they became his workers.48
The inquiry and trial drew considerable attention from the press and concerned 
organizations. By the fall of 1936, newspapers across the country carried stories o f Knabb’s 
operation. The NAACP and Workers Defense League sent investigators o f their own. The 
NAACP urged the Justice Department to thoroughly investigate and prosecute the Knabb men. 
AFL president William Green demanded that Florida governor David Sholtz lend his state’s full 
resources to the investigation. When the AFL sent its own agent to inspect conditions, he 
experienced first-hand the intimidation that made the labor system work. Fearing for his own 
safety after an informer notified the manager of his presence and a small group of white men 
gathered, the agent left the camp after two hours. The president of the Federation’s 
Jacksonville branch submitted a report on the plight o f Knabb’s laborers.49 Boyd hoped that the 
AFL would “continue to make efforts to clean up the situation which now exists in not only 
Florida but possibly other places.”50
48 Richard E. Smith, Federal Bureau of Investigation Report, 12 November 1936, Federal 
Grand Jury Indictment o f William Knabb, Earl Knabb, Fred Jones, and Edward Stuart Hall, 
February 1937, and Brien McMahon to Herbert S. Phillips, 7 November 1936, Ibid.
49 Shofher, “Postscript to the Martin Tabert Case,” 168-170; W.G. Boyd to Dave Sholtz,
1 December 1936, Walter White to Attorney General, 8 December 1936, and A. Philip Randolph 
to Homer Cummings, 5 March 1937, Correspondence, Classified Subject Files, Department of 
Justice Central Files, General Records o f the Department of Justice, Record Group 60, National
Archives.
50 W.G. Boyd to William Green, 1 December 1936, Correspondence, Classified Subject 
Files, Department of Justice Central Files, General Records o f the Department o f Justice, Record 
Group 60, National Archives.
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According to workers interviewed by the NAACP, all o f Knabb’s four hundred black 
laborers were held in peonage. Workers labored from sunup to sundown and received from sixty 
cents to one dollar per day, although a few received $ 1.25. It was rumored in the community 
that, although Knabb kept accounts o f wages owed to workers, they received smaller amounts 
than they were due on payday and met with serious consequences if  they complained. Workers 
were forced to make all their purchases from the commissary, where prices were one hundred 
percent higher than at retail stores. Thus their low wages had only half the buying power they 
would have with area merchants. For example, white bacon or fatback, which cost 15 cents in 
Tampa, cost 25 cents in Knabb’s commissary and six pounds of flour, which cost 24 cents 
elsewhere, cost 40 cents if purchased from Knabb.51 One woodsrider, in fact, discontinued his 
employment with Knabb after two years because he did not approve of the way the camps were 
operated. He admitted that “the general feeling of people acquainted with the turpentine industry 
is that the Knabbs are unfair to their employees, and that they are hard to get along with, 
especially Will Knabb.”52 Knabb ran his various turpentine operations like small police states. 
He had all roads leading to the quarters watched, and two spies lived among the workers, even 
crawling under the shanties to discover dissatisfaction or escape plans. If workers attempted to 
leave, Knabb threatened their lives and had them beaten. Because labor was so scarce, it was 
Knabb’s policy to punish workers but not dismiss them. When one o f Knabb’s woodsriders
51 Richard E. Smith, Federal Bureau of Investigation Report, 12 November 1936, A. 
Philip Randolph to Homer Cummings, 5 March 1937 and Aron S Gilmartin to Homer T. 
Cummings, 24 November 1936, Ibid.; Shofher, “Postscript to the Martin Tabert Case,” 168.
52 Richard E. Smith, Federal Bureau of Investigation Report, 23 December 1936 
Correspondence, Classified Subject Files, Department of Justice Central Files, General Records 
of the Department o f Justice, Record Group 60, National Archives.
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dismissed a worker for calling him a  liar, an unhappy Knabb explained that it was “all right to 
whip them, but not to run them o ff.. .  ,”53
The Knabb case illustrates the difficulty prosecutors found in securing convictions in 
peonage cases. When questioned about the fear o f peonage charges, Knabb responded with 
sarcasm and arrogance that “there isn’t any such thing in Florida. I have been doing that for 19 
years and there hasn’t been any charge of peonage made against me, and nobody has tried to stop 
me.”54 Knabb’s powerful friends, including state senators, reportedly sought to interfere with the 
case. Will Knabb’s brother, T.J. Knabb, had been a state senator and turpentiner and had 
himself been the subject of an earlier peonage investigation. Another brother who was 
associated with Will in the turpentine business was the president o f the Bank of MacCIenny.55 
Knabb’s supporters made efforts to tamper with government witnesses, actions that Boyd 
explained were “very easy when negroes are offered money or either intimidated to forget what 
they know.”56 A local doctor who believed that the Knabbs were capable of practicing peonage, 
thought that they considered themselves “to be the cock o f the walk” in Baker County.57 Boyd 
wrote to the governor requesting help as well as to the U.S. Attorney General explaining the 
seriousness o f the case.58 “I do know,” he proclaimed, “that if the Federal Government fails in
53 C.B. Winstead, Federal Bureau o f Investigation Report, 10 March 1936, Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 Richard E. Smith, Federal Bureau of Investigation Report, 12 November 1936, Ibid.; 
Shofher, “Postscript to the Martin Tabert Case,” 168.
56 W.G. Boyd to J. Edgar Hoover, 28 December 1936, Correspondence, Classified 
Subject Files, Department of Justice Central Files, General Records o f the Department o f Justice, 
Record Group 60, National Archives.
57 Richard E. Smith, Federal Bureau of Investigation Report, 12 November 1936, Ibid.
58 W.G. Boyd to Homer S. Cummings, 1 December 1936 and W.G. Boyd to Dave Sholtz,
1 December 1936, Ibid.
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this attempt at this time to bring about justice what will take place hereafter in the turpentine and 
operation of same, slavery and servitude here in Florida. It will show that the Knabbs not only 
control the territory surrounding McCIenney (sic) but that they are bigger than the Federal 
Government as they have often made their braggs.”59
The trial’s outcome did nothing to disprove Boyd’s claim. Earl Knabb was dismissed 
from the case by the District Attorney, who decided the evidence did not involve him. Before the 
trial the defense attorney argued that the indictments reference to “a condition of peonage” was 
vague and uncertain to the degree that the defendants did not know the nature of the charges 
against them. Once the trial was under way, the defense argued that the peonage charge 
represented nothing more than a rivalry between turpentine operators and had grown from 
Boyd’s frustrated efforts to recruit labor from Knabb’s camp. The defense also intimated that the 
lawyers representing Boyd had demanded $16,000 in “hush money.” Even after listening to this 
implausible defense, the jury deliberated for less than thirty minutes before acquitting Knabb and 
his men of all federal peonage charges.60
Not all camp managers fit the mold of Will Knabb. At one Cross City, Florida operation 
a group of Federal Writers Project workers, which included Zora Neal Hurston, encountered a 
thirty-two year old widow serving as vice president and overseeing production. They described 
her as a “brunette, not bad to look at—by no means. Not the business girl, nor the athletic type, 
nor the purely feminine kind, but something of all this. Beyond that, she knows her business. 
Dons blue riding breeches, boots, striped shirt and bandanna neckerchief and goes right to work.
. . .  She seems more capable and intelligent than she knows herself.” She also appeared to be
59 W.G. Boyd to Homer S. Cummings, 1 December 1936, Ibid.
60 Motion to Quash and “Witness Arrested As Peijurer, 2nd Held For Contempt,” 
newsclipping, Ibid.
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decent, agreeable, and completely unaware that her business practiced peonage and violently 
mistreated its employees.61
Not only did forced labor practices continue into the 1930s and 1940s, so did the timber 
lease. The majority of producers, around seventy-three percent, leased the crops they worked. 
Leasing was most common in South Carolina, where 81.5 percent of the crops were not owned, 
and practiced the least in Alabama where producers leased only 65 percent of their crops. 
Evidence suggests that leased tracts became more available in the 1930s. Lumber companies 
dramatically reduced their output, in some areas by as much as two-thirds, and grew more willing 
to lease their forests to turpentine producers. Lease prices, however, do not appear to have 
declined substantially. Because producers commonly controlled their leases for four years, those 
who made agreements in early 1929 faced pre-Depression lease prices through 1932. But even 
for those turpentiners negotiating leases in 1933, the rate had dropped by only sixteen or 
seventeen percent from the late 1920s. Land owners had to charge at least enough to pay the 
property tax, keeping lease prices elevated.62
Provided the lessee used conservation methods, timber owners could make more money 
by leasing their timber before cutting it than leaving it to grow undisturbed. In most cases the 
mortality rate among turpentined trees was not noticeably different from that of round trees. And 
because improved methods reduced growth by only five percent over four years, landowners still 
profited by working their stands for turpentine despite the lost wood growth. But leasing timber 
continued to pose some risks. Beetle infestation could bring serious destruction to turpentined
61 Lauriault, “From Can’t to Can’t,” 326-327.
62 Donald Fraser Martin, Jr., “An Historical and Analytical Approach to the Current 
Problems of the American Gum Naval Stores Industry” (Ph.D. diss., University of North 
Carolina, 1942), 236; Elwood R. Maunder, Voices From The South: Recollections o f Four 
Foresters (Santa Cruz, CA: Forest History Society, 1977), 88; I. James Pikl, A History of Georgia 
Forestry (Athens: Bureau of Business and Economic Research, University of Georgia, 1966), 2; 
Campbell, et al., Naval Stores Industry. 27-89.
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timber no matter how carefully a  lessee worked it. Timber owners also ran the risk of serious 
tree damage if they leased to sloppy and unscrupulous producers. In the late 1930s and early 
1940s, one owner, for example, leased to an uncooperative and careless operator with disastrous 
results. The latter’s violation o f approved practices included cupping trees smaller than 9.S 
inches in diameter, failing to properly rake around the trees at the end o f the season, running 
chipped faces together without leaving any strip o f live wood to sustain the tree, and using a 
large hack which produced deep and broad cuts. Worst of all, he failed to remove all nails and 
aprons from the stands that he had finished working. Once at the mill, saws repeatedly hit nails 
embedded in the wood, causing considerable damage to the blades and seriously endangering the 
workers.63 Landowners worried that even the most informed producers would harm their timber 
with fire. In 1936, one consultant informed a landowner that even though the lessee was “a 
member of our Forestry Commission and favorable to protecting young timber from fire, it is just 
as natural for a turpentine man to want to bum woods where he is operating as it is for a canary 
to sing, and unless some restriction with reference to the use of fire is inserted [in the lease], 
great harm is liable to be done young timber and seedlings.”64 Turpentiners resented the 
stereotype, arguing that it was illogical for them to incinerate that from which they made their
63 Nails in turpentined trees had been a persistent problem for the mill. Between 1938 
and 1942 a saw struck nails a total of 1,713 times, causing a total o f $4,343.21 in damage. When 
confronted, the producer would only admit to chipping accidentally too deeply and claimed the 
nails were left from the turpentining of the same timber years before. The angry landowner 
considered halting turpentining but feared the producer would leave his equipment mounted on 
the trees in retaliation. With so much equipment in the forest and labor scarce, the timber owner 
had no way of removing it without lessee’s cooperation. Shirley, Working Trees for Naval 
Stores. S; Clifford S. Schopmeyer, “Gum Yield and Wood Volume on Single-Faced Naval Stores 
Trees,” reprinted from Southern Lumberman (IS December 19SS), Olustee Experiment Station 
Files, Georgia Agrirama, Tifton, GA; P.N. Howell to W.W. Barber, 14 March 1943, W.W. 
Barber to Newton Naval Stores Company, 23 February 1942, Newton to L.N. Dantzler Lumber 
Company, 24 April 1943 and 7 August 1942, and P. N. Howell to E J .  Ford, 3 April 1943, and 
W.W. Barber to P.N. Howell, 13 January 1941, Dantzler Lumber Company Papers.
64 P.N. Howell to L.N. Dantzler Lumber Company, 23 November 1936, Dantzler Lumber 
Company Papers.
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living, yet some o f them feared that their laborers would accidentally set blazes with camp
fires.65
Thus, many conditions long associated with turpentine production persisted, the timber 
lease and threat o f  fire among them. Producers continued to organize labor according to the task 
system and pay by piece work. The low-paid black men who dominated the labor force 
continued to work in rough terrain under the watchful eye of woodsriders who considered 
violence and brutality necessary measures for labor management. Workers lived in isolated 
camps where they remained indebted to the commissary. Driven from the open by U.S. Justice 
Department investigations, peonage continued as did efforts by producers to recruit or “steal” 
workers from one another.
Not all industry patterns continued, however. The number o f small producers rose 
rapidly beginning in the late 1930s, due in large part to the growth o f central distilleries. These 
large gum processors eliminated the need for capital to own and run a fire still and made it 
possible for owners of small timber tracts to enjoy a greater return by working their trees for 
turpentine themselves rather than leasing to large producers. Small owners thus began working 
their own pines, commonly employing their sons as laborers, and marketing the gum at the 
nearest central distillery. Men who possessed no land occasionally found timber owners willing 
to let them work land on shares for turpentine. Blacks made up a substantial portion of these 
new share producers. Unlike black turpentine wage earners, share workers labored 
independently and, because their production expenses were low, did not need to rely on advances 
as did agricultural share croppers. During the Depression and especially the Second World War, 
out of pocket expenses for small producers were low enough and naval stores prices sufficiently 
high to bring an attractive profit. Their rapid entry into naval stores production greatly altered
65 P.N. Howell to L.N. Dantzler Lumber Company, 23 November 1936 and Robert M. 
Newton to P.N. Howell, 15 October 1937, Ibid.
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the industry’s makeup. In 1934, the typical turpentiner worked nearly ten crops and employed 
thirty workers in gum production and just over two in distilling. Eighty percent o f  these 
producers had their own still which, on average, produced 435 units annually. But from the early 
1930s to the mid 1940s the number of turpentiners grew from six hundred to between four and 
five thousand, seventy percent working less than one crop of faces.66
In yet another change, the factorage houses entered a decline during the 1930s. In the 
early years o f the decade, around eighty percent o f naval stores were marketed through factors as 
they had since at least the early nineteenth century. One southeastern Georgia producer’s factor, 
for example, loaned him operating capital, marketed his product, and sold him supplies and 
equipment. In another instance o f the factors’ power over operators, in the early 1940s one 
Jacksonville factor strongly recommended that a producer not invest in a new centrifugal pump 
for his still, directing him instead to have the Glidden Company central distillery refine it. This 
factor also reminded its clients o f  the importance of working within the guidelines of the NSCP 
to remain eligible for benefit payments. Consolidated Naval Stores Company remained the 
largest factor in the United States with a tangible net worth, in 1935, of eight million dollars, or 
seventy-five percent of all the other ten houses combined.67
66 Martin, “An Historical and Analytical Approach,” 223, 231-232; General Counsel and 
Assistant to the President to John Slusser, 12 April 1966 and J. Lundie Smith, “A Few Words of 
Appreciation,” 20 April 1966, American Turpentine-Farmers Association Papers, Georgia 
Agrirama, Tifton GA; Herbert L. Kayton, interview by Roy White, 7 October 1959, Forest 
History Society; Richard C. Davis, ed. Encyclopedia o f American Forest and Conservation 
History (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1983), s.v. “naval stores;” Brown, Forest 
Products. 86; I.F. Eldgredge, interview by Roy R. White, 9 July 1959, Forest History Society, 
Durham, NC; Reed, interview.
67 Campbell, et al., Naval Stores Industry. 26, 51; Hulda Summerall Baker, “Summerall 
Turpentine Still,” Museum o f Coastal History, Coastal Georgia Historical Society, St. Simons 
Island, GA, 11-13; Turpentine and Rosin Factors, Inc. to A.D. Popped, 31 January 1940, 
Turpentine and Rosin Factors, Inc. to Our Customers, 1 March 1940 and March 26, 1940, 
Popped Papers; Antwerp Naval Stores Company, et al. to W.F. Holtsman, 20 October 1933 and 
Commercial Reports of Naval Stores Factors, 20 October 1933, Austin Cary Memorial Forestry 
Collection, Department o f Special Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries, University of 
Florida; Eldredge, The 4 Forests. 20.
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By the late 1930s, however, growing dissatisfaction with the factorage system developed 
among producers. They complained that factors and dealers did not initiate any consumer 
marketing strategy, but instead just took orders for what was available instead. Because gum 
turpentine producers had competition from wood naval stores, producers demanded more 
aggressive efforts to retain their market share. They also alleged that factors encouraged over­
production because they benefited from commissions on the extra sales, regardless o f the 
resulting low naval stores prices, and profited from the investment in additional loans and 
equipment sales. Producers especially resented the recent vertical integration of factorage houses 
like Consolidated, which controlled not only the marketing of products and the supplying of 
investment capital, but also manufactured the equipment, marketed the groceries needed to stock 
the commissaries, and even competed with producers by running their own operations. Another 
complaint was that factors were expensive at a time when economic efficiency mattered more 
than ever. The factor charged two and a half percent commission for each transaction, with eight 
percent interest for all capital advances. Harley Langdale, Jr., the Judge’s son, likened factors to 
loan sharks. Some producers even began questioning the factors’ honesty, suspecting that they 
conspired with bankers and exporters to manipulate prices for their own profit. Although 
producers resented the paternalistic relationship between themselves and their factors, most 
considered them necessary evils. They had, after all, helped many operators begin their 
businesses at a time when they had nothing at all. Judge Langdale, who himself had experienced 
great difficulty working his way out from under his factor, saw them as a necessary, stabilizing 
force in the industry.68
68 Campbell, et al., Naval Stores Industry. 90-91. The factor, it must be admitted, had to 
borrow much o f  his capital, including the funds he lent to producers, from local banks and 
especially large northern financiers. Harley Langdale, Jr, interview, 7-9; Downing Musgrove, 
(paper presented at the Naval Stores Breakfast, 31 October 1961, Washington, DC), American 
Turpentine-Farmers Association Papers, 2-4; Jane Twitty Shelton, Pines and Pioneers: A History 
of Lowndes County. Georgia. 1825-1900. (Atlanta: Cherokee Publishing Company, 1976), 185.
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With the government’s entrance into market regulation and the rise o f centralized 
distilleries, however, producers found it somewhat easier to loosening ties to their factors. The 
factor was now no longer the principal voice in an operator’s production practices. Under the 
Naval Stores Conservation Program, turpentiners needed to satisfy the Forest Service’s requests 
just as much as their factor’s, although both parties were usually in agreement on 
recommendations. In the American Turpentine-Farmers Association producers also had a new, 
powerful voice with considerable political clout and capable o f influencing national policy. But 
the shift from processing gum in fire stills to centralized distilleries undermined factors the most. 
Producers could now sell their gum directly to the central distillery and not wait for the factor to 
find a buyer or pay a handling fee. Moreover, in reducing the operating expenses by eliminating 
the need for each producer to run his own still, the central facilities decreased producers’ reliance 
on factors. The entry of new types o f producers spurred by the central distilleries also weakened 
the factors’ position. The many new small operators harvested gum largely with their own labor 
and had very low production costs that did not require the factor’s financial services. Smaller 
producers were usually able to secure loans from banks, relieving themselves of any need for a 
factor. Not only was the region’s banking industry better developed by the 1940s than at any 
other time, but small producers tended to own their own timber, which banks accepted as 
collateral. They also required only small loans, just enough to cover the cost o f the hardware 
needed to place their trees in production.69
Surprisingly, factors failed to lead the industry’s construction of central distilleries. The 
uncertain business climate o f  the 1930s caused their hesitation to invest in these expensive and 
technologically revolutionary facilities. By the time very large producers and consumers
69 Kayton, interview, 4-5; Eldredge, interview, 9-10; A.R. Shirley, “Gum Naval Stores 
Long Linked With Industrial Development” Valdosta. Georgia Daily Times. 18 November, 1959.
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constructed enough o f  these plants to prove their profitability, the region was well on its way 
toward containing as many facilities as its gum producers could keep in business. Desperate to 
have part o f the market share, by the early 1940s such companies as Turpentine and Rosin 
Factors o f Jacksonville and the giant Consolidated Naval Stores Company, bought interest in 
existing stills, but they were too late to gain any control in the processing.70 Because factors 
failed to adapt to changes in gum naval stores processing and marketing, their businesses rapidly 
declined and, by the second half of the 1940s, played a minor role in the business.
Although the great majority o f producers gladly accepted the weakened role o f factors, 
associated with government intervention in production and development o f central distilleries, 
not all makers welcomed the changes. In 1939, the AT-FA faced a temporary challenge from a 
rival organization frustrated with industry trends. Organized in Vidalia, Georgia, the Gum 
Turpentine Farmers Cooperative Association believed that the AT-FA had failed to address 
circumstances that reduced the operators’ control of the industry. The Cooperative opposed what 
its organizers charged were exploitativly high interest rates and commission charges by factors as 
well as the trend toward central distillation, which they argued lessened the operators’ control of 
the industry by reducing them to the status of mere gum producers, not manufacturers o f spirits 
and rosin. Organizers were also dissatisfied with what they considered the AT-FA’s failure to 
promote cooperative processing and marketing strategies. The Gum Turpentine Farmers 
Cooperative Association’s efforts and organization were short-lived, however. Most producers 
were happy to rid themselves of the expensive and troublesome task of distilling their gum and 
many could already foresee decline in the factors’ industry position, making any new program to 
curb their power unnecessary. Moreover, the government already administered satisfactory 
marketing and production regulation programs71
70 Martin, “Historical and Analytical Approach,” 226-227,273.
71 Ibid., 283.
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Whereas such developments as an increase in small producers and decline of the 
factorage houses’ represented significant changes during the 1930s, the Second World War set in 
motion circumstances that transformed the entire business. When it began in Europe in 1939, the 
war created uncertainty in the gum naval stores market. Although many European buyers 
clamored for the products, interruption in shipping traffic made export difficult (figs. 13.3 and 
13.4). In the winter o f 1940, for example, the Continental Turpentine and Rosin Corporation of 
Laurel, Mississippi, had difficulty receiving British Navicerts, commodity passports required to 
accompany goods aboard neutral ships. Because o f the resulting shipping delays, the company’s 
barrels o f rosin sat at port, drawing charges for storage and insurance. When shipments were 
finally possible, the company had to pay astonishingly high freight charges.72
With American entry into the conflict, wartime demand for rosin industry transformed 
supplies o f that product from surplus to shortage, and the Naval Stores Conservation Program, 
whose initial mission had been to reduce production, shifted to encourage naval stores 
manufacture for the war effort73 Such companies as Filtered Rosin Products attempted to recruit 
new producers with a booklet explaining the basics of gum naval stores production and by 
offering assistance to anyone desiring to enter the business. The company assured operators that 
“crude gum production for turpentine and rosin is a vital necessity for victory. Produce more of
72 Continental Turpentine Company and Rosin Corporation, Incorporated to Cordell 
Hull, 13 February 1940, William M. Colmer Papers, Archives and Manuscripts Division,
McCain Library and Archives, University o f  Southern Mississippi; For figures related to the 
volume o f naval stores exports by country and the value o f United States naval stores exports see 
Appendix A.
73 Arthur G. Steedley, “‘Doctors, Lawyers, Teachers, Merchants, and Widows, Call to 
Ask Advice.,” in Historical Background o f  the Naval Stores Conservation Program. Olustee 
Experiment Station Files, Georgia Agrirama, Tifton, GA, 12; Thomas, McCranie’s Turpentine 
Still. 8.
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it and buy victory bonds with your larger income.”74 The Newton Company circulated a similar 
publication to help producers realize the maximum yield from their faces.73 NSCP foresters, for 
their part, put on “Naval Stores for Victory Shows” to encourage production expansion. With a 
few musicians, a truck foil o f  war equipment, and one or two wounded servicemen, they 
preached the message that “no ship can sail, no plane can fly, and no soldier can eat or fight 
without naval stores.”76 By 1942, the U.S. Department of Agriculture estimated that o f  the 
approximately thirty million acres o f pine in the naval stores region, sixty percent was in 
production and 400,000 people depended, at least partially, on the products manufacture for a 
living. But despite these large numbers, turpentine and rosin demand exceeded production 
throughout the war. With a goal o f 350,000 units, the industry could only supply 250,000.77
An increased demand for lumber and puipwood relative to naval stores created part of 
the difficulty. From 1939 to 1942 lumber production in Georgia nearly doubled, from 1.09 
billion board feet to 2.07 billion board feet. Pulp and paper industries were attracted to the 
South’s rapidly growing second-growth forest, cheap labor, and good transportation systems. By 
1939, forty-seven paper mills operated in the South, representing an investment o f two hundred
74 M.E. Henegar, Gum Naval Stores Timber Land Use: Information and Suggestions 
(Brunswick, GA: Filtered Rosin Products, Inc.), Olustee Experiment Station Files, Georgia 
Agrirama, Tifton, GA, 6.
75 M.E. Henegar, Slash and Loneleaf Pine Growers Handbook: Practical Information and 
Suggestions for Growing. Protecting, and Realizing Maximum Utilization (Lake City, FL: The 
Newton Company, Incorporated), Olustee Experiment Station Files, Georgia Agrirama, Tifton, 
GA.
76 E.O. Powers, ‘“ With Pearl Harbor Our World, of Course, Turned Upside Down,”’ in 
Historical Background o f the Naval Stores Conservation Program. Olustee Experiment Station 
Files, Georgia Agrirama, Tifton, GA, 8.
77 Production of Naval Stores (Washington, DC: United States Department o f 
Agriculture, 1942), 8; Albert G. Snow, Jr., “Research on the Improvement o f Turpentine 
Practices,” Economic Botany 3 (October-December, 1949): 380; Pikl, A History o f Georgia 
Forestry. 39.
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million dollars. With a  growing market for smaller timber, landowners were more willing to sell 
their trees untapped than risk part of its value to the sometimes unreliable work of turpentiners. 
Indeed, even if producers used the most conservative techniques, owners could still lose part o f 
their timber is value.78
An acute labor shortage, however, explains most o f  the difficulty in meeting wartime 
demands for naval stores. With workers willing to chip and dip already scarce, the labor 
shortage further intensified once the United States government requested that operators increase 
production by fifty percent for the war effort. In November 1941, Harley Langdale insisted to 
Washington officials that operators must greatly increase wages in order to retain their present 
workers and attract others who had already left for better-paying jobs. He explained that where 
fanners could rely on machinery to increase production, gum turpentine producers relied 
completely on man power.79 The following year a producer lamented that he was making all he 
could, but because o f the labor shortage his production was less than fifty percent of its potential. 
He complained that the army was drafting his turpentine workers, but worse, a “large part o f our 
turpentine labor, both white and black are on W.P.A., and so far, my efforts to get them back in 
to the turpentine business has been a failure.”80
78 Production o f Naval Stores. 8; Snow, “Research on the Improvement of Turpentine 
Practices,” 380; Pikl, A History of Georgia Forestry. 39, 41; Thomas D. Clark, The Greening of 
the South: The Recovery o f Land and Forest (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 
1984), 115-116; George B. Tindall, The Emergence o f the New South. 1913-1945 (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1967), 467; Albert G. Snow, “Turpentining and Poles,” reprint 
from Southern Lumberman (15 December 1948), Olustee Experiment Station Files, Olustee 
Experiment Station Files, Georgia Agrirama, Tifton, GA, 1.
79 Harley Langdale, Memorandum Regarding Gum Naval Stores, 10 November 1941, 
Colmer Papers.
80 Cliff Dees to Theodore G. Bilbo, 26 February 1942, The Papers o f Theodore Bilbo, 
Archives and Manuscript Department, McCain Library and Archives, University of Southern 
Mississippi.
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Problems securing adequate labor persisted throughout the war. The federal 
government’s wartime Office o f Price Administration set prices o f naval stores so low that 
producers were reportedly unable to raise wages to attractive levels without incurring a loss. Nor 
could the industry successfully compete for workers with other forest product industries in the 
naval stores belt or with the war industries that lured rural workers to the cities. Under the wage 
rates set by the War Labor Board, naval stores workers earned around seventy-five percent of the 
minimum standard of $28.60 per week. Despite the federal government’s request for greater 
gum naval stores production, its manufacture continued to drop through the war years because of 
inadequate labor supplies. To remedy the crisis, turpentine producers recommended that the 
government raise the price of naval stores by $ 18 per unit, or $ 1.33 1/3 per one hundred pounds 
of rosin. Eight dollars of the SI 8-increase would be applied to chippers’ wages, S2.80 to 
dipping, and $7.20 to other labor. Opponents o f raising the price ceiling admitted that wages in 
gum naval stores production were substandard and that the basic obstacle to production increases 
was a manpower shortage. But they doubted a price adjustment would remedy the situation since 
there was no guarantee that producers would use the increased returns to raise wages. No 
minimum wage standard existed in the business to compel them to do so. And even if wages did 
rise, they still might not attract a significant number of additional workers. Moreover, the severe 
shortage o f gum rosin, they alleged, was not solely the result o f a labor shortage, but partially 
caused by speculative withholding of stocks in anticipation of profits once the price increase was 
granted. Despite such warnings, in early May 194S, the War Food Administration recommended 
that the maximum price for base-grade gum be increased by at least ninety-five cents per one 
hundred pounds. At this time the price ceiling was already 254 percent over that o f the 1939- 
1940 season and even 143 percent above that o f the previous season."
81 The Labor Board set wages at 550 per hour plus time and a half for over-time. Forty 
hours at 550 equaled $22 plus eight hours at 82.50 equaled $6.60 or $28.60 per week. Jay Ward 
to Theodore G. Bilbo, 9 May 1945, Claude Pepper to Chester Bowles, 11 May 1945, Robert M.
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As severe as the labor scarcity was, it could have been much worse. Changes in die 
industry had already eliminated the requirement for two historically important classes of 
laborers, coopers and distillers. The need for coopers gradually declined as the manner in which 
turpentine and rosin were packaged changed. By 1930, most producers purchased factory-made, 
tightly-constructed spirit barrels, which were made o f oak. Coopers still had to coat the barrels’ 
inside with glue to properly seal them. Glue was purchased in a brick form, melted on a small 
stove, and, once liquefied, poured into the bung hole. The cooper then rolled the barrel until the 
inside became evenly coated. Distillery workers poured spirits in only after the glue dried. At 
some operations coopers continued to construct wooden rosin barrels from machine-cut staves. 
Wooden barrels become prohibitably expensive. Moreover, the metal barrels did not possess 
several problems associated with wooden ones. Unless the staves were well-seasoned, wooden 
barrels shrank as they dried and allowed the rosin to leak. Wood barrels used to hold the NSCP 
loan stock could not endure more than two years in storage before decay required rebarreling at 
considerable expense. Wide weight variation in wood barrels made it difficult to determine 
prices and central distilleries had a harder time sampling resin from wooden barrels. During the 
1930s producers, therefore, began to use metal rosin barrels, which arrived either ready-made or 
in two sections that had to be crimped together. More and more smaller producers shipped rosin 
in metal drums to larger processing plants, where it was pumped in its liquid form into insulated 
tank cars and delivered hot to the consumer. By 1941, all 130,503 barrels of rosin in storage 
were held in metal barrels. A small percentage of naval stores was packed in four to six ply 
paper bags weighing one hundred pounds. Few producers employed coopers by the Second
Newton to Office of Price Administration, 2 May 194S, and William H. Davis, 28 May 1945, 
Bilbo Papers.
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World War. As with coopers, the number o f distillers declined as producers ended their use of 
old fire stills and began shipping resin to central distilleries.*2
Despite the decreased need for coopers and distillers, turpentiners still lacked a sufficient 
work force; they reacted to the labor crisis in several ways, among them the continuation o f  
peonage. In 1942, the FBI received a letter from one young man’s desperate mother and aunt 
requesting help in rescuing him from peonage. The two women wanted “to see if there is enny 
wat(y) o f getting you to get my boy out o f  the Hills o f MacHenry - Miss Sippie. he have been 
there Six mears this coming September the First and I just heare from him now and then, he is 
on a tearptine Farm ant, that is a out Law Place and I am asking you for help if you Please. I 
want to see my Dear sun if there is enny possible chance enny more in life.”*3 The Justice 
Department, at J. Edgar Hoover’s recommendation, decided not to investigate the case. In yet 
another incident in the 1940s, a family of dippers was recruited by another producer who sent 
them bus tickets. Their employer, however, stopped them on their way to town with their
82 Wood naval stores plants shipped most of their product intended for the domestic 
market in 6,000- to 10,000-gallon-sized railroad tank cars. For dealers and export trade they 
barreled it in fifty to fifty-five gallon casks. Because ninety-two percent o f  gum turpentine was 
sold through retail paint, hardware, and drug stores, most was packaged in four ounce to five- 
gallon-sized containers. For the small number o f distillers that remained, the old practice o f 
regulating the stills through sound, the hazard o f explosions, and the pattern o f training through 
apprenticeship continued. As one Florida Writers Project participant discovered, “the still 
workers are probably the elite o f a turpentine personnel.” The technique had gone virtually 
unchanged for a century, retaining its primitive and dangerous nature. Maguire, interview by 
author; Hurston, “Turpentine Camp-Cross City, 12-14; Robert S. Blount, Spirits of Turpentine: 
A History o f Florida Naval Stores. 1528-1950 (Tallahassee: Florida Agricultural Museum, 1993), 
43-45; Carroll B. Butler. Treasures of the Longleaf Pines. Naval Stores (Shalimar. FL: Tarkei 
Publishing, 1998), 114; Florida Writers’ Project, “The Story of Naval Stores . . . , ” Florida 
Highways 11 (July 1943): 31; Campbell, et al., Naval Stores Industry. 32-34; Shirley, Working 
Trees for Naval Stores. 35-36; Joseph B. Hosmer, Economic Aspects o f the Naval Stores 
Industry (Atlanta: Georgia School of Technology, 1948), 23; Martin, “Historical and Analytical 
Approach,” 32; Duncan, “Report on Trip to Cross City,” 4.
83 James Houser, 7 July 1942, Correspondence, Classified Subject Files, Department of 
Justice Central Files, General Records o f the Department of Justice, Record Group 60, National
Archives.
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belongings and forced diem to return. After the father went to the new employer by himself his 
former one, with whom his family stayed, went to retrieve him only to be punched and held at 
gun point until the sheriff arrived. The three-hundred pound sheriff shook the producer until he 
agreed to let the family move to Florida. Three days later a truck arrived to move the family, and 
the driver delivered a check to pay off their account. After an FBI investigation the producer 
narrowly escaped peonage prosecution because of the leniency of a sympathetic Superior Court 
judge in Tifton, Georgia.84 At the same time a convention of Georgia Baptists concluded that 
“peonage or debt slavery has by no means disappeared from our land. There are more white 
people involved in this diabolical practice than there were slaveholders. There are more Negroes 
held by these debt slavers than were actually owned was slaves before the war Between the 
States. The method is the only thing which has changed.”85 Also, a Florida Writers Project 
participant found that turpentine workers “are the lowest strata of legally free humans” and a 
social worker remarked that “a negro who is foolish enough to go to work in a turpentine camp is 
simply signing away his birthright.”86
Producers as well responded to their labor shortage in more innovative ways than 
peonage. The state o f Georgia paroled convicts to provide workers in rural areas. The program 
was begun in the spirit o f  patriotism on the argument that crop products were more essential to 
victory than road construction by chain gangs. The employers were to see to the ex-convicts’ 
upkeep and to pay them the current rate for rural help, but if the parolee left the camp, he was to 
be arrested and returned to prison to complete his sentence. Whereas many parolees went to
84 John Edgar Hoover to Wendell Berge, 1 August 1942 and Wendell Berge to Director, 
Federal Bureau o f Investigation, 12 August 1942, Ibid.; William P. Lagdale, interview, 5-6.
85 Stetson Kennedy, Southern Exposure (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, 
Inc., 1946), 48.
86 Duncan, “Report on Trip to Cross City,” 6. Kennedy, Palmetto Country. 261.
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farms, some found themselves in turpentine camps. In one instance a member o f  the governor’s 
staff, who operated a large turpentine operation in Patten, Georgia, employed a dozen parolees, 
both white and black. They all lived together in a bam. At least one such worker objected to the 
turpentine work and complained that he was not adequately compensated. Other operators 
employed released Florida convicts. In the 1940s, Florida apparently freed prisoners, even 
murders, if they promised not to return to the state. Many took jobs at Georgia turpentine 
operations.87
German prisoners o f war who worked at many jobs in the South—in agriculture, 
pulpwood, and at army bases—also labored in the naval stores industry. Foresters helped to train 
twenty-two thousand prisoners of war, many of them captured from Rommel’s army, for 
harvesting turpentine and cutting pulpwood at Blountsville, Florida. Turpentiners apparently so 
valued and jealously guarded the use of these German workers that, upon repatriation following 
the war, they sought assurance that their prison workers would not be withdrawn at a rate faster 
than in other businesses.88
The naval stores producers’ effort to hold onto their prisoner laborers as long as possible 
resulted from the challenging situation that the Second World War presented them; at the same 
time the war drove product demand to dizzying heights, it sapped the supply o f low-cost workers 
on whose shoulders the labor-intensive business rested. Producers’ concern therefore shifted 
from managing surplus quantities of turpentine and rosin to securing adequate timber supplies
87 J. Carlton Gatner, Federal Bureau o f Investigation Report, 7 January 1943, 
Correspondence, Classified Subject Files, Department of Justice Central Files, General Records 
of the Department of Justice, Record Group 60, National Archives; Maguire, interview, St. 
Augustine Historical Society; William P. Langdale, interview, 5; Blount, Spirits o f  Turpentine.
29.
88 Jim A. McArther, ‘“ During the War, I Trained 22,000 German Prisoners-of-War to 
Work Naval Stores and Cut Pulpwood,”’ in Historical Background of the Naval Stores 
Conservation Program. Olustee Experiment Station Files, Georgia Agrirama, Tifton, GA, 6; John 
W. Snyder to William Colmer, 29 May 1946, Colmer Papers.
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and workers to meet government requirements for increased supplies. But the military, federal 
work programs, and war-time industries, all o f which paid higher wages than work in turpentine, 
siphoned off the laborers needed to harvest gum. Operators responded through continued efforts 
to hold workers in peonage and even by resorting to innovative forms o f  convict labor.
With the war’s end, the gum naval stores industry entered a rapid decline. As long as the 
war continued, naval stores demand exceeded supply and the industry persisted despite its 
shortcomings. Because nothing about the gum naval stores industry changed over the course of 
the conflict, as forest researcher Keith W. Dorman observed, the “outlook for the future is not 
bright for the competitive position of gum naval stores . . .  than it was before the war.”89 Gum 
producers continued to suffer from labor shortages. The hard, low-paying work required laborers 
to toil in the summer heat while fighting bugs and snakes and attracted few black southerners 
who, with the rise of small manufacturing facilities in local communities, could now find better- 
paying and less physically-demanding jobs. By the early 1960s, the expansion of minimum-wage 
laws to cover agricultural workers, including those in naval stores production, forced operators to 
abandon the piece work system for hourly wages.90 In 1949, forest researcher Albert Snow, with 
the Southeastern Forest Experiment Station, explained that “the naval stores industry must 
compete with newer industries for manpower, and its products must be marketed in competition 
with those of modem chemical industries.”91
89 Dorman, “High-Yielding Turpentine Orchards,” 295.
90 “Firm Provides Constant Cash,” Valdosta. Georgia Daily Times. 26 June 1977; Davis, 
Encyclopedia of American Forest and Conservation History. 477; E.W. Carswell, “‘Naval 
Stores’ Industry Came to Northwest Florida in 1883,” Pensacola Florida News-Joumal File, 
Pensacola Historical Resource Center, Pensacola, FL.
91 Snow, “Research on the Improvement of Turpentine Practices,” 375.
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Just as alternative job opportunities began attracting workers away from the gum naval 
stores industry, widespread peonage diminished, although the practice by no means ended.92 
First, two Supreme Court rulings in the first half of the 1940s found both Georgia’s and Florida’s 
labor laws, which continued to support peonage despite previous court decisions against similar 
statutes, unconstitutional, thus removing the legal underpinnings for the practice in those states. 
Second, as roads improved and cars became more accessible, community grocery stores began to 
attract the business o f turpentine workers, undermining the role o f the commissary, the linchpin 
of worker indebtedness.93 In 1943, one Florida observer found that “low-price cash and chain 
stores in nearby towns, improved transportation facilities and the fact that with few exceptions 
present-day camps are no longer isolated communities, have reduced commissary stocks to staple 
groceries, work clothes, tobacco, and soft drinks.”94 In some cases, however, producers relied on 
country stores in place o f the commissary, opening accounts in the worker’s names, paying their 
bills, and then deducting the balance from their monthly pay. Finally, the increasing availability 
of cars made escape easier and the telephone put workers in better contact with legal assistance.93
The workers who continued in the business had grown up in it, had little or no education, 
and knew only that trade. They had no way o f  leaving the industry, no one to intercede for them,
92 An investigation o f peonage begun by the Workers Defense League in the second half 
of the 1940s uncovered potential forced-labor practices in turpentine camps. The League found 
that “more forms of forced labor are more widely practiced in Florida than in any other state.” 
And as late as 1949 the Workers Defense League found fourteen turpentine camps in Alachua 
County, Florida alone where peonage was openly practiced. Brown, Forest Products. 186;
Duncan, “Report on Trip to Cross City,” 5-7; Kennedy, Southern Exposure. 49; Shofner, “Forced 
Labor in the Florida Forests,” 24; Shofner, “Postscript to the Martin Tabert Case,” 172.
93 Daniel, Shadow o f Slavery. 185; William Cohen “Negro Involuntary Servitude in the 
South, 1865-1940: A Preliminary Analysis,” The Journal o f  Southern History 42 (February 
1976): 52; Shofner, “Forced Labor in the Florida Forests,” 24-25; Blount, Spirits o f Turpentine.
30.
94 Kennedy, Palmetto Country. 259.
95 Wright, “Turpentining,” 115.
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and had no choice but to accept whatever they were given.96 Wages in the naval stores industry 
remained so low that, as John W. Langdale, the judge’s son, explained “they could make as much 
on welfare as they could working the pine trees to get gum.”97 But as this work force aged, no 
one replaced them. In 1959, one retired forester explained that “today blacks don’t  want to work 
in turpentine. They can go to a little town and work at a  manufacturing plant and make more 
money with shorter hours.”98 Many o f the few producers who continued worked on a very small 
scale, laboring with their families to harvest gum. In some cases, white women replaced black 
men in the forest. On one occasion an NSCP inspector came across a producer and his wife 
preparing trees for installing cups. The wife held a broad ax while her husband hit it with a 
maul. The same inspector also discovered a widow, whose livelihood depended on naval stores 
using a hack after her chipper left Such cases were reportedly not uncommon.99
Resumption of foreign naval stores production after the Second World War also hurt the 
American gum naval stores industry by decreasing export demands. Before the war, nearly half 
of all U.S.-produced rosin and close to forty percent o f turpentine was exported. In the mid 
1930s, for example, the U.S. made 57 percent of the world’s naval stores and France, ranking 
second, manufactured 22 percent (fig. 13.5). Spain, Russia, and Portugal followed with 8.57 
percent, 4.29 percent, and 3 percent respectively. Greece, Mexico, and India contributed small 
quantities to the world market. And as European gum naval stores production rose in the 1940s
96 Reed, interview; Kayton, interview, 5; Dwight Wilson, interview, Oral History 
Collection, Research Library, St. Augustine Historical Society, S t Augustine, FL; Blount, Spirits 
of Turpentine. 30.
97 “Langdale Company Sells Gum Process Machinery,” Valdosta. Georgia Daily Times.
27 August 1975.
98 Kayton, interview, 5.
99 Ibid.; Meldrin, interview; McArther, “‘During the War, I Trained 22,000 German 
Prisoners-of-War,” 7.
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with the stabilization of the European economies, American exports fell. By the late 1940s, less 
than a quarter o f  rosin production was sold overseas. U.S. production continued to outpace 
exports, however, causing price declines. In 1947, the U.S. exported 95,000 barrels o f  turpentine 
and 570,000 drums of rosin. But in 1948,453,000 barrels of turpentine and 975,000 drums of 
rosin were available to fill foreign orders. The loan program’s stocks began to rise as only a 
small portion o f gum naval stores left the country.100
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Figure 13.5. World Gum Turpentine Production, 1935
Donald Fraser Martin, Jr., “An Historical and Analytical Approach to the Current Problems of 
the American Gum Naval Stores Industry” (Ph.D. diss., University o f North Carolina, 1942), 
324.
Over the 1930s and 1940s, the gum naval stores industry’s losses were the wood naval 
stores industry’s gains (figs. 13.6 and 13.7). By the late 1930s, the American gum naval stores
100 Campbell, et al., Naval Stores Industry. 19, 36-37,92-93; Martin, “Historical and 
Analytical Approach,” 193, 196-197; Harley Langdale and E.E. Holdman to Office o f 
International Trade, United States Department of Commerce, 6 May 1948 and Harley Langdale 
to Secretary o f Agriculture, 13 October 1947 [38], Colmer Papers.
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industry was responsible for just 53.67 percent o f world naval stores production, down from 80 
percent ten years earlier (fig. 13.8). The greatest part o f the decline was the result o f increases in
Production o f Turpentine by State 
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Figure 13.6. Production o f Turpentine by State, Selected Years 1931-1944 
* Texas figures for 1931, 1934, and 1938-1944 are included in Louisiana figures.
Joseph B. Hosmer, Economic Aspects o f the Naval Stores Industry (Atlanta: Georgia School of 
Technology, State Engineering Experiment Station, 1948), 8; For figures related to chart see 
Appendix B.
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Figure 13.7. Production o f Rosin by State, Selected Years 1931-1944 
* Texas figures for 1931, 1934, and 1938-1944 are included in Louisiana figures.
Joseph B. Hosmer, Economic Aspects o f the Naval Stores Industry (Atlanta: Georgia School of 
Technology, State Engineering Experiment Station, 1948), 9.
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Figure 13.8. Turpentine Production by Method, 1930-1950
Naval Stores Statistics. 1900-1954 (Washington, DC: United States Department o f Agriculture, 
1956), 8.
American wood naval stores production. In 1933, Phoenix Naval Stores Company acquired and 
reopened the Yaryan wood naval stores plant at Gulfport which Hercules had earlier shut down 
with the completion o f  its Hattiesburg facility. Three years later the Crosby Naval Stores plant 
began operations in Picayune, Mississippi, and the Alabama Naval Stores Company started 
production in Mobile. In 1938, the Chemical Products Company plant opened at Laurel, 
Mississippi. Newport Company, based in Pensacola, remained active during the period and, in 
1939, opened a new plant. By the late 1940s, naval stores plants went up in western Louisiana.
A Crosby plant opened in DeRidder in 1946 and, one year later, a Newport plant started 
operations in Oakdale. By the end of the 1940s, the South contained thirteen wood naval stores 
plants: one in Georgia, one in Florida, three in Alabama, six in Mississippi, and two in Louisiana.
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One Mississippi plant held die distinction as the largest in the world. Although, in 1940, gum 
naval stores operators manufactured the majority of products, 60.7 percent o f U.S. turpentine and 
53.6 percent of rosin, the domestic wood naval stores output that year was the largest on record 
while gum naval stores production had shrunk to one o f its lowest levels of production in half a 
century. With the rise in demand during the Second World War, wood naval stores increased its 
share of the world market. As their customer base continued to expand, by 1945, wood naval 
stores exceeded gum naval stores in production. Over the 1950s gum naval stores manufacture 
declined by nearly sixty-five percent (figs. 13.9 and 13.10). In 1950, gum naval stores accounted 
for forty percent of the total production o f naval stores products. By 1960, it reached close to 
twenty percent, around sixteen percent in 1965, and, in 1970, less than half of a percent.101 One 
industry observer remarked that, despite all of the gum naval stores industry’s government 
support, “the steam solvent industry due to its efficient operation, competes with the gum 
industry and produces a better product at less cost, and is on a sounder financial and industrial 
basis.”102
But just as gum naval stores production declined and wood naval stores manufacturing 
experienced impressive growth, the latter’s consumption o f  huge quantities of stumps threatened 
to exhaust the supply, just as gum turpentine had nearly consumed the living pine stands
101 R.E. Price, “Naval Stores in Southwest Louisiana,” The McNeese Review 2 (Spring 
1949): 10-11; Janice Croft, “A Twin Success Story: Pensacola and Newport,” Pensacola 
Historical Resources Center, Pensacola, Florida, 9; Charlotte Wittwer, “Stumpwood to Resins— 
Oldest Pensacola Industry,” Pensacola. Florida News-Joumal File, Pensacola Historical 
Resources Center, Pensacola, Florida; Naval Stores Statistics. 1900-1954 (Washington, DC: 
United States Department of Agriculture, 1956), 2-3; Martin, “An Historical and Analytical 
Approach,” 21, 182, 186-188; “Naval Stores History We Never Knew ’Til Now,” Olustee 
Experiment Station Files, Georgia Agrirama, Tifton, GA, 4; Shirley, “Gum Naval Stores;”
“Waste Stumps from Dixie Cut-Over Land Become Hundreds of Products at Plant,” Pensacola. 
Florida News-Joumal. 2 October 1949; Peter Koch, Utilization o f the Southern Pines 
(Washington, DC: United States Department of Agriculture, 1972), 1477; Naval Stores Statistics. 
5.
102 “Naval Stores History We Never Knew ’Til Now,” 5.
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generations earlier. In total, the thirteen wood naval stores plants had a capacity of nearly four 
thousand tons of stumps per day, requiring two hundred boxcars or five hundred trucks full to
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Figure 13.9. Turpentine Production by Method, 1950-1974 
* 1950-1954 figures do not include destructively distilled turpentine.
Naval Stores Statistics. 1900-1954 (Washington, DC: United States Department of Agriculture, 
1956), 8; Naval Stores: A Summary of Annual and Monthly Statistics. 1955-74 (Washington, 
DC: United States Department o f  Agriculture, 1977), 5.
keep them supplied.103 Although the southern pine belt contained hundreds o f thousands o f acres 
of cut over land from which stumps were available, the growth in demand outpaced the 
replacement o f  the supply, especially since not all pine stumps made suitable processing 
material. Because they contained most o f the heartwood, the stumps from old-growth longleaf
103 During the 1930s, wood stump usage at the Pensacola Newport plant rose from 70 
tons per day to around 1,100 tons per day following the plant’s expansion. The Crosby plant in 
southwestern Louisiana consumed 750 tons of stumps per day, a quantity that required around 
five hundred men working in the field to supply. Using bulldozers, they uprooted the stumps, 
then chopped them into pieces and transported them an average distance o f thirty-five miles on 
trucks to the plant.
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were the most profitable to process. Like the virgin longleaf pine stands themselves, the number 
of stumps was finite.
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*TaIl oil figure for 1950-1956 not available.
Naval Stores Statistics. 1900-1954 (Washington, DC: United States Department of Agriculture, 
1956), 8: Naval Stores: A Summary of Annual and Monthly Statistics. 1955-74 (Washington. 
DC: United States Department o f Agriculture, 1977), 5.
Wood naval stores plants went to great lengths to secure adequate stump supplies. They 
purchased them from landowners who granted the companies a certain amount of time in which 
to remove them. In 1942, for example, Phoenix Naval Stores Company purchased from the 
Dantzler Lumber Company o f  Mississippi all its old dead lightwood pines, all surface and 
turpentine pine lighter wood, and all lighter stumps on the company’s property in George 
County. They had four years to complete the removal. The sale of stumps provided landowners 
with extra income and cleared their cutover property for pasture, agricultural use, or
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reforestation. Some companies not only gathered up as many stump purchase agreements as they 
could, they also purchased the property on which the stumps and wood lay. In late 1946, the 
Crosby plant owned about 100,000 acres o f land and had contracts for stumps on another
400,000 acres in the vicinity of DeRidder. The supply was estimated to last the company 
between twenty and forty years.104
Beginning in the late 1940s and continuing through the 1950s, the wood naval stores 
industry suffered not only from a decline in available stumpage but, most importantly, because of 
new, more efficient production techniques developed by the pulpwood industry. At the South’s 
increasing number o f pulpwood plants, trunks were debarked, chipped, and cooked in a weak 
sulfuric acid solution to extract the wood’s cellulose for paper. During the process, turpentine 
spirits were released and, once condensed, formed sulfate turpentine. While the spirits vaporized 
from the cooked solution, rosin was emitted in the form of tall oil, a frothy substance that 
materialized on the top of the mixture and could be skimmed off after cooking. During the early 
years o f the pulpwood industry, no process existed to refine the tall oil into its usable component 
parts and it had to be discarded or burned as fuel. But in the late 1940s, the Arizona Chemical 
Company, after a decade of research, developed a fractional distillation process whereby tall oil 
could be separated into fatty acids, rosin, and pitch. With this discovery, the sulfate naval stores 
industry, a division o f the chemical/pulpwood industry, quickly moved to conquer production. 
Sulfate naval stores could be made more cheaply than comparable gum or wood products. By 
1955, sulfate turpentine production exceeded that of gum turpentine and over the next thirteen
104 Croft, “Twin Success Story,” 8; Price, “Naval Stores in Southwest Louisiana, ”10-11; 
“Naval Stores History We Never Knew ’Til Now,” 4; Sale o f pine stumps to Phoenix Lumber 
Company, 14 January 1942, Dantzler Lumber Company Papers; “Newport Division Welcomes 
You,” Pensacola. Florida News-Joumal File, Pensacola Historical Resources Center, Pensacola, 
FL; Eldredge, The 4 Forests. 21.
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years, almost completely replaced all other methods.105 Although many wood naval stores 
companies went out o f business, a few innovative producers, such as Newport Company, began 
construction o f tall oil processing plants. In the late 1940s, Newport built a facility at Bay 
Minette, Alabama and later enlarged its capacity ten times. In the early 1960s, it erected another 
such plant in Oakdale, Louisiana.
By the early 1950s, many larger producers and businesses that supported the gum naval 
stores industry phased out production and turned to other activities. Foreseeing the industry’s 
continued decline, producers like the Maguire family began selling their St. Johns County, 
Florida, timber for pulpwood in the early 1940s and started a timber land management company 
that remains in operation today. The Langdales continued to prosper by consolidating their naval 
stores operation and simultaneously branching out into a wide range of businesses. In the mid- 
1940s, the Langdale turpentine operation consisted of eighteen to twenty separate partnerships, 
but, in 1947, the judge consolidated these different enterprises into the Langdale Company with 
he and his sons as equal shareholders.106 They then began buying out the partnerships. At the 
same time, they built a central distillery and a wood-treating operation. Through the 1960s, the 
Langdales remained a powerful force in Georgia and what little remained of the gum naval stores 
industry. The judge continued as the AT-FA president until 1966. While a Georgia state 
congressman from 1949 to 1951, his son John sponsored an unsuccessful bill on behalf of the 
AT-FA to change Georgia from the Peach State to the Turpentine State.107 Over the next few
105 Davis, Encyclopedia o f American Forest and Conservation History. 477-478; Koch, 
Utilization o f the Southern Pines. 1477; Snow, “Research on the Improvement o f  Turpentine 
Practices,” 380; Carswell, ‘“Naval Stores’ Industry Came to Northwest Florida in 1883;” Blount, 
Spirits o f Turpentine. 30; Naval Stores Statistics. 1900-1954. 3; Croft, “Twin Success Story,” 9.
106 The judge had built his empire by joining with a partner who actually saw to the day- 
to-day operation of the enterprise.
107 At that time South Carolina was the country’s largest peach producer and Georgia the 
largest gum naval stores producer. In March 1998 the Georgia House of Representatives passed 
a resolution eulogizing John W. Langdale following his death earlier that year.
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decades, as the gum naval store industry continued to decline, the Langdales shifted their 
financial resources into other lines of business. When the Judge died in April 1972 at the age of 
eighty-four, another son, Harley Jr., became the head of Langdale Company while yet another, 
son Billy, took on responsibility for organizing timber for the Langdale mills. Harley Jr. served 
as chairman o f  the Valdosta Savings and Loan and as the chairman of the board of Georgia’s 
state university system. In the mid-1970s, Langdale Company sold its gum turpentine processing 
plant, which had operated continuously since 1945, to a Guatemalan concern. By the 1980s, 
their businesses in and around Valdosta included a sawmill, a building supply company, a 
Sheraton Hotel, a Ford car dealership, a tire company, a fuel company, and an insurance 
company. Outside o f the Valdosta area, they owned a fence post processing plant in Homerville, 
Georgia, a pole pealing operation and pole yards in both Chauncy and Blackston, Georgia, and a 
wood processing plant in Sweetwater, Tennessee.108
Companies supplying turpentine equipment also had to reorient their focus or go out of 
business. The Lerio Corporation o f Valdosta, for example, began as a manufacturer of metal 
turpentine cups. Founded by the family patriarch who had been in the naval stores industry since 
the turn of the century, the company produced its last cups in the early 1960s. The business 
continued, however, because a decade earlier the Lerios had the foresight to diversify and began 
manufacturing ice cans, draft beer pumps, garden hoses, and oil breather caps. By the late 1970s, 
their largest-selling product was metal containers used by nurseries for growing plants. Not all 
companies made such a successful transition. Consolidated Naval Stores Company, the 
vertically-integrated gum industry giant, kept its factorage business during the Depression, but
l0> John Langdale, interview, 1,7,10-11,15,21-22; Mary Beth Arceneuax, “Captains of 
the Naval Stores Industry,” Naval Stores Review 90 (September-October 1980): 9; Georgia 
House of Representatives, Resolution Honoring John W. Langdale, 6 March 1998, SR 723; 
“Langdale Company Sells Gum Process Machinery.”
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closed its subsidiaries. With the increasing popularity o f central distilleries, it acquired a twenty- 
five percent interest in Filtered Rosin Producers, which operated five plants in south Georgia and 
north Florida. Unsatisfied with the arrangement, Consolidated divested itself within only a few 
years. By 1948, only forty operators used their factorage services. With such little demand for 
its services, Consolidated closed its factorage business at the end of 1949.
A very few gum turpentine producers continued after the 1960s. Not only did operators 
face the challenge of low prices and high production costs, but the end of government support.
In 1967, the government began liquidating its stock pile o f gum naval stores held as part o f the 
NSCP and, in 1972, it shut down the program. One year later the Olustee Experiment Station 
ended naval stores studies and began agricultural research. Remaining producers faced the 
difficulty of finding a still to process the gum. As the central distillation plants closed, operators 
were forced to truck their gum further and further away. In 1961, twenty central distilleries 
operated, but fifteen years later, only seven plants remained. By the late 1970s, just two gum 
distilleries operated in the Valdosta area. Today only one facility, built in Baxley, Georgia in 
1949, continues to serve the very small number of remaining gum naval stores producers. Most 
naval stores are supplied by pulpwood plants using the sulfate method.109
The demise o f the gum naval stores industry in the post-World War II South ultimately 
represents the defeat o f a poorly-capitalized, technologically-primitive, and labor-intensive 
business by a well-funded, sophisticated, and highly-mechanized one. Retaining the basic 
characteristics it possessed as far back as the colonial era, the gum naval stores industry, despite 
significant government support, found itself unable to compete in the South’s mid-twentieth-
109 Karen Harvey, “Maguire Bom Into Turpentine Family: Industry Once Had Major 
Impact on County,” The Compass. 26 April 1990,9; Hawk, “Turpentine: An Ancient 
Technology,” 12; “Quality Product, Good Service Key Lerio Success,” Valdosta Daily Times. 
26 June 1977; Robert S. Blount, “Spirits in the Pines” (M.A. thesis, Florida State University, 
1992), 100; Butler, Treasures of the Longleaf Pines. 166; Davis, Encyclopedia o f American 
Forest and Conservation History. 477.
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century business environment. Change began slowly with the gradual rise of wood naval stores 
plants in the early 1900s and rapidly accelerated during the 1940s as changing labor conditions 
denied the industry an adequate supply o f cheap workers. Gum naval stores producers could 
therefore not successfully compete with their rival, which offered far more attractive employment 
and produced a superior product at a lower price. With its failure to modernize, the gum segment 
o f the naval stores industry fell victim to an advancing economy.
During the 1930s and 1940s, the labor conditions of naval stores workers remained 
remarkably unchanged from what they were many decades earlier. Although new gum- 
harvesting technology required workers to adopt new techniques, the routine and labor 
conditions changed little. Producers persisted in their reliance on cheap, black labor and debt 
peonage and woodsriders continued to monitor workers closely and employed violence to 
maintain control. Moreover, workers lives remained centered on isolated camps where education 
was scarce. Hard work, low pay, and poor living conditions offered little to encourage workers’ 
retention once greater employment opportunity rose in the World War Q and postwar South. As 
employment related to the war effort attracted black men, naval stores producers found little 
means o f encouraging or even forcing them to stay. The economic development and associated 
transportation and communication improvements that continued to sweep the South after the war 
further widened worker options and greatly eroded operator control of turpentine camps. As the 
pool of cheap and reliable black labor vanished, the wood naval stores industry grew at the 
expense o f its gum counterpart. Just as wood naval stores production made impressive gains, 
however, a newer, even more efficient method rose to take its place. Most gum naval stores 
producers diversified into other businesses leaving only a few very small operators who 
employed family labor. The American gum naval stores industry rapidly disintegrated into a 
minor business. Today large industrial plants supply the demand for naval stores.
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Conclusion
This study, in its effort to determine what southern development looks like through the 
lens o f naval stores production, first establishes the industry’s colonial and antebellum 
characteristics as a baseline by which to compare developments after the Civil War. In the late- 
eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries, naval stores languished as a  marginally-profitable 
business with which no state, save North Carolina, would bother, North Carolina lacked any 
other staple it could produce profitably. Planters grew tobacco in the colony’s fertile 
southeastern river bottom land, and rice in the coastal region near Wilmington, but most areas 
had to rely on their pine forests for income. North Carolinians were able to produce some 
lumber from their pine forests, but scarcity of water power for sawmills and the difficulty and 
high cost o f transporting the heavy product made tar and pitch more profitable. Thus, North 
Carolina achieved its distinction as the Tar Heel State because it had to settle for the manufacture 
of a commodity that no one else wanted.
By the 1830s, however, new uses for turpentine as a solvent in the growing rubber 
industry, as an principal ingredient in the most widely-used lamp oil o f  the day, and as an 
essential element in the manufacture o f  paints and varnishes resulted in increased demand for 
turpentine, even greater than that for tar, and brought prices high enough to make gum and spirit 
production an appealing alternative to cotton cultivation. The same types of producers who 
dominated colonial production remained in the business. Poor whites, who lived in relative 
isolation and primarily practiced subsistence agriculture in the pine barrens, either harvested 
small quantities of gum, which they sold for finished goods or food, or labored on an irregular
660
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basis for larger producers. Yeoman farmers worked on a somewhat more regular schedule to 
produce larger amounts o f turpentine for the market, sometimes with the help o f several slaves. 
Another type o f  producer, however, entered production in the 1830s. With access to capital 
resources and the control of large, slave labor forces, new entrepreneurs each invested in 
thousands, even tens o f thousands o f acres of previously undesirable pine land, constructed their 
own distilleries, and began production on a grand scale. At the same time, a transportation 
revolution in North Carolina—improvements in river navigation and construction of plank roads 
and then railroads—facilitated the industry’s expansion into areas earlier too remote to permit 
profitable manufacture. Unlike the piney woods whites most of these large producers did not 
reside in isolated areas, but near small population centers or at least major transportation routes. 
Their lives more closely resembled those of large agricultural plantation owners than small naval 
stores producers.
Slaves performed the vast majority of work at these large turpentine operations. The 
various procedures involved in harvesting gum, the size and location o f  the pine forests, and the 
ways that these three factors affected slave management practices created distinct work patterns 
and manners o f life for slaves in the naval stores industry. Environmental factors also played an 
important role in shaping their lives. Given the size o f the pine forests and the methods of 
harvesting resin, producers could not permit workers to labor in groups. Instead, slaves were 
forced to spread out widely through the forest, where they worked alone and their tasks were 
closely monitored by overseers who patrolled the forest on horseback. The migratory nature of 
the industry discouraged producers from constructing substantial cabins to house their workers. 
Instead, laborers could take refuge only in crude lean-tos that could be easily dismantled, moved, 
and reconstructed. The natural setting o f the turpentine orchards also contributed to poor 
conditions. Most owners found it unfeasible to raise food at the camp sites. Instead, producers 
hauled provisions into the forests and tended to keep rations at a subsistence level. Unlike many
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plantation slaves, turpentine laborers lacked the opportunity to supplement their diets with food 
raided from local smokehouses, chicken coops, and cornfields or gathered from their own garden 
plots. Analysis of turpentine slaves’ experiences finds that they lived lives similar to those of 
bondsmen involved in other areas o f manufacturing in that they tended to labor for absentee 
producers, were worked excessively hard by overseers, and received food, clothing, and shelter 
of an inferior quality to agricultural slaves.
Slave laborers were not the only victims o f exploitation by the burgeoning naval stores 
industry. By the 1850s, destructive gum-harvesting methods led to severe depletion o f the North 
Carolina longleaf pine forests, causing the industry to begin a southward migration in search of 
fresh stands. The practice of cutting quart-size gum collection cavities, or boxes, in the trees’ 
bases seriously weakened their stability and left them vulnerable to decay and disease. The 
process of weekly chipping an inch-thick streak o f bark and wood from the trunk to maintain 
gum flow interfered with the movement of nutrients from the trees’ roots to the top of their 
trunks. Fire, usually deliberately set to clear away underbrush and debris, often scorched the 
flammable scarred trunks and boxes, especially in worked out and abandoned stands where 
hardened gum coated the old wounds and flammable debris carpeted the trees’ bases. The 
weakened pines were left susceptible to insects which invaded the trees’ bark and sapwood, 
nibbling at the live wood until too little was left to support its life. As North Carolina’s mature 
longleaf pines yielded to windfall, rotting, fire, and insects, stands failed to regenerate. A 
relatively slow-growing but fire-tolerant species, the longleaf pine required frequent, Iow- 
intensity blazes to prevent other trees from overtaking them in the early years. The cessation of 
regular burning in used-up tracts allowed other tree species to shade out the longleaf seedlings. 
Those which managed to begin vibrant growth were usually consumed by wild hogs who found
i.
the pines’ starchy taproots especially tasty. As their longleafs disappeared, many North 
Carolinians abandoned the turpentine industry for agricultural production, which new fertilizers
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made possible in the eastern counties’ sandy and infertile land. Other producers, determined to 
continue in the business, purchased fresh pine tracts in South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, and 
Alabama, and moved their operations, including their slaves, to the new locations, persisting in 
the same destructive harvesting practices that had forced them from North Carolina.
The antebellum naval stores industry’s trends—large-scale production, primitive 
harvesting methods that led to environmental degradation, and reliance on forced labor- 
continued after the Civil War. The war devastated the turpentine market, interrupted the 
industry’s southward movement out of North Carolina, and freed the slaves on whose labor 
production had relied. But the business recovered rapidly. The New South’s railroad building 
boom provided access to more and more previously-isolated longleaf pine tracts, just as had the 
antebellum transportation improvements in North Carolina. The old harvesting process, which 
dated back to colonial times, persisted and, consequently, destruction of the turpentined timber 
stands continued as well. The unchanged practices and their effect on the forest perpetuated the 
industry’s transient nature, ultimately forcing almost all turpentining out o f  North Carolina. 
Throughout the industry’s postbellum migration, North Carolinians and their descendants 
continued to dominate production. By the beginning o f the twentieth century, these Tar Heels 
were firmly established in south Georgia and north Florida where they pioneered a middle-class 
business community in the thinly-settled pine forest into which they introduced a more market- 
oriented economy. Some turpentiners and their children not only established naval stores 
operations, but also began sawmills, custom distilleries, general merchandising businesses, and 
banks in the small towns whose numbers remained few but began to dot the piney woods South 
in the late nineteenth century.
Along with the southward migration and domination by an entrepreneurial group, 
reliance on various forms o f unfree black labor represented further continuation o f the industry’s 
antebellum characteristics. Producers moving into the more southerly areas o f the pine barrens
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faced two interrelated challenges: first, securing an adequate number of workers and, second, 
maintaining a reliable labor force at tasks well-known to be more physically exhausting and less 
well-paid than agriculture. Because little antebellum plantation agriculture existed in the piney 
woods, the area contained only a small native black population. Its white population, also 
relatively sparse, viewed turpentining as “black” work and refused to have anything to do with 
the difficult and low-paying occupation. Turpentine operators who left die Carolinas and formed 
the backbone o f the industry in Georgia, Florida, Mississippi, and Alabama attempted to remedy 
the scarcity o f available labor by bringing their workers with them. Indeed, through the end o f 
the nineteenth century, the typical turpentine laborer in Georgia remained an African-American 
native of North Carolina. The influx of turpentiners and their workers into the pine region grew 
so great that they dramatically altered the area’s demographics. In the Georgia counties most 
active in naval stores production, the black population grew at a rate that surpassed both the 
increases in the state’s white population and the overall rise in the black population, resulting in 
the more than doubling o f African-Americans as a percentage o f the turpentine region’s 
residents.
As before the war, producers relied on forced labor and employed various tactics to 
ensure that workers remained in the business. Convicts leased to turpentiners, especially in the 
state of Florida, provided cheap and reliable labor. But as part o f the overall naval stores work 
force, however, their number was small, between 1880 and 1910 only seven to eight percent.
The great majority of turpentine workers lived in a state somewhere between freedom and forced 
labor. Whereas some workers were free to sell their labor on the market, enticement, emigrant 
agent, and vagrancy legislation limited their movement, casting them into a gray area of semifTee 
labor. Others languished in debt peonage whereby they were coerced to work to repay what they 
owed their employer. The naval stores industry’s dependence on various degrees of unfree labor 
reinforces recent scholarship that argues that forced labor proved compatible with southern
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industrial development. It offered the turpentiners the ability to pay low wages in a tight labor 
market and still enjoy a relatively reliable labor supply. The intensive work routine involved in 
naval stores manufacture and the laborers’ daily existence in the isolated pine forest camps also 
persisted.
The industry’s characteristic elements survived largely unchanged through even 
Progressive Era reform efforts. Around the turn o f the century, as southern states strengthened 
peonage legislation with false pretense laws and expanded vagrancy statutes and employers 
began drawing whites—particularly recently-arrived immigrants—into the system, the Department 
of Justice investigated and tried employers for violation of the Thirteenth Amendment. The 
national press coverage o f  the cases focused public attention on the use of forced labor and 
spurred public outcry. But despite intense national interest and peonage’s apparent wide-spread 
use, only a relatively small number of producers were ever tried and fewer still convicted. With 
the same zeal but more successful results, reformers also attacked convict leasing. Not as widely 
practiced as peonage, convict leasing proved less capable of withstanding opposition pressure. 
The combination of public attack, the growing expense of leasing, and the demand for chain gang 
work on state projects, finally brought convict leasing to an end. Peonage, however, survived. 
Although the fear of prosecution drove the practice out of full public view, it continued beyond 
the 1930s.
Despite the attacks on the naval stores industry’s labor practices during the first decades 
of the twentieth century, relatively little changed in the lives of workers. The labor force 
remained predominately black and was supervised by white overseers. Camps remained rough 
and isolated places where workers lived in clusters of small shanties. For convicts, conditions 
did grow more tolerable with small physical improvements to camp buildings, a  limited increase 
in diet quality and variation, and the institution o f  a better record system of convict treatment.
But brutality and abuses continued until convict leasing’s demise.
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Although the Progressive efforts failed to alter significantly the lives o f turpentine 
workers, they did bring successful efforts to adopt less destructive harvesting methods than had 
been employed since the naval stores industry began in the American colonies two centuries 
earlier. Researchers pioneered two new practices, shallow scarring of the tree trunk to make gum 
run and the attachment o f a clay cup to collect it, methods that not only produced a higher-grade 
gum than the older practices of deep chipping and boxing but also caused less harm to the tree. 
The industry’s efforts to alter production methods resulted from the coinciding o f two significant 
events, the near total loss of the southern pine forest and the emergence o f scientific forestry in 
the United States. The success of these new techniques fostered a more receptive environment 
for forestry among many producers, which allowed for further refinement o f improved methods 
and ultimately greater involvement o f forestry in the South. In this more cooperative atmosphere 
the federal Bureau of Forestry and the Bureau of Chemistry were able to pioneer other 
improvements that aided the industry. But despite all these advancements, the basic system of 
production persisted. In fact, the innovations were intentionally designed to alter techniques as 
little as possible to minimize labor complications. Even so, although many operators, especially 
large turpentiners, embraced the new methods to save the industry, not everyone was converted. 
Many producers continued to view forestry as a meddlesome and intrusive movement and 
persisted in production practices little changed from the eighteenth century.
Unlike destructive production methods, turpentiners faced business challenges during the 
Progressive Era that federal efforts did not address. Despite a stabilization o f timber resources, 
due largely to forestry efforts, pine acreage remained relatively scarce and expensive, especially 
after lumber companies, fearful of a timber depletion, began buying up remaining stands. Other 
production costs, particularly labor, rose during this period, the greatest jump occurring during 
the First World War as African-Americans began migrating to northern cities. Both higher 
timber and labor costs strained turpentine producers’ ability to operate profitably. Competition
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from two new rivals, the wood naval stores industry and foreign gum naval stores production, 
posed another serious threat to operators. Wood naval stores production involved the highly- 
mechanized and technical process of extracting turpentine and rosin from ground pine stumps, 
and was thus very different from the gum naval stores industry. Wood naval stores 
manufacturing enjoyed an advantage over gum naval stores production in its ability to provide 
superior products possessing specific qualities for individual consumers’ needs. Foreign gum 
naval stores producers, especially the French, grew capable o f supplying European consumers 
with quality gum turpentine and rosin thus cutting into the U.S. naval stores export market
The persistence o f these challenges, combined with the economic and social changes that 
affected the South in the 1930s and 40s, finally brought the gum naval stores industry to virtual 
collapse and the wood naval stores industry took its place. However the transition occurred only 
after considerable efforts by producers and the federal government to save the dying industry. 
With the creation of the American Turpentine-Farmers Association in 1936, operators demanded 
federal assistance, especially after successfully arguing that they were in fact agriculturists, and 
began receiving the benefits o f  New Deal crop support payments. But despite price subsidies 
and increased government research, producers were unable to operate without cheap labor and as 
the supply declined, so did gum naval stores production. Although their new status as farmers 
provided operators with a temporary reprieve from minimum wage and social security 
legislation, New Deal work programs and especially the influx o f young black men into the 
military during the Second World War drained available labor. Moreover, though peonage 
survived into the 1940s, improvements in transportation and communication made naval stores 
camps far less isolated than in earlier periods and significantly reduced the control exercised by 
producers over their workers. The wood naval stores industry, which did not rely on intensive 
labor but rather heavy mechanization and a small number o f well-trained technicians, made gains 
at the expense of the gum industry. By 194S, wood naval stores production exceeded that of gum
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and, ten years later, outpaced it by two and a half times, only to be replaced itself by the 
manufacture of naval stores at pulpwood plants during the 1960s. Thus, naval stores production 
did not fully industrialize until the Second World War.
Analysis o f naval stores production, one o f the most representative o f southern 
industries, provides a different picture o f  southern economic development than scholars, who 
concentrate on cotton cultivation and textile manufacturing, typically offer. It reveals that 
antebellum southerners possessed an intense interest in manufacturing and, although they 
admittedly poured the majority o f their resources into agricultural pursuits, they did indeed invest 
in such enterprises as turpentine operations, especially in areas which failed to support plantation 
agriculture. Turpentine production, typical of antebellum southern industry, was closely linked 
to agricultural production, operated in rural areas, required relatively little initial capital 
investment, and employed forced labor in the form o f slavery. Further examination of naval 
stores manufacturing in the postbellum era reveals that these characteristics persisted well after 
the Civil War and thus demonstrates a considerable degree o f  continuity between the Old South 
and the New. The postbellum turpentine industry continued to rely on primitive production 
techniques, which in many ways resembled agricultural methods and work cycles, operated in 
isolated rural areas, and continued to employ forced labor in the forms of convict leasing and 
debt peonage. With minor changes, these characteristics carried on into the twentieth century 
and only ended when the New Deal and the Second World War created an environment in which 
gum turpentine production could no longer profitably operate. Thus, the naval stores industry 
shows that a significant portion of post-Civil War southern development represented a 
continuation of antebellum patterns and suggests that the Old South was not so old nor the New 
South quite so new.
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Joseph B. Hosmer, Economic Aspects o f the Naval Stores Industry (Atlanta: Georgia School o f 
Technology, 1948), 11.
Estimated Production Cost Per Crop by State 
1936-1941
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Donald Fraser Martin, “An Historical and Analytical Approach to the American Gum Naval 
Stores Industry” (Ph.D. diss., University o f North Carolina, 1942), 346.
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Percent o f Still Output o f Gum Turpentine by State
1930-1950
I Other States 
I LA and TX 
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Naval Stores Statistics. 1900-1945. Statistical Bulletin No. 181 (Washington, DC: United States 
Department of Agriculture, 1956), 24.
Exports of Gam Turpentine by Country 
1930-1939
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Denmark, and Italy
Joseph B. Hosmer, Economic Aspects o f the Naval Stores Industry (Atlanta: Georgia School of 
Technology, 1948), 31.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
717
Exports of Gum Rosin by Country
1930-1939
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* “Other Countries’* includes Sweden, China, Belgium, Cuba, Australia, New Zealand, Norway, 
Finland, Denmark, British India, Poland-Danzig, and France.
Joseph B. Hosmer, Economic Aspects o f the Naval Stores Industry (Atlanta: Georgia School of 
Technology, 1948), 32.
Unit Value of Turpentine Exported from the United States
1931-1944
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Unit Value o f Rosin Exported from the United States
1931-1944
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Joseph B. Hosmer, Economic Aspects o f  the Naval Stores Industry (Atlanta: Georgia School of 
Technology, 1948), 17.
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* After 1936, chemicals and pharmaceuticals includes turpentine consumed in producers’ plants 
in the production o f  unclassified derived products.
Naval Stores Statistics. 1900-1945. Statistical Bulletin No. 181 (Washington, DC: United States 
Department o f Agriculture, I9S6), 16.
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Turpentine Consumption in the Chemical and Paint Industries
1931-1950
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Naval Stores Statistics. 1900-1945. Statistical Bulletin No. 181 (Washington, DC: United States 
Department o f  Agriculture, 1956), 18-19.
Average Price of Gum Turpentine and Gum Rosin by Month
1955-56 Season
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Naval Stores: A Summary o f Annual and Monthly Statistics. 1955-74 (Washington, DC: United 
States Department o f Agriculture, 1977), 40.
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Appendix B 
Tables
Value o f Naval Stores Produced 
Southeastern United States 
1850-1860
NC SC GA FL AL MS LA TN
1850 $ 2,476,252 S 235,836 $ 55,068 $ 29,671 $ 17,800 $ 19,680 $ 1,750 $ 600
1860 $ 5,311,420 $1,096,974 $236,111 $100,676 $642,114 $ 1,700 $ 20,750 —
United States Department o f  the Interior Abstract o f  the Statistics o f  Manufactures. According to 
the Returns o f the Seventh Census (Washington. DC, 18S0), 116; United States Department o f 
the Interior Manufactures o f  the United States in 1860 (Washington. DC: 186S), 2-14, 57-82, 
168-204, 285-294,420-438, 552-579.
Number of Naval Stores Establishments by State 
Southeastern United States 
1850-1860
NC SC GA FL AL MS LA TN
1850 785 40 14 5 4 5 1 1
1860 1,576 95 13 5 37 1 1 —
United States Department o f  the Interior Abstract o f the Statistics o f  Manufactures. According to 
the Returns o f the Seventh Census (Washington, DC, 1850), 116; United States Department o f  
the Interior Manufactures o f  the United States in 1860 (Washington. DC: 1865), 2-14, 57-82, 
168-204, 285-294, 420-438, 552-579.
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Number o f Hands Employed in Naval Stores Production 
Southeastern United States 
1850-1860
NC SC GA FL AL MS LA TN
1850 2858 220 202 82 33 33 3 3
1860 3775 1422 307 127 614 4 26 0
United States Department o f the Interior Abstract o f  the Statistics o f  Manufactures. According to 
the Returns o f  the Seventh Census (Washington, DC, 1850), 116; United States Department of 
the Interior Manufactures o f the United States in 1860 (Washington. DC: 1865), 2-14, 57-82, 
168-204, 285-294,420-438, 552-579.
Value of Naval Stores Produced 
1870-1900
NC SC GA FL AL MS LA
1870 $2,338,309 $ 774,077 $ 95,970 $ 26,116 $ 280,050 $ 8,550 $ —
1880 $1,758,488 $1,893,206 $1,455,739 $ 295,500 $ 372,050 $ 97,000 $ —
1890 $1,705,833 $1,524,100 $4,242,255 $ 191,859 $ 131,266 $ 282,066 $ —
1900 $1,055,695 $ 787,656 $8,110,486 $6,469,605 $2,033,705 $1,772,435 $115,324
United States Department o f the Interior, Census Office The Statistics o f  the Wealth and Industry 
of the United States. Ninth Census. 1870 (Washington IX : 1872), 627; United States 
Department o f  the Interior, Census Office Report on the Manufactures o f  the United States at the 
Tenth Census (June 1. 18801 ('Washington. DC: 1883), 89-103, 106, 141, 161, 174; United States 
Department o f the Interior. Census Office, Report on the Manufacturing Industries in the United 
States at the Eleventh Census: 1890. Part III (Washington, DC: 1895), 308-309; United States 
Department o f Commerce and Labor, Bureau o f  the Census, Manufactures. 1905. Part III 
(Washington, DC: 1908), 650-652.
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Number o f Hands Employed in Naval Stores ProductioB
1870-1900
NC SC GA FL AL MS LA
1870 959 876 138 18 602 27 —
1880 1,798 4,619 2.743 589 724 53 —
1890 1,747 2,243 9,911 484 285 645 —
1900 400 886 19,199 15,073 3,716 2,288 302
United States Department o f  the Interior, Census Office The Statistics o f  the Wealth and Industry 
o f the United States. Ninth Census. 1870 (Washington DC: 1872), 627; United States 
Department o f  the Interior, Census Office Report on the Manufactures o f the United States at the 
Tenth Census (June 1. 18801 (Washington, DC: 1883), 89-103,106,141,161,174; United States 
Department o f  the Interior. Census Office, Report on the Manufacturing Industries in the United 
States at the Eleventh Census: 1890. Part in  (Washington, DC: 1895), 308-309; United States 
Department o f Commerce and Labor, Bureau o f  the Census, Manufactures. 1905. Part in  
(Washington, DC: 1908), 650-652.
Naval Stores Establishments by State 
1870-1900
NC SC GA FL AL MS LA
1870 147 54 4 2 12 1 0
1880 184 192 84 10 26 It 0
1890 194 201 228 15 7 24 0
1900 174 132 524 366 152 145 10
United States Department o f  the Interior, Census Office The Statistics o f the Wealth and Industry 
o f the United States. Ninth Census. 1870 (Washington DC: 1872), 627; United States 
Department o f the Interior, Census Office Report on the Manufactures o f  the United States at the 
Tenth Census (June 1.18803 (Washington. DC: 1883), 89-103,106, 141,161,174; United States 
Department o f  the Interior. Census Office, Report on the Manufacturing Industries in the United 
States at the Eleventh Census: 1890. Part HI (Washington, DC: 1895), 308-309; United States 
Department o f  Commerce and Labor, Bureau o f  the Census, Manufactures. 1905. Part m  
(Washington, DC: 1908), 650-652.
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Average Weekly Gam Naval Stores Wages Per Wage Earner
1899-1930
1899 $ 3.86
1904 $ 4.83
1909 $ 4.56
1914 $ 4.74
1919 $ 11.63
1920 $ 10.50
1921 $ 6.67
1922 $ 9.00
1923 $ 8.65
1924 $ 8.75
1925 $ 9.93
1926 $ 9.50
1927 $ 8.60
1928 $ 8 J 8
1929 $ 7.20
1930 $ 5.75
Donald Fraser Martin, Jr., “An Historical and Analytical Approach to the Current Problems o f 
the American Gum Naval Stores Industry” (Ph.D. diss., University o f  North Carolina, 1942),
339.
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Total Barrels o f Gam Turpentine and Gum Rosin 
1897-1933
Gum Turpentine Gum Rosin Total
1897 500,000 1,665,000 2,165,000
1898 525.000 1,784,000 2,309,000
1899 535,000 1,782,000 2,317,000
1900 620,000 2,065,000 2,685,000
1901 600.000 2,000,000 2,600,000
1902 581,000 1,935,000 2,516,000
1903 545,000 1,815,000 2,360,000
1904 600.000 2,000,000 2,600,000
1905 590,000 1,964,000 2,554,000
1906 588,000 1,958,000 2,546,000
1907 585,000 1,948,000 2,533,000
1908 750,000 2,498,000 3,248,000
1909 600,000 2,000,000 2,600,000
1910 615.000 2,047,000 2,662,000
1911 660.000 2,198,000 2,858,000
1912 715,000 2,381,000 3,096,000
1913 675,000 2,248,000 2,923,000
1914 560,000 1,865,000 2,425,000
1915 530,000 1,765,000 2,295,000
1916 610,000 2,032,000 2,642,000
1917 520,000 1,731,000 2,251,000
1918 340,000 1,132,000 1,472,000
1919 400,000 1,332,000 1,732,000
1920 525,000 1,748,000 2,273,000
1921 500,000 1,665,000 2,165,000
1922 520,000 1,731,000 2,251,000
1923 565,000 1,881,000 2,446,000
1924 530,000 1,765,000 2,295,000
1925 480,000 1,599,000 2,079,000
1926 510,000 1,700,000 2,210,000
1927 650,000 2,165,000 2,815,000
1928 560,000 1,865,000 2,425,000
1929 625,000 2,081,000 2,706,000
1930 600,000 2,000,000 2,600,000
1931 500,000 1,665,000 2,165,000
1932 390.000 1,300,000 1,690,000
1933 450.000 1,500,000 1,950,000
A. Stuart Campbell, Robert C. Unkrich, and Albert C. Blachard, “The Naval Stores Industry,” 
Studies in Forestry Resources in Florida 1 (May 1934): 39.
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Total Cost Per Unit o f Gam Naval Stores
1919-1930
1919 $ 98.80
1920 $ 93.03
1921 $ 66.60
1922 $ 76.05
1923 $ 73.32
1924 $ 73.15
1925 S 82.39
1926 $ 81.45
1927 $ 74.49
1928 $ 73.01
1929 s 67.75
1930 $ 60.19
Donald Fraser Martin, Jr., “An Historical and Analytical Approach to the Current Problems o f 
the American Gum Naval Stores Industry” (Ph.D. diss., University o f North Carolina, 1942),
340.
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Net Cash Proceeds Per Fifty Gallons o f Spirits ofTurpentine
1907-1930
1907 $ 18.78
1908 $ 20.68
1909 S 30.52
1910 $ 28.20
1911 $ 19.92
1912 $ 17.00
1913 $ 20.54
1914 $ 19.05
1915 $ 19.80
1916 $ 20.20
1917 $ 20.66
1918 $ 26.80
1919 $ 64.14
1920 $ 60.94
1921 $ 28.74
1922 $ 54.28
1923 $ 38.24
1924 $ 38.96
1925 $ 45.33
1926 $ 39.32
1927 $ 24.15
1928 $ 23.37
1929 $ 22.45
1930 $ 18.33
Donald Fraser Martin, Jr., “An Historical and Analytical Approach to the Current Problems o f 
the American Gum Naval Stores Industry” (Ph.D. diss., University o f  North Carolina, 1942), 
338.
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Season Average Prices of Gum Spirits and Gnm Rosin
1900-1930
Gum Rosin Gum Spirits
1900 $ — S 0.359
1901 $ 0.610 S 0.283
1902 $ 0.740 $ 0.414
1903 $ 1.050 $ 0.454
1904 $ 1.300 s 0.465
1905 $ 1.830 $ 0.570
1906 $ 1.960 s 0.556
1907 $ 1.930 s 0.490
1908 $ 1.460 $ 0.331
1909 $ 2.240 $ 0.423
1910 $ 2.610 $ 0.617
1911 $ 2.970 $ 0.481
1912 $ 3.000 $ 0.359
1913 $ 1.960 $ 0.327
1914 $ 1.830 s 0.388
1915 $ 1.760 s 0.370
1916 $ 2.540 $ 0.370
1917 $ 2.580 $ 0.358
1918 $ 4.920 $ 0.508
1919 $ 7.490 $ 1212
1920 $ 6.070 $ 1.393
1921 $ 1.830 $ 0.556
1922 $ 2.260 $ 1.138
1923 $ 2.030 $ 0.892
1924 $ 2.440 s 0.753
1925 $ 4.830 s 0.907
1926 $ 5.300 $ 0.776
1927 $ 3.630 s 0.454
1928 $ 3.600 $ 0.445
1929 $ 3.280 s 0.423
1930 $ 2.180 $ 0.333
Naval Stores Statistics. 1900-1954 (Washington, DC: United States Department o f Agriculture, 
1956), 22-23.
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A u r a l Average Number of Wage Earners 
in the Gnm Naval Stores Industry by State 
1909-1919
FL GA AL LA MS TX SC NC
1909 18,143 12,787 3,519 1,688 2,573 — — —
1919 11,748 7,078 3,014 2,604 2,495 1,018 84 26
Donald Fraser Martin, Jr., “An Historical and Analytical Approach to the Current Problems o f 
the American Gum Naval Stores Industry” (Ph J ) . diss., University o f North Carolina, 1942),
316.
Number o f Naval Stores Establishments with Wage Earners by State
1900,1909,1919
AL FL GA LA MS NC SC TX
1900 152 366 524 10 145 174 132 —
1909 175 493 592 23 64 — — —
1919 174 452 441 33 45 14 22 10
Donald Fraser Martin, Jr., “An Historical and Analytical Approach to the Current Problems o f 
the American Gum Naval Stores Industry” (Ph.D. diss., University o f North Carolina, 1942),
317.
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Net Cash Proceeds Per Fifty Gallons o f Spirits of Turpentine
1920-1939
1920 S 60.94
1921 $ 28.74
1922 $ 54.28
1923 S 38.24
1924 $ 38.96
1925 $ 45.33
1926 $ 39.32
1927 $ 24.51
1928 $ 23.37
1929 $ 22.45
1930 $ 18.33
1931 $ 17.43
1932 $ 17.65
1933 $ 19.67
1934 s 21.59
1936 $ 17.33
1937 $ 14.64
1938 $ 9.38
1939 $ 11.89
Donald Fraser Martin, Jr., “An Historical and Analytical Approach to the Current Problems o f 
the American Gum Naval Stores Industry” (Ph.D. diss., University o f North Carolina, 1942),
338.
Number of Gum Naval Stores Establishments
1921-1939
1921 1,062
1923 1,203
1925 1,007
1927 1,149
1929 1,183
1931 953
1933 843
1935 895
1937 933
1939 755
Joseph B. Hosmer, Economic Aspects o f the Naval Stores Industry (Atlanta: Georgia School o f 
Technology, State Engineering Experiment Station, 1948), 11.
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Average Weekly Gum Naval Stores Wages Per Wage Earner
1924-1940
1924 S 8.75
1925 $ 9.93
1926 $ 9.50
1927 S 8.60
1928 $ 8.38
1929 $ 7.20
1930 $ 5.75
1931 s 4.95
1932 $ 3.75
1933 $ 4.03
1934 $ 4.00
1935 $ 4.60
1936 $ 5.00
1937 $ 5.30
1938 $ 5.00
1939 $ 5.00
1940 $ 5.20
Donald Fraser Martin, Jr., “An Historical and Analytical Approach to the Current Problems of 
the American Gum Naval Stores Industry” (Ph.D. diss., University o f North Carolina, 1942),
339.
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Production o f Turpentine by State in Gallons 
Selected Years from 1931-1944
GA FL AL MS LA NC AND 
SC
TX
1931
12,523,749 7,802,435 1,847,880 636,301 567,534 971,125
*
1934
14,440,650 6,885,000 2,226,150 451,350 247,350 951,150
*
1935
13,772,500 7,070,800 2,281,850 502,250 236,650 882,650 298,350
1936
13,834,050 6,229,250 2,553,850 554,000 112,250 762,600 103,300
1937
14,790,450 6,842,300 2,501,500 798,650 103,250 791,450 33,350
1938
15,289,550 7,443,500 2,236,500 832,600 193,050 719.350 95,100
1939
11,373,450 5,172,550 1,434,850 565,200 153,600 439,400
*
1940
10,910,100 4,328,000 1,172,200 393,500 91,000 302,000
*
1941
9,476,600 3,366,100 884,850 265,450 79,450 180,050
*
1942
11,169,650 3,450,900 1,000,700 226,000 50,800 198,450
*
1943
9,931,850 3,272,250 829,500 176,400 46,000 163,100
*
1944
8,376,900 2,881,200 698,650 160,400 33,350 109,200
*
* Texas figures for 1931, 1934, and 1938-1944 are included in Louisiana figures.
Joseph B. Hosmer, Economic Aspects o f  the Naval Stores Industry (Atlanta: Georgia School o f 
Technology, State Engineering Experiment Station, 1948), 8.
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Production o f Rosin by State in Barreto 
Selected Years from 1931-1944
GA FL AL MS LA NC and SC TX
1907
657,202 993,647 234,358 142,972 70,754 136,426
4,261
1908
673,713 1,081,984 250,269 155,514 109,650 114,258 16.050
1909
506,240 868,000 173,600 108,080 93,520 75,040
*
1914
347,931 733,772 165,099 154,115 150,793 22,294 41,639
1919
234,690 486,432 120,839 115,984 112,900 7.636 60,179
1922
467,349 556,355 133,702 139,159 116,912 23,701 12,360
1923
627,305 660,009 151,641 162,231 145,223 30,231 13,447
1924
655,512 604,260 121,255
---
310,039 29,700
♦
1925
679,915 570,837 102,775
---
192,339 33,000
♦
1927
953,923 711,852 144,381 117,688 93,601 50,368
•
1929
1,002,446 623,188 123,798 81,683 70,580 73,936
♦
* Texas figures for 1931, 1934, and 1938-1944 are included in Louisiana figures.
Joseph B. Hosmer, Economic Aspects o f the Naval Stores Industry (Atlanta: Georgia School o f 
Technology, State Engineering Experiment Station, 1948), 9.
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